Caritas and Ren: a comparative study of Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi in the contexts of their traditions by Griffin, James Joseph
CARITAS AMD REN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THOMAS AQUINAS AND ZHU XI





£ . 1 n o o
DECLARATION
I declare that the work contained here is entirely my own.
"X I. ^(f-
7\ x."5 CTin t\ r»miiiib iKAL i
The thesis is a comparison of Chinese and Western,
Confucian and Christian, ideas and values. Its central
focus is on caritas as the primary Christian virtue, and
ren (benevolence) as the primary Confucian virtue. The
comparison deals eventually with the way in which these
virtues are read by Aquinas and xhu Xi, and situated within
their philosophies as a whole. Aquinas and Zhu Xi are in
read in relation to their traditions, in order to identify
the tensions and presuppositions that are incorporated
in their work. Attention is also given to the problems
of reading Historical texts, and texts from different
cultural traditions, both in terms of the hermeneutic
issues at work in such reading, and the possible significance
that such reading might have for contemporary culture.
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THE CONTEXT OF INQUIRY
You will never know the truth, and you will read the
signs in accordance with your deepest wishes. That is
what we humans have to do. Reality is a cipher with
many solutions, all of them right ones. Iris Murdoch,
The Flight From The Enchanter.
Man wanted everything to be simple, even if
mysterious: one god - in the singular, of course; one
form of natural law; one principle of reason in the
universe, and so on. Astronomy, for example, held
that the totality of existence was made up of stars -
past, present and future - and their debris in the
form of planets. But gradually astronomy had to
concede that a number of cosmic phenomena couldn't be
contained within its scheme of things. Man's hunger
for simplicity paved the way for Ockham's razor, the
principle stating that no entity, no category, can be
multiplied unnecessarily. But the complexity that we
refused to acknowledge finally overcame our
prejudices. Modern physics has turned Ockham's maxim
upside down by positing that everything is possible.
Everything in physics, that is; the complexity of
civilisations is far greater than that of physics.
Stanislaw Lem, The Chain of Chance.
Pax Britannica insured the intellectual triumph of the
belief in universals - universals that could be
circumscribed and tested, theorems that were defined
as laws, realities that became imperatives. Just as
British power and capitalist enterprise came to
pervade the furthest corners of the world, so did the
presumptions about universal truths come to pervade
and define our consciousness, our cosmologies, our
moralities, our scientific efforts.
Imraanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World
Economy
1. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps all cultures tell stories about "others": about
the gods and demons who differ from the humans in power,
the barbarians whose habits are different, the terrors of
seas and deserts, the strange totemic vitalities of plants
and animals. This telling can set the boundaries of safe
experience: the others belong to realms that a culture
chooses not to enter, or knows it cannot enter; they
represent the dark side of the sacred, the scene of
unpredictable energies, the place where the everyday - the
light of mundane meaning and value - is threatened with
extinction. But the telling can be otherwise: the other
that is unknown or partially known can be perceived as
eminently attractive, the locus of values lost or never
before seen, the supreme object of desire engendering
heroic quests and journeys where hidden powers are invoked
as beneficent rather than feared as malign.
These themes, these ways of ordering experience along
a major polarity of belief and value, are perhaps evident
in a particular sense in primal cultures, undergoing a
passage of dissolution towards contemporary residual forms.
But it is their still present creative and heuristic power
that I wish here to note, and subsequently to
negotiate,their force in the minds and texts of those who
would write about others. How, in this writing, is the
force of projection, the mirroring in the other of one's
own deepest apprehensions, to be acknowledged and
circumscribed? For its mark in cultural history is too
well-engraved to be ignored.
We can think, for instance, of Voltaire's elevation of
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Confucius as the type of ideal enlightened rationality,
spokesman for a purely ethical culture [1]; or of
Heidegger's assumption of an original Adamic tongue uniting
and founding the pluralism of languages [2]; or of the
orientalism and primitivism governing the thought of Rodin,
Gauguin and Bataille, as they locate ideal value in the
mysterious East, the Edenic Pacific, the archaic
Palaeolithic [3]. Here the moods of nostalgia, utopianism,
alienation and rejection of the decadent West - drawing at
times on a pessimism that sees history as decline - shape
the work of art as much as they do intellectual inquiry.
How, in their presence, can we judge whether the work makes
its passage to the other, or stays caught within an economy
of the same?
Some ways of handling the difficulties involved in
reading the monuments of other cultures will be considered
later. One argument might be that an adequate style of
inquiry can only be reached after cutting a swathe through
phenomenology, hermeneutics, dialectics, and structuralism,
but I am not prepared to grant to method this primacy to
free us from the circle of identity. O'Flaherty's use of
texts of diverse provenance [4], and Derrida's sense for
the hidden operations at work in any writing, come nearer
to the approach I favour, though certain issues with
Derrida might first alert us to one or two difficulties.
Of Grammatology addresses in part the reception of
Chinese texts within Western discourse, and the
idealisation of Chinese writing that this could involve; it
thus comes close to one concern of this study. But how are
we to assess Derrida's opening claim, his reference to
Western metaphysics as "(the only) metaphysics", a single
tradition stretching "not only from Plato to Hegel (even
including Leibniz) but also, beyond these apparent limits,
from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger" (p.3). Or the
reiteration of a similar point elsewhere:
The entirety of philosophy is conceived on the basis
of its Greek source. As is well-known, this amounts
neither to an occidentalism, nor to a historicism*. It
is simply that the founding concepts of philosophy are
primarily Greek, and it would not be possible to
philosophise, or to speak philosophically, outside
this medium [5].
These assertions of Western uniqueness are neither
self-evidently true, nor supported by the kinds of reading
and documentation that might explicate and validate them in
the terms of their assertion. It might be, on a certain
definition of metaphysics, that Chinese and Indian
philosophical traditions are judged non-metaphysical.
Derrida does define metaphysics in a particular way - or,
more precisely, shows how Western philosophy has been
organised according to particular metaphysical oppositions
since its origins. He also shows the contingency which
gave rise to those oppositions, thus disallowing their
necessity in favour of their historical constructedness.
At the same time he shows the power of such oppositions by
speaking of them as "necessary" (where he means "once
established, then strongly determining"), and by tracing
their operation in a massive range of different texts,
<r
suggesting that it is only within a certain formation of
twentieth century texts that that power is being loosened.
But even here, in the breadth of his demonstration in the
Western arena, he does not limit his argument by the
serious consideration of counter-examples (he follows, for
instance, Plato's exclusion of the Sophists, rather than
attempting to show the power of sophistic wisdom in
contrast with Platonic [6]). And he does not apply his
definition of metaphysics to a reading of the Indian and
Chinese traditions, thus neither allowing them onto the
historical map of philosophy nor apparently appreciating
that the structure of their terrain might lead to a
redrawing of that map altogether. The ground here for
reading and judgment on non-Western metaphysics thus still
lies open for exploration [7].
2. COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
This exploration is part of what I hope to provide in
the work that follows. At stake specifically is an
exercise in comparative philosophy that aims to be as
much an exercise in reading as an occasion of substantive
comparison. By that I mean that I intend to question the
presuppositions of philosophical texts and categories,
their historical sedimentation and the various strategies
whereby they come to be constructed, as much as I intend to
offer a comparison between ideas and institutions of
different cultural provenance. One consequence of this is
that many terms become problematic, and remain so in their
use. For instance, the word "tradition" readily carries
the connotations of singularity, simplicity, the proper, as
of a plant arising out of its own native soil and growing
eventually to a fulfilment of the riches originally
inherent within it. This reading ignores the existence of
a past that is a site of perennial conflict, one
battle-ground coming to be established upon another, change
only arising from struggle and dissension and leading to
nothing which might be called fulfilment. Here, bearing in
mind this ravaged face of history, the word "tradition"
will be opened to a number of different readings: instead
of the singular, it is the multiple, diverse and
contradictory that we will seek to foreground.
Our reflections deal eventually with two medieval
philosophers, two systematic visionaries whose genealogies
are obscured in the bright completion of their work, whose
work is spoken of as a certain completion of history, an
assimilation and organisation of prior diverse strands so
that when they write it seems as if by way of
recapitulation and as such a luminous instance of the one
perennial philosophy (though different for each) [8],It is
now partly to disrupt the normative force their texts have
carried that I pursue this inquiry, betraying no doubt in
the process aspects of my own previous and current
fascination with their visions and intellects, with the
otherness of their worlds that writing strains to capture.
(i) Aquinas and Zhu Xi: Elements in a Reading
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Comment has been made that Aquinas and Zhu Xi are worthy
peers - thus Joseph Needham, remarking that Zhu Xi has been
likened to a number of Western thinkers:
these include Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza,
Leibniz, and Herbert Spencer, and it is a tribute to
Chu Hsi that such suggestions have no absurdity about
them. To my mind St. Thomas and Herbert Spencer are
Chu Hsi's nearest equivalents, the one because he was,
after all, a man of the medieval age, occupied with
the the systematisation rather than the radical
transformation or supersession of beliefs which had a
long history behind them; and the other because he
uncompromisingly affirmed a thoroughly naturalistic
view of the universe. Needham 1956:458 [9]
At play in the equivalence and difference of these two
saints and intellectuals is the play of cultures: different
cosmic visions entailing different anthropologies and
soteriologies, different weightings for epistemology and
metaphysics, different regimes of life; and yet a similar
priority ascribed to the intellect, meditation, writing,
teaching, orthodoxy and its enemies. The study of these
factors is at first sight enriched by a purity of
conditions and substances aspired to in any laboratory:
twelfth and thirteenth century Europe and China in the
absence of any mutual cultural exchange, each with
heterogeneous traditions of philosophy, religion, magic,
science and technology. The force of this heterogeneity on
Aquinas and Zhu Xi will be a central consideration.
But why these two men? Why systematic rather than
edifying or disruptive philosophers [10]? Why yet another
reading of great names and figures, a further consolidation
of a proper uniqueness and heroism? Above all, why again
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the past, the re-inscription in tradition, the re-reading
of the ancients even if to tell them otherwise - in this
age, where the possibility of a break, a rupture, a full
uprooting from the past and insertion into the modern
period is stronger than before [11]? Even if this century
has seen a revived Thomism, a renewed immersion in the
texts of Zhu Xi, can this be viewed as anything other than
anachronism, a refusal to engage the upheaval of current
change, a nostalgic retreat to the safety of idealised
intellectuality? So that further work in this area is
subscription to an escape. In the modern West we have our
own systematic writers - Whitehead, Heidegger, Habermas -
so why not engage here if system is a matter of concern?
And why comparison?
Any grappling with these issues entails some
consideration of the status of history if we are at all to
register the force of the modern moment in its relation to
the past. We can, for instance, recognise two different
styles of reading the past, both of which presume the
validity of engagement in historical study. A teleological
stance, of the sort associated with Enlightenment thinking,
might view historical development as the progressive
emancipation of reason from the enchantment of myth and
irrationality, and might suggest that knowledge of the ways
in which emancipation has been won constitutes an important
guard against the resurgence of atavistic irrationalisms
(this stance is evident, for instance, in Habermas'
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interest in the development and preservation of
communicative rationality as the mainstay of social order
and progress [12]). A genealogical stance, by contrast, in
eschewing any notion of progress, might see the past as a
field of power and repression and wish to understand the
functioning of power today by recognising its previous
formations, aiming to create, through this understanding, a
revulsion against the urbanity of liberal rationality with
its veiled use of power, and a struggle for the brief
moments of emancipation that might be achieved (here we can
think of Foucault's (mis-)reading of Nietzsche, a reading
necessarily distanced from Nietzsche in the wake of
twentieth-century totalitarianism [13]). I choose here
between neither of these readings, but intend to
incorporate the power of both, in line with some of the
best recent readings of the past of philosophy [14], The
status of the modern, or post-modern, moment is something I
will return to in the final chapter. All I would say now,
in endorsing a historical reading as central to the
conception of philosophy that this inquiry wishes to focus,
is that consideration of the past, just as reflection on
different traditions and cultures through the exercise of
comparison, is a way of extending and enhancing the scope
of thinking, thus constituting one vital strand in the
fabric of contemporary reflection [15].
As we read we can consider the attractions of system.
One of these is its promise of security, its promise to
name all that appears within any horizon and to name the
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horizon itself. This attraction can be all the stronger at
certain critical moments, when new Information and ideas
spill over or disrupt the broad structures of
categorisation that have previously been established,
provoking a turn to a style of system-building which can
constitute a form of ad hoc engineering. Such engineering
can be variously seen in Western responses, from the
seventeenth century onwards, to the increasingly
diversifying sense of cultural difference. The rupture at
the heart of Western Christian ontologies provoked by
awareness of India, China and Africa awakened such
different organising responses as Jesuit Figurism [16],
Hegelian and Marxist teleologies of history [17], aspects
of Heidegger's thinking, and the systematic presentations
of phenomenology of religion [18],In each of these
instances the concern with system, masking the element of
power within it by emphasising the desire for knowledge and
order, manifested itself as a concern with a common ground
for all thinking, and commensurability between discourses
[19], The political and intellectual crises in Aquinas'
and Zhu Xi's worlds also provoked their particular
approaches to system, though it might be argued that
"system" is too confining and totalising a word for the
work they produced [20],
This will to knowledge as a will to power, evident in
system, could, for long in certain contexts, be reckoned
the mind's wonder at the multiplicity of being, a
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contemplative drive that sought hierarchy behind diversity,
the return of the knowing soul to the source of
intelligibility. This strength of assurance is there in
Aquinas and Zhu Xi - even a metaphysics of desire for
knowledge is partly shared by them. To read their approach
to systematic inquiry will be one way of deepening the
issue of diversity in our own time, using their time and
their distance as a means of focussing our own
specificities. To do this is not to search for system - to
search for a philosophy of philosophies that would link
East and West in a shared vision - but to explore what
might be at stake in systematic inquiry, and to open a
space for comparative philosophy that rests in questioning
rather than agreement.
It is clear that the past can serve as a buffer against
the present, that one can attempt to live today in London
or Paris with a medieval mind. One position might claim
that the hermeneutic enterprise, the retrieval of older
value systems and their reinscription within a contemporary
economy, is a means whereby an increasingly inter-linked
world bourgeoisie finds its security and retains its power.
When for instance it is claimed that "Chinese history
belongs to the world, not only as- a right and necessity,
but also as a subject of compelling interest" [21], then
the problems of knowledge and power begin to come into
focus. Speaking of the renaissance of non-Western
civilisations (and the study of these civilisations is
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clearly one factor in this renaissance) Immanuel
Wallerstein remarks:
Once having said that these civilisational
renaissances are a principal sociopolitical phenomenon
in the present situation, we are not much enlightened
as to what this implies for the process of 1
transformation. It could theoretically push in
opposite directions. On the one hand, these
renaissances may contribute to the institutional
inventions that would inevitably be a part of the
creation of a socialist world order. Since we need to
rethink all of our basic premisses, what better way
than to dip into the multiple wisdoms to which the
world has given birth? On the other hand,
civilizational renaissances may also provide the outer
clothing for the logic of domination. Since what the
world bourgeoisie needs is to continue the reality of
inequality under new forms of more equal statuses,
what better way than to dress in new exotica, renewing
the world bourgeoisie with fresh elements? [22]
History, then, is a battleground for any contemporary
thinking on problems of order and diversity - not here the
liberal-humanist history that would give us poise and
phronesis from the lessons of the past, but Walter
Benjamin's history where "every document of civilisation is
at the same time a document of barbarism" Benjamin
1973:258. For us the writing of history is a re-inscription
of lost elements that aims to be both genealogy and
evolution, a reading of emergent tendencies that
acknowledges the diverse values contained within them. In
this reading it may be that there is space for a
provisional philosophy of history.
(ii) Aquinas and Zhu Xi: Aspects of Their Work
Zhu Xi and Aquinas were nearly exact contemporaries, Zhu
living from 1130 to 1200, Aquinas from 1224/5 to 1274.
[Already in chronology part of the comparative problem
emerges: both men are situated within the trajectory of
Christian history, absorbed into Christian teleology as the
one historical order. The implications here are not
insignificant.] Each was thought the major systematic
thinker in his immediate tradition, drawing on the work of
previous figures to argue comprehensively - Aquinas in the
Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae, Zhu Xi in the
Jinsi Lu (Reflections on Things at Hand) - the central
themes and logic of Christian and Confucian belief [23],
Aquinas read Aristotle, reaching for a synthesis of
Aristotelian metaphysics with a Christian theology
previously structured and inspired by Platonism and
neo-Platonism. Presenting an apologia for Christianity
before Judaism and Islam, he argued a theology that
subsequently became Church orthodoxy and that remains the
major intellectual force in Catholic thought today. In
this century his writings have been variously advocated,
commented on and reworked by neo-Thomists and
transcendental Thomists (24],
Zhu Xi similarly restated Confucianism. Central to the
development of Song neo-Confucianism, with a critical
stance towards Buddhism, he fought for a supremacy of
Confucianism over Daoist and Buddhist values. His reading
of Confucian traditions, figured in extensive textual
commentary, was soon taken as state orthodoxy and
functioned so until the final civil service examinations in
1905. With the early dissemination of his work in Korea
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and Japan he fomented intellectual revolutions in both
these milieux, and presides still over the texts and
discussions of contemporary Confucian scholars [25].
The commentarial work of Aquinas and Zhu Xi is central
to their philosophy and marks their complex relations with
prior tradition. ["Philosophy" here is a broad term,
indicating simply the intellectual corpus of each man.
Aquinas was a theologian as well as philosopher, and aware
of a difference in disciplines - though the form of the
difference he identifies would now be questioned [26]. Zhu
wrote poetry and history [27], Aquinas delivered homilies
and wrote hymns for liturgical use [28], In all this
nonetheless their activity as philosophers is central,
powerfully shaping other interests and concerns.]
Aquinas commented on the Christian scriptures [29], on
the texts of Aristotle [30], on the Fathers Augustine and
John Chrysostom [31], on the neo-Platonist Denis the
Areopagite [32], on his earlier fellow-scholastic Peter
Lombard [33]. He was a student of Albert the Great, the
most encyclopaedic thinker of the age. Fluent in
scholastic rationality and disputation, he made this potent
across topics as diverse as ethics, sacramental theology,
the nature of the intellect and the existence of angels.
He lacked Albert's interest in science but achieved more as
a philosopher. While interpreting the history of his
traditions he did not have a concept of historical truth,
but rather of the eternal truths of philosophy and religion
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that could be understood partially in history, and fully in
paradise. He saw faith and reason, scripture and
philosophy, as ultimately in harmony, though the harmony
was hierarchical: reason was approximate, a partially
successful search for knowledge, faith and the Christian
revelation were the fulfilment of that search [34],
Zhu was as much a commentator, though his range is less
extensive. If Aquinas would include Aristotle within the
scheme of Christian truth, Zhu sought to exclude Buddhist
and Daoist values from his Confucian vision. He maintained
that Confucianism had been eclipsed for 1500 years, that
the true tradition, daotong, had been lost, that he was its
restorer; in this he is for some the founder of <*•
religion [35], He canonised four Confucian texts - the
Analects (Lunyu), Mencius (Mengzi),■ Great Learning (Daxue),
and Doctrine of the Mean (Zhonqyonq) - writing commentaries
on each [36], He wrote also on the Shijinq (Book of
Poetry), Yijing (Book of Changes),on the poetry of Chu,
Chuci, and on traditional texts on ritual. The leader of a
neo-Confucian revival, he had Shao Yang, Zhang Zai, Zhou
Dunyi, Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao amongst his major
predecessors. He dealt with such crucial earlier
neo-Confucian texts as the the Taijitu shuo (Explanation of
The Diagram of the Great Ultimate) of Zhou Dunyi, and the
Ximing (Western Inscription) of Zhang Zai [37].
Zhu thought his own teacher Li Tong too inclined to
Buddhism; for him the Cheng brothers had best understood
the Confucian dao. The truth of that dao lay in its
origins, and in the eternal heavenly principles, tianli,
that were constititive of the universe and of human nature,
xing, and that were manifest by the sages in action.
Whatever truth was available to individuals lay in
extensive study, and in the progressively intuitive
perception of li^ (principle) that it facilitated. Zhu
presented these themes, and reiterated them constantly, not
in the systematic structures of a Summa but in commentary
and conversation: the vital part of his work is contained
in the Yulei (Classified Conversations) [38]. He also
planned a historical study that could constitute a moral
I*
reading of the past and exemplify Confucian values;
executed by his students, this work bore a central role in
directing later interpretations of Chinese history towards
Confucian evaluation [39],
(iii) A Structural Theme
Can there be an economy of excellence, or does its
ardent pursuit not disrupt any economy: beyond the
pragmatics of basic need the gesture of excess, the work
not completed but perfected, the labour of a brilliance
durable or ephemeral, the pleasure of the moment's
intensity or the longevity of fame and offspring. What
project governs the desire for excellence? And can we view
it more positively than as ineluctable nostalgia and
retrospective vision, the quest for a lost primary
narcissism, displacement of an original self-love through
the movement of differance [40]? And how might we link this
desire with a Buddhist affirmation of sunyata that would
reduce the force of desire; where here do we locate the
powers of intellect and imagination?
Excellence in life and action has been variously
figured: one well-used contrast would be between
subordination to traditional practices accepted for
generations, and the direct unfettered response of one's
deepest inclinations (witholding for the moment here the
problem of "naturalness"). For the Daoist Zhuangzi
unlearned, unplanned action,wuwei, action that is natural
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and spontaneous, ziran, is what is excellent. For
Confucius excellence is manifesting the dispositions of the
sages as these are assimilated through learning, xue, and
ritual, For Plato, within the dynamism of eros towards
the good, come definitions of particular forms of
excellence or virtues, aretai, of excellence in its most
general sense, arete, and a distinction between moral
excellence and the technical excellence, techne, of the
craftsman. The Upanishads indicate various quests for
excellence, perceiving this as transcendence over suffering
and death. For one such as Svetaketu the goal lay in
assurance that the self, atman, was eternal, and that
asceticism, meditation and an enlightened teacher were the
ways to realise this. Confucius again dealt with excellence
in the political sphere, with ways in which the morally
upright person, junzi, might be exemplary in achieving it.
(iv) Excellence in Aquinas and Zhu Xi; Caritas and Ren
Aquinas and Zhu Xi cover excellence in part with
discourse around two primary terms, caritas and ren.
Caritas we know well enough as charity, a dilute term now,
but expressive for Aquinas of the highest perfection
possible, the transformation of life, through human freedom
and divine grace, from imperfection to eternal flourishing
[41]. Ren, usually translated benevolence or humaneness
[42], is for Zhu Xi the counterpart virtue, as central to
Confucianism as caritas to Christianity. Ren is part of
the deepest structure of human nature, xinq, but part also
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of the structure of the cosmos, an innate principle of good
in all things, and a capacity in each to work for the good
of all. Ren is most fully manifest in the life of the
sage, when the emotions, qing, are stilled and action is
balanced, zhong, when the human mind, renxin, is the mind
of the dao, daoxin [43],
These terms have their history, which Aquinas and Zhu Xi
understood in a particular way. Each had a concept of
orthodox transmission: Zhu's daotong is balanced by
Aquinas' understanding of the role of church and papacy.
Zhu, as noted, planned a normative Confucian history, the
Zizhi tonqjian gangmu, and if Aquinas did not produce such
a work he had one before him, Augustine's Civitas Dei. In
part we will be elucidating that history - not subscribing
to the filiation of texts both men acknowledged, nor
affirming the primacy of their scriptures, but seeking
something of the permanently elusive horizon within which
their discourse was set, the intellectual and religious
moment in history that was their world, and the processes
governing its emergence.
On ren we will take first the text of Confucius, and
also the formulation of the two main divergent strands of
Confucianism advanced by Mencius and Xunzi. We will also
look at alternative traditions, alternative figurings of
excellence strongly critical of Confucianism, that were
presented by Mozi, Laozi, Zhuangzi and Buddhist authors.
And we will look at neo-Confucian teachings immediately
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antecedent to Zhu Xi. With caritas we will look at
classical Greek and New Testament writers, since caritas is
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in part the outworking of two notions, philosophical eros
and Christian agape. Cicero and Augustine, monasticism and
troubadour poetry will also figure as we come to consider
Aquinas; we will thus indicate some at least of the
complexity governing these issues.
At first the approach - necessarily, and as a regulative
principle - will be exegetical and hermeneutical in a
standard sense: any passage towards the repressed element
in these texts, to positions unsaid but indicated, can only
hold insofar as it demonstrates the opening in what appears
as a set of well-worked integrated positions. This opening
of the repressed is already clear in some instances:
Aeschylus for instance opens the complex play of forces
instinct in the Greek achievement of rationality, and
tragic drama in particular has been identified as the
privileged emergence of the repressed [44]; Zhuangzi mocks
the claim of any position to be consistent or
incontrovertible, subjecting norms and values to the
dissolution of humour and paradox. At the same time the
posture of irony, of critique, potentially carries its own
exhaustion, or solicits a mis-reading: Zhuangzi's void
leave us shorn of projects and forces for decision, but is
also easily assimilated as a form of naturalism [45],
To pass from critique to project via a critique of
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projects may be finally frustrating, leaving us either in a
desert without direction or in marshland where the ground
sinks constantly underfoot. Certainly the question of
ground, of foundations, is a central one for us, and at
issue in our consideration of this will be any form of
transcendental thinking. Aquinas and Zhu Xi are both
strong foundationalists: the Summa contra Gentiles and the
Summa Theoloqiae start with the question of God and proceed
from there, putting metaphysical first principles first; in
the Jinsi Lu and the Yulei Zhu opens with questions of
taij i (the Great Ultimate), (principle), and tian
(heaven) before passing to questions of morality and social
order. Differently as metaphysics is weighted by each
writer, the common requirement is that the gound of
departure and inquiry be solid [46], For them the ground
and foundation is taken as given, to be known by the mind
through the force either of reason or revelation. For us
the point will be to determine how the ground comes to be
constructed by means of a particular play of categories; in
rejecting the possibility of moving through and beyond
those categories to apprehend the ground directly, we will
be marking our distance from a foundationalist enterprise,
whilst seeking also to understand its power and ways of
operating [47],
Foundationalism and order link readily with
universalism: when strongly adhered to, these constitute
the aspiration to find a single unifying idea, to achieve
an eternalism with a vantage point beyond the world, with a
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view of things steady in their changeless essence [48].
(Even so, with Zhu Xi, when the stress on organic change is
central to his ontology.) While universalism is
particularly focussed in metaphysics, we will also consider
universalism and the question of values. Commentators take
Aquinas and Zhu, as these authors took themselves, to
denote by caritas and ren constant and consistent
dispositions, forms of moral and spiritual perfection the
same for all individuals of whom they might be predicated,
aspects of a moral order transcending background or
context. But what of the functioning of values within
hierarchies of power and knowledge? Specific social groups
- to which Aquinas and Zhu each belonged - control, or can
access control of, the apparatus by which values are
universalised (writing texts, instituting academies,
canonising a culture), and encoded in these values are
strategies maintaining privilege and effecting
subordination. Charity is one thing for the lord and
master who commands, another for the servant whose
existence hangs by the master's "goodwill". In recent
debate Chinese Marxist philosophers question whether ren is
a putative universal value, or one serving and sustaining
(at least implicated in) the life-style and interests of a
feudal aristocratic community [49], Plato and Aristotle,
living in a society which was compromised for Hegel by its
continued maintenance of slave-ownership, present an idea
of arete as universal virtue which obscures consideration
of precisely who in Athens was reckoned eligible for the
attainment of arete.
A final theme. In the moral vi6ws crystallised around
caritas and ren cluster exclusionary positions on women.
The background is clear enough. Commenting on the
subordination of women within Confucian value systems,
Metzger remarks
Given the sexist bias integral to traditional Chinese
culture, many of the apparently universal traditional
concepts about human life implicitly refer only to
males, or perhaps better, to a mode of existence
shared by males and females but attaining its fullest
realisation only in the case of males. That a woman
could become a sage was inconceivable to the typical
Confucian, I believe. Metzger, 1977:237.
And observing how male philosophical traditions have
presented interpretations of "human nature" in general,
Okin comments
"Human nature", we realise, as described and
discovered by philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas,
Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, and many others,
is intended to refer only to male human nature.
Consequently, all the rights and needs that they have
considered humanness to entail have not been
perceived as applicable to the female half of the
human race. Okin,1979:6-7 [50],
In China and the West male philosophers in joint discussion
have specified human nature and its fulfilment; the
functions of male experience work across all topics (with
Plato even the midwife is incorporated as a male power).
If ideally philosophy is the conversation of humanity [51],
to date it has been a conversation between males. But if
philosophy is - has been - the mind's search for truth, an
intellectual transformation of eroticism, then there may be
a sense in which, within a given economy of eros, it is
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inevitably exclusionary (not simply different,
acknowledging the power it deploys): "perhaps metaphysical
desire is essentially virile, even in what is called woman"
(Derrida,1 978:321 ) [52].
3. A CONTEXT FOR COMPARISON
In China the unicorn, jilin, served from an early date
as a symbol of peace and prosperity. It appeared in a
particular locale when the ruler was generous and
righteous. It was a sign of benevolence, ren, a cipher for
paradise and utopia, its presence a mark of the kindliness
and ease at work in human relations. It stands for the
central virtue of Confucianism, though seems not to count
specifically as the instantiating symbol or incarnation of
the sage [53].
In the medieval West, through a complex symbolism of
conflicting and contrasting tropes, the unicorn stands in
predominant fashion for the power of God manifest in
Christ, for the incarnation of divine charity. Tamed by
the gentleness of the virgin, it forms with her the
primordial archetypal balance of male and female [54],
The cultural parallels of symbolic function at work in
this example would open for some onto the issue of a
collective mind, archetypes present in the genes and rising
from biology and instinct to effect a common architecture
of experience, a world similarly human independent of any
discernible transmission of values and ideas. Here the
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parallel rests as a first curiosity.
Of more direct significance are the differences in the
worlds of Aquinas and Zhu Xi.
(i) The Problem of Separate Cultures
To compare Aquinas with al-Ghazali or Maimonides, Zhu Xi
with Dogen or Nichiren - each an important figure and
roughly contemporary with the others - we have a network of
beliefs, values, inaugural inquiries.
Aquinas and Maimonides had a partly common scriptural
heritage; both had with al-Ghazali a shared philosophical
heritage, Platonist and Aristotelian. Intellectual
exchange between medieval Christians, Muslims and Jews was
heightened by extensive trade, and by the Crusades,
bringing a Greek and Arabic Aristotle to the Latin West and
prompting the transformative translations of William of
Moerbeke [55]. Troubadours who travelled on the Crusades
came to know Arabic love poetry, intensifying their own
chansons in the process, and formulating a "religion of
love" around the themes of amour courtois [56], Bernard of
Clairvaux, in commentary on the Song of Songs in
particular, transformed this poetic eros into an ecstatic
Christian mysticism, at the same time providing an
interpretation of scripture that was deeply influential in
the Jewish world [57]. Bernard's ecstasy was curbed by
Aquinas' more sober linking of caritas with ratio.
The cross-hatching of experience for Aquinas, Maimonides
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and al-Ghazali is dense; it is equally so for Zhu Xi, Dogen
and Nichiren. Chinese language, literature and culture in
general were the basis of learning in Japan (as in Korea).
Dogen and Nichiren were raised on the same classics as Zhu
Xi. Soon after Zhu's campaign to strengthen Confucianism
against Buddhism, Dogen was travelling in China (1223-27)
to gain a more profound understanding of Chan Buddhism, so
to consolidate its position in Japan [58]. Different as
their particular religious, philosophical and political
categories were, each of these men drew on a set of
conceptual and imagistic resources familiar to the others.
For Aquinas and Zhu Xi there are no common categories or
resources: they knew no shared body of texts, no shared
language, no jointly accepted canon of rationality, no
joint cultural traditions. Trade and diplomatic contacts
between Europe and China date back to the Han dynasty, to
the opening of the Silk Road. Trade links also continued
throughout the medieval period, either by sea, with the
entrepreneurial assistance of Middle Eastern and Indian
merchants, or overland through the Mongol Empire under the
aegis of the Pax Mongolica [59). These contacts yielded
images that made of Europe and China a place of mystery in
each other's eyes; not until Marco Polo's I_1 Milione do we
find a more extensive, though still fabulous, presentation
of one civilisation to the other. Marco did not set off
from Venice, however, until 1271, seventy years after the
death of Zhu Xi and four years before that of Aquinas, and
his work bears no direct significance for us here. There
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was furthermore no serious or extensive exchange of ideas
between Europe and China until Jespit enterprises in the
late sixteenth century [60], For the period we are dealing
with Europe and China represent discrete entities, each
with its own specific complexities of historical
development [61].
(ii) The Medieval Ecumene: Contextual and Structural
Issues
Separateness of Chinese and European world and vision
notwithstanding, certain links between medieval cultures
nonetheless did provoke significant religious and
intellectual exchange - not only within areas of common
culture but also between different cultural configurations.
Intense devotionalism within Hindu bhakti, for instance,
likely left its mark on Islamic spirituality - on Sufi
mysticism - in turn shaping troubadour perceptions of
ecstatic love [62]. Abelard was famous for his secular love
poetry. Bernard of Clairvaux was in his youth a troubadour;
so also Aquinas' brother. Cistercian philosophy of love -
and its all-male fraternity - was a transformation of a
secular religion of love, a shift in its energies. That
Bernard, and Aelred of Rievaulx, lived in a world shaped at
some remove by Kalidasa is a fertile notion [63].
Equally so the thought that Zhu Xi was provoked by
Nestorian Christian concepts. Small Nestorian communities
flourished in Tang China [64], In Zhu's writings - not as
a central theme - the idea of a personal God recurs, of a
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Lord who might with consciousness direct the course of the
cosmos [65]. Such was never a dominant motif in
Confucianism, though it is suggested in certain early texts
- the Shijing and Shujing - which were part of the
Confucian canon. Perhaps these texts were the source of
Zhu's thinking. Or Nestorian or Muslim ideas. Or Buddhist.
The force of the latter two suggestions is not that they
are correct, but that they could prove so: Song China,
through past and present contact, was part of a far wider
intellectual ecumene than that determined by its
geographical boundary [66].
Points of cultural contact thus urge questions reaching
beyond the immediate contexts of Aquinas and Zhu Xi, and
also broaden onto more general structural aspects of
culture. I do not wish to suggest here any theory of
archetypes, any universalism, but these are issues that
lead us to a first question, a heuristic opening of issues.
We can take two themes: love and knowledge (with
accompanying networks: self-love and altruism; sexuality
and asceticism; flesh and spirit; desire and communion -
or: inspiration and labour; scholarship and intuition;
books and cosmic order; solitude and disputation). In
Hindu spirituality these are canonised as two ways:
bhaktimarga and j nanamarga. These can be judged separate
themes heuristically, with multifaceted links in a network
of interactions.
Medieval European intellectual life was powerfully
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shaped by scholasticism: in its dominant concern with logic
and metaphysics, and its magisterially formalised ways of
dealing with topics, it remains the most comprehensive and
detailed style of philosophy in the Western tradition. In
contrast with the earlier medieval organisation of learning
in monasteries and cathedral schools, scholasticism at its
height was closely associated with the university (or, in
its medieval designation, the studium generale). Aquinas
spent much of his life studying and teaching at the
university of Paris, and for some his work bore too many
echoes of secular intellectualism [67].
In contrast with scholasticism there existed the
emphasis on mystical and religious desire already
encountered with Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153). This
shaped the lives of Francis of Assisi (1181/2-1226) and
Bonaventure (1221-1274) and lay at the heart of the devotio
moderna. But the projects of love envisaged here were not
solely worked out within religious communities. Bernard
preached crusades and linked spirituality with politics.
Bonaventure, in the university forum, spelled out a
mystical theology rivalling Aquinas' in vision and
intentionality.
Similar points occur in the Islamic world, first with a
series of seminal thinkers - Avicenna (ibn Sina, 980-1037),
al-Ghazali (1059-1110) and Averroes (ibn Rushd, 1126-1198)
- jointly forming the high tide of Islamic philosophy. It
was the Aristotelianism of the Arabs that was a strong
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stimulus to Aquinas' Christian Aristotelianism; if the
Stagirite became known as 'the Philosopher', then Averroes'
commentarial work on the Aristotelian corpus won for him
the epithet 'Commentator'. The intellectual work of the
philosophers has its counterpoint in the intense mysticism
of al-Hallaj (857-922) and Rumi (1207-1273) and in the
development of the Sufi brotherhoods, which in many cases
counted philosophers amongst their associates and charged
philosophy with a religious dimension [68],
The major Jewish philosophical work was that of ibn
Gabirol (1021-85?) and Maimonides (1125-1204), who
continued in their writings to use the categories of
neo-Platonisra. Intellectual life was also formed by strong
traditions of scriptural exegesis and Talmudic
interpretation. The counterpart concern with religious and
mystical experience here lies in the increasing importance
attached to the Kabbalah [69].
In India, in the early medieval period, Sarnkara
(788-820) powerfully argued the intellectualist Advaita
Vedanta philosophy, thus setting a stamp on later
philosophical work. This was balanced by the devotional
philosophies of Ramanuja (d.c.1137) and Madhva (1199-1276),
with their stress on bhakti rather than jnana. The
development of Tantric schools carried the stress on direct
religious experience further, with important consequences
for Naropa (1016-1100) and for the Tibetan Buddhists Marpa
(Mar-pa,1012-1096) and Milarepa (Mi-la ras-pa,1040-1123)
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who were influenced by him. Tantrism, whether Hindu or
Buddhist, raised profound questions for any intellectual or
devotional structuring of life.
The issues finally in Song China, where Zhu Xi was at
the centre of a flourishing neo-Confucianism, parallel
European scholasticism in many ways. Here certainly the
formalisation of logic and a philosophy of language - so
much the hallmark of the schools - was not a major concern.
But learning and scholarship were, and the banner of Zhu
Xi's movement carried the Daxue phrase zhizhi gewu
("extension of knowledge through the investigation of
things"). Neo-Confucianism was as much a religious as a
philosophical movement. For Zhu, religion lay particularly
in this conception of learning, in a slowly-accumulative
approach to knowledge which allowed the individual to
acquire the mind of the sages [70].
For other neo-Confucians such as Zhu's philosophical
opponent Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) and also later Wang
Yangming (1472-1529) enlightenment, sagehood, and a morally
complete life were more directly intuitive affairs, not
entailing a burden of learning, but susceptible of direct,
uncultivated expression in daily life. In the contrast
between learning and intuition, practice and spontaneity,
an ancient separation of Chinese value systems and styles
of ethic is made manifest: present in early Confucianism,
it marked also a polar tension in the developed schools of
Chinese Buddhism. In the Song, the intuitive side was
n
still present in Chan Buddhism, and found expression also
in poetry and in certain traditions of painting [71].
Two contrasting and interlinked ways of structuring
experience, then, are evident in a range of cultures and in
the lives of various individuals. For some these ways
existed in acute tension: Naropa and al-Ghazali perceived a
radical divide between the concerns of philosophy and
religion, in the end abandoning the former for a commitment
to religious practices. With Aquinas and Zhu Xi, however,
the issues was different; and while Zhu's early life was
marked by a religious uncertainty and quest that is absent
with Aquinas, their work in general expresses a
deeply-achieved synthesis of philosophy and religion [72].
This achievement ties closely with the ways both men
searched for excellence in their own lives, and with the
ways they perceived excellence in human affairs. With
Aquinas contemplative and meditative disciplines were
central to his.development, and provided a necessary and
indispensable context for a correct understanding of
philosophical issues [73]. Similarly, Zhu held the
practice of jingzuo, a form of sitting meditation
influenced by Buddhist discipline, central to his
philosophical pursuits [74]. In this both men understood
philosophy to be more than the exercise of rationality
alone. They tied intellectual practice to programmes of
moral and religious self-cultivation, and in this perceived
philosophy to be ultimately wisdom and intuitive knowledge
[75]. While elevating the power of rational discussion and
inquiry they took it nonetheless as preliminary to a more
complete form of understanding.
4.CONCLUSION
If we have introduced here some preliminary structural
categories, it is not, as we have acknowledged, in order to
pre-empt any judgment on universalism, or to indicate any
substantive conclusions towards which our inquiry might
tend. The categories - too loosely defined anyway to
constitute more than some preliminary markers or indicators
- are simply heuristic devices that might serve to open an
exploration of cultural diversity. What is of vital
import, given the differences between Chinese and Western
cultural traditions and philosophical systems, is the
unfolding of a narrative within which those differences
might be set against each other and be read both iri their
difference and in the moments of convergence. In this
narrative we will be attempting to move beyond the style of
parallel description which characterises a good deal of
comparative work, using a guiding - and again, initially
loosely defined - theme of excellence as a way of moving
through a variety of philosophical positions.
CHAPTER 2
REN IN ITS PRE-CONFUCIAN CONTEXT
Well into the nineteenth century it (Chinese culture)
was still Neolithic, not rejuvenated, as elsewhere,
but simply interminably complicated in on itself, not
merely continuing on the same lines, but remaining on
the same level, as though unable to lift itself above
the soil where it was formed.
P. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man.
As to the effects of an increased knowledge of Chinese
thought upon the West, it is interesting to notice
that a writer so unlikely to be thought either
ignorant or careless as M. Etienne Gilson can yet, in
the English Preface of his "The Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas", speak of Thomistic Philosophy as
'accepting and gathering the whole human tradition'.
This is how we all think, to us the Western world is
still the World (or the part of the World that
counts); but an impartial observer would perhaps say
that such provincialism is dangerous. And we are not
yet so happy in the West that we can be sure that we
are not suffering from its effects.
I.A. Richards, Mencius on the Mind.
1. INTRODUCTION
To read towards Zhu Xi and Aquinas from the beginnings
of their respective traditions; to recapitulate a fraction
of the forces operative in these time-spans; to grasp the
sense of even a chapter of the Analects, and to deepen that
by a reading of Confucius' world as a particularised play
of repression and enhancement of desire; to detour in and
around the standard readings so as to retrieve aspects of
thought neglected or forgotten - to work in this way is to
activate some of the problems in comparative philosophy I
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spoke of in chapter one.
(i) Confucius and Confucianism
Our first opening will be in the memory of a stance
prior to the Analects, in the world which these sayings
attempt to comprehend, suppress, retain in an old-new
saying, the world of the Shijing singers.
To speak of ren is almost to speak first of Confucius:
the term occurs extensively in his discourse, but its prior
use is so thinly attested we can effectively say that it
was he who coined it as an item of language and a theme of
discussion, or he who re-coined it, stamping his effigy on
the reflux of its brief earlier energies. Ren bears the
burden of Confucius' vision of life, but its force is
various and its possible interpretations and conjunctions
encourage those multiple readings which focus the
differences in Confucian traditions [1].
Confucius inaugurated a style and an epoch in philosophy
that in the eyes of some is now coming to a close [2], In
life and activity he was near contemporary with such others
as the Buddha and Mahavira Jaina, the early Upanishadic
seers, Jeremiah and deutero-Isaiah, Solon, Aeschylus and
Socrates. The simultaneous play of these individuals on the
stage of world history has led to the designation of the
"period" in which they lived as the Axial Period or Axial
Age. Jaspers takes it as the starting point for his
philosophy of history and refers to it as
(the) axis ... situated at the point in history which
gave birth to everything which, since then, man has
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been able to be, the point most everwhelmingly
fruitful in fashioning humanity ... It would seem that
this axis of history is to be found in the period
around 500 BC, in the spiritual process that occurred
between 800 and 200 BC. It is there that we meet with
the most deep cut dividing line in history.
Jaspers,1953:1.
It is also a time that is important for our reading of eros
since this term, as ren, was first used then in any
extended way. But there are difficulties in the concept of
a "period" as employed here, particularly given the low
level of cultural interaction evident during the centuries
concerned. Furthermore, the attempt to derive the
structures for a single philosophy of world history from
the varied philosophical and cultural developments which
occurred then is, as we shall see later, quite mistaken,
even thought it has been useful as an initial device for
thinking about comparative philosophy [3]. Important recent
treatments of Chinese intellectual history, Bauer,1976, and
of early Chinese philosophy, Schwartz,1985, have employed
the notion of the Axial Age in interpreting Confucius'
work, and I will return to the issues involved here below
[4].
2. CONFUCIUS' INHERITANCE: REN IN THE SHIJING.
The first recorded use of ren "/£ , occurs in two Shijing
odes, both dating to the latter part of the -8th century,
nearly two hundred years before Confucius' birth [5]. No
sign of the character exists on any oracle bone dating from
the Shang dynasty (-1766 to -1122), or on any bronze
vessels dating from the Shang or the Western Zhou (-1122 to
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-771). It cannot be found in any parts of the written
classics deriving from the Western Zhou (in any of the
early odes, that is, or in any sections of the Shujinq or
Yijinq that can be ascribed to that period). It has been
suggested that one character on some older bronze vessels
might be an early form for ren, but there is as yet no
means of determining this with any confidence [6], There
may be certain bronze inscriptions belonging to the Spring
and Autumn period (722-481) - thus prior to or contemporary
with Confucius - on which the character does appear, but
they will not be significant for our present discussion.
The only relevant textual materials which can safely be
said to be pre-Confucian are thus the,two Shijinq odes [7].
The odes in question are Shuyutian and Luling.
Shuyutian
Shu is away in the hunting field,
There is no-one living in our streets.
Of course, there are people living in our
streets,
But no-one like Shu,
So handsome (mei), so ren.
Shu has gone after game,
No-one drinks wine in our streets.
Of course, people are drinking wine in our
streets,
But no-one like Shu,
So handsome (mei), so good (hao).
Shu has gone to the wilds,
No-one drives horses in our streets.
Of course, people are driving horses in our
streets,
But no-one like Shu,
So handsome (mei), so brave (wu).




Here come the hounds, ling ling
And their master so handsome (mei) and ren.
The hounds, with double ring,
Their master so handsome (mei) and brave
(quan).
The hounds with, triple hoop,
Their master so handsome (mei) and strong
(si) .
Mao 103; Waley 1960:255
(i) The Context: Change and Transition in Zhou China [81
Ren in the Analects is a term of central moral import;
in the Odes it seems to carry no moral connotations at all.
Instead it specifies one of a number of values constituting
the code and ethos of Zhou aristocratic culture. This
first use of ren exists within a transition from pre-moral
to moral value systems, within a shift in the complexity of
forms of symbolism and structures of social life, a shift
thus in a network of repressions, exclusions and
enhancements. In the Shiiina ren lies on the fringes of a
mythico-religious worldview, society set within a broad
horizon of cosmological order, the chief social functions
exercised by a hereditary scribal-priestly class. In the
Analects it exists at the centre of ethical debate, the
ends of the human community and of individuals within it a
direct matter of concern through public discourse, the
authority of ministerial function now increasingly granted
to persons of proven competence rather than inherited
status [9].
The world of the Shiilna is cosmological in its basic
structures, though the time-span covered by the odes makes
of that world far more of a shifting and dynamic process
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than the notion of cosmological order might suggest.
Central theological features are tian (Heaven) as the
provident source of cosmic vitality and foundation of all
norms, together with the spirits of nature and the
ancestral spirits as powers operative in the processes of
the world:
We bring our offerings
Our bulls and sheep;
May Heaven bless them
Our ritual (1_±) is patterned
On the rules of King Wen.
Daily we bring peace to frontier lands.
See, King Wen blesses us;
He has approved and accepted.
Now let us day and night
Fear Heaven's wrath
And thus be shielded.
Mao 272;Waley,1960:229.
Very hard have we striven
That the rites (li) might be without
mistake.
The skilful recitant conveys the
message,
Goes and gives it to the pious (xiao)
son:
"Fragrant were your pious offerings,
The Spirits enjoyed their drink and
food.
They assign to you a hundred blessings.
According to their hopes, to their
rules,
All was orderly and swift,
All was straight and sure.
For ever they bestow upon you grand store
Myriads and tens of myriads."
Mao,209; Waley,1960:210
The structures of belief indicated here were inherited by
the Shijing poets as part of a long-established pattern of
religion in early China. The centrality of transcendent
forces pervades the scheme of Shang religion, whose world
was as much governed by a sense of the numinous, the
"mysterium tremendum et fascinosum", as ancient Egypt or
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Mesopotamia. Within this domain of the numen the
extraordinarily frequent consultation of the ancestors by
means of oracle-bone divination marks the steps the Shang
took to render the transcendent rational and
manageable [10].Ancestors were consulted in relation to
matters of ill-health, appearances in dreams, the
propitiousness of a hunt, a marriage-alliance, an act of
war. Not reckoned wholly benevolent even to their own
descendants, the anscestors were powerful capricious
figures who could intervene to disrupt human affaris.
relations with them could be rational, however, insofar as
they were (had been) human: their emergence in Lungshanoid
and Shang theology marks a different cosmological order
from that governed by animal powers alone. Within this
part-rationalised, part-humanised order appeasement -
particularly through broadscale practice of human sacrifice
- and control constituted the two hallmarks of Shang
sacrificial relations with the power of the Other,
organised by the king and the royal household in the
interests of their own political authority.
In essence this sacrificial-ancestral cult was retained
by the Zhou - the practice of human sacrifice continued
late into Zhou times - but set within a framework of belief
in tian as provident guardian who called the dynasty into
existence and would preserve it insofar as it was faithful
to the mandate with which it was charged:
The charge (ming) that Heaven gave
Was solemn, was for ever.
And ah, most glorious
King Wen in plenitude of power!
With blessings he has whelmed us;
High favours has King Wen vouchsafed to us
May his descendents hold them fast.
Mao,267; Waley,1960:227.
Zhou is an old people,
But its charge (ming) is new.
The land of Zhou became illustrious
Blessed by God's charge (ming).
Mao,235; Waley,1960:250 [11]
The precise force of the claims concerning the Mandate of
Heaven, tianming, is difficult to determine. For some it
represents the beginning - in the -11th century, in the
speeches attributed to the Duke of Zhou - of a specifically
moral tradition of rulership, emphasising the king's
responsibility to Heaven for the well-being of the people
[12]. For others it represents an example of realpolitik,
the formulation of an ideology encouraging the Shang to
accept their conquest by the Zhou,at the same time
legitimating Zhou hegemony. Truth doubtless lies in both
positions, though the particular force of the latter comes
from Zhou attempts to erase the Shang's memory, in an act
of forced amnesia designed to consolidate Zhou control
[13]. For our purposes here it suffices to noe that tian
was central to the Zhou cult, that it was in feudal
relations administered through the cult that political
order was invested, and that no specifically moral order -
either conceptual or institutional - was developed separate
from the order of the cult. Not that is until the
politico-religious crises of the -8th century, which are
diffracted through some of the odes [14].
A number of these odes indicate a deepening spiritual
malaise and questioning, a failure of belief in tian: tian
no longer cared for his people and did nothing to alleviate
their suffering:
I go out at the northern gate;
Deep is my grief.
I am utterly poverty-stricken and destitute;
Yet no-one heeds my misfortunes.
Well, all is over now.
No doubt it was Heaven's doing,
So what's the good of talking about it?
Mao,40; Waley,1960:305.
That blue one, Heaven,
Takes all our good men.
Mao,131; Waley,1960:311
My father begot me,
My mother fed me,
Led me, bred me,
Brought me up, reared me,
Kept her eye on me, tended me,
At every turn aided me.
Their good deeds I would requite.
It is Heaven, not I, that is bad.
Mao,202; Waley,1960:317
The voices speaking in these odes are reminiscent of those
expressions of suffering in Mesopatamian religion which
culminate in the ethical lament of the Book of Job [15],
Here, in the Zhou context, we find an index to an equally
profound structural change underway in a religiously
founded universe, a change not issuing in a theology of
suffering or in the elevation of suffering as a recurring
central motif, but a change where religion, politics and
ethics eventually came nonetheless - in the work of the
first philosophers - to be more precisely separated as
symbolic orders. Religion as ritualism was no longer
adequate without some moral practice and intentionality.
V
The power of sacrifice, of transcendent agents and their
intermediaries, was no longer sufficient, and perhaps not
even necessay, as a source of social well-being. The
energy of the human agent might itself alone be an
effective force in preserving and vitalising the life of
the community [16].
These condensed themes evoke the sorts of change at work
in the mid-Zhou worldview, and evident also in other
cultures at the time; they point to a widespread dynamic in
the evolution of symbol-systems, though their
"contemporaneity" in the Axial Age is from our point of
view fortuitous.Bellah refers to the emergence at this time
of a strategy of world-rejection that marked the growth of
major religious traditions [17]. Voegelin, in more
extensive elaboration, identifies, in Kirkegaardian manner,
a leap in being that brings into play a radical new stance
in the world, a shift from compact to differentiated
symbolisations of experience, the opening of a world of
"inner" human experience and the emergence of concepts of
autonomy, a loosening of the powers of naturalistic
enchantment, the differentiation of a sense of historical
order from cosmological order [18].
For Israel Jeremiah focussed issues by specifying a
disjunction between ritualism and ethics, stressing
Yahweh's preference for moral integrity, and the same call
echoes in the other Hebraic prophets: the moral individual
is to be an image of the holiness of Yahweh, and the moral
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stance taken is one which moves towards the formation of a
universalist ethic. The Upanishads mark a break with
Brahmanic ritualism, substituting the power of meditation
and asceticism for that of the sacrifice, and claiming that
the essential self, atman, of the individual is the locus
of, identical with, transcendent power, Brahman. And
Socrates marks a shift from the cosmological reflection of
the Ionians, putting the ethical individual and his role in
the state at the centre of philosophical debate. In all
this comes a certain emancipation of the human from
transcendent powers sacrificially appeased, together with
an idealisation of a specific and presumed universally
valid human ideal: the holy one, the philosopher, the
sannyasin, the Buddha, the sage or noble one. We find such
an ideal conceptualised in Confucius' discourse on ren,
with its attendant reference to the ideal person, the
junzi, noble man. The first use of ren in the Odes,
however, indicates a "preliminary" celebration of human
power and achievement, though not yet within an ethical
context.
We will find also that discourse on ren in the Odes
begins the process of an idealisation of maleness that
became profoundly consolidated later, and that is also
attested in other cultures at the time. It thus seems
that, as part of the phenomenon of the emergence of
philosophy, of world-rejecting religions, of the
theorisation of transcendence and the quest for an inner
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ideal self, and the organisation of that quest both in
terms of the visionary rhetoric whereby it was articulated
and the institutional forms whereby it was lived, the
systematic exclusion and suppression of "the feminine", in
theory and in practice, was set in motion. The delineating
features for this, if not the foundational motives behind
it, are precisely discernible.
In the Indian context women occupied an important
position in the Vedic world, but came to receive an
increasingly secondary status through the Upanishadic
period. There is one famous woman philosopher,Gargi, in
the early Upanishads but the rest of the leading figures
are men [19], Women figured amongst the early groups of
sannyasin, but were excluded as these groups consolidated:
the Buddha refused at first to countenance an order of
women, yielding only under pressure from his aunt [20].
Both the Buddha and Mahavira Jaina perceived women as a
hindrance to, and as ineligible candidates for,
enlightenment and salvation [21].
In the Greek context an original stratum of, if not
matriarchal religion, then of religious and social life
where the nurturing powers of nature were represented as
'feminine', became progressively overlain with the more
strongly patriarchal forces of Olympian belief. Women were
central to Minoan cultic practices, and as religious
functionaries were organised into their own schools; traces
of these exist into the classical period on Lesbos but, as
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the culture of Greek city-states became elaborated, the
opportunities for women in education and in the public
sphere were radically reduced [22]. Plato and Aristotle
both regarded woman as a deformity, an aberration from the
masculine ideal [23]. Aeschylus reads and re-reads the
dispossed feminine powers of the cosmos first as the
Erinues, Furies, and then - their energy finally
domesticated in democracy - as the Eumenides, the Kindly
Ones [24].
The power and force of the patriarchal order in Judaism
is clear enough, figured foundationally in the contours of
Yahweh as masculine lord and his people as marked by the
'feminine* attributes of submission (to use the categories
thus is already to acknowledge the inherited distribution
of gender attributes). But Yahwism was an overlay on an
earlier style of religion where a mother-goddess, and
feminine powers of nature, were more vitally central
concerns [25]. Part of the force of prophecy as a movement
in the Axial Age is the establishment, in the domain of
men, of the sole authority to speak with the voice of God
[26], The representation of Yahweh as heavenly, celestial,
powerful, and the people as of the earth, submissive, marks
also a hierarchical polarisation of heaven and earth, a
dispossession of the earth's energies, that occurs in other
contexts: world-rejection, rejection of the feminine,
rejection of the earth, form an interlinked complex at this
time, varying in its details in different milieux.
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It is difficult to establish the first religiously
symbolised contours of "the feminine" in China. One claim
is that a religious centrality for woman did exist early,
figuring still in Shang belief [27], and it has also been
argued that the structural principles of early Daoist
practice preserve evidence of a priority given to women,
and of some form of matriarchal cult [28], Women were
active as warriors and diplomats in Shang and early Zhou,
but again we will see that with the rise of philosophy the
scope of the feminine became profoundly curtailed and
domesticated; certainly we meet with no women philosophers,
and [the problematic status of feminine imagery in the
Daodejing and Chuci (Songs of the South) apart] the imagery
and style of philosophical disputation engaged by
Confucians, Mohists and Legalists is profoundly
subordinating of women. The beginnings of that process, as
we suggested, can already be observed in the Odes.
(ii) A Definition of the Human: Aristocratic Value and the
Hunt
In Shuyutian and Luling the power of human action is
celebrated through the figure of the hunter. Traditionally
in China the hunt was the noble or aristocratic pursuit par
excellence. Far from being a pastime it was strongly
hedged with religious overtones from Shang times at least.
Questions on oracle bones indicate that the ancestors were
consulted on the hunt and could approve, disapprove and
generally determine its appropriateness. The spoils won
served as a thanksgiving for the care of heavenly and
4 *
earthly spirits, and as food for the noble households.
The animal motifs on Shang bronzes further specify the
religious ambience involved in the hunt, evoking the
perceived fertile and daemonic powers of the natural world.
The continuing presence of these motifs in Zhou decoration
shows that a similar religious sense still marked the world
of the early Zhou nobility. We know further that for the
Zhou, as for the Shang, the hunt was significant in
military as well as religious terms, providing occasion for
practice in the tactics and skills of warfare [29]. This
conjunction of religious and martial frames determines a
complex identity for the hunter, and contrasts his
domain with that of political and cultural values. He acts
in a world of spiritual powers,and seeks the means by which
these might be propitiated. He also develops those martial
skills which help maintain and further the sway of a
particular order. At the same time in possessing these he
constitutes a potentially disruptive force against the
stability of any form of order. He thus stands on the
threshhold of nature and culture, serving as an ambivalent
link between two worlds. His life risks physical and
spiritual danger, and the possibility of cultural
exclusion. In becoming the subject of praise he is marked
at the same time as the bearer of an unpredictable physical
and spiritual power.
(iii) Ren in a Martial-Heroic Context
This religious and military background belongs to the
hunter in the Odes, while the crisis in religion to which I
have referred etches his outline more sharply: here he is
both part of the traditional world, receiving his identity
from the opposition of values implicit in it, and also a
figure in a different world, where the individuality of his
own presence and action are stressed. The Odes present a
moment of low relief as the hunter steps from anonymity to
humanity, becoming a part of culture while standing as a
question mark against it. This form of identity is
indicated more precisely by the ascription of qualities in
the Odes, and by the location of ren within an economy of
martial-heroic virtues. To see this, we can consider the
relations between ren and other dispositions referred to in
• the odes we are considering (hao, good or accomplished, wu,
brave, martial, courageous). In all of this, and for
reasons that are specified further below, ren works to
define "the human" in a particular way.
First, within each ode there is a contrast between mei
and the other terms. The phrase mei qie - recurs and is
also used elsewhere. It may have been a formula for
describing the nobleman, and its repetition at least
suggests that a certain physical grace or beauty was taken
as a standard characteristic of nobility [29o) . While mei
indicates an aspect of appearance however, hao, wu, quan
and si^ all appear to be dispositional terms. This is clear
in Shuyutian where hao and wu indicate a talent for
drinking and horsemanship respectively, and in Lulinq quan,
bravery, and si^, strength, mark two of the primary
dispositions required of the hunter (though since these
characteristics are obviously visible signs a disjunction
between appearance and disposition should not be
over-stressed).
With a constellation of terms established thus,
encouraging a reading of ren which makes it a sign of
apparent grace or potent disposition, we have a sense of
ren that is markedly different from the one it normally
carries in the Analects, where it is generally translated
"benevolence" or "humaneness." One reading takes its sense
in the Odes to be simply "manliness", claiming that this
first use of the word is directed toward securing a general
definition or specification of what it is to be human [30].
This claim is supported by the points remarked above on the
shift in the structures of the Zhou religious universe
bringing a growing sense of the autonomy or uniqueness of
the human world. And it is also supported by the structure
of the charactwer ren which comprises the character for
man, ren K. , plus two horizontal lines. At the same time
this interpretation entails that the human receives its
first definition in terms of a set of martial-heroic
qualities - a point that we need to follow further.
The reading of ren as manliness is not the traditional
one. The Han dictionary Shuowen takes the structure of the
character /C to be equivalent to ^ (where the two
horizontal lines indicate a reduplication of the character
for man), suggesting that ren means "men together"
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and hence community. This is in line with later Confucian
interpretations of the term, but makes no sense when
applied to the Odes. The suggestion that the two lines are
reduplicative seems most apt, but that also allows the
interpretation that ren is the quality belonging to men in
the plural, man in general, everyman - hence that ren
specifies "manliness" in its broadest sense. This is the
interpretation that will hold here, to be modified later,
and we might see what is at stake in it.
If we take ren as manliness some gloss is clearly
necessary. Is manliness for instance a quality predicable
only of men, but not of women, so that it thus means
"maleness"? We have already indicated some of the issues
here. And is ren predicable only of a certain class of men,
so that the aristocrats can be said to be ren but not the
artisans or slaves? Again, we have already raised this
issue in chapter one in pointing out that some contemporary
Chinese philosophers take ren to be predicable only of the
aristocratic slave owners, holding that this was the case
not only for the early Zhou period but also for that of the
first philosophers [31] . Clearly at stake here also is
the extension of the term ren A , for if ren is the
generalised and distinctive virtue of the ren A. it is
important to know who were thought to be ren /.
3.THE IDENTITY OF THE REN
(i) Structures of Shang Society
51
In the eyes of some commentators the ren originally
formed a particular social class, and it is claimed that
this is shown in the use of the character in oracle bone
inscriptioins for the Shang period, and in other subsequent
writings. Against this however Chao argues a quite
different thesis:
it is important for us to confirm the understanding
that the term jen was a word meaning "person" or
"man1 in general without any social or political
implication. The term was not concerned with whether
such a person or such a man was a free man or a slave,
an alien or a fellow countryman. Chao 1982:117
This reading makes of ren a term of general human
extension, similar to homo or anthropos, and in one sense
such would seem to be required, given that the pictograph
from which ren developed is a representation of the human
figure. Chao reckons to establish his argument on the basis
of two kinds of inscriptional use of ren: the references to
zhongren, or "the multitudes", and those to the Shang
ruler's self-designation as yuyiren, "I the one man" or "I
the first man". As we shall see however, neither of these
instances definitively secures his point, and a final
interpretation must remain open.
One set of occurrences shows that ren was used to refer
to a number of non-Shang tribes. Prusek,1971 for
instance, speaks of oracle bone inscriptions which identify
as ren a tribe or series of tribes on the borders of the
Shang domain who were the subject of various punitive
expeditions by the Shang. Here it is not clear whether ren
is a proper name for the tribes, or a general term
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referring to "tribes" or "peoples". The second possibility
is suggested by the fact that ren used of tribes is a loan
character, and was substituted in later writings by other
characters which served as proper names. This is further
supported by a certain parallelism in use between ren and
ronq, the latter being a general term for "barbarians".
Rong can be qualified in various ways: we find beirong,
northern barbarians, shanrong, mountain barbarians, darong
and xiaorong, "big" and "small" barbarians. In a similar
manner we encounter Jingren, Changren,Xianren, Er-ren,
Kuren, where the first character in each case is a place
name, thus giving as a form of translation "the
tribe/people of X".
From this it is at least clear that ren refers both to
peoples outside the Shang state, and to certain structural
aspects of the Shang polity (yuyiren and zhongren).
However, not all non-Shang peoples wer called ren: some
were referred to as barbarians (rong, and also chiang) and
there is a strong differednce at least between the ren and
the chiang. Ren does not, then, refer to all human beings
as such, and may perhaps be a normative term which
specifies some as human, or as people, in contrast to the
barbarians. Perhaps the non-Shang ren were those living on
the borders of Shang cultural hegemony, who in some way
acknowledged or participated in Shang suzerainty [33].
This normative function of the terms "man" or "people"
is commonly attested elsewhere, and various tribes and
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communities refer to themselves simply as "the people",
"the men", "the humans" [34], Such self-designation
identifies the particular cultural practices of the tribe
as the sum of what it is to be human. Those outside the
tribe, with their different practices and forms of social
life, are seen in various ways as less than human,
non-human, "barbarians". Strategies of incorporation often
also exist whereby "the others", "barbarians", can, through
establishing appropriate relationships with "the humans",
become (partly) human. (We will see something of this in
the next chapter in relation to Confucius.)
As a hypothesis here, and in light of this other
evidence, we can take it that the Shang saw themselves
first as ren and extended this status also to those other
tribes or groups with which they had alliances. (Marriage
alliances were particularly important for the Shang.
Wuding, Shang ruler from c. -1300 to -1242, had more than
fifty wives and through these marriages is reckoned to have
secured the support of various other groups,Chao,1982:1-2.)
This hypothesis need not conflict with the fact that the
Shang conducted campaigns against peoples known as ren,
for there is no presumption here that alliances once made
were permanent, or that different tribes at different times
might not have wished to free themselves from commitments
to the Shang. Indeed it was perhaps steps towards such
independence which precipitated the Shang campaigns.
Whatever the status of the other tribes, it is the
self-referential aspect of ren for the Shang that we can
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take to be central, and the meaning of this can be further
specified by a reading of the terms zhongren (multitudes)
and yuyiren (I, the one or first man).
For some Marxist historians the zhongren, or zhong,
represent a slave class. It is not possible for us here to
enter into a close reading of early Chinese society; within
any such discussion the question whether the Shang
constituted a slave society remains an issue, and all we
can do at this point is establish some parameters. One
recent excursus in philosophical history claims "that there
have been only five slave-based societies in human history,
namely those of Greece, Rome, the ante-bellum South, Brazil
and the West Indies" Hall,1986:31. Even if the Shang did
not constitute a slave society, however, slave-ownership
seems to have been a strong aspect of Shang life, and on
this basis Chang Cheng-lang reads the zhongren thus;
(zhongren) were farmers, and were the fighting men in
wars. They ... usually occupied a very lowly
position, opposite the ... nobility. They had no
title to land ... and they were severely tied up with
agricultural collectives, contolled by the ...
rulers, were conscribed to become soldiers, paid
tributes, and performed labor services. When they
were soldiers they would become slaves when captured,
and if they refused to become soldiers they and their
families would instantly become slaves also. Their
lives and their possessions were controlled by the
king and nobles, being in essence their tools and
possessions. [35]
Speaking against such a position, however, Chao 1982:117-21
argues that the zhongren, or zhong, did not constitute a
slave group and that the Shang cannot be read as a slave
society [36]. The zhongren do represent something like a
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labour force, constituting the lowest position in a rigidly
hierarchical Shang state; as such they could be sent to
cultivate the fields or to establish a garrison, though
amongst them there "might be a plain citizen or the head of
a family, a royal official, or even a local lord" Chao
ibid. p.120. From the term zhongren alone,then, we cannot
conclude anything specific about the meanings of ren within
the Shang polity; ren seems to cover all the people, and
also to refer to women, since women were probably part of
the labour force. One form of differentiation there might
be in the terra, however, is suggested in the contrast
between the zhongren and the wang, king, as yiren.
The parameters at work in the king's reference to
himself as yuyiren cannot easily be ascertained. If we
read yiren as "the one man" there may be the notion that
the king is the representative of the people, incorporating
their well-being and destiny in his own life, a notion
evident in Mesopotamian and Egyptian theories of kingship,
as in Jewish and Christian theologies of representation;
Adam, also "man", and Christ are taken in different ways as
representatives of the whole of humanity. And in later
Chinese political thought the emperor is seen as the
representative of the whole people. In this style of
thinking a particular individual, whether historical or
fictional, becomes mythologically the cipher for an ideal
humanity, incorporating either in whole, or in terms of
some dominant aspect, the essence of human nature and its
potential.
Certainly in practice the Shang king had a representative
role. He was the central figure in the divinations whereby
the favour of the ancestors and spirits was secured. He
represented the needs of the people to them, received their
messages, and thus served a mediating function. He was the
one man insofar as communication between Heaven and Earth
occurred primarily through him. In the same sense he was
also the first man: first in the eyes of the ancestors,
since they looked to him to provide for them, first in the
eyes of the people, since they also looked to him for the
provision of order and well-being [37],
The contrast between zhongren and yuyiren does not
establish any high degree of differentiation in the meaning
of the term ren. What it does establish perhaps is a
reinforcement of the normative reading of ren as "the
humans" that we suggested above. Here it is the king who
is paradigraatically human, and the rest of the polity
participates in humanity insofar as it enjoys well-ordered
relations with him, sharing in the ritual feasts, honouring
the duties of marriage alliances, and fulfilling allotted
functions in the state. We cannot agree with Chao that ren
refers indiscriminately to all persons; it refers rather to
the Shang, and then to their allies; and it refers first to
the Shang king, and then to those bound to him in the
practice of ritual.
(ii) Structures of Zhou Society
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The discussion at this point is at some historical
distance from the first use of the term ren in the Odes,
but it is important in helping to establish the scope of
that term. We shall next, in a reading bearing more
directly on ren, briefly consider the meaning of ren after
of the demise of the Shang. The issue here will be that in
Zhou society we find a greater degree of stratification
than we do with the Shang, and that this altered the scope
of ren. The term became more differentiated, and came
implicitly to exclude, and also to mask the marginalisation
of, certain groups of people. Some writers argue that, at
the time of Confucius, ren refers only to a social elite,
and min refers to the mass of the people: the argument then
follows that ren refers only to a style of virtue
appropriate to this elite. One problem with this approach
is that it does not admit of resolution on the basis of
linguistic usage alone. Here, in trying to delineate ren
for the early and mid-Zhou period, we will situate the
linguistic issue in a larger social framework.
(a ) Tian, Ren /N and Min
A first glance at the characters for tian and ren shows
a similarity of form that also covers a partial similarity
of meaning. Early examples of tian appear as the
representation of a man with a large head, and the
character has been taken as a general specification of the
power of the great ancestral kings. Thus Creel:
"T'ien came to mean the group of ancestral Kings.
They controlled the destinies of men on earth, and
thus T'ien came to have the sense of providence or
fate. Since Chinese does not distinguish singular and
plural, T'ien as the group of ancestral Kings came
gradually to be the single powerful deity, T'ien,
"Heaven." T'ien was also used as the name of the
place where the ancestral Kings lived, in the heavens.
And T'ien was also used to mean the literal, visible
sky." Creel 1970:502.
Tian was a deity of the Zhou in particular, in contrast
with the Shang high-god Shang Di. We have already seen how
the specific doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, tianming,
was used by the Duke of Zhou to articulate the moral
authority of tian but, this doctrine apart, it can perhaps
be doubted whether there was any great formal distinction
between Shang Di and tian (and we have also remarked
further how arguments about moral authority might have been
incipiently present in shang conceptions of royal
authority). Shang Di and tian both represent ancestral
power, and represent the continuing interlinked dependency
of the human world and that of the ancestors.
Man issues from the ancestors: the point is graphically
put in the Zhou reference to the king, wang, as tianzi, son
of heaven [38], Tian and wang jointly represent the might
of ancestral power, and this is shown in the upright form
structuring the character for each; ren, by contrast, as a
designation for man in general (if that is what it is)
shows a figure stooped and bent, as if either tilling the
land or bowing before authority [39] (we will consider
later how ren , ren , and a series of characers with
initial "r" might be read as marking qualities of
yieldingness, humility and deference which were taken to be
primary qualities of the (ideal) renX•)
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The ren lived in a moral universe founded by tian and
maintained by the wanq; we have seen, though, how that
universe could accommodate human sacrifice, and how the
providence of tian had become a questionable notion by the
middle of the 8th century [40]. The crisis of suffering in
Mesopotamia led to a deeper theorisation of the mysterious
power of Yahweh, and in Job this entailed both a retention
of anthropomorphic imagery, an intensified sense of Yahweh
as the creative other, and an acceptance of human
incomprehension before divine mystery. The relation of man
to god as a relation between two persons was affirmed. For
the Zhou, however, from the late odes through to the
philosophers, the sense of tian as personal was gradually
eliminated, in favour of an idea of tian as impersonal
principle of moral and cosmic order. In spite of that
move, though, traces of a sense of personal dependence on
tian did remain later, and to grasp the force of that we
might note how tian and ren X. were interlinked in the Odes.
Perhaps a chief point to note is that, even at its most
strongly anthropomorphic, tian lacks that overwhelming
specification via personal characteristics which marks the
identity of God in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Tian is
not a creator in the sense of making the world from
nothing. Tian and the world seemingly co-exist as parts of
a permanent and continuous universe. Tian is not a
transcendent fashioner of the world (the Hebrew scriptures
specify God's creative power as of a potter, or as of
speech producing something out of nothing). Tian does
nothing to bring the material world into being, nor to
govern its course. Tian does not organise the stars in the
firmament, nor interfere in the course of nature, though
the ancestral and cosmic powers do have sway within the
world [41]. Tian's relation is to the (Zhou) people as a
whole: specifically tian gives birth to the people, sheng
min; Waley, 1960:1 47; the rulerunzi, then assumes
tian's function in relation to the people, being specified
as "father and mother of his people", minzhi fumu, p.179.
(A variant on the birth-theme has a primal mother-figure
Jiang Yuan giving birth to the people, min, in giving birth
to the first ancestor of the Zhou, Hou Ji.)
Tian gives blessings and rewards, is called on as a
witness to human life and suffering, is wrathful and
destroys those (the Shang/Yin) who do not follow his
precepts; yet tian is also capricious, drawing the Shang to
their downfall, and then granting the Zhou possession of a
mandate that is never certain. [The caprice of Shang Di
for the Shang is marked by the repetition-compulsion of
the oracle-bone consultations; for the Zhou the same issue
is evident in the increasing importance given to correct
performance of the rituals, IjL. ] The ancestors reside with
tian. Tian's action is "without sound, without smell"
Waley p.251. At places tian and Shang Di are assimilated to
each other:
God (Di) shifted his bright power,
To fixed customs and rules he gave a path.
s>?
Heaven (Tian) set up for itself a counterpart on
earth
His charge was firmly awarded. Waley p. 256.
Tian is progenitor of the Shang as' of the Zhou:
Heaven bade the dark bird
To come down and bear the Shang. Waley p.257
To establish the relations between tian and ren we must
first see how ren and min are linked, if for no other
reason than that the Odes do not speak of tian's relations
with ren directly, whereas tian is said to give birth to
min; min here is usually taken to refer to the Zhou tribe
or people as a whole, and we need to consider whether ren
and min are contrasting, overlapping, or interchangeable
terms. A contrast between the terms is the usual
assumption, and one standard reading, as we have remarked,
is that min represents the peasantry and ren the elite.
Hall and Ames, however, writing on the significance of the
terms in the Analects, propose a different reading, and we
can consider whether in principle we are also able to
extend this back to cover Shijing usage. They write:
The distinction between "the masses" (min ) and
"persons" (jen ) that we find in the Analects and
other classical text has been a focus of some
debate...The question as framed is whether or not this
distinction entails a conscious class distinction
between the masses (min) who have no right to office,
and the upper classes who do have political status and
privilege...we believe that a credible case can be
made for a perhaps blurred yet significant contrast
between the amorphous, indeterminate mass of peasants
(min), in themselves having little by way of
distinguishing character or structure, and particular
persons (j en). The distinction, however, as we
understand it, is fundamentally cultural rather than
political. That is, political privilege and
responsibility are simply conditions which attend
higher enculturation. Although economic and social
status would certainly affect one's opportunities for
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edification, birth in itself is not a warrant for the
distinction. A person is not entitled to political
participation because he is born into an exclusive jen
class. Rather, he becomes j en as a consequence of
that personal cultivation and'socialization that
renders him particular. Hall and Ames, 1987: 138-39.
I think the focus here on enculturation as the key-
distinction is right, but what Hall and Ames play down is
the relative inseparability of that notion from questions
of class and social position. The two issues are indeed
partially distinguished by the time of the Analects, where
an increasing degree of social mobility allowed some of
lowly social origins to achieve the privileges of culture,
though the interpretation here is complex, as we shall see
in the next chapter; for the Shijinq period, however, where
social mobility was not high, the issues of inherited
social status and enculturation are hardly separable at
all.
In one ode, part drinking song, part celebration of the
joys of human company and conviviality, ren and min appear
at first as terms of equal extension - the ren seeks out
his friends and kinfolk, the min should drink if they would
preserve their vitality (de) : ren and min are seen to have
similar governing functions for different stanzas (Waley,
pp.204-5). Yet the world translated "kin" is shenq, with
its connotations of rawness, birth, origins - we have seen
it associated with min, and it is so again in another ode
where the people min are brought into being (sheng) as
naturally as young gourds spreading (Waley,pp.247-8). The
min are thus to do with origins, birth, the starting point
of culture - yet culture itself, designated a system of
kinship, is here also part of origins, part of nature, not
separate from it. The ren who seeks out his friends and
kin (sheng) - and the kin are enumerated as paternal
uncles, zhufu, maternal uncles, elder brothers and younger
brothers (xiongdi), -is the one who thus seeks out the min
as his total natural kinship order; here, in calling the
clan together the ren has more the status of clan leader
who is set over the min as a whole, whilst also being a
part of them. Yet if min refers in this way to the total
kinship group - and then by extension to the whole of the
Zhou as descended from the one common ancestor - the
question arises whether any part of the social order was
thought to exist outside clan affiliation. One way of
distinguishing ren and min in the Analects is to suggest
that ren designates those who were members of "the hundred
(named) clans", baixing, in contrast with the min who were
the nameless mass of persons existing outside clan order.
Yet, if min in the Odes designates the whole clan as a
"natural" kinship group are there any members of the polity
thought to exist beyond the clans, and what designation do
they receive?[42]
Many odes indicate that the min are a group in a
subordinate position. One instance, in an allegory that is
not clear, speaks of the people down below, xiamin, (Waley
p. 235); another speaks of a junzl, nobleman - referred to
also in the same ode as ren - who ensures that the min do
not waver (p. 192); King Wen is ruler of the people below,
xiaminzhi wang (p. 259); Hou Ji sets the people to work (p
269); the people come in homage (p. 273); the people below
are in awe of the ancestors, xiamin you yan (p. 279); the
min are helped by the warlike kings of Shang (p. 276); the
junzi is the father and mother of the people, minzhi fumu,
support and refuge of the people, minzhi you guei, minzhi
you xi, Waley (p.182); the wise ruler is a pattern to his
people, wei minzhi zhang, (p.300).
Subordinate though they are, the min are nonetheless a
sign of ancient order and virtue. They are born direct
from tian or the first ancestor, and are therefore a link
with primordial value - from the beginning the min have
distinctions and rules, you wu, you ze p. 1 41 ; a
dance-celebration, whose origins lie in the mists of time,
was begun by the min, p.225.
In some cases there is a conjunction of the terms ren
and min, but the force of the conjunction is not clear.
The wise ruler should listen to the opinions of ren and
min, be gracious equally to friends, companions and min
p.301. The j unzi should benefit the min and the ren
p.181. At one point a contrast of innate vitality or
"virtue" between ren and min is perhaps indicated:
There is a saying among ren/. :
"Inward power (de) is light as a feather
Yet too heavy for common people (min) to raise"
Waley, p.142.
In these instances, while the conjunctions of ren and min
might be of similar, overlapping or contrasting terms, the
u
iqsue surrounding de is clearly one of contrast: the ren
understand de and can possess it, but it is beyond the
capacities of min. What I take to be indicated here is the
belief that, while the principles of innate order and value
are given with the min, the protection and developing of
that order, the full flowering of what is given as raw
innate principle, is possible only with the ren (we will
see this contrast transposed in Mencius into a theory which
contrasts the seeds of virtue with their final
flourishing). To follow this idea further we might note
the semantics of ren in the Odes.
The chief aspect to ren in contrast with min is the
differentiation of qualities and characteristics it
commands. Ren identifies specific persons, usually male
but also female - guren is for Waley an "old love" in a
poem sung by a male lover (p.58); meiren is a "beautiful
woman", where the same ode (p. 221) has shouren as a "big
man". Ren is often compounded with another term to specify
a particular kind of person, or grouping of persons.
Jiaren designates a household (p.106, "the people of her
house"); daren are strangers or others (p.99),
specifically contrasted here with kinfolk; guoren are
people of one's own land (p.174); countrymen are bangren
p. 313. Ren can function simply as a suffix or qualifier,
in ways comparable to the "-er" suffix in words like
"worker", or the "-man" in tradesman" : xinqren is an
escort (p.67); muren is herdsman (p.167-8); nongren is an
(agricultural) labourer (farmer, husbandman) (p.169-70).
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Many odes focus on the ren as bearers of civic, moral or
exemplary qualities, or else criticise them for their lack
of these. Ode 270 (Waley) condemns a ren for his lack of
dignity, poise and "manners" (ritual fluency or etiquette)
(ren er wuyi, ren er wuzheng, ren er wuli]. A lover
complains of a ren "Of whom no good word is said,/ How can
he be true?" (p.63); another girl laments the wickedness of
ren (renzhi bushu) p.59. A recurring epithet is that of
the "good ren", llangren (p 112, pp 311-2). Some are wise
men, some are foolish (zheren, yuren p. 118). When King Wu
rules, "grown men could use their inward power" (zhengren
you de, p.261). Those whom Waley refers to as "the Mighty
Ones" (p.132) are men possessed of culture and refinement
(wenren).
Finally we might note that,together with a
differentiation of attributes, there is also a certain
hierarchy implicit within the uses of ren. The king is
still referred to as yiren. More interestingly, a
distinction is drawn at one point between junzi, nobleman,
and xiaoren (small or lesser ren: "the ways of Zhou
(zhoudao)...are for gentlemen (junzi) to walk/And for
commoners (xiaoren) to behold": Waley p. 318; the junzi
rides in a chariot, the xiaoren form his protective escort,
p. 123. While xiaoren becomes a term of moral disapproval
with Confucius, in the Shijing it is simply an indicator of
lesser social status.
The contrast between min and ren can thus be very
precisely put in terms of differences in enculturation: the
min constitute the undifferentiated mass of society (or
clan membership) as a whole, whilst the ren form that elite
group that actively participates in the li_ (rituals) that
govern social order, and thus enjoys the privileges of
culture (wen). A formal parallel seems to exist between
the mass of the ancestors and the min, on the one hand, and
those particular ancestors who are known and named
(including tian) and the ren, as particular persons, on the
other. While the min are born from tian, theirs is purely
a passive function in society, and it is the ren who are
actively engaged in that maintenance of social order, and
of culture, that is tian's active concern.
4.A CHINESE HEROIC TRADITION
Earlier we established a background against which ren
in the Odes might refer to (male) aristocratic excellence
in its most general sense. This is partly affirmed by the
way in which ren /v as a designator for "man" is itself
already a profoundly value-laden term. We might now note
how our reading of ren is reinforced by the structure of
each ode, insofar as we find a representation there of an
hierarchical ordering of values and dispositions.
The way in which ren is repeated in the Odes suggests
that it was perceived as a standard attribute of the
nobleman, and the conjunction mei qie ren, twice used, may
itself have been a conventional descriptive formula. (The
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conjunction of mei and ren also occurs once in the
Analects. The formula is similar to the classical Greek
epithet kalos k'agathos, and this conjunction of beauty or
grace with general virtue and excellence is as central to
early Chinese as to early Greek perceptions - even though
in the case of each culture there were significant
alternative traditions which ascribed value to what was, in
the dominant tradition, reckoned ugly or deformed.)
Ren appears in the first stanza in each ode. In
Shuyutian hao and wu refer, as we have seen, to quite
precise qualities, whereas ren is more general in
reference, specifying a charismatic quality in lifestyle as
a whole. Shu is presented as the spirit and vitalising
principle of the community. While he is away it appears
that there is no-one present. The people are reckoned to
find life and energy in the charisma of this
hunter-warrior. In describing him as ren this most general
enlivening aspect of his virtue is indicated.
In Lulinq the sense is also well held if ren is taken
to be more comprehensive in reference than quan and si,
specifying manliness as a whole rather than any more
precise disposition. In each ode the placing of ren in the
first stanza, and the wide range of reference suggested by
the structure of the character, can thus be taken to grant
it a priority over any more circumscribed dispositions, so
that hao and so on are best seen as representing particular
aspects of ren. The man who is ren is thus by definition
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equally hao and wu, guan and si.
On the basis of this reading two further questions arise
concerning the semantics of ren. They concern the general
status of martial-heroic virtue in early Chinese culture,
together with its choice here as the hallmark of the
nobility (as opposed for instance, to wen: refinement,
culture, paideia); and the reference to Shu as in come
sense an exemplary individual.
Whether and in what respect China has a tradition of
heroic culture has long been at issue. Part of the
discussion concerns the absence of the epic from the major
forms in the Chinese literary canon [43]. In the West,
whether with Achilles, Agamemnon, Odysseus and Herakles, or
with Beowulf, or Cuchullain, the martial hero has been a
paradigmatic figure, and has given substance to the epic.
Indeed, here the epic form is created precisely for the
heroic warrior, for the one who asserts his own
individuality, who glories in his own action, challenging
the gods and the perceived limits of his own destiny. It
is Virgil's song armorum virumque. In Greece this
glorification of youth, war and valour, even though
circumscribed with warnings on hubris, provided both for
the emergence of tragedy and the structuring of philosophy.
At the same time it meant that the lyric aspect to poetry
was there held secondary, a significant difference from the
concerns of Chinese literature, where the lyric has been
central from the Shijing on.
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It would of course be wrong to equate epic traditions
and heroic traditions without remainder: any culture
probably has accounts of heroic individuals and events that
constitute its own origins and an essential aspect of its
identity, without fixing these in an epic form. And in
early China there are strong traditions concerning such
culture heroes as Yu, who quelled the floodwaters and
facilitated agriculture, or Shun, who provided an ancient
model of good government [44] . Furthermore, recent study
has shown that martial-heroic virtues are accorded a place
within Chinese tradition, within lyric poetry, although
they never came to occupy a central position [45]. In
interpreting ren in the Odes, then, we need to know why a
Chinese martial-heroic ethos has not been more fully
elaborated, in an epic form, and why it has remained
marginal to the dominant literary-cultural tradition.
The tension between military and cultural values is
symbolised in the contrast between the two founding heroes
of the Zhou dynasty, Wu the martial king and Wen the
cultured king: the exploits of both are celebrated in a
number of odes. In this celebration, however, we do not
find the symbolisation of two equally significant modes of
life: Wu remains secondary, he prepares by conquest for the
Zhou succession to the Shang, he initiates the possibility
of a stable culture. But it is the values of this
culture, of refinement, music, dance, love and the rhythm
of the seasons and seasonal activities that are dominant,
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and most sharply and variously expressed. There is no
glorying in the details of battle and bloodshed such as we
find in Homer. (Indeed it is difficult, given the
traditional Chinese stress on the sanctity of the body, on
the duty to return the body intact at death to the
ancestors, to see how any celebration of war in this sense
could have arisen [46].) If martial virtues are
important, they are so instrumentally, and only in the
service of culture. As such, they are hidden rather than
expressed, and the memory of the violence they entail is
erased [47].
(If the question could be pursued at all adequately in
terms of social structures, it would also doubtless emerge
that the power of a priestly and scribal class to determine
values and normative forms of culture was such that no
warrior class could formalise its own ethos. Nonetheless,
steps were later taken in this direction, as we find with
Mozi. And I take it that the definitions of ren in the
Odes is also a move of this sort, though still sufficiently
tentative to be acceptable to the scribes.)
We have it then that martial-heroic virtue is in China
secondary to the virtues of cultural order; that it does
not receive any major expression (although it does receive
some expression); and that the form of epic literature,
together with its particular structuring of the world, is
not significant for the Zhou. How does this bear on the
meaning of ren, and the expression of martial-heroic
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values, in the two odes we are considering?
My suggestion is that the odes Shuyutian and Lulinq
express the subordinate martial-heroic virtues at a time of
relative cultural disorder, when heroic qualities were able
to assert themselves. They do so at the beginning of a
long period of conflict that only finally ceased with the
demise of the Zhou dynasty. They give a definition to
human nature at a time when one was first sought, as the
human order became to a certain extent specific, and
separate from the order of tian, the transcendent spirits,
and the legacy of culture. They celebrate the power of
action in an ambivalent figure - the hunter-warrior - and
in an ambivalent person - the noble Shu. They define ren
as male aristocratic heroic excellence, but it is a
definition that holds only for a time, until a new
definition of ren is established within the horizon of wen
rather than wu.
That definition I will consider in the next chapter.
Here we can note finally how the person of Shu fixes the
reading I have suggested. From what we know of Shu through
other sources, he would not merit a title to Confucian ren
as benevolence or humaneness Shu was a warrior, a fighter,
a conspirator, a regent who unsuccessfully schemed the
overthrow of hos brother. He would have been at home with
Aiax and Odysseus; there his ren would perhaps have been
arete, an aggressively heroic energy on the threshold of
civic and cultural order [48],
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CHAPTER 3
REN IN THE ANALECTS
History opposes its grief to our buoyant song,
To our hope its warning. One star has warmed to birth
One puzzled species that has yet to prove its worth:
The quick new West is false, and prodigious but wrong
The flower-like Hundred families who for so long
In the Eighteen Provinces have modified the earth.
W.H. Auden, Sonnets from China IX
1.TIME AND ORDER, CULTURE AND BARBARISM
The Master wanted to settle amongst the Nine
Barbarian Tribes of the east. Someone said,"But could
you put up with their uncouth ways?" The Master said,
"Once a gentleman settles amongst them, what
uncouthness will there be?" An.9.14
On this showing, Confucius might be taken as a
crypto-Daoist. What investment is there here in "the
barbarians" as a locus of original innocence, a tabula rasa
prior to culture, where lack of virtue is not positive evil
but merely an emptiness, a void, perhaps even an inclination
towards culture once the appropriate stimulus is provided,
the pattern and scheme of virtue made available? Certainly
this would not be the positive and paradoxical celebration
of non-virtue that we shall see with Laozi, but it
problematises Confucius' relationship with his own Zhou
heritage as the privileged gathering and enclosing of
virtue. For what is to be made of those within the Zhou who
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stray from virtue, who abandon the closure, who neglect the
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heavenly way once known? Criticism of these is an integral
part of Confucius' discourse, highlighting in particular the
dangers attendant on the corruption of the superior man
(junzi), since in the hierarchical order and dispensation of
the state it is his failure in virtue that is judged the
cause of escalating disorder for the people as a whole.
But is this disorder a better or worse state, one less or
more susceptible of remedy, than the non-order of the
barbarians?
There are no grounds elsewhere in the Analects for
presuming that Confucius abandoned faith in the ideal order
of the Zhou; furthermore, he did not talk about escaping
from the Zhou to the simplicity of the barbarians, but
rather of converting them to Zhou ways. Even in its
disorder and possible decline Zhou culture is judged
superior to anything else:
The Master said, "Barbarian tribes with their rulers
are inferior to Chinese states without them." An.3.5.
[1 ]
For all his criticism of its people, Socrates did not go
beyond the walls of Athens, finding the balance of law and
freedom more fully achieved there than elsewhere; Confucius
likewise did not choose to leave the Zhou domain, reckoning
Zhou order to be the fulfilment of previous cultural styles:
The Master said, "The Zhou is resplendant in culture,
having before it the example of the two previous
dynasties. I am for the Zhou. An.3.14 [2].
But where do familiarity with one's own and the fear of
exile mesh here with ignorance of others, with exclusionary
strategies developed in the formation of cultural identity,
of the home, the proper, the heartland, the familiar and
familial gods, order and destiny itself? And is there a
context where faith in one's own might no longer prevail?
There is little of despair in the Analects, but at points
Confucius implies that the Zhou might finally abandon the
path of culture, at which point he would abandon the Zhou:
The Master said, "If the correct teaching (dao) should
no longer prevail and I were to put to sea on a raft,
the one who would follow me would no doubt be Yu."
An.5.7 [3]
[Though note also how, in pursuing the dao of the Zhou,
Confucius is further spoken of as one "who keeps working
towards a goal whose realisation he knows to be hopeless."
An.14.38.]
The barbarians and theZhou respond to the call of virtue
within different temporal frameworks: the conversion of the
barbarians is judged almost instantaneous, "once a gentleman
settles amongst them"; the re-establishment of the Zhou
state in the way of heavenly virtue is a task for
generations [4], Certainly Confucius would have been
sufficiently aware of historical conflicts with "the
barbarians" to know that they were not willing subscribers
to Zhou hegemony, but perhaps he dismissed difficulties thus
raised by assuming that so far they had seen only the
martial (wu) not the cultured (wen) face of the Zhou, that
the force of virtue once evident would be so attractive as
to win them over of its own accord. This certainly meshes
with a faith in the authoritative and effective power of
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culture which is evident within the Analects, with a
philosophical style that ascribes priority to ritual (li)
and the power (de) inherent in ritual, a style as much to do
with gesture as with word, pointing to the figure of the
shaman at work within the text of the Analects, to a
residuum of archaic religiosity that the manifest discourse
of Confucius does not overtly invoke or endorse but draws on
and is drawn into as a particular stance in the world [5].
This authority, this call from the order of tradition and
from the gods, can in turn hold sway as much over the Zhou
as over the barbarians:
"The virtue (de) of the junzi is like the wind; that of
the small man (xiaoren) is like the grass. Let the
wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend."
An. 12.19
Elsehwere, speaking of ren, Confucius says "Is ren really
remote? No sooner do I desire it than it is here." An.7.30.
This power of summons is the power of the shaman, a power
central to Chinese thinking from some of the earliest
evident moments of religion through to the present. Within
and through ritual the shaman is able to woo, invoke,
command the powers of the universe, and within ritual also
the passage of time is broken and entry into a non-temporal
realm achieved. Here is the moment of the instantaneous,
the 'now' that ruptures the flow of temporality, the seam
through which another world makes its entry, the ladder
where the gods pass to and from the world of men [6] . Here
we can see how the rational-bureaucratic style that is part
of the Analects, its Apollonian moment, is an overlay on -
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certainly in tension with - a Dionysiac element that
substitutes energy and power for rationality; it is this
element, the return of a certain repressed within the text
of Confucius, that evokes a contrast in the rhetoric of
temporality between the instantaneous and the gradually
transformative. Speaking of virtue as other than the
instantaneous acquisition of ren, Confucius for instance
acknowledges a slow, transformative passage throughout the
life of the individual as the only means of acquiring
virtue. It is of interest here to know whether,in our
interpretation these two motifs, we can incorporate a
Pauline-Kierkegaardian contrast between a moment of faith,
and a life of works under the law [7].
Where does this leave questions of the barbarians and of
time in our reading of the Analects? Three areas seem to lie
outside time; the gods and ancestors, the barbarians, and
the individual soul [8]. On most approaches to the
Analects the question of a soul is excluded from
consideration, and Fingarette indicates the kind of issue at
stake here;
my point ... is not that Confucius's words are intended
to exclude reference to the inner psyche. He could
have done this if he had had such a basic metaphor in
mind, had seen its plausibility, but on reflection had
decided to reject it. But that is not what I am
arguing here. My thesis is that the entire notion
never entered his head. The mataphor of an inner
psychic life, in all its ramifications so familiar to
us, simply isn't present in the Analects, not even as a
rejected possibility. Fingarette,1972:45.
We will refer later and in more detail to the question
of psychology, of the status of concepts of mind or soul in
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Chinese philosophy more generally, though certainly at the
most manifest level of Confucius' discourse the point
Fingarette makes is secure. But in the Zhou period there
was popular belief, not just in one soul but in two or a
number, and this belief was as central to the cult of the
ancestors as it was to the possibility of ecstatic transport
on the part of the shaman. The soul - in life and after
life - is, with the transcendent powers and the barbarians,
assimilated to those larger cycles of change and
transformation that are manifest in nature and that, in
their regularity, appear timeless. And it is clear, in
various ways, that Confucius presupposes some timeless
moment as part of the structure of the person. Speaking,
for instance, of the magico-ritual properties of the person
- apparently in reference to the ruler, though the virtue of
rulership is generalised - he remarks:
The work of virtue (de) can be compared to the Pole
star which commands the homage of the multitude of
stars without leaving its place. An.2.1 [9]
This power of the fixed moment, this symbolic rooting
of the person in the foundational order and source of
virtue, this belief that the person can through culture
become assimilated to what is already given as the order of
nature - and we saw how culture came from nature in the
birth-imagery of the Shijinq - leaves the barbarian in an
ambivalent position insofar as he already represents nature
in a raw state. Here the barbarian, like the rain, seems to
be already close to the order of tian; does his untutored
innocence mark a perfection that Confucius, in the passage
go
through culture, would wish finally to achieve, or is there,
as we suggested for the Shijing world, a contrast at work
between raw nature and worked culture, between the seeds of
innate disposition and their full flowering in achieved
virtue? On concepts of nature we will say more later.
2.THE FREQUENCY OF REN IN THE ANALECTS
These reflections open some themes that bear on our
understanding of ren; they will be amplified and reworked as
we proceed. We saw in the last chapter a first
quasi-definitional use of ren. The minor significance the
term has for the Shijing world contrasts radically with the
discussions of Confucius: ren occurs some 105 times in the
Analects, and 58 chapters deal specifically with it. This
strongly suggests that ren may be Confucius' single thread,
though the claim needs certain qualifications[10]. Firstly,
if there is a single thread to the Analects it need not be
manifest there; it may instead be implicit, the various
overt terms of discourse might point to it in different ways
without naming it. Secondly, it may not be ren that
functions as the unifying principle; an equally strong claim
could be made for li^ (ritual), or for a conjunction of ren
and li_ as mutually implicating and reinforcing terms. Dd
Thirdly, there may not be a single thread to the Analects:
the text may be a compilation of sayings representing two
divergent Confucian schools, one giving a priority to ren,
the other to JLL. In this case the text could be read as
governed by two organizational principles which might at
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times be complementary but more often competing [12],
Fourthly, we might wish anyway to discard the assumption of
a single unifying principle, as distracting from
consideration of the diverse intentionalites which are
located in the text, and which it is more our interest here
to bring to light.
Since it is standard to assume a certain unity to the
text, and to assume a mutually reinforcing role for ren and
li, I shall at first follow those assumptions, introducing
qualifications as the argument proceeds. Ren expresses
Confucius' concept of an ideal way for humanity, a standard
of perfect virtue (problematic as these terms are: the
problems will be considered below. In particular, it can
perhaps be doubted whether the concept of perfection is at
all present in the Analects.) Discussions involving ren
indicate that "being fully human" is conceived very
differently in the Analects from the way indicated by ren in
the Shijinq. My assumption is that it was important for
Confucius to divest ren of any of its previous
martial-heroic associations, and to transform it instead
into a fully civic and co-operative virtue [13].
While ren has an apparent centrality, and at least a
frequency, within the Analects, one saying which has been
strongly resistant to interpretation suggests otherwise:
The occasions on which the Master talked about profit (li)
destiny (ming) and benevolence (ren) were rare. An.9.1.
(Zi han yan li yu ming yu ren. )
The character yu has various meanings - as the conjunction
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"and", the preposition "compared with, than", the verb "give
forth, share with" referring to either speech or action -
and the text can be variously translated depending on the
meaning ascribed to yu and the punctuation chosen. Two
different solutions to the problem have been proposed, both
of which recognize the frequency of ren elsewhere in the
Analects. Bodde re-punctuates the text, reads yu as a verb
in each case, and translates:
The Master rarely spoke of profit. (But) he gave forth
(his ideas concerning) the appointments (of Heaven)
(and also) gave forth (his ideas concerning) perfect
virtue. Bodde,1981:385 [15].
This at least is an improvement, though it leaves us with a
problematic linking of ren and ming. Ming is not a frequent
term with Confucius, it cannot be read as fulfilling a
central function in the Analects, and it is better
recognised, like l_i (profit), as something on which the
Master had little to say.
A better solution is proposed by Malmqvist, who notes
from other sources that yu can have two different meanings
in the same sentence. He therefore takes the first yu as
"and", the second as "compared with", and translates:
The Master spoke more rarely of profit and human destiny
than of humanity. Malmqvist,1978:1549n.7.
Another possible translation, taking the first yu as "and"
and the second as "discourse" would be:
The Master spoke rarely of profit and human destiny.He
discoursed on humanity.
These two final translations are consistent both with
Confucius' frequent reference to ren, and his more
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occasional reference to ming and l_i. The disjunction
established here between ren on the one hand, and ming and
li on the other, is crucial also for the general semantics
of Confucius' discourse [16].
[A different procedure could also be followed, which
would leave the first reading intact and would therefore
have it that Confucius did indeed speak rarely about ren.
This procedure would take seriously the notion that the
Analects expresses two antithetical schools of thought, and
would see the passage in question as a piece of polemic on
the part of the li^ (ritual) school, questioning the
credentials of the ren school by saying that the real
Confucius had very little to say on ren.] ClT3
3. THE PROBLEM OF VIRTUE
With one exception, where ren is predicated of a
community as a whole, ren in the Analects is an attribute of
individual persons. It is standardly taken to specify, in a
carefully circumscribed way, both a particular quality which
is variously rendered as benevolence, humaneness, altruism,
or concern for the well-being of others, and also the more
general quality of human excellence or fulfilment in its
broadest terms. (It also admits of various other
interpretations, however, and these will be considered as
occasion arises.[18]) It is strongly relational in
connotation, insofar as it defines individual excellence in
terms of the successful and harmonious functioning of the
community, and of the individual's contribution to it.
n
The Master said, "it is ren which constitutes the
excellence of a neighbourhood. If in selecting a
residence a man does not go where ren prevails, how can
he be considered wise? An.4.1.
The man of ren, wishing to be established himself,
seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged
himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. An.6.30.
To this extent, and independent of any obvious theorised
associations between ren and l_i (ritual), ren is in fact
closely linked with the idea of Li insofar as this indicates
the rules of decorum, propriety, ritual and ceremony which
shaped (aristocratic) life in Zhou China, which established
the networks of co-operative value and thus constituted the
normative principles of social order. It does also seem for
Confucius that it is in becoming fluent, and ultimately
spontaneous, in the practice of li that an individual
s
becomes ren; though what this could mean more precisely we
shall consider below. At the same time the stress on ren as
a social virtue is balanced by statements which identify it
as a quality of individual life which is of intrinsic value,
irrespective of the ways in which it is socially cohesive.
As an ideal human quality ren in the Analects is not
attributed to the natural world, to the ancestors, or to
Heaven.
(i) Aspects of the Paideia of Ren
We have already considered the aristocratic background to
the pre-Confucian use of ren. A central feature of
Confucius' work is his attempted transformation of the
aristocratic code of conduct into a more widely disseminated
set of social mores. One element in this is his reference
to the junzi (gentleman, noble person, superior man) as an
ethical ideal. Originally the junzi was simply a nobleman,
an hereditary member of the Zhou aristocracy, whose life
style was ideally governed by Li, and who had access to the
institutionalised forms of learning where could be known
and practised, and where a sense of the cultural traditions
from which Li derived could be conveyed. We will consider li
further, though we might note here certain indicators:
The Master said,"Be stimulated by the Odes, take your
stand on the rites (li.) and be perfected by music."
An. 8.8
When the Master went inside the Grand Temple, he asked
questions about everything. Someone remarked,"Who said
that the son of the man from Tsou understood the rites?
When he went inside the Grand Temple, he asked
questions about everything."
The Master, on hearing of this, said, "The asking of
questions is in itself the correct rite (Li)."
An.3.15.
Archery was one of the privileged activities governed by li,
and Confucius' comment on the decorum appropriate to it is a
good qualifier for Li as a whole:
The Master said, " There is no contention between
gentlemen (junzi). The nearest to is, perhaps,
archery. In archery they bow and make way for one
another as they go up and on coming down they drink
together. Even the way they contend is gentlemanly.
An.3.7.
For Confucius, in a move that at once reinforces and
undermines the privileged status of the aristocracy, the
junzi came to refer not to a specific social class, but to
an ethical and cultural type transcending particular social
roles (though perhaps never freed from them)[19]. Education
of some sort was an important feature for the sons of the
Zhou nobility, and the school, together with the family,
n
provided an initial context for training in l_i, and so for
the development of ren. Insofar as ren is thus linked with
a process of paideia - spoken of specifically as xue
(study, learning) in Confucius' teaching - the question of
the social distribution of ren - the question that is of
which groups in society might realistically aspire to be ren
- needs to be addressed in relation to the possible rise of
a school system in the mid-Zhou period.
Other reform movements of the age in other cultures
tackled this problem: the Academy and the Lyceum in Greece,
and the educational role of the Buddhist sanqha, are
important examples of institutions given over to the
cultivation of learning and virtue. Mencius refers later to
a series of village schools, which perhaps indicates that by
his time the option for learning had become available to
more than simply a scribal elite [20]. To get a full
reading of Confucius on this point (something impossible at
this stage of scholarship) we would need to know whether his
role as educator extended to founding places of learning,
and whether, in this way, he really strove to make the junzi
exemplary for all through some provision of education for
all, or whether he thought of education as at most an
opportunity availible to townspeople, to the nobility and to
the rising merchant class. This identification of the groups
that might realistically aspire to education would be a
crucial component in any adequate interpretation of ren in
the Analects [21], My first assumption here will be that,
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for the vast mass of the people, tied to labour on the land
and to military service, the possibility of schooling was
non-existent, so that in practice, though with certain
exceptions, the range of reference for ren covers scribes,
merchants and nobles.Other arguments supporting this view
will be presented later.
In expressing a social code for a strictly hierarchical
society _li provided detailed specification of both
authoritarian and deferential forms of behaviour, and being
ren included the capacity to assume the dispositions of
superior or subordinate as occasion required. While some
translations of ren suggest that it includes a
non-discriminatory attitude of concern for humanity as a
whole, my claim is that any such reading of the Analects is
forcedly non-contextual. Even in references to relations
between friends, where we might expect attitudes to be
spontaneously non-hierarchical on both or all sides, it
still seems necessary to see ren as respectful and
preservative of social order. That this is so is
established in particular by the absence from the Analects
of any symbolic or institutional resources which specify or
nurture relations between persons as such, in virtue of
something like a common humanity which in an absolute and
irreducible sense renders them equal as human beings.
Persons in the Analects exist entirely in terms of their
formation within social hierarchies, and any concept of
friendship has to be viewed in this light. [This is
important given the contrasting situation in Greece, where
philosophical reflection on the nature of friendship was an
important move for Plato (in the Lysis in particular) and
Aristotle (in the Nichomachean Ethics and elsewhere) -
though we shall see that the problem of hierarchy remained
also an issue for the Greeks. [22]]
It is on these grounds, and particularly as regards the
semantic relations between ren and l_i, that I speak of ren
as a specification of what it is to be human in an
aristocratic way. A text post-dating Confucius has it that
punishments, fa, do not reach up to the nobles, and rituals,
li, do not reach down to the common people, min. Confucius
himself also remarked
The common people (min) can be made to follow a path
but not to understand it. An.8.9.
This suggests that, not admitted to the practice of li, the
common people could not hope to become ren in any full and
final sense [23]. In a move at once liberating and binding,
the Analects presents an aspect of the life of the nobility
as the completeness of human virtue, whilst allowing that in
principle such virtue was not available to all, and probably
not even to most, within Zhou society. And here the
question of the scope of virtue has not to do with the
intrinsic difficulty of its attainment - a point addressed
and answered by Confucius - but with the social
contextualisation of its practice.
(ii) Ren as Virtue in General; Being Human in an
Aristocratic Way
One way to consider the frequency of ren in the Analects
$4
is to view its use as a search for a definition of an
essential and perfected form of humanity. Its reference to
some general concept of virtue or perfection would thus
parallel the referential function of terms such as arete and
virtus. [ I have already expressed caution on the idea of
perfection. We will see that ren is the virtue of the
junzi, but not of the sage, sheng; in this respect it
perhaps indicates an appropriate perfection which Confucius
reckoned to be manageable in his own time, in contrast with
the ideal but impossible perfection associated with the
sage.[24]] As well as referring to virtue in general, ren is
also taken to refer to the specific virtue translated as
"benevolence" or "humaneness". That much said, distinction
tbetween these two usages is not clearly made, and there is
no concern in the Analects with a formalised definition of
ren; attention is given instead to a rhetorical and
pragmatic articulation of its modes of manifestation, and of
the dispositional qualities necessary for its attainment.
One saying linkes ren to accomplishment in and in
music, yue:
The Master said, "What can a man do with l_i who is not
ren? What can a man do with yue who is not ren?"
An.3.3.
Here we would need to see li^ and yue from two viewpoints.
As part of the process of paideia they would jointly
constitute an induction to ren, elements in a rite of
passage whereby an individual might progress to ethical and
cultural maturity - in this sense, they assist a process.
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At the same time they also constitute terms of a process:
their perfect expression, their proper articulation in the
life of the community, lies in the disposition of one who
has been perfected in their practice, who is at ease with
the conventions governing performance. To be perfected in
this way is to be ren [25].
As a perfection, ren implies a quality of
self-possession, composure, an ability to remain balanced
and unswayed in extreme circumstances (we will remark later
how this compares with the self-sufficiency of the
Aristotelian agathos); in terms of adherence to Li, it means
following the normative ethical and cultural practices even
when external circumstances do not favour this:
The Master said, "The man without ren cannot live long
in conditions of hardship, nor can he live long in
comfort. The man of ren is at home with ren (renche an
ren), the wise man profits (l_i) from ren. An. 4.2.
Yen Yuan asked about ren. The Master said, "To return
to l_i through overcoming self constitutes
ren. If for a single day a man could return to
through overcoming himself, then the whole world
(tianxia) would consider ren to be his. However, the
practice of ren depends on oneself alone and not
on others.
Yen Yuan said, "I should like you to list the items."
The Master said,"Do not look unless it is in accordance
with 3jL; do not listen unless it is in accordance with
li; do not speak unless it is in accordance with 3^; do
not move unless it is accordance with li^. An. 12.1.
The ideal of responsibility for self here - and the man of
ren is finally able to use himself as a standard by which to
judge others, An.6.30 -, mediated as it is through the
practice of _li, raises a number of tensions within any
reading of ren. First, there is a tension between the ideas
of ren as perfection and ren as benevolence. Even though we
1/
are at this stage considering ren as perfection or general
virtue, we would nonetheless expect some indicator which
suggests a link between general virtue and the specific
virtue "benevolence". [When Aquinas speaks of caritas he
identifies it as the form and efficient cause of all
virtues, as well as a specific virtue itself, but its former
qualities are expressly linked to its specific function as
"love" characterised as openness and orientation to God.]
There is nothing that we have seen so far, however, that
would encourage us to make any link between ren and
benevolence. Ren implies balance, self-control, and fluency
in l_i - and while certain l_i cover areas of interpersonal
behaviour (as for instance the l_i governing behaviour
towards a guest), so that it might be possible there to read
ren as the spirit of benevolence at work in the practice of
li, the network of as a whole extends into areas of
practice for which "benevolence" would have no bearing (as
for instance wearing the correct kind of cap for a
particular function An.9.3, or archery, which we have
alrteady noted as a primary JLi^-bound activity for the
junzi. ) And even in the context of governing
interpersonal relations, we would need to consider whether
ren is a disposition of benevolence, or simply the general
aptitude to perform the correct behaviour. (We will see
later with Aristotle how even a discussion of friendship,
philia, can focus on behaviour and intentions geared to
self-enhancement, and show a minimal concern with affective
disposition towards others.)
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A second tension linked to the notion of responsibility
for self - and a fruitful tension tor Confucius - is that
concerning relations between individual and community.
"Self" and "community" are both normative notions in the
Analects; as such they are approached in their ideal
connotations as given through li. Here the perfection of
self is mediated through one's role in the community (it is
not the reclusive self-perfection favoured by hermits and
others who withdraw from society), and as such it represents
an enhancement of community life. To perfect self is, in
part, to perfect the forms of one's relations with others.
A third tension would be that between deliberation and
spontaneity in the practice of _li, and thus in the
expression of ren. Confucius favours a cultivated
spontaneity, as that achieved by a musician who hits the
right note at the right moment in any performance. The
extension of the musical analogy to society as a whole opens
a vision of society as fundamentally harmonious in its
various functions, so that once all l_i have been mastered
the notion of deliberation would have minimal place. The
problem of choice is markedly absent from the Analects: one
chooses to follow the dao expressed in JLi or one does not,
but the notion that there might be a conflict between
different _ljL, and thus a choice to be made over which to be
honoured at any particular time, is excluded [26]. The
Analects systematically represses conflict and deliberation
in favour of harmony, conformity to the specified details
<?3
of life, and spontaneous fulfilment of duties and
role-requirements. At the same time - and insofar as
Confucius himself acknowledges Ll not to be a static corpus
of behaviour fixed beyond change, but rather a flexible and
open-ended network capable of transformation - then space
for deliberation (as, for instance, over which Li, for
whatever reasons, have grown obsolete) is acknowledged. Here
I take it that the junzi, the one proficient in _li_ and ren,
is the one with authority to modify the practice of li -
though there is a hidden conflict in the Analects regarding
the appropriate locus of authority in society [27],
We have seen how Confucius can reckon ren to be something
close at hand, but he also suggests the opposite, that ren
marks a perfection which eludes him:
The Master said, "How dare I claim to be a sage
(sheng) or a man of ren (renche)? Perhaps it might be
said of me that I learn without flagging and teach
without growing weary." An.7.34.
He also suggests that ren is rarely manifest in others:
The Master said,"I have never met a man who finds ren
attractive, or who hates the absence of ren." An.4.6;
but he then immediately proceeds to remark that it is not
through lack of ability and strength that individuals fail
to be ren but (presumably) only through lack of inclination.
At one level this might seem to raise a question concerning
the degree of Confucius' own motivation in pursuit of ren,
but I think it rather opens for us the problem of how to
read the different sayings in the Analects. Two points are
worth remarking. First, what Confucius says on any topic is
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strategic rather than theoretic - it represents a particular
response to a particular inquiry or situation and, as
became much more the case with the' Chan masters in the Tang
and Song dynasties, it constitutes an attempt to waken
insight and transformation in a particular individual, with
his specific strengths and weaknesses, rather than to
provide further amplification of a general theory. And
second, Confucius' various sayings come from different
stages of a long life given over to teaching, and any full
hermeneutic would require a reconstruction of the
developmental stages in his approach to any topic.
Confucius himself reviewed his life in old age, describing
it as a journey through a series of particular phases, each
with its own accomplishment, and this in turn provokes two
further observations. First, the young teacher might
consider ren elusive, since he remains aware of a body of
accomplishment lying beyond him, whilst the old teacher
might well feel ren to be close at hand, so conformed has he
become to the byways and intentionalities of l_i. And
second, the notion ren might itself become differentiated so
as to mark not some final single perfection, but the
particular perfections available within particular stages of
life. [Hindu philosophy, for instance, has four different
stages of life with different perfections in dharma
appropriate to each.] I leave these options on ren open
here, since that is how they are left in the Analects.
In a curious series of sayings Confucius claims, in
relation to some his own closest followers, not to know
whether they are ren. Given that he says so much about ren,
and that ren is linked through l_i to the sphere of publicly
observable performance, rather than that of inner
disposition and intention, then the profession of ignorance
here is difficult to assess. Elsewhere Confucius
acknowledges that one individual in particular taught him to
judge a man's virtue not by his words but by his actions
(An.5.10), and we would expect him to be particularly able
to apply such a judgment to the practice of his immediate
followers; indeed, on one occasion he does not hesitate to
assess the virtue of someone close to him:
The Master said,"In his heart (xin) for three months at
a time Hui does not lapse from ren. The others attain
ren merely by fits and starts. An.6.7.
Various comments are appropriate here. First, Hui seems to
have the status of favourite disciple for Confucius, much as
John does for Jesus - Confucius would thus likely know his
disposition and practice better than he would that of
others, and so might feel able to comment on his ren.
Second, we do not know the degree of contact Confucius had
with his followers in general - he did not gather a comunity
around him, as the Buddha did with the sangha, and thus
there exists the possibility that he did not know the lives
of many of his followers in close detail, so judging it wise
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to refrain from comment on their ren. And third, the
precise reference to xin here opens for us that area in the
Analects - not extensive, but present - where Confucius is
concerned with disposition and intention, as well as with
performance. On this we can say that Hui's perfection of
<?*
ren lets us extend the analogy of acquired spontaneity in
musical performance, by opening the area of personal
commitment, and concern with perfection in performance, as
necessary factors in any acquired spontaneity: only the
sustained desire for perfect fulfilment of l_i, to match the
spirit as well as the letter, draws out the fully moral
aspect of performance, and it is in identifying this
constancy of commitment and disposition that Confucius
refers to xin.
(iii) Ren as Specific Virtue: Benevolence, Humaneness, or
Some Other Quality?
It has been assumed for so long that ren might be
translated as benevolence, or altruism, or humaneness, and
thus be taken as a marker of other-directed concern and
affection, that the notion that these qualities might be
very far from anything indicated by ren is scarcely
entertained. Yet a close reading of the Analects reveals
very little that is of a markedly affective nature - so that
the notion of interpersonal warmth does not emerge as a
major theme - and the tenor of ren might much more be
considered a formalised courtesy expressed through li, than
warmth towards another known and loved; and in many cases it
seems to have nothing to do even with courtesy.
This is not to deny that some structures of affection are
presupposed by Confucius: respect and devotion towards
parents is a central theme, with strong emphasis placed on
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the expression of grief for three years at their death.
Reciprocity (shu) is an occasionally praised quality,
though this can be read as do ut des, expressive of a
contractual basis for social order. Friendship is valued:
the Analects begins with its recommendation:
The Master said, "Is it not a pleasure, have learned
something, to try it out at due intervals? Is it not a
joy to have friends come from afar?" An.1.1;
and the affection Confucius had for Hui is marked by his
manifest, almost excessive, grief at Hui1s death. Yet the
linking of affectivity with ren is problematic. The
usually-quoted indicator is the following saying:
Fan Ch'ih asked about ren. The Master said, "Love your
fellow men (airen)." An.12.22.
We have seen already the distinction existing between ren
and min (which I take to be continued, though in somewhat
modified form, into the Analects), and our first observation
here must be that, whatever is meant by "love", its
expression exists from one ren to another, not from ren
to min nor between min [29], "Love" here is thus mediated
through l_i as the common bonds of practice and way of life
within which the existence of ren is situated. Ren as
airen is not a "direct" affective response of the heart (is
not the simple expression of love found in many Shijing love
lyrics), but is the mediated concern for others within a
common culture group. Airen can perhaps be taken here as
expressive of a range of possibilities, from a formalised
reciprocity which keeps the social contract alive, through
to that affective bonding with others whose lives mesh with
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one's own. With these qualifications it can in part be read
as warmth and benevolence.CJol
Another saying makes generosity towards others a
component of ren:
Tzu-chang asked Confucius about ren. Confucius said,
"There are five things and whoever is capable of
putting them into practice in the empire is certainly
ren." "May I ask what the are?"
"They are respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in
word, quickness and generosity. If a man is respectful
he will not be treated with insolence. If he is
tolerant he will win the multitude. If he is
trustworthy in word his fellow men (ren) will entrust
him with responsibility. If he is quick he will
achieve results. If he is generous he will be good
enough to be put over his fellow men (ren)." An.17.6.
Here generosity (which we could also call benevolence)
constitutes but one part of the virtue ren, and the other
named elements bear no necessary or intrinsic relation to
it. (On the other hand, it is of interest to note that
generosity to other ren is specifically identified as the
quality of leadership.)
A further saying suggests that ren constitutes a
generalised courtesy to others, linked with personal
integrity:
Zhonggong asked about ren. The Master said, "When
abroad, behave as though you were receiving an
important guest. When employing the services of the
common people (min) behave as though you were
officiating at an important sacrifice. Do not impose
on others (ren) what you yourself do not desire. In
this way you will be free from ill whether in a state
or a noble family." An.12.2.
Here ren can be read as the expression of that achieved
conformity to ritual that allows one to know and demonstrate
the required courtesies in any context; from what we have
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already remarked, it can be read as conformity to the spirit
and not just the letter of Li; it can be read as concern for
the order manifest in li; but it does not need to be read
at any level as a strongly affective concern for persons
(which is not to say that Confucius lacked or disregarded
such concern, only that it is not a theme of his discourse).
Ren is on a number of occasions linked with
trustworthiness (xin) or correct and truthful speech
[An.1.3,5.5]. It is spoken of as a capacity for
concentration and application to work in hand [An.6.22], It
marks a prudence that does not act hastily [An.6.26]. It
constitutes a basis in the self for achieving judgment about
(the moral capacities and attainments of) others [An.6.30] .
It is a quality of the min when they are stirred by the good
example of the junzi [An.8.3]. Ren marks an absence of
anxiety (An.9.29), and a capacity to absorb without wavering
the dislike of others (An.8.10). In all of this, I would
suggest, it is best read - rather than as benevolence or
humaneness - as courtesy to others and concern for one's own
integrity, insofar as these notions are organised in letter
and spirit by l_i [31],
4. REN AND LI
We have indicated that one reading of the relations
between ren and LL, ritual, might be as follows. Li, as a
network of principles governing behaviour in a diverse range
of social contexts, constitutes jointly a pedagogy and a
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kind of score, guiding and orchestrating action so that
society functions as a harmonious whole, with ren in
consequence being the sort of social fluency arising from a
full understanding of one's place in a hierarchically
ordered whole where each individual "spontaneously" meets
the details of his or her part. To be ren in this context,
to have undergone the paideia of JLl, is to be as fluent as
an archer or a musician (to follow Confucius' favoured
instances) in using an acquired skill, when the skill in
question is simply "being fully human" according to the
definitions of humanness coded in li.
To those familiar with a metaphysical tradition, where
customs and received practices (nomoi) are downgraded in
favour of laws of nature and the perceived structure of the
soul, the priority granted to ljL in articulating and
founding ren might seem questionable and relativistic. In
Greece the Sophists favoured the relativism of laws and
values as these found different expression in different
societies, but Plato perceived things oppositely: his
attempt to establish virtue, arete, on a foundation of
immutable moral principles - on knowledge of the good and of
the soul's capacitites for goodness - was the first of a
series of Western attempts to undercut relativism and to
secure transcendental principles that are universally
binding, thus tying moral and political order to them. This
conjunction of metaphysical knowledge and self-knowledge
marks a significant difference from the orientation of the
Analects.
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The comparison of Confucius with Plato should not be
pressed too far: the latter was after all writing with some
centuries of philosophical debate behind him, where the
issues had already become diversified, while the inaugural
function of the Analects is such that even claims to view it
as a philosophical text are rendered suspect [32],
Nonetheless it did open a space for Confucian philosophy,
and that space was one where, until the end of the Tang
dynasty, metaphysical, psychological and,to an extent,
epistemological issues were not a major concern, with the
result that Confucian handling of ethical and political
themes proceeded from different foundational and structural
principles from those established early in the West. Even
so the question still arises - it is a question in fact
present in the Analects - whether some form of relativism is
implicit in Confucius' li_ and how this might be understood.
If it is, we have the further question whether this affects
the interpretation of ren. Far from seeing ren as the
single thread, as a unifying vision of human excellence,
should we think of different forms of ren practised, for
instance, in the different states of the Zhou domain; or of
different forms apropriate to different social stations
within a single state such as Lu; or even of different forms
of ren appropriate to different stages of an individual
life? Can these differences be united, and does their unity
or lack of it constitute a problem? Two issues will help
focus the inquiry.
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Firstly the question of cultural diversity, a matter to
the fore in classical Greece in a way in which it was not in
China. Plato studied in Egypt perhaps, and knew of Persia -
recognised, thus, two imperial civilizational traditions
older than the Greeks. The movement of his thought in
philosophy was of a piece both with that of earlier Greek
speculation, and with that of Egyptian and Mesopotamian
imperial ideologies, in its concern to find a single
principle of order and single source of authority. While
for imperial theology this led to an organisation of the
gods under a high god, and a dispensation of divine justice
through the mediation of the king, for Plato it led to an
ordering of the functions of the soul and a structuring of
the movement of desire, eros, so that the free man might
achieve knowledge of the good. The opening of the soul as a
locus of order was Plato's move to avoid relativism and the
conflict it implied; its consequences will detain us for
some time later.
For Confucius the issue of relativism in this sense did
not arise. There were no other royal or imperial systems, no
forms of culture that existed beyond the Zhou and that might
put the divinely founded hegemony of the Zhou in question,
nor was there need to speculate on the origins of the gods
and establish a theogony, since the overthrow of the Shang
and the assimilation of Shang Di to tian had sufficiently
described the force and outlines of transcendent authority
and power. The Zhou king had received the mandate, the
mandate was manifest in observance of the li, and in this
sense we can take it that Confucius saw a single,
fundamental set of l_i uniting the different local practices
of the Zhou domain: differences there were, but these were
of such a secondary order as to be compatible with cultural
unity. And while with Plato the Forms are the objectives
and motivation of moral striving, supreme exemplars of
value, for Confucius the culture heroes Yao, Shun and the
Duke of Zhou fulfil a comparable exemplary function.
(Though this unified vison does need to be read in relation
to one strong possibility of relativism opened in the
Analects.)
The second point concerns those precise JLi to which the
Analects might be taken to refer. While later Confucianism
produced compendia of li (the Zhouli, Yili and Liji) there
is no evidence that any such compendium existed at the time
of Confucius [33]. Certainly particular can be taken to
be exemplified in older texts (in the principles of
political action in the Shujing, or in the moral
exhortations of the Shijing) but - especially as regards the
latter text - we would need, for any adequate comment on the
issue here, to know how Confucius intended it to be read:
one surviving reading in the Analects, for instance, raises
important questions as to how the poems of the Shijing were
put to educational use [34].
We can direct inquiry by asking whether, for Confucius,
all social practices are examples of _li, and then whether
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proficiency in all practices is required to achieve ren.
In one sense the organised practices of any society can
be seen as rituals. When Fingarette speaks of handshaking
as a recognizable instance of JjL, and its spontaneous
expression between two people as an example of acquired
social ease, he suggests one way of seeing LL in the
Analects [35], But while ^Li might exist for the smooth
functioning of the whole, it does not follow that all l_i are
directly interpersonal: we have seen that ren can be a
quality, disposition or achievement of individuals on their
own, and it seems similarly likely that l_i might specify the
conditions for the fulfilment of a role (that of
impersonator at the ancestral feast, for instance) without
that role entailing, or entailing any high degree of,
interpersonal involvement [36]. But then, are all roles
governed by Li, or only a select number? Zhuangzi's delight
in presenting Cook Ding as a paradigm of Daoist excellence
later brings home the point that menials and outcasts in
society have their own perfection which is not covered by
the Li of the Confucian junzi, and the notion that the JLL do
not reach down to the common people suggests that there is
no early Confucian perspective for viewing non-elite skills
as determined by l_i (LL governing archery and charioteering,
yes, JLi^ governing bronze-working, jade-carving or farming,
no). To what extent might this position be true for
Confucius himself?
The last point, whether there might be a LL of farming,
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directs us back to the Shijing, and the uses of Li found
there. Several odes tell of the regularity of the
agricultural year, the existence of times and seasons for
all things under heaven, and insofar as the first use of li
derives from a sacrifical religious context it seems at
least that the order of agricultural life is governed by li.
It seems also, however, that the activity of ordering, and
the group responsible for it, is what is of real
significance here; and this draws us back to the priestly
and scribal functions tied to ancestral and nature cults. If
we take it that - ideally at least - the organisation of
cultic practice moved from the centre to the periphery of
the Zhou world through the enfeoffment of local rulers as
civic and religious authorities, and that the practice of l_i
was first centred in courtly circles, then while we may see
the agricultural year as ordered by li, we have no reason to
suppose that the mass of the people tied to the land were
thought to practise l_i, or thought themselves to do so, as
part of that maintenance of order.
Certain odes, however, suggest that things might be
otherwise:
In the seventh month the Fire ebbs;
In the ninth month I hand out the coats.
In the days of the First, sharp frosts;
In the days of the second, keen winds.
Without coats, without serge,
How should they finish the year?
In the days of the third they plough;
In the days of the Fourth out I step
With my wife and children.
Bringing hampers to the southern acre
Where the field-hands come to take good cheer.
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In the seventh month the fire ebbs;
In the eighth month they pluck the rushes,
In the silk-worm month they gather the mulberry-leaves,
Take that chopper and bill
To lop the far boughs and high,
Pull towards them the tender leaves.
In the seventh month the shrike cries;
In the eighth month they twist thread,
The black thread and the yellow:
'With my red dys so bright
I make a robe for my lord.'
Mao 171;Waley 1960:164-5.
If we take the sentiments expressed here to be those of the
people - and we have already suggested the folk origins of
the Odes, however much they were later worked by court
singers - then it would seem that the people could see
themselves as active participants in a world governed by li,
even if the roles they fulfilled were ascribed to them by an
elite group as part of a specific order.
The difficulty in focussing a conclusion here relates to
our manner of reading the compact symbolisation of
experience prior to the differentiations of philosophical
inquiry, and prior to the emergence of diverse marginal and
critical genres [37], Compact symbolisation and the
tightness of social control at this point go hand inhand. We
rely on the writings of an elite group as a filter for the
perceived order of Shijing society. The Odes present a world
neither riven with dissension, nor even marked by any
significant disturbance. It has been claimed that the early
centuries of the Zhou were in fact a time of great peace,
but whether this is true or not we have no way of
establishing whether the people acquiesced in the picture of
them presented in the Odes, or resisted it.
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That much said, we have only noted one reference in the
Analects to the ren of the common people, and its
acknowledged derivation from the exemplary behaviour of the
junzi. We can also accept for the time of Confucius a
degree of social conflict which made a single li-bound
society of min and ren - if it ever existed at all - a thing
of the past. With JLj^ not reaching down to the min it would
seem wrong to hold that they might be considered ren in any
significant sense. And with an acknowledged development of
different Li in different states, we have the implicit
possibility in Confucius' owrt teaching that different forms
of ren might represent appropriate perfections in different
states [38].
5. REN AND MODEL EMULATION
One feature in becoming ren is the practice of li;
equally important is the emulation of models, and these two
features are closely related. Once more the analogy of a
game or performance: proficiency does not lie in learning
the rules adequately as theory, or even in playing - a
lifetime can be spent playing badly; grasp of theory may
never actually shape a worthwhile practice. Becoming good
musically involves practice, but also listening to the
masters, observing their technique, their finesse at
translating marks into living sound. Acquaintance with
variety is of the essence here, if the concept of mastering
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an art is to become fully rounded. For Confucius it is the
culture-heroes of the past who function in particular as
exemplary models; in the present it is the king and the
junzi who should do so, and whose demonstration of virtue
should bring order to the state.
The idea of emulation involved is - with certain
modifications - consistently hierarchical: it is always the
masters one learns from, whether they be the ancient sages,
the king and the junzi, or one' parents and elders. These
are the keys to the dao, the traditional teaching, that
Confucius aims to transmit and re-establish. More, however,
than just a hierarchy of patterning is involved: the
perceived ideal flow of virtue comes in a movement of
descent from tian through the king to the various levels of
the polity. [One aspect of Confucius' apparently
contradictory position on the junzi as a ritual vessel is
significant here [39], The affirmative position that the
junzi is such a vessel is a confirmation that virtue does
not simply rest and gather with him. As is the case with
offerings in the vessel, he is a moment of exchange in an
economy where the flow and circulation, rather than the
accumulation and hoarding, of virtue is at stake. The
question whether the junzi should in all cases assist such
circulation, or whether he should not also at times withdraw
from the movement of exchange and gather his own virtue as
capital, is one which we shall consider in the next
chapter.] This descent of virtue explains why Confucius
urges the junzi to aspire to public office: from a status
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where self-effacement and receipt of the veneration of
others sit in precarious balance, the junzi should with
maximum effect propagate heavenly virtue; and since it is
precisely Heaven that is author of the virtue which is in
him, the balance of positions at stake should always incline
fully to the side of self-effacement. Model emulation here
is not overtly geared to the shaping of an independent self,
but to the dissolution of the self in a play of social roles
where the constant flow of virtue in a structured economy of
order is the object of desire.
6. LI, EXEMPLARITY, AND THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES
(ZHENGMING)
There is some dispute as to whether the doctrine of
zhengming can be ascribed to Confucius, but I shall presume
here that it can; it is in fact a central aspect to his dao
(teaching) that there be a congruence between names, ming,
and social reality, and the idea of correcting names is a
good part of what his work is about. One related idea here
is the correction also of behaviour. Names are not simply
neutral tags attached to an objective world; they are
value-laden indicators of patterns of conduct. Thus when
Confucius says let a father be a father, a son be a son, he
is calling attention to the aspects of value and normativity
coded in these terms: meeting the roles they specify
involves meeting a set of proprieties, a network of
practices that can stretch to fit all eventualities [40],
These names - the full specification of social reality -
have their origin in the work of the king as he translates
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into hierarchical order the mandate of Heaven.
If the king names, then the king should correct names:
this is the tenor of the authoritarianism Confucius
endorses. Thus when he criticises the behaviour of the Chi
clan, their usurpation of practices properly named only for
the royal court, he himself does not re-name the clan
leaders (as upstarts or insurgents) - nor do we find a
powerful rhetoric of changed designation anywhere at work in
the Analects: the need for rectification is shown at
several points, but for Confucius to engage in re-naming
would be to damage further the royal prerogatives he wishes
to re-instate. Nonetheless, Confucius does show himself
ready to refuse or endorse certain names in specific
contexts, which raises questions concerning the kind of
authority he reserved for himself as a prophet of the ancien
regime.
Confucius saw himself as a successor to King Wen in the
field of virtue [41]. In many traditions we know of a
conflict between scribal and royal interests; indeed in
Egypt the value of the scribe, as of his patron the god
Thoth, and of writing as the scribal art, is designated as
cunning: writing can make the world otherwise, can change
records, just as it can trace the magic formulae to secure
passage through death [42]. If Confucius is a successor to
King Wen then he is a rival to the present Zhou rulers as
the focus of heavenly order. This rivalry did not lead to
the establishment of two competing and interacting realms of
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moral and political value such as we find elsewhere (with
Buddhism and Christianity, for instance, where the sangha
and the church became orders alternative to that of the
state); nonetheless, it does open a line of conflict that we
shall find developed to some extent in Mencius. And
certainly, if tradition is right, Confucius did not hesitat
to take responsibility for a quasi-royal function, the
re-naming (correct naming) of history, fulfilling this in
his editorial work on the Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn
Annals).
Getting names right is a prerequisite to action. Name
someone wise and one can go to him for guidance; name him
charlatan and one tries to expose his imposture; name this
entity a fetus, or an unborn child, and one can judge a
certain act to be simply clinical, or murder. In his
re-naming the historical record - in his lifting a normative
past from the flux of history, designating it tradition, and
clearly separating heroes and villains - do we name
Confucius a faithful interpreter of the Zhou past, or a
despoiler, erasing from the record all that might be at
variance with his ideal image of virtue's passage? In
moralising the past Confucius seems continuous with that
early Zhou practice which reduced the memory of the Shang to
simply the form of the degenerate: this theft of the voice
of the Shang, this portrayal of them solely in reprobate
guise, is a central feature in King Wen1s act of parricide.
And while Confucius' move might be a more complex act, in
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retaining the perceived heart of Zhou history,
nonetheless the way this act reverberates in Confucius'
understanding of authority and humanity, ren, is of crucial
import.
We might complicate matters by suggesting - Confucius
suggests it clearly himself - that the son has a duty of
obedience to his parents in all things; not blind obedience,
certainly, since the son can hold a certain corrective
power, a power of reprimand, in reserve, but an obedience at
least ready to mask parental wrongdoing [43], In one case
Confucius suggests that it is the appropriate JLL to cover
for one's father, to maintain his face with the community,
even when one knows him guilty of a certain "injustice"
[44], ("Injustice" has to be problematised, precisely
because the act in question could not be defined as such -
could not even perhaps be named as "theft" - from the
perspective of Confucius's IJJ Here it is part of xiao
(filial piety), but also part of ren as the practice of li,
to mask, to conceal, to draw the veil of propriety over
"injustice". Ren shows its particularised scope as family
loyalty in the first instance, as protection of the family
against others, rather than as behaviour expressive of a
justice more universally founded.
In this example, the name of the father takes priority
over any other name; one cannot re-name him "thief", and
prosecute him; one preserves "father", and conceals him by
honouring the relationship to the father. One question
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which remains beyond resolution from the Analects is how far
this game of protection goes, and whether in any
circumstances the son has a right to obliterate the name
"father" according to principles of a wider humanity. If a
father is known, for instance, to have killed in a quest for
power, can the son re-name him "murderer", and surrender him
to the appropriate authorities? There is nothing in the
Analects to suggest this possibility, while the weight of
hierarchy tends against it: it is those with authority who
have power over names, not those in subordiante position.
Yet if Confucius can re-name history why can the son not
re-name the father?
Part of the answer here might be that, as we have seen,
the junzi has, through assiduous practice of Li, earned the
right to interpret and modify the rituals; this entails also
the right to change names within a certain sphere of
competence. Confucius claimed competence over history,
particularly the power to recreate there an ideal father,
but his role here is justified precisely as one of sonship,
preserving the face of history-as-father; whereas the son,
as son, has not learned, and can never learn, a competent
authority over his father, while any act of exposing the
father, perhaps delivering him to execution for wrongdoing,
robs the son of continuity with his own past, insofar as he
enters a future devoid of the father's ancestral role as
transcendent intermediary and of his own continuing role as
filial son.
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There is little doubt that "legitimate" acts of parricide
did occur at the time of Confucius; of interest here is the
fact that they are ignored by him, and that no symbolic
resource is developed to deal with the issues raised. In
Greece, parricide (and matricide) is one of the central
themes of tragedy. Orestes kills Clytaemnestra to avenge
Agamemnon, and crucial in the dramatic sequence is Orestes'
step into an abyss of horror, leading to a focussing of the
conflict between two competing orders of justice,
tribal/familial revenge and the new civil order of the
emergent state. With Confucius the question of horror is
avoided - not that it was not there in the fabric of his
time, but he elides it in presenting himself as twin to a
certain Nietzschean Socrates, the optimistic rational man -
while any question of competing standards of virtue is also
by-passed on the assumption that there is just one normative
tradition, the teaching, dao, of the ancients [45],
7.EXBMPLARITY, EQUALITY AND THE ENDS OF MAN
With what degree of terror did Confucius live in the
world, and by what means was this held at bay? If we know
that a motif of terror - before heaven, before the king -
was announced in the Shijinq then how did Confucius
assimilate and rationalise this in his own stance? (His
reading of the Shijinq seems rationalistic.) Fear and
horror of the sort made manifest in tragedy (Greek or
Shakespearean), and covered by Nietzsche in his reading of
the Dionysiac, is in many philosophies the bass note of
existence, known as a sense of radical finitude not just in
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face of the ultimate dissolution of death, but in
confrontation also with the force of difference at the heart
of identity, with life as a play of incommensurable powers
which muthos/logos attempts to order around a logic of the
proper [46]. Any such ordered semiosis is a process of
naming and dividing the powers of the world which is
achieved at the cost of repression, and one which occurs as
a necessary moment in any individual and social life.
Insofar as Western philosophy has been structured around a
rational order of being-as-identity (for Aquinas ens et unum
convertuntur), the sense of non-being has regularly tended
towards a thematic of sin, evil, and an original power of
violence and disruption. In this framework the force of
tragedy (a Western style of handling these themes that does
not exist as a genre in China) can easily be read, with
Aristotle, as a process of catharsis, a knowing release from
horror through ritual re-enactment of the loss - in Oedipus
for instance - of the cornerstone of order's edifice. Here
we can follow Nietzsche's criticism of Aristotle and note
that the normative moment of tragedy involves a step beyond
catharsis, and a full entry into the horror of the void as a
necessary moment of liberation [47].
Horror is perhaps simply a Western response to the void.
Zhuangzi's critique of Confucius raises the possibility of
non-identity as joyful release, rather than as terror [48].
In ways that we shall consider, Zhuangzi's otherwise close
proximity to Nietzsche changes here (pace Nietzsche's joyful
wisdom) to a divergence that is rooted in a set of radically
different, historically differently sedimented, approaches
to non-being. For the moment, though, if Zhuangzi presents
non-identity as release, as play, how does this allow us to
read the basic stance of Confucius?
As with identity, non-identity has to be achieved: if the
Buddhist monk looks with equanimity on the void, and on his
loss of a sense of substantial self, this is the result of
work, of proficient following of a teaching, a dao.
Zhuangzi's dao, as a critique of the sense of self
crystallised by Confucius and Mencius, allows us to focus
the point here that, despite our earlier comments about
self-effacement in the Analects, Confucius does organise a
very powerful self, though one not dependent on a concept of
the inner self, or on any psychological reference. He does
not, then develop a theory of the mind or soul; instead he
offers an account of the self in behavioural and social
terms.
Confucius presents a profoundly extensive ego-ideal
modified by the constraints of insertion within a social
hierarchy, and by recognition of the mediating power of the
king/emperor [49]. Thus, the sage-rulers of the past are
presented as exemplary models, but the practical ideal to
aspire to is that not of sagehood, sheng, but of nobility,
junzi. To be a sage is ultimately to have the power to
disrupt any given social order in the name of the true order
of heaven. The sage by his virtue stands close to the mind
ny
of heaven, and at a time when the mandate, tianming, was
partially in eclipse - as it was in the mid-Zhou period - to
recognise someone as sage would be to recognise a possibly
alternative source of authority to that of the king [50],
Confucius' aim, on the contrary, was to strengthen royal
Zhou authority. A somewhat similar problem of authority is
found in Old Testament literature, with the solution - a
distinction between true and false prophets - hinging on the
question of legitimate access to the voice of God. In the
Analects the solution is to suggest that sagehood indicates
a distant, unattainable ideal; the practically feasible goal
is that of junzi.
A corollary is that neither sage, nor indeed ruler, is
presented in the Analects as a man of ren: ren is the virtue
of those fully within the social hierarchy, but it is not a
foundational principle in the way the word of Heaven, of the
sage, or of the ruler is: this word is unquestionably
foundational and as such requires not modification but
implementation. In this framework it does not matter
whether someone can be said consistently to be ren in action
and disposition, since the sage is always more than ren;
this will not win for them the designation "sage"; and if
ren is a counsel of perfection it is such in a circumscribed
rather than absolute sense. [Co]
Confucius thus presents a partially limited ego-ideal,
but one of tremendous power nonetheless, where a combination
of the cultivation of virtue, ritual dexterity, imposing
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(archaic) dress and demeanour, a mind disciplined by study
and by chanting the odes, and a superior status in the
social hierarchy, all conspire to make the word and gesture
of the junzi powerfully efficacious. Within this one cannot
read directly a sense of terror at the chance aspect of
things, nor a sense of ideals wrested from a void beyond any
determination of order and value: the accident and hazard of
life in this sense are deferred into specific questions of
management and change within an order whose fundamental
structure is presupposed. The intense ritualism of
divination we encountered in the Shang as a means of holding
chaos at bay has by the time of Confucius (indeed, earlier)
consolidated itself in a sense of the cosmos as
ontologically secure, as fundamentally ritually ordered.
Here the ideal of junzi as knowing and living with a ritual
world can be posited as operational within a scheme of
things, rather than foundational for it.
This still leaves unresolved the management of horror as
it ruptures such a scheme: neither in a myth of original
usurpation - whether by an Adam or Prometheus - nor in a
ritualising of horror itself through the formulae of tragic
repetition, do we find this issue addressed in the Analects.
It may be, however, that a repeated and ritualised violence
at the foundation of order constitutes the heart of darkness
that Confucius knew. A line of reading here is suggested by
Mozi, Confucius's first philosophic critic. Speaking
against the waste involved in the expensive funerals which
Confucius favoured he says:
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And as to those who are chosen to accompany the dead,
in the case of a son of Heaven anywhere from several
ten to several hundred persons will be sacrificed,
while in the case of generals or high ministers the
number will be from several to several tens.
Mozi 25; Watson 1964:67
As we have noted, the archaeological record attests
large-scale human sacrifice for the Shang, and the
continuation of such practices well into the Zhou period
[51]. Neither Confucius nor Mencius speak against these
(Xunzi does), and it is crucial to know whether their
philosophy is rooted, in part at least, in a presupposition
of sacrificial violence. The shedding of blood in rituals,
as in oaths of allegiance, was standard in Zhou China. As
an expert in ritual affairs Confucius would certainly have
known of this, as of the situation with human sacrifice; and
while funerals for the Son of Heaven were not frequent,
those for high ministers certainly were. Just as in Greece
the rituals prototypically formative of tragedy served to
establish order, and regularly to re-establish it, so
perhaps for Confucius the ceremonial surrounding certain of
the more solemn Zhou rituals provided that recurring sense
of horror known and redeemed upon which an optimistic
philosophy could rest.
Insofar as ritual violence belongs at the limit, in the
sacred time of the foundations, there need not seem any
necessary contradiction between it and the humanism it might
found. Indeed, the space for contradiction is reduced
virtually to zero, since the logic of foundations is a logic
of repression that can only be undone at the limits, on the
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threshhold of the founded order [52] . The significant
point in reading Confucius here concerns not contradiction,
but the use of rational violence in a continuing exclusion
of the repressed: is Confucius simply an ethical humanist,
an optimistic Socratic rationalist tout court, using the
violence of hierarchizing reason to exclude ritual violence
fromhe overt record, just as the original founding act of
the Zhou dynasty is excluded - as violence - from the
historical record; or does he wish that violence to be known
regularly as the bass note above which the harmonies of
order rise?
[An alternative reading, which stresses the function of
ren as the articulation of a specifically human world,
distinct from the gods and nature, would be that, in
rationalising the rituals, as also the Odes, Confucius
sought not to exclude the unpredictable power of the
religious or holy, since this had already been rendered
manageable within the ritual sphere, but to exclude a sense
of the holy as such, to exclude any contact with horror and
ecstasy. Since the burden of rationalisation in this latter
position is greater than the Analects can bear - it could
only be supported if Confucius were seen overtly to render
null the powerful religious tone the JLi had for the Zhou -
then I take the assumption that he validated l^L as in part
religious ritual to stand.] That much said, the points at
which the analects might be seen to tremble before a void of
horror and dissolution are difficult to name.
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If some practice of human sacrifice is pre-supposed, then
this would clearly constitute one such. The remembrance of
absent love - where memory arches over time and difference -
is another. But perhaps most important here - and
functioning in a similar mode to tragedy in Greece, is the
ritualised three year mourning period for the death of
parents. While it is not clear how many features of the
following description Confucius would endorse, Mozi's
account of some of the mourning rituals is worth noting:
And what are the rules to be observed by the mourner?
We are told that he must wail and cry in a sobbing
voice at irregular intervals, wearing hemp mourning
garments and with tears running down his face. He must
live in a mourning hut, sleep on a straw mat, and use a
clod of earth for a pillow. In addition he is urged
not to eat so as to appear starved, to wear thin
clothes so as to appear cold, to acquire a lean and
sickly look and a dark complexion. His ears and eyes
are to appear dull, his hands and feet lacking in
strength, as though he had lost the use of them. And
in the case of higher officials we are told that during
a period of mourning they should be unable to rise
without support or to walk without a cane. And all
this is to last for three years. Mozi,25;
Watson,1964:67-8.
It is clear from the details and extent of these
practices that the real death of a parent (or other close
relative) constitutes for the mourner his own extended
ritual passage through death - he becomes a semi-recluse,
semi-outcast, living on the borderlines, losing his
separateness from the animal world, taking on the visage of
a living corpse. Here in this chosen effacement, this
dissolution of the face along the lines of grief, this
disruption of ren as the balance and poise of life in a
passage that goes at once to the heart of ren as the filial
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relation, there is the knowledge of death in life, the
burden of the filial as death itself - the name of the
father as the name of death, and the passage of mourning as
at once the exorcism of that name and the willing assumption
of it as one's own in a return to the law of the community.
Mourning here can be seen as an encounter with the energies
met by the Greeks in tragedy, a Dionysiac passage through
horror into a reborn world of Apollo. In part at least.
For by means of a crucial difference here an encounter with
violence (the sacrificial violence surrounding Iphigeneia;
the violence of Oedipus) is excluded from the script of this
process [53].
8. REN AND HUMAN NATURE
From the few overt uses of the Odes in the Analects it
seems that Confucius rationalises their meaning in order to
establish his own position; how extensively, it is
difficult to say. One powerful instance opens here some
further considerations.
Zixia asked,
"Her entrancing smile dimpling,
Her beautiful eyes glancing,
Patterns of colour upon plain silk.
What is the meaning of these lines?"
The Master said, "The colours are put in after the
white."
"Does the practice of the rites likewise come
afterwards?"
The Master said, "It is you, Sheng, who have thrown light
on the text for me." An.3.8
Only a reading set on repressing the seductive power of
beauty could find the meaning of these lines to be such as
Confucius asserts. Yet the response he receives from Zixia
suggests a possible premise within his own philosophy, that
of a given, untutored human naturei if patterns suggest
rites, then plain white silk perhaps suggests a simple
nature that later gets formed, shaped and differentiated.
We only see debates on human nature emerging in subsequent
writers - in Mencius, for instance, under the pressure of
Gaozi's and Mozi's philosophies. Yet some assumption of a
given nature might be there with Confucius, reinforced by
other images and motifs. Even so, this would not be an
assumption of original equality: the degrees of talent that
individuals are born with varies in each case, and delimits
the shaping, formative power of the rites [54],
We have stressed repeatedly the hierarchical nature of
the rites, how they chart a way of life for an elite. We
have no reason to conclude that those absent from the
discourse of the Analects - women,peasants, craftsmen and
traders insofar as they are concerned with material
production rather than learning and diplomacy - are reckoned
either to have a place in the value system Confucius
presents, or to make any contribution to its symbolisation
(a fact heightened by the different status these groups
achieve with Laozi and Mozi) [55]. Since there is no overt
position on an original human nature advocated by Confucius,
the imagery and exlusions operative within such a concept do
not concern us here; what is significant is the way these
are at work in the ideal of human fulfilment represented by
the junzi.
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In speaking of the junzi - which we take also to be the
locus for the full realisation of ren - Confucius delineates
an ideal sphere of human operation within an existing and
unquestioned world order; crucial here is that he does not
represent the human ideal in terms of the sage, sheng.
Implicated in this is Confucius' own attempt to refurbish
the royal Zhou institutions, rather than inaugurate new ones
through the power of the sage; and while one argument
suggests that he saw himself fulfilling a messianic role, it
seems better - in the absence of any references to him as
sage - to identify his role as prophetic, but prophetic
precisely for the old order. For Confucius to speak of
himself or of any other contemporary as "sage" would be to
acknowledge an alternative source of order to that of the
Zhou king [56]. [By the same token, it is not the original
foundations of order - the empires of the Xia and Shang -
that Confucius aligns himself with, but the order of the
Zhou. If he has a concept of a golden age, it is one within
an already established and developing world order, rather
than one at the beginnings or foundations. The sacred order
of original time and original foundations is separate from
the world he validates.]
Whilst the junzi is an examplar and preserver of
elite values, the encounter with failure and
non-recognition, with poverty and low social status, are not
excluded from his lot - not included as experiences he
should aspire to, as valuable and necessary tests of his
virtue, but not excluded either since they are likely enough
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occurences in an age of political turmoil and rapidly
changing fortunes. Thus Confucius, weds his daughter to a
man in prison; he accepts his own lack of political success;
he praises the junzi's equanimity in the face of poverty,
making a virtue of the balance that remains undisturbed
through changing circumstances; and he stresses the regular
application to work in whatever context. While he speaks on
occasion of destiny, ming, this is more to do with one's
allotted life-span than with the particular fortunes of life
encountered; it does not seem he would accept the Mencian
formula which excludes from a junzi's destiny the
possibility of death in prison.
The junzi then is a this-v/orIdly ideal of learning and
integrity, finding his appropriate fulfilment in political
office, though on the assumption that office is simply a
recognition of virtue already acquired: it is fulfilment of
the claims of virtue - of learning, filiality, deference,
ritual, and integrity - that is the goal of the j unzi,
and this can be realised even in straitened circumstances.
Yet not perhaps in all circumstances, for it at least seems
unlikely that each and every walk of life is compatible with
being a junzi and achieving ren, as we have already
indicated. While Confucius does not speak out against
profit (li.) in the way that Mencius does, he does disvalue
it as a principle, and thereby also disvalues the life of
those for whom profit is a necessary (though not the only)
criterion of achievement: traders, craftsmen, farmers.
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Furthermore, since it is doubtful that the lives of these
would have been regulated by _li (rituals) then the
possibility of being a junzi, as of achieving ren, is
excluded for them anyway. The point seems similarly true
for women: while it is Mozi's opinion that later Confucians
held their wives in inordinate esteem at least as regards
the provision of mourning rituals [57] , it is nonetheless
unlikely that women were active enough in learning, and in
the more central social rituals, to be considered candidates
for junzi by Confucius. Certainly no exemplary women figure
in his table of heroes.
(i) The Junzi: Self-love, Community and Death
Within the ethic of the junzi it does not seem
that self-love - so central and controversial a feature in
Western value systems - is of any significance; at least, it
is not thematised. We have noted that there is no strongly
psychological imagery at work in the Analects; the notion of
an inner self, a subject or soul, is not a matter of
consideration, and a self thus understood is not affirmed as
an object of love. But the self as agent, and the self as
possessed and gathered in tranquillity, are powerfully
figured, thus encouraging a broadening of the category
"self-love" so that the dynamic of motivation which
Confucius attributeso this self might be read as a
manifestation of it. Negatively, the imagery of
self-hatred, of self-loathing - the imagery tied in other
systems to theologies of the self as evil or sinful - is
absent from the Analects, as also is any emphasis on
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asceticism - any emphasis, therefore, on the body and mind
as powerfully unruly forces to be curbed and negated. This
absence is perhaps paradoxically linked to the one space
where an approach to asceticism does gain force - to the
mourning rituals - though here the ruination of the body is
less asceticism as such than an outworking of grief. It
seems that the powerfully regulating force of the parents
and ancestors, and of filiality, is taken to be such as to
repress the unruly, thereby creating the space within which
the specifically humane virtues might not only be operative,
but hold court entirely. With this repression presumed,
there is no division of good and evil, of holiness and sin,
rupturing the operation of virtue in the Analects.
Within imagery of the self as active, in search of
fulfilment, in a space stressing balance, where the body is
a locus of profound respect, in a gathering and heightening
of energies that would otherwise be lost, and where the self
yet remains deferential, bowed before heaven and authority,
in a world where the self meshes with others in an ideally
harmonised play of social relations, it would be wrong to
deny that there are strong considerations of self-love at
play. Not egotistical; not reducible to a desire for
status, for receipt of the love of others; but rooted in a
concept of ren as life's full empowering, so that to raise
oneself above the tedium of the day-to-day is to love self
more fully.
Yet this self is inscribed in the play of a
IZ0
world marked by the barrier of death. By contrast Plato's
vision of love has its roots in a 'myth of the soul' full
flowering after death. This transcendental intentionality
is also powerfully present in Aquinas, and more so, since
the community living beyond death, the communio sanctorum,
is inwardly united in caritas, and in caritas is one also
with the community of the ecclesial world. In the China of
Confucius, as in the period before him, the orientation
towards death is difficult to determine. The practice of
calling back the soul of the recently dead person powerfully
suggests that the beyond, even as the locus of ancestral
power, was a locus of dread, so that the men of Zhou
remained tied to the paths of this life, as were the Greeks
of heroic and classical times before that onset of worldly
pessimism which is the matrix of Plato's thought. Certainly
for the Zhou the otherworld was not figured as a place where
the dead might converse with the sages of the past. And as
we have remarked, the bond of ren operates entirely within
the configurations of the living human world; it does not
reach into the beyond; and even xiao as a continuing
disposition towards the parents after death is judged more




REN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ZHOU DEBATES
1. MOZI ON JIAN'AI AND REN
It seems difficult by any criterion to speak of the
Analects as philosophical, and less so of the Confucius
hidden and dispersed within it, stripped of the voice of
argument and the processes of reason - those attributes we
normally judge philosophical - and wearing instead a
hieratic, professorial garb, dispensing wisdom with the
voice of authority; which was perhaps his own original
voice, offering that knowledge which could only come from
above, a human distribution of the wisdom of heaven. But
that stance is no doubt as much shared by Heraclitus and
Parmenides, whom in the West we do not usually hesitate to
call philosophers. At least we can say of Confucius that
he is proto-philosophical, taking a newly stated position
and opening the space for subsequent debate [1].
Within that space Mozi appears as the first arguer given
over to the critical rejection of another position - in
this case that of Confucius himself. Active some years
after the death of Confucius (he flourished in the late
-5th century), and at first a follower of one Confucian
school, Mozi speaks with a practical, military,
technological and committedly religious voice against the
conservative, scholarly, authoritarian scepticism of the
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Confucian position. There is certainly a clash of class
interests at work here - the parvenu practical theorist
against defenders of the ancien regime - but that works out
into significantly different stances on the use of reason,
the nature of the state and social order, and the order of
the cosmos. As Mozi argues, we find him engaging in a
practice soon common to other Chinese philosophers, of
caricature at the service of his own position. Since he
was obviously highly familiar with the details of Confucian
thought and life, it is difficult at times to distinguish
caricature from reality in his portrayal of these;
certainly he writes with the sentiments of a man
disappointed in his former mentors.
Standardly, Mozi is taken to widen the scope of
Confucian morality by substituting for what seemed a
primarily familial concept of ren the broader concept of
universal love, jian'ai, arguing for it on utilitarian
grounds. [It had not been apparent from our reading of the
Analects that, in speaking of ren, Confucius was speaking
of family/clan relations in particular - indeed, ren could
be partly read there as the bond between adult males in a
given social group or class. The familial issue comes to
the fore with Mozi, and with later Confucian responses to
him.] Mozi thematises jian'ai by arguing for an actively
engaged will of Heaven which is directly concerned to
bestow favour on all; the extent to which Heaven on this
reading functions as a foundational principle for ethics,
in conflict with a utilitarian principle operative
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elsewhere in the text, is a point to be considered. This
apart, Heaven is at least seen as the instaurator and
preserver of profoundly hierarchical social order - this
much, with Confucius, is retained from the earlier
tradition - so that any reading of 1ian1ai as socialism
before the event is quite off the mark.
While interstate conflict was already a fact of life
with Confucius, the havoc this could wreak at all levels of
society was significantly more pronounced in Mozi's day
than earlier - the designation of his time and the rest of
the span of the Zhou as the Warring States period (-463 to
-222) indicates this aptly - with the result that, in his
and the texts of subsequent thinkers, certain topics became
more direct matters of concern than hitherto. As lands
were ravaged and harvests lost through war, issues of basic
economic survival and preservation of life became
predominant. Some withdrew from society - we meet these
proto-Daoists already in the Analects - to preserve their
qi (literally "breath", pneuma, then "life-force",
"energy") and to avoid what seemed the inevitability of
early death in the political arena. Others - Mozi to the
fore - stressed the economic restructuring of society [2].
Central to Mozi's thinking here is the value of
frugality. Certainly when he speaks on this it is partly
with the voice of the worker whose goods must be well
crafted if they are to sustain his livelihood - so that the
merely decorative can seem misplaced and frivolous - and
here his fulminations against Confucian-backed indulgence
spring more from a sense of indignation at waste than from
any positively-felt spirit of asceticism. Thus, in arguing
for new economic strategies (presenting these as a
re-appropriation of ancient practices) he speaks against
the court music-festivals - in reality, lavish large-scale
entertainments involving a range of performing arts - and
in so doing preserves the Confucian benevolent man (renren)
as a moral yardstick:
Therefore Mozi condemns music not because the sound of
the great bells and rolling drums, the zithers and
pipes is not delightful; not because the sight of the
carvings and ornaments is not beautiful; not because
the taste of the fried and broiled meats is not
delicious; and not because lofty towers, broad
pavilions, and secluded halls are not comfortable to
live in. But though the body finds comfort, the
mouth gratification, the eye pleasure, and the ear
delight, yet if we examine the matter, we will find
that such things are not in accordance with the ways
of the sage kings, and if we consider the welfare of
the world we will find that they bring no benefit to
the common people. Therefore Mozi said: Making music
is wrong I
Now if the rulers and ministers want musical
instruments to use in their government activities,
they cannot extract them from the sea water, like
salt, or dig them out of the ground, like ore.
Inevitably, therefore, they must lay heavy taxes upon
the common people before they can enjoy the sound of
great bells, rolling drums, zithers, and pipes. In
ancient times the sage kings likewise laid heavy taxes
on the people, but this was for the purpose of making
boats and carts,and when they were completed and
people asked , "What are these for?" the sage kings
replied, " The boats are for use on water, and the
carts for use on land, so that gentlemen may rest
their feet and laborers spare their shoulders." So
the common people paid their taxes and levies and did
not dare to grumble. Why? Because they knew that the
taxes would be used for the benefit of the people. Now
if musical instruments were also used for the benefit
of the people, I would not venture to condemn them.
Indeed, it they were as useful as the boats and carts
of the sage kings, I would certainly not venture to
... >
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condemn them. Mozi,33;Watson 1964:110-11.
The chief criterion at work here - evidenced later in the
essay and throughout the text - is utility or profit, li
(the characterjjj , a compound of the characters for grain
and knife , graphically conveys through the image of
harvest the sense of profit for an agrarian community.)
For Mozi, what matters is whether elite forms of life bring
any practical advantage to the people as a whole - if not
then, however intrinsically pleasurable, they are
redundant.
A similar argument is developed against the
extravagance of funerals. We have seen already how
individuals could in mourning be brought near to death
themselves through a surfeit of grief and asceticism. But
there was also the question of material expenditure - the
costly wood for coffins, the decorations, the grave goods -
which time and again in later Chinese history become an
almost overwhelming burden for filial sons. On both these
scores Mozi is outspoken, arguing again for modest
expenditure if the will of Heaven to benefit the people is
to be effected [3).
(i) Universal Love, Utility, and the Will of Heaven
Through his arguments for jian'ai (universal love) Mozi
preserves and strengthens the value of social hierarchy in
two different ways: he claims, in a combination of
utilitarian and natural law positions, that Heaven wills
hierarchy as the efficient means whereby love is to be
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distributed, adding that it is a natural feature of human
psychology for persons to wish to exist within hierarchical
relationships [4] ; and he claims that the expression of
love by the individual, insofar as it transcends immediate
family relationships in order to address the needs of all,
serves precisely, in the response of love that it elicits,
to render the family - and indeed, any social - bond more
secure:
I know for the following reason that Heaven loves the
people generously: It sets forth one after another
the sun and moon, the stars and constellations to
lighten them; it orders the four seasons, spring,
fall, winter, and summer, to regulate their lives; it
sends down snow and frost, rain and dew, to nourish
the five grains, hemp, and silk, so that the people
may enjoy the benefit of them [5], It lays out the
mountains and rivers, the ravines and valley streams,
and makes known all affairs so as to ascertain the
good or evil of the people. It establishes kings and
lords to reward the worthy and punish the wicked, to
gather together metal and wood, birds and beasts, and
to see to the cultivation of the five grains, hemp,
and silk, so that the people may have enough food and
clothing. From ancient times to the present this has
always been so Heaven loves the world universally
and seeks to bring mutual benefit to all
creatures... If someone kills an innocent person, then
Heaven will send down misfortune upon him....There are
those who, by living and benefiting others and obeying
the will of heaven, have won Heaven's reward... They
(the sage kings of the Three Dynasties of antiquity)
devoted themselves to universality and shunned
partiality. Universality means that if one is in a
large state he will not attack a small state, and if
one is a member of a large family he will not
overthrow a small family. The strong will not oppress
the weak, the many will not bully the few, the cunning
will not deceive the stupid, and the eminent will not
lord it over the humble. Examining such a policy, we
find that it brought benefit to Heaven above, to the
spirits in the middle realm, and to man below. And
because, of these three types of benefits, there were
none that were not realized, it was called heavenly
virtue. All the fairest names in the world were given
to such a ruler, and people said, "This is benevolence
(ren) ; this is righteousness (y_i) 1 This is what it
means to love and benefit others, to obey the will of
Heaven, and to win Heaven's reward!"
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Mozi,27; Watson, 1964:88-90.
Far from rejecting Confucian ren in favour of jian'ai,
Mozi usurps the Confucian position by retaining the
benevolent man (renren) as a primary moral agent within his
own philosophy, but more markedly he argues that it is
precisely jian'ai that is the fulfilment of the Confucian
virtues of benevolence and righteousness (yij [6].
Confucianism is presented as degenerate in terms of its
support of material extravagance in a time of dire economic
straits; it is judged to be partisan in relation to the
narrowness of its clan and family concerns which neglect
the needs of society as a whole; and it is reckoned to be
inconsistent in its code of conduct, insofar as this finds
expression in the rites (l^L ).
Mozi's stance on jian'ai emerges strongly in the two
examples he uses to present his case, those of the
universally minded man (jianshi) and the universally minded
ruler (jianjun) [Shi is translated here as 'man', though
it does not have the same scope that is normally associated
with the terms ren and min; it refers to that class of
scholar-officials and knights (or mercenaries) who, in
growing numbers in the Zhou period, relied on their skill
in order to secure a living. If we take it that ren and
min still residually refer to aristocracy and peasantry
(though even in Mozi these terms are used fairly
indiscriminately), then shi refers to a relatively
independent skill-based group incorporating workers of both
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aristocratic and peasant background [7]].
In presenting the jianshi (and the jianj un, though here
to a lesser extent) Mozi creates a limit-situation in order
to focus the argument. A man is preparing for war, and must
leave his family in the care of others. Even if he is a
partially-minded man (bieshi - one who discriminates in
favour of his own rather than others) the exigency of his
situation requires that he entrust his dependents to a
1ianshi if they are to be properly treated - entrusting
them to a bieshi such as himself will ensure that they
receive only second-rate treatment. The stance of the
jianshi, then, is not so much one of altruism tout court,
as of enlightened self interest, do ut des. And in the
choices forced upon him in extremis the bieshi is forced to
acknowledge the contradiction at the heart of his own
position: taking his stance entirely in self-interest is
the surest way of defeating his own deepest interest in a
situation of crisis.
Mozi presents his case, here as elsewhere, in a
combination of appeal through argument to the inherent
rational superiority of his own stance, and appeal through
testimony to the congruence of his thinking with the
traditions of the sages. If he argues for working to
benefit (.li.) others, it is not on the basis of a
calculation of profit or loss (there is no trace here of
Bentham's calculus: even though utilitarian, this would be
too close to the style of the bieshi for Mozi, though his
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system as a whole is specifically utilitarian in a sense
which we have already begun to examine). While Moz.i takes
his stance in a rational manner, it is not so much moral
agency as rational deliberation, but moral agency as
"instinctive" response, that is uppermost in his thinking.
He does not develop the later Mencian notion of a moral
heart (xin) with its instinctive sense of right and wrong;
but it is - in contrast to the detailed deliberations and
codifications of behaviour constellated around Confucian Li
- on that notion of simplicity which came to be expressed
by Mencius that he wishes to focus. Here his various
arguments about frugality come to a point: the aim is to
live in a simpler world where moral imperatives are felt
and responded to without any difficulty, and where one
responds to those in need insofar as needs are apparent.
Even if do ut des, the element of calculation is at a
minimum, and the ideal is a reciprocity premissed on a
capacity to take the viewpoint of others:
If men were to regard the states of others as they
regard their own, then who would raise up his state to
attack the state of another? It would be like
attacking his own. If men were to regard the cities
of others as they regard their own, then who would
raise up his city to attack the city of another? It
would be like attacking his own. If men were to regard
the families of others as they regard their own, then
who would raise up his family to overthrow that of
another? It would be like overthrowing his own. Now
when states and cities do not attack and make war on
each other and families and individuals do not
overthrow or injure one another, is this a harm or a
benefit to the world? Surely it is a benefit.
When we inquire into the cause of such benefits, what
do we find has produced them? Do they come about from
hating others and trying to injure them? Surely notl
They come rather from loving others and trying to
benefit them. And when we set out to classify and
as
describe those men who love and benefit others, shall
we say that their actions are motivated by partiality
or by universality? Surely we must answer, by
universality, and it is this universality in their
dealings with one another that givbes rise to all the
great benefits in the world. Watson 1964:40.
The argument on the jianjun consolidates these points,
whilst introducing an important further feature. If men
(shi) have to choose a leader (1un) will they choose one
who is self-interested, or one who sacrifices self for the
well being of others? Again the point seems obvious: the
state cannot be well ordered if the ruler is out for his
own advantage; and even if individuals in their own lives
approve of partiality (bie), nonetheless in a ruler they
seek universality [8].
When Mozi speaks of the shi choosing a leader he might
seem to perceive society in a proto-democratic way. It
does seem likely that, in the particular brotherhood of shi
to which he belonged, the election of a leader by those of
a certain status was practice; furthermore, in his example
here he talks about choosing the leader of a state (as
opposed to a non-territorial group. The distinction is
important, for much of the ruler's authority was precisely
tied to his ability to relate to the transcendent powers of
the land, as represented by the altars of soil and grain.
A ruler of a community without a territorial base would
obviously have a different transcendent support for his
authority). Nonetheless, there is no evidence elsewhere
that he thought the wang (king) should be elected; and
whether elected or not, he clearly expected that the
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individual would fill a role in a hierarchy which had been
specifically appointed and sanctioned by Heaven, and whose
form it was not for him to change (other than by retrieving
the forgotten practices of the sage kings). In this sense,
kingship as an institution is ordained by Heaven, and
individual kings are approved in authority by Heaven [9],
Mozi gives considerable space (three chapters or
sections) to the value of hierarchical order, of
identifying with superiors (shangtong). He also stresses
how Tian established hierarchy to benefit the people (li
ren), and how the spirits of the other world support
hierarchy by checking on its maintenance; here we have a
doctrine of active providence supporting a theological
version of natural law founded on the principle of
universal utility [10]. Here we can call Mozi a
system-utilitarian in attention to this fact, that the
human social order taken as a whole exists for the sake of
universal benefit as this is judged from a theological
point of view, the purpose of human action being to promote
and sustain this order in its essential detail.
(ii) Love, Pleasure, Desire and Justice.
Various terms distinguish different forms or aspects of
love in the Western tradition. Mozi's jian'ai (together
with ren. as Mozi shifts its interpretation [11]) seems at
first very close to the concept of agape in the Christian
scriptures: a theologically derived capacity for universal
love modelled on the exemplary power of God as loving
creator. In further congruence with this Mozi presents
jian'ai as altruism going to the point of self-sacrifice;
as non self-affirmation; as active concern for the
oppressed and marginal; as sublimation of individual desire
in favour of the common good; as the legitimate sharing of
pleasure without extravagance in a harmonious community;
and as, if not entailing pacifism, then practically
directed towards the curtailment of aggression [12],
If from a Confucian point of view jian'ai is a movement
of excess towards death, in destruction of the
particularity of the family, for Mozi Confucian familialism
is the very inscription of death within life, nowhere more
graphically marked than in the excess almost unto death of
the mourning rituals. If for Confucius it is the burden of
culture and of memory that must be preserved if the human
world is to keep its edge over barbarism - marking the
living body with the dead letters of a stored and sacred
script so that the body might live in that particular
memory of death which is the only worthy form of life -
then for Mozi, calling on memory only to witness what is
already rationally known, in the presence of the unchanging
light of Heaven which measures affairs and judges their
rightness with the precision of geometry, forming thus a
rational standard outside scripture, it is the removal of
suffering in all its more obviously treatable forms that is
a pre-requisite to any culture. Given the shift in
authority and the shift in intention, Mozi's incorporation
of ren within iian'ai is in fact a significant shift in the
ways ren might be understood. If for Confucius ren was in
strong part linked with - thus with scriptural authority
and pedagogy - with Mozi ren through 1ian'ai appears
(though nowhere is this argued) as an innate disposition,
the tendency of a rational mind which is relatively
unhindered by the claims of the past.
One leader of the Mohist school demonstrated sharply
the rupture with Confucianism, surrendering his own son to
death for wrongdoing (thus depriving himself of that
permanent Confucian value, a lineage) in order that the
claims of a rational justice might be met. While the act
may have overtones of the sacrifice almost required of
Abraham, the differences are significant. In the biblical
story, particularly as read by Kierkegaard, it is the
irrationality of God that is to the fore, the absolute
authority of God to command whatever, and to make that act
worthy by his command. God here is the inscrutable lord
over individual conscience. For Mozi, the will of Heaven
lies in the public domain, compelling for its simplicity in
establishing the best of possible social orders and
orientating that toward the human good].
If love as a form of selflessness is affirmed by Mozi,
love as self-seeking, as positive self-love, love as the
pursuit of pleasure, or love as erotic quest for one's
ideal self or partner, or as quest for union with Heaven or
the spirits, is absent from the scene (though ren as an
active expression of gratitude to Heaven, mediated through
religious sacrifice, is stressed). It is true that two very
strong ideal selves are presented: for the iianshi the
gaoshi (lofty or exalted shi) is his ideal image, just as
for the 1ianjun it is the mingjun (enlightened or
illustrious ruler). These two are heroic images
historically exemplified (and more in accord, despite the
martial aspect to Mozi, with the culture heroes of
Confucius than with the heroes of war) [13]. But the quest
for realisation of the ideal is not thematised reflexively
in terms of its psychological or ontological components, as
it is for instance in Plato's discourse on eros. Nor is it
presented in the erotic quest imagery favoured not long
after Mozi in the Chuci (Songs of the South). Instead it
is presented pragmatically, in terms of the tasks
exemplified by qaoshi or mingjun alike, tasks which are
directly assumed as their proper concern by jianshi and
jianjun.
[It is interesting that Mozi situates the jianshi in a
battlefield scenario not in order to promote martial
virtue, but rather to set in focus the true significance
and import of civic virtue. The scene of war thus receives
a significantly different status from that ascribed to it
in the Iliad and the Bhagavad Gita, where, in different
ways, the centrality of martial virtue is affirmed and
consolidated.[14]]
If Mozi is against excess, he seems definitely for the
types of pleasure that harmonise with civic order. Yet
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nowhere do we find a strong sense of this pleasure in his
text, in contrast to the pleasures positively affirmed by
Confucius. Vagaries of temperament apart, it is in strong
measure a difference of class background that can be
presumed here: Confucius enjoying that leisure presupposed
by an elite group in order to appreciate music, archery,
and cultured discussion, Mozi knowing the discipline of
hard work and frugality if he is to make a living as a
practical man. This difference raises one crucial question
on jian'ai. To Mao Zedong, jian'ai as expressed by Mozi is
an impossible and premature virtue: its only plausible
place is in a classless society, yet Mozi is situated in a
feudal age:
it is a basic Marxist concept that being determines
consciousness, that the objective realities of class
struggle and national struggle determine our thoughts
and feelings. But some of our comrades turn this
upside down and maintain that everything ought to
start from "love". Now as for love, in a class
society there can be only class love; but these
comrades are seeking a love transcending classes, love
in the abstract and also freedom in the abstract.
From "Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, 1942" in Mao
Zedong, Vol.3,pp.73-4.
Mozi might claim to have handled this problem by
separating the questions of hierarchy and class: hierarchy
is preserved as the indispensable structuring of society in
the interests of the maximum good of all, with each role in
the hierarchy being filled according to merit; class is
abolished as the unnecessary (and immoral) preservation of
status and privilege without talent. And a confirmation of
this step might be seen in the Mohist creation of an ideal,
knightly, quasi-religious community existing under its own
leader, a comm.u.n.i'4-w - in principle ol - cu.IUiq
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across received social divisions yet preserving their ideal
hierarchy, a community thus corresponding in some way to a
church or sangha. Here the creation of a new social order,
in contrast to Confucius' transformation of an old order,
marks the specific space within which the Mohist ethic
might claim to be operative.
Yet there are difficulties in this reading. Firstly,
jian'ai is presented simply as airen. loving others, with
no qualification on background, status, membership of the
Mohist order, or otherwise. Secondly, the critiques of
contemporary practice (against Confucius, against music,
against funerals, against excess) obviously situate the
practice of jian'ai within the larger society, as
transformations of it. And thirdly - Mao's criticism here
has most force [15] - Mozi provides no options for dealing
with the recalcitrant element in society: for example,
should the 1ianshl show jian'ai to instransigently
particularist Confucians, thus doubly disadvantaging
himself by caring for a group that is always going to take
care of its own interests first anyway, whilst depriving
himself and his own of any reciprocal response? A balance
between love and justice is not here considered. [Though
it is for the iianiunf who is through force of authority in
a position to alter social practice in the direction of
iian'ai. Yet on this it is a paradox that Mozi and his
followers do not aspire to public office in the manner of
the Confucians. The status of Mozi's rhetoric on 1ian'ai
is thus more visionary than pragmatic in relation to the
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given contemporary order of society].
2. LAOZI'S REJECTION OF REN
If Mozi preserves ren within a broader moral framework,
Laozi rejects ren as mere adornment and decoration, the
(degenerate) supplementarity of culture set on an
originally good and simple nature, the (perhaps necessary)
completion of a spoiled innocence, though permanently
secondary, never effecting the restitution of loss but
barring the way against further degradation.
When the great dao falls into disuse
There are benevolence (ren) and rectitude (vi);
When cleverness emerges
There is great hypocrisy;
When the six relations are at variance
There are filial children;
When the state is benighted
There are loyal ministers.
Daodejing 18; Lau,1976:74
Exterminate the sage, discard the wise,
And the people will benefit a hundredfold;
Exterminate benevolence (ren), discard rectitude
(Zl) r
And the people will again be filial;
Exterminate ingenuity, discard profit,
And there will be no more thieves and bandits.
These three, being false adornments, are not
enough
And the people must have something to which they
can attach themselves:
Exhibit the unadorned and embrace the uncarved
block,
Have little thought of self and as few desires as
possible.
Daodejing,19; Lau,1976:75.
At one point ren is specifically excluded from the
attributes either of Heaven and earth, or of the sage:
Heaven and earth are ruthless (buren) and treat the
myriad creatures as straw dogs; the sage is ruthless
(buren). and treats the people as straw dogs.
Daodejing,5; Lau 1976:61
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It is not clear who is under attack at this point:
Confucius, as we have seen, calls neither Heaven nor the
sages ren, while linking both as foundational principles of
morality. Laozi wants to say that this foundation is not
original but, like the later layers of habitation
established progressively on a first site, or the writing
on a palimpsest, secondary; it is to the first site or the
first writing, to the uncarved block before the imposition
of form or the newborn child before the imposition of
culture, that he wishes to return, presenting a network of
images which argue the superiority of (a certain) nature
over (a certain) culture. Many of these are expressive of
an individualist ethic directed to the preservation of
one's gX, but in one famous example Laozi offers an
instance of communal agrarian simplicity: stripped of the
adornments of culture, villagers will happily live within
the confines of their community knowing that others live
nearby, but not desiring to visit them:
Bring it about that the people will return to the
use of
the knotted rope,
Will find relish in their food
And beauty in their clothes,
Will be content in their abode
And happy in the way they live.
Though adjoining states are within sight of one
another,
and the sound of dogs barking and cocks crowing in
one state
can be heard in another, yet the people of one
state will grow
old and die without having had any dealings with
those of another.
Daodejing,80; Lau,1976:142
This form of emptying, this reduction of culture to a
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point of stasis, has its ominous aspect, expressed
particularly in the sage's mandate to empty the minds and
fill the bellies of the people, thus keeping them free from
desire. Laozi, here and elsewhere, sits ambiguously close
to the Legalist solution to social reconstruction,
apparently granting an absolute value to authority (rather
than freely elective desire) to effect a return to
simplicity. This stance is reminiscent of an aspect of the
Shang's first rise to supreme power. In cultures other than
China the emergence of urbanism is linked to an increase in
agricultural productivity generating a surplus of wealth.
In China, such an increase is not evident; what occurs
instead is a rapidly developed powerful stratification of
society, by means of which an elite group came to
expropriate the labour and produce of the mass of the
people, maintaining them at a barely subsistence level
whilst granting themselves the luxuries of urban life (16].
Certainly Laozi does not recommend the power of an elite in
this way - simplicity, as argued for, is a value for all -
but his is nonetheless far from being a vision of
individualist anarchy. He seems nowhere to question the
value of hierarchy - certainly he assumes the importance of
the sage and ruler as figures of authority - but seeks
instead to transform the functioning of hierarchy through
the medium of a leadership committed to non-aggrandisement:
The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to
his subjects
Next comes the ruler they love and praise;
Next comes one they fear;
Next comes one with whom they take liberties.
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When there is not enough faith, there is lack of
good faith.
Hesitant, he does not utter words lightly.
When his task is accomplished and his work done
The people all say, "it happened to us
naturally."
Daodejing,17; Lau,1976:73
It is the emphasis on simplicity that marks his chief
divergence from Confucian ren. Linked as it is to li, to a
complex mass of behavioural requirements, the repertoire of
skills needed for richly civilised living, ren is at the
antipodes of "natural" life. As implicated in the
refinements of culture, ren is the kind of (artficial)
accomplishment which men come to desire, just as they come
to desire jade, fine clothes, and political power. Culture
for Laozi is a form which, through its complexity and
refinements generates desire, and through desire conflict.
The rejection of culture is also the rejection of desire,
in return to a presumed original state of freedom from
desire:
I alone am inactive and reveal no signs,
Like a baby that has not yet learned to smile,
Listless as though with no home to go back to...
The multitude all have a purpose.
I alone am foolish and uncouth.
Daodejing,20; Lau,1976:76-7.
The nameless uncarved block
Is but freedom from desire,
And if I cease to desire and remain still
The empire will be at peace of its own accord.
Daodejing,37; Lau,1976:96.
Yet here one of Laozi's favoured metaphors sorely betrays
him; for the newborn child, far from being an instance of
non-desire, is perhaps the profoundest moment known of
importunate desire requiring instant gratification.
Indeed, on this point culture can be seen as the very
process whereby individual desire becomes reduced and
regulated, in the emergence of a (relatively)
non-conflictual social order.
Confucius, as we have seen, implicates ren within a
patriarchal politeia. Laozi, oppositely, presents us with
the idealisation of a set of feminine attributes - it is
perhaps here that we should locate his stress on the virtue
of compassion, ce. as a more receptively empathetic,
mothering place, in contrast with the socially active
beneficence of ren [17] . But the feminine in Laozi is
presented in the male philosophical text. This need not in
itself be a mark of expropriation - on the assumption that
there is a voice of the woman, specifically, which is not
available to the man, a voice which is excluded from the
sphere of male discourse but which belongs in secret to the
common comprehension of women, is a problematic one to
unfold - but the way in which the image of woman valorises
the options of lowliness and humility, of non-striving
(wu-wei), of contentment with one's (lowest) lot certainly
bears implications not only for one's vision of society,
but for one's placing of women within it. Laozi may have
been speaking from a part-shamanist background which
ascribed high value to women. His philosophy, however, can
easily be given an interpretation whereby the reduction of




The safeguard against this, as we have already
indicated, is the sage or ruler; each of these figures
bears a paradoxical status. The injunction against desire
means there is no idealisation of the sage as a figure for
emulation: what the sage should be like is often enough
stated, but why one should wish to be sage (indeed, wish to
be anything of status) is nowhere evident. Contrary to a
desire for status, the move to relinquish it - even to
relinquish rulership - is affirmed as an appropriate step
towards simplicity. Here we find a paradox of desire
similar to that in the Buddha's teaching: the problems of
life stem from desire, yet one must also desire nirvana and
simplicity, as release from desire and its problems. Laozi
is able to proceed in this manner, offering a wisdom that
reverses Confucian stereotypes, precisely because those
stereotypes are there: Confucianism (rather than Mohism
which nowhere seems to be strongly implicated in the
Daodejing) is the framework for thinking about society
against which Laozi pits himself, arguing as much by way of
negative dialectic as positive affirmation.
With Confucius as the principle object of attack, it is
not clear how far Laozi's text stands in its own right as a
piece of social philosophy, and how far it serves the
purely polemic, but aporetic purpose of deflating the
pretensions of its opponent. Most readings of Laozi find
him providing a natural law philosophy, a philosophy of
radical equality, with its foundations in a law of the
in
cosmos (Dao) whose way is precisely humility,
non-assertion, change and transformation: the sage is one
who knows how to adapt to situations, rather than one who
actively bends life to his own will. Much of this depends
on an ontological reading of the word dao which has
recently been challenged; in contrast, it has been
suggested that dao simply means "teaching", in particular
"prescriptive teaching for the conduct of life". Thus,
Confucius and Mozi both offer daos, as do other teachers,
and the famous opening lines of the Daodejing should be
read as affirming an inevitable pluralism of teachings.
Rather than translate in the manner of Lau 1976:57
The way that can be spoken of
Is not the constant way;
The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.
we would instead be better advised to translate thus:
Any dao that can be spoken is not constant;
Any name that can be named is not constant.
Laozi appears in this light more as a philosopher of
language, with claims about the way in which language in
fact gets used, than as a metaphysician or natural law
theorist [19]. Against the Confucian (and Mohist) attempt
to establish one single, constant dao, fixed in the
immutability of heaven and the constancy of its regard for
man, or in a single normative tradition of the sages, he
urges the changeability of teachings, as adaptations to
different needs and contexts. Precisely what he does not
provide is a constant Way modelled on the unchanging Way of
nature, which persists through seasonal and diurnal
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transformations (and is thus comparable to the way o-C
Parmenides, who sought the constancy of Being within the
flux of becoming). It is instead flux, change, inconstancy
that Laozi valorises.
In doing so, however, he does not present his own dao as
a rival to that of Confucius. Rather, he systematically
and paradoxically brings the opposites of Confucian
valuation to the fore, using his text as an X-ray device to
reverse the normal distribution of light and darkness. He
does not recommend the reversed image as a new dao - this,
precisely, is why he does not recommend the value of
sagehood - but rather lets those aspects of life discarded
by Confucius (and Mozi) insinuate themselves as worthy of
election. His text establishes the space within which a
significantly new type of choice might occur [20].
3.MENCIUS' REFORMULATION OF REN.
In the face of Mohist and Daoist critiques, Mencius
(-372? to -289?), St. Paul to Confucius' Jesus, Plato to
Confucius' Socrates, offers a reformulation of ren that
distinguishes it from 1ian'ai, confirms its status as a
foundational virtue, separates it from the practice of li,
inserts it as an innate disposition in an essentially good
human nature, recognises it as the primary attribute of the
ruler, and specifically affirms that a new sagely ruler is
required if a political dispensation based on ren is to be
achieved.
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In contrast with Confucius, the features of a complex
new philosophical situation are to the fore in Mencius'
text. Where Confucius had a more "intellectually"
intuitive reading of ren - ren as the immediate, practical,
right response in any given situation - Mencius situates
ren as an intuition of the heart (xin), not thereby
severing affective from intellectual dispositions (x.in
combines both, and is more appropriately translated
mind-and-heart), but nonetheless giving a primacy to the
affective in the life of the individual. This move is a
response to Mozi in particular, insofar as his discourse on
iian'ai began to open an affective space which was simply
absent for the Analects. In identifying that space as
xin, and thematizing it in a way that Mozi does not,
Mencius situates affectivity at the root of Confucian
morality.
At the same time his theory of the heart is an important
reversal of certain claims in Laozi's philosophy - a matter
of no small interest, insofar as Mencius is as much Daoist
as Confucian in some of his basic attitudes. His famous
parable on the original goodness of the heart enables us to
see part of his approach:
Mencius said, "There was a time when the trees were
luxuriant on the Ox Mountain. As it is on the
outskirts of a great metropolis, the trees are
constantly lopped by axes. Is it any wonder that
they are no longer fine? With the respite they get in
the day and in the night, and the moistening by the
rain and dew, there is certainly no lack of new shoots
coming out, but then the cattle and sheep come to
graze upon the mountain. That is why it is as bald as
it is. People, seeing only its baldness, tend to
think that it never had any trees. But can this
possible be the nature of a mountain? Can what is in
man be completely lacking in moral inclinations? A
man's letting go of his true heart (xin) is like the
case of the trees and the axes. When the trees are
lopped day after day, is it any wonder that they are
no longer fine? If, in spite of the respite a man
gets in the day and in the night and of the effect of
the morning air on him, scarcely any of his likes and
dislikes resemble those of other men, it is because
what he does in the course of the day once again
dissipates what he has gained. If this dissipation
happens repeatedly, then the influence of the air in
the night will no longer be able to preserve what was
originally in him, and when that happens, the man is
not far removed from an animal. Others, seeing his
resemblance to an animal, will be led to think that he
never had any native endowment. But can that be what
a man is genuinely like? Hence, given the right
nourishment there is nothing that will not grow, and
deprived of it there is nothing that will not wither
away. Mencius 6A.8; Lau 1983:164-5.
Laozi suggested that original goodness is like the uncarved
block, devoid of characteristics: Mencius claims that the
absence of characteristics, like the baldness of the
mountain, marks the destruction of an original goodness
that would normally grow to fruition given the right
conditions. Such natural growth is something profoundly
absent from Laozi: although on occasion he speaks of
returning to the root, it is much more towards a nature
devoid of growth that he gestures towards, a winter
landscape that still admits the river's movement but shows
precious little sign of life besides [21.
[Laozi images nature as the great mother, but primarily as
the disengaged, inactive (wu-wei) mother, little stressing
her nutritive or generative aspect. The individual can
seek to become again as a newborn child, and thus find for
him/herself an original nourishing that seems to be
withdrawn in the journey beyond infancy, but the active
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provision of nourishment by nature (or the dao, if we allow
a substantive aspect to the term) is minimally evident.
Indeed, in emphasising the non-ren aspect to Heaven and
Earth (Tiandi) Laozi focusses on the cruel,devouring
mother, the castrating mother that resents the passage
through law to social order and withdraws its favour if the
law (as culture, wen) is appropriated. Here as a mirror of
the patriarchal father the mother becomes a phallic mother,
the fate and necessity of life that will brook no other,
the all devouring mother that would consume its own rather
than see them live under the heteronomous autonomy of the
law. By contrast the Confucian law, as read by Mencius,
becomes generative in a non-coercive way (22).
Mencius claims that there are four living seeds or
shoots (si duan) to the heart which under the right
conditions come to fruition in the four primary virtues of
ren. vi (righteousness), li (ritual) and zhi (wisdom). What
constitutes the right conditions is crucial: in contrast to
Confucius it is not li_ or any obvious style of pedagogy
that counts (Mencius proclaims his relative ignorance of
li), but the creation instead of economic stability and
prosperity, the responsibility for this being part of the
mandate laid on the humane or benevolent ruler. (Mencius
also assumes the provision of schooling, but its status in
his text and distribution in society is difficult to
determine.) On economics, for instance, he remarks:
If you do not interfere with the busy seasons in the
fields, then there will be more grain than the people
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can eat; if you do not allow nets with too fine a mesh
to be used in large ponds, then there will be more
fish and turtles than they can eat; if hatchets and
axes are permitted in the forests on the hills only in
the proper seasons, then there will be more timber
than they can use. When the people have more grain,
more fish and turtles than they can eat, and more
timber than they can use, then in the support of their
parents when they are alive and in the mourning of
them when they are dead, they will be able to have no
regrets over anything left undone. This is the first
step along the Kingly way. If the mulberry is planted
in every homestead of five mu of land, then those who
are fifty can wear silk; if chickens, pigs and dogs do
not miss their breeding season, then those who are
seventy can eat meat; if each lot of a hundred mu is
not deprived of labour during the busy seasons, then
families with several mouths to feed will not go
hungry. Exercise due care over the education provided
by the village schools, and discipline the people by
teaching the duties proper to sons and younger
brothers, and those whose heads have turned grey will
not be carrying loads on the roads. When those who
are seventy wear silk and eat meat and the masses are
neither cold nor hungry, it is impossible for their
prince not to be a true King.
Now when food meant for human beings is so plentiful
as to be thrown to dogs and pigs, you fail to realize
that it is time for garnering, and when men drop dead
from starvation by the wayside, you fail to realize
that it is time for distribution. When people die,
you simply say, "It is none of my doing. It is the
fault of the harvest." In what way is that different
from killing a man by running him through, while
saying all the time, "It is none of my doing. It is
the fault of the weapon." Stop putting the blame on
the harvest and the people of the whole Empire will
come to you [24],
Mencius 1A.3; Lau 1983:51-2
This stance marks a strong faith in the original
goodness of human nature - a point Mencius defends against
Gaozi, and illustrates at various stages in his writing
[25] - together with the assumption that the heart
possesses a natural inclination or dynamism towards a
moral fulfilment or telos. Mencius thus shows little
knowledge of the individual burdened by the weight of his
own moral weakness or incompetence (a notion that is
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evident to a certain extent in the Analecfs), nor a sense of
the individual divided within himself in a fundamental
moral conflict of the sort expressed by St. Paul and Plato.
If left to flourish the individual is coherent, autonomous,
and instinctively moral; and learning here constitutes the
way to renew one's original resources:
Mencius said, "Benevolence (ren) is the heart of man,
and Tightness his road. Sad it is indeed when a man
gives up the right road instead of following it and
allows his heart to stray without enough sense to go
after it. When his chickens and dogs stray, he has
sense enough to go after them, but not when his heart
strays. The sole concern of learning is to go after
this strayed heart. That is all."
Mencius 6A 11; Lau,1983:167.
For Mencius the individual also inclines affectively
towards his own kin:
Mencius said, "The content of benevolence (ren) is the
serving of one's parents; the content of dutifulness
(vi) is obedience to one's elder brothers; the content
of wisdom (zhi) is to understand these two and hold
fast to them; the content of the rites (li) is the
regulation and adornment of them; the content of
music (vue) is the joy that comes of delighting in
them." Mencius 4A 27; Lau 9183:127.
Here and elsewhere Mencius distinguishes ren as
familial virtue for the universalism of jian'ai, arguing
against Mozi in a critique that also goes against the
Mohist idea of benefit (li). For Mencius it is the idea of
graded love rather than universal love that is paramount:
the family is the immediate and irreducible context for
demonstration of affection and loyalty, and the movement of
affection is outward from the family towards the larger
society:
Treat the aged of your own family in a manner
befitting their venerable age and extend this
irs
treatment to the aged of other families; treat your
own young in a manner befitting their tender age and
extend this to the young of other families, and you
can roll the Empire on your palm. Mencius 1A 7; Lau
1983:56
Mencius said, "What a man is able to do without having
to learn it is what he can truly do; what he knows
without having to reflect on it is what he truly
knows. There are no young children who do not know
loving their parents, and none of them when they grow
up will not know respecting their elder brothers.
Loving one's parents is benevolence (ren); respecting
one's elder brothers is Tightness (yi). What is left
to be done is simply the extension of these to the
whole Empire." Mencius 1A 15; Lau 1983:184.
Here Mencius re-emphasises the role of the father, as if
this had been undermined by Mozi; (he also reinstates the
Confucian emphasis on lavish funerals). Yet from Mozi's
point of view jian'ai, far from weakening the position of
the father - or of any member of the family - strengthens
it by ensuring a comprehensive framework of reciprocity.
The difference between Mozi and Mencius here more concerns
the social framework within which reciprocity might be
operative. Mozi, paralleling steps towards democracy in
classical Greece - where disruption of clan authority led
to the Athenian order of adult free males meeting in
assembly - established a community of shi that cut across
the order of the clan (indeed, many of his followers, being
of artisan background, would have no class affiliation
anyway). Mencius sought to reinstate clan order as the
backbone of society.
In doing so, he actually incorporated a good deal of
Mohist thinking whilst rejecting Mozi's terminology. Thus
his emphasis on the renwanq (benevolent king) is strongly
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reminiscent of Mozi's discourse on the jianjun (universally
minded ruler). Confucius did not focus on the ruler,
counting the formation of ministers of state more pressing.
Mencius differs from Confucius here partly insofar as the
political context is more profoundly troubled, partly
insofar as Mozi's thinking is now part of that context and
requires refutation.
Mencius said,"The people in power are not worth our
censure; their government is not worth condemnation.
The great man alone can rectify the evils in the
prince's heart. When the prince is benevolent,
everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is
dutiful, everyone else is dutiful; when the prince is
correct, everyone else is correct. Simply by
rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm
basis." Mencius 4A 20; Lau 1983:126
The sage, having taxed his eyes to their utmost
capacity, went on to invent the compasses and the
square, the level and the plumb-line, which can be
used endlessly for the production of squares and
circles, planes and straight lines [26], and, having
taxed his ears to their utmost capacity, he went on to
invent the six pipes which can be used endlessly for
setting the pitch of the five notes, and, having taxed
his heart to its utmost capacity, he went on to
practise government that tolerated no suffering, thus
putting the whole Empire under the shelter of his
benevolence (ren)....Hence, only the benevolent man is
fit to be in high position. Mencius 4A 1; Lau
1983:118.
While Confucius wished to renew the Zhou, Mencius
specifically accepts the demise of the Zhou, brings forward
a theory of dynastic cycles to account for that demise as a
fated, almost inevitable process, and elevates the
foundational principles of sage and renwang as sources of a
newly instituted order. Confucius, we saw, refrained from
making the sage an exemplary figure. Mencius specifically
claims that Confucius himself was a sage - more, was the
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originator of a new order [27] . Here he almost
anticipates Dong Zhongshu's claim that Confucius had been
appointed wang by heaven and had received the mandate.
Mencius thus grounds a hierarchical benevolent society with
the king at its apex; structurally, his only difference
from Mozi here is the maintenance, and heightening, of clan
privilege.
Mencius rejects the word li. (benefit) in describing the
activity of the ruler, yet his arguments against it involve
a poor travesty of Mozi's position; at stake really is an
aristocratic exercise in zhengming (rectification of names)
directed towards removing the artisanal/commercial concept
of profitable activity. Yet - with an important
qualification - it is the idea of profitable engagement
that is central to the concept renwang; the king should so
organise economic and social relations, should so work
towards a state of material prosperity, that all the people
will benefit. The qualification is that in this social
dispensation, Mencius preserves the privileges of an elite
group. Thus, expropriating the voice of the dispossessed,
he argues that the common people, once their basic needs
are met, will rejoice in the lavish music festivals and
hunts that are their lords' (but not their own) indulgence
[28] . He argues one form of order (li) for the elite, and
another (fa - fixed laws and penalties) for the masses
[29]. Most particularly, he excludes from this concept
of rulership the sort of frugality urged by Mozi; lavish
music festivals and funerals are retained, even it seems in
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the present context of extreme economic disorder; the elite
should not forgo their privileges at any price, and Mencius
himself was well-known for the size and opulence of his
entourage (no sign here of the impoverished enquirers who
received instruction from Confucius) [30]. In his
critique of Mozi, Mencius misreads Mohist li as the selfish
accumulation of profit, rather than as the generation of
benefits for all.
(i) Ren and Human Nature
While Mencius' theory of the innate goodness of the
human heart and of human nature was an important
inspiration to later Confucians, receiving detailed
elaboration in the work of Zhu Xi, it is in many ways
extremely problematic. Several difficulties, for example,
gather round his parable of the child in danger of falling
in a well:
Mencius said, "No man is devoid of a heart sensitive
to the suffering of others. Such a senistive heart
was possessed by the Former Kings and this manifested
itself in compassionate government. With such a
sensitive heart behind compassionate government/ it
was as easy to rule the Empire as rolling it on your
palm.
My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart
sensitive to the suffering of others is this. Supose
a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on
the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly
be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get
in the good graces of the parents, nor because he
wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or
friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the
child. From this it can be seen that whoever is
devoid of the heart of compassion is not human,
whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human,
whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty
is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of
right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion
is the seed of benevolence; the heart of shame, of
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dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of
observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong,
of wisdom. Man has these four seeds just as he has
four limbs. Mencius 2A 6; Lau 1983:82-3.
Taken on its own, the story has a strong intuitive
plausibility. The problem is that it defeats other aspects
of Mencius' philosophy, for it shows, if anything, not the
Mencian particularity of ren but the Mohist universality of
jian'ai: in a limit-situation (the kind of discurisve
device introduced by Mozi) one instinctively moves to save
a child in distress, whatever one's relationship to it
might be. Mencius could have complicated the story in his
own favour by introducing a second child, describing a
scenario where one must choose between saving a stranger
and saving one's own. Here, again with intuitive
plausibility, he could have argued that the immediate
impulse is to save one's own, thus grounding the
particularity of ren. However, he lets his narrative
stand.
The response that Mencius is not at this stage talking
about ren (he's not) but about commiseration, ce-yin, the
original seed from which ren grows, resolves nothing.
Indeed, it further complicates our reading, for it suggests
that there is an original universality to the heart which
becomes fully-formed in the particularity of ren; why the
process of formation should be thus, and what guides it, is
not indicated (it is suggested that the responsibility for
self-cultivation lies with the individual - but again, why
he should cultivate in himself the preferential love of the
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family is not argued.)
A different response might remark that Mencius starts
his story by talking about the virtue of kings: the
compassionate heart is the seed from which the kingly
virtue of ren grows (the king's ren being universal insofar
as it is directed to all in his domain). Here, however,
the problem of particularity is not resolved, but
submerged. For the path to kingly ren in the Mencian scheme
lies by way of the family, and involves a widening of ren
beyond its first familial context towards universality.
Furthermore, there is in Mencius anyway a tension between
universal kingly ren and particular familial ren: if the
king's ren is universal, without being destructive of the
familial context, why can the indivdual not cultivate
universality (ren as jian'ai) and preserve his family at
the same time, as Mozi argued?
Another point concerns the fact that it is an adult who
is moved by compassion to save the child. But if the
dynamic here comes from compassion, what is the interplay
between the seed of compassion and the fruit of benevolence
in an adult life? Our first response to the imagery of
seeds and growth might be to locate seeds (an original
tendency) in childhood and growth (a fulfilled capacity) in
adulthood: it might thus be to consider ren the ideal
motivating force, the force of rationally structured
motivation, that takes over from and completes the raw
tendency of ce. Yet an implication in the story might be
that, at any stage in life, the original seeds of the heart
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might express themselves directly, as some immediate
impulse that evades the layers of moral formation. And
unless one has doubts about the value of that impulse
(claiming for instance that it is ambivalent rather than
wholly good), then it is not clear why the impulse alone
should not be affirmed, rather than the impulse and the
completed virtue. Could Mencius not have said that ren
itself is the original seed and impulse of the heart, which
in time comes to fruition as perfected virtue (it is this
move that Zhu Xi makes, for instance)?
A further complication - and it is this that shows the
essence of the Mencian procedure - concerns the derivation
of all four seeds of the heart, and their completed forms
as virtue, from this single story. We can acknowledge that
the story demonstrates compassion. But shame? Surely it is
precisely the absence of shame that Mencius shows, and on
his own admission: the man acts "not because he wanted to
get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he
wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or
friends." Similarly, it is difficult to see that the story
has anything to do with the seed of courtesy and modesty,
other than by excluding it as a motivating factor from the
scenario. And while the seed of right and wrong (shi-fei)
- as an innate capacity for deliberation and judgement - is
partially affirmed in the judgement behind the action
described, that judgement is itself subsumed under the
immediacy of the impulse of compassion.
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Apparent in this story, as in any theory of innate
natural goodness, is the strategy of incorporating one's
deepest presuppositions into the narrative, whilst so
structuring it that they are then seemingly derived as
conclusions in a self-evident way. [Laozi's appeal to a
nature beyond culture is a move of a similar sort.]
Mencius' project is to ground Confucian morality in a more
fundamental way than hitherto, hence the introduction of
the nature (xing) and the heart (xin); and his ascription
of foundational value to the heart - influenced both by
Mozi's theory of love and by Laozi's naturalness - is such
that, either everyone is considered in essence a Confucian,
or everyone has a set of innate capacities which find their
natural fulfilment in Confucianism, Confucian thinking is
thus the essence of that one normative culture which had
its historical foundations in the Xia dynasty. If Mencius'
arguments seem self evident to any amongst his
contemporaries, it is because they have over generations
been nurtured on ideas similar to the ones for which he
argues.
(ii) Ren and Self-cultivation
We have already noted the lack of interest in psychology
in the Analects. Despite the centrality of the heart in
Mencius, it would be wrong to see his comments on it as
constituting a psychological doctrine. Certainly he seems
to have practised powerful forms of self-cultivation,
perhaps involving meditation and breathing control:
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"May I ask what your strong poinst are?"
"I have an insight into words. I am good at
cultivating my flood-like qi (huoranzhi qi)."
"May I ask what this flood-like qi is?"
"It is difficult to explain. This is a qi which is,
in the highest degree, vast and unyielding [31].
Nourish it with integrity and place no obstacle in its
path and it will fill the space between Heaven and
Earth. It is a qi which unites Tightness and teaching
(dao). Deprive it of these and it will collapse. It
is born of accumulated Tightness and cannot be
appropriated by anyone through a sporadic show of
Tightness. Whenever one acts in a way that falls
below the standard set in one's heart, it will
collapse. Hence I said Gaozi never understood
Tightness because he looked upon it as external. You
must work at it and never let it out of your mind."
Mencius 2A 2; Lau 1983:78.
His reference to the heart, however, is not discursive in
the sense that he elaborates an introspective or faculty
psychology. He roots the virtues in the heart, rather than
in pedagogy, tradition, or Heaven; he finds the heart's
inclinations confirmed by tradition; he produces a direct
narrative which appeals to the culturally-determined
intuitions of his audience; and that is where he stays.
The style of his rhetoric is pragmatically geared to
establishing confidence in the Confucian option, and
evolving a sense of kingly virtue, not to a speculative
reading of human nature or the human psyche.
(iii) Kingly Virtue: Ideals, Decline, and the Mind of the
People.
Together with the theory of the heart and nature, the
Mencian theory of kingship remained a profound legacy for
later Confucians. We have already stressed its main
features; the primacy of the benevolent king, or renwang,
and benevolent government, renzheng; economics as a central
feature of government; the idea of dynastic cycles; the
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acceptance of the end of the Zhou lineage, and the need for
a new king whose virtue would be, the sole criterion for
office; the suggestion that Confucius himself was the model
of the sagely ruler; and the restitution of clan order.
Influential as it became, the theory of dynastic cycles
is the weakest point in Mencius' presentation. Starting
with the assumption of a golden age of perfect virtue, he
fails to incorporate any dynamic that would initiate the
recurring process of decline which eventually necessitates
the emergence of a new virtuous ruler. Whilst chaos is
diverted from the heart to the economic sphere, the
emergence of economic chaos itself is left without account.
In parallel with the foundational role of the heart,
Mencius suggests the foundational role of the people: and
just as the heart generates the virtues, so the people
"generate" the king [32], There is here a profound
tension between the elitism Mencius wishes to preserve, and
the role he ascribes to the people. The king exists for
the people, not the people for the king. To rule, the king
must know the mind of the people. The king forfeits his
right to rule - indeed, forfeits the name "king" - if he
abandons benevolence. The one who is appointed (by whom is
unclear - presumably Tian) has a right to kill the unjust
ruler. The murmurings of the people are one sign of
political disorder [33], With these themes Mencius
circumscribes a vision of ren as royal service.
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Yet the vision is not democratic in any strict sense,
though presumably popular demonstrations of approval
indicate that a particular individual carries the virtue of
leadership. In a sense the mind of the people becomes
equated here with Tianming: the people's approval of a
ruler is the mark of heaven's approval. The dynamic of
choice and election, however, is not manifest; and while
"the people" obviously played an important part in Mencius'
rhetoric, with their well-being or lack of it forming a
critical point of appeal to individual rulers (the very
possibility of this appeal is rooted in an assumed network
of beliefs about Tianming), nonetheless - and particularly
insofar as it seems Mencius does not favour the authority
of popular revolution - the practical authority for
appointment of a new king still lies with a specific elite.
In all of this, "the people" have for Mencius a status of
extreme malleability: not possessed directly of their own
voice (reports on their "murmurings" are mediated), they
can work to support his argument in any way he chooses;
thus he can have them go cheerfully to their death:
Mencius said,"The people under a leader of the feudal
lords are happy; those under a true King are expansive
and content. They bear no ill-will when put to death,
neither do they feel any gratitude when profited.
They move daily towards goodness without realizing who
it is that brings this about." Mencius 7A 13; Lau
1983:184.
4. ZHUANGZI'S CRITIQUE OF MENCIUS
In a style of argument that remains permanently without
refutation at a theoretical level, Zhuangzi sets out to
demolish the foundational positions established by Mencius.
At once he sets in the air any other foundations that would
subsequently be grounded. Reversing the normative
preferences of Confucian evaluation, exposing the partial
and hierarchical orderings that Mencius enshrines as
natural, demonstrating the inevitable paradoxes that attend
any normative moral philosophy (and so subverting any
reading of his own text that might find in it a naturalist
philosophy of "the Way"), his thinking soars into a
relativistic universe where no boundaries are permanent or
unchanging, whilst his judgement allows the practical
necessity and inevitability of pragmatic positions as a
necessary component to getting on in the world.
(i) The Rejection of the Mencian heart.
In order to grasp the force of Zhuangzi's dialectic, it
is well to consider various reversals of received wisdom
that he offers before checking his reading of the Mencian
heart.
Zhuangzi (-369 to -286) occupied the same world of
competing philosophies as Mencius; his stance was to judge
that competition intrinsic to the flux of life, allowing no
clear vantage point from which the merits of the various
positions might be impartially judged. Any position - any
teaching or dao - is itself part of the debate, drawing on
its own criteria of evaluation (shi-fei) in order to
support its stance, and thus itself liable to subversion by
the categories of a contrary discourseJj^This round of
changing discourses - not change possessed of any
no
direction, or inscribed within a teleological or
dialectical process, but simply randomness and necessity,
sprung from a play of forces: argument, power, patronage,
fear - is as natural as the passage of the wind, bearing
voices as varied as the softest breeze and the strongest
gale: the winds thus are the pipes of earth, and teachings
the pipes of heaven:
"You hear the pipes of men, don't you, but not yet the
pipes of earth, the pipes of earth but not yet the
pipes of Heaven?"
"I venture to ask the secret of it."
"That hugest of clumps of soil blows out breath, by
name the 'wind'. Better if it were never to start up,
for whenever it does ten thousand hollow places burst
out howling, and don't tell me you have never heard
how the hubbub swells 1 The recesses in mountain
forests, the hollows that pit great trees a hundred
spans round,are like nostrils, like mouths, like ears,
like sockets, like bowls, like mortars, like pools,
like puddles. Hooting, hissing, sniffing, sucking,
mumbling, moaning, whistling, wailing, the winds ahead
sing out AAAH!, the winds behind answer EEEH1, breezes
strike up a tiny chorus, the whirlwind a mighty
chorus. When the gale has passed, all the hollows
empty, and don't tell me you have never seen how the
quivering slows and settles 1" Zhuangzi 2;
Graham,1986: 48-9.[35]
If the Confucian teaching is one amongst others -
ascribing virtue to a certain type of person - why should
an opposite type not be seen as equally, though
differently, possessed of virtue? On this premise,
Zhuangzi erects a rogues' gallery of figures who would
haunt Confucians by their contradiction of the hierarchies
of li: menials, criminals, cripples speak with a wisdom
unknown to Mencius. Thus Cook Ding is seen to possess a
skill equal to, but different from, the skill of the expert
in li - or is seen to possess his own li of a sort excluded
m
from the Confucian canon: he carves the ox with a timing as
apt as anyone presenting offerings at the royal ancestral
feast:
Cook Ding was carving an ox for Lord Wenhui. As his
hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot stamped, knee
crooked, with a hissl with a thud I the brandished
blade as it sliced never mised the rhythm, now in time
with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra
playing the Jingshou.
"Oh, excellent!" said Lord Wenhui. "That skill should
such heights!"
"What your servant cares about is dao, I have left
skill behind me. When I first began to carve oxen, I
saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years
more and I never saw an ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am
in touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look
with the eye. With the senses I know where to stop,
the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely on
Heaven's structuring, cleave alone the main seams, let
myself be guided by the main cavities, go by what is
inherently so. A ligament or tendon I never touch,
not to mention solid bone A good cook changes his
chopper once a year because he hacks. A common cook
changes it once a month, because he smashes. Now I
have had this chopper for nineteen years, and have
taken apart several thousand oxen, but the edge is as
though it were fresh from the grindstone. At that
joint there is an interval, and the chopper's edge has
no thickness; if you insert what has no thickness
where there is an interval, then, what more could you
ask, of course there is ample room to move the edge
about. That's why after nineteen years the edge of my
chopper is as though it were fresh from the
grindstone.
"However, whenever I come to something intricate, I
see where it will be hard to handle and cautiously
prepare myself, my gaze settles on it, action slows
down for it, you scarcely see the flick of the chopper
- and at one stroke the tangle has been unravelled, as
a clod crumbles to the ground. I stand chopper in
hand, look proudly round at everyone, dawdle to enjoy
the triumph until I'm quite satisfied, then clean the
chopper and put it away."
"Excellent!" said Lord Wenhui. "Listening to the
words of Cook Ding, I have learned from them how to
nurture life."
Zhuangzi 3; Graham 1986:63-4
For Zhuangzi nature and its patterns stand against
culture, death against life, as something to be revelled
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in, rather than controlled and feared: the whole universe
is seen by him as an unending process of transformation,
and the inscription of some uniquely normative cultural
value within that process is a perverse inscription of
death within life, which lends to the moment of death
itself an absolute terror. The Confucian ritualising of
death is an avoidance of the factuality of death through a
(suppressed) affirmation of immortality in the continuing
life of the ancestors end of the community. Zhuangzi undoes
the fear of death in order to liberate nature
from culture, valorising a visionary excess that flies
beyond the confines of the law:
When Zhuangzi was dying, his disciples wanted to give
him a lavish funeral. Said Zhuangzi
"I have heaven and earth for my .outer and inner
coffin, the sun and moon for my pair of jade discs,
the stars for my pearls, the myriad creatures for my
farewell presents. Is anything missing in my funeral
paraphernalia? What will you add to these?"
"Master, we are afraid that the crows and kites will
eat you."
"Above ground, I'll be eaten by the crows and kites;
below ground,I'll be eaten by the ants and
molecrickets. You rob the one of them to give to the
other; how come you like them so much better?"
Zhuangzi 32; Graham 1986:125.
In various ways Zhuangzi shows the lack in Confucian
sagacity, makes Confucius draw another wisdom from
different teachers. On the status of the heart, Zhuangzi
himself steps forward as the teacher of Mencius. Why, of
the various organs of the body, should the heart be granted
special status? - the organs perform their diverse
functions, and the heart has its own particular function
amongst these, but no more. Here he reduces the process of
deliberation and judgment linked with the heart:
"Petty fears intimidate
The supreme fear calms.
It shoots like the trigger releasing the string on
the notch",
referring to its manipulation of 'That's it, that's
not' (shi-fei).
"It ties us down as though by oath, by treaty",
referring to its commitment to the winning
alternative.
"Its decline is like autumn and winter",
speaking of its daily deterioration. As it sinks,
that which is the source of its deeds cannot be made
to renew them.
"It clogs as though it were being sealed up",
speaking of its drying up in old age. As the heart
nears death, nothing can make it revert to the Yang.
Zhuangzi 2; Graham 1986:50.
Mencius derives social order jointly from the innate
seeds of the individual heart and the superiority of the
heart to other organs. He develops no argument tying the
nature of persons to the nature of society: he presumes a
certain social order to be natural, and its naturalness an
expression of the nature of the person. Zhuangzi sees the
heart as one organ amongst others - as such, susceptible to
death - and adds that, since individuals form their very
different ideas about life through the heart's
instrumentality, the heart itself constitutes no criterion
for distinguishing between positions: the completed heart
of the sage and the fool are each perfect in their own way.
No obvious social philosophy can be derived from
Zhuangzi's reading. One thing it is not, I would suggest,
is a separation of claims about the body (or person) from
claims about society. His is an individualist anarchism
that does not even portray the minimal social utopia we
found with Laozi. He praises those who are recluses and
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outcasts, those who cultivate their own qi and live in
harmony with nature; and he rejects rulership and any
concern with politics as mere trivia in comparison. His
ideal is the daemonic man (shenren), who develops himself
without fear of death, who stands free of any social
conventions, who possesses penetrating insight and complete
mastery of his own emotions and behaviour [3$]. Yet this
mastery does point to a paradox in Zhuagzi's rejection of
the heart. Cultivation of self as a complete organism is
certainly an appropriate stance within his style of
thinking; but as part of this he does also seem to
recognise some guiding principle within the organon, just
as he suggests there might be some initiating and
organising force behind the cosmos as a whole [37]. This
principle receives no specific elaboration (it is not
explicated as a foundational, metaphysical principle), but
remains subsumed within his text as the merest possibility
of a metaphysic, and as the merest possibility of sagely
rulership.
(ii) The Affirmation of Naturalness.
The critical stance of Zhuangzi, as of Laozi, is a
negative dialectic; this, minimally, is his reading of the
heart; a rejection of the metaphor of hierarchy, without
any necessary contrasting commitment to foundational
metaphors of democracy and naturalness. Yet, given that he
does use an extended imagery of naturalness, how does he
want this to be read [38]? Is he putting forward a
particular philosophy as better than any others; or is he
reducing all philosophies to a natural play of competition
which allows no judgement on their substantive merits?
The story of Cook Ding suggests that all acquired skills
are governed by rules, or li, that in this they are equal,
and that no evaluation of one skill against another is
possible. But the torturer who knows how to prolong the
intensity of pain over time in order to extract a
confession is possessed of a skill, as is the man v/ho
controls the gas chamber. Are these skills equal to
others, and beyond any general principles of moral
assessment? If so, is Zhuangzi's reduction simply an
opening for the naked excercise of power? I think not: for
whilst he might admit the existence of power, what he
undercuts is firstly the masked validation of power as
virtue and righteousness within a normative discourse, and
secondly the direct appeal to power as self-establishing:
just as the capacity of the heart does not grant it any
claims to superiority, so the existence of power does not
require that it be accorded any particular respect. By
reducing all claims to authority, in an essentially
libertarian discourse, Zhuangzi robs those who would employ
torture of any possible ground of appeal [39].
What Zhuangzi does not do - and it is here that he has
been most consistently misread - is provide a naturalist
foundation from which something like torture might be
judged immoral. Here, first by the logic of his discourse,
he removes all possibility of such a foundation; - his
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making things equal undercuts all priorities and
foundationalism; secondly, the usage of his text does not
require that dao be read as a foundational principle; and
thirdly, since nature has already been stripped of moral
attributes by Laozi (a move I take Zhuangzi to support)
then even if it gets reintroduced as a metaphysical
principle, it can just as easily be made to support the
validity of torture as anything else. Zhuangzi's idea of
naturalness is not of natural virtue different from, and
superior to, the virtue of the Confucians. His naturalness
is one way of being amongst others, which wins support and
favour if at all by the force of rhetorical presentation
[40].
What are we to make of the naturalism which still does
at times seem to assert itself? In comparing teachings
with the winds of the earth, Zhuangzi describes the
crescendo as all winds blow together, then the silence once
the stormh as passed: it is the silence he seems to favour,
the absence of all teachings, rather than the struggle of
competing daos. This silence, this absence of
distinguishing marks and features, is graphic in the tale
of original chaos:
The Emperor of the South Sea was Fast, the Emperor of
the North Sea was Furious, the Emperor of the Centre
was Huntun. Fast and furious met from time to time in
the land of Huntun who treated them very generously.
Fast and Furious were discussing how to repay Huntun1s
bounty.
"All men have seven holes through which they look,
listen, eat, breathe; he alone doesn't have any.
Let's try boring them."
Every day they bored one hole, and on the seventh day
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Huntun died.
Zhuangzi 7; Graham 1986:98.
The point at stake here and elsewhere does seem to be
Laozi's point that teachings and culture are better
abandoned, that priority is ascribed to the formlessness of
the uncarved block.
(iil) The Rejection of ren.
Zhuangzi's rejection of ren is a rejection of culture
and politics insofar as these function as adornments,
encourage a fear of death, expose one to a premature death,
and generally detract from the focus of self-cultivation
that a frugal and socially withdrawn lifestyle support.
Ren is thus seen as a style of self-destruction rather than
self-enhancement [41]. In arguing for the forms of virtue
that he finds more attractive, Zhuangzi focusses on the
individual to the exclusion of the social, thus differing
from Laozi. His virtues are self-directed rather than
other-directed - he does not for instance mention Laozi's
virtue ce, compassion - and the focus, in a warring age of
unexpectedly sudden and premature death, is on cultivation
of qi and abandonment of the political arena.
In writing on narcissism, Freud distinguishes two forms,
that of the man and of the woman [42] . The man, forced
through the style of his socialisation to abandon his
original narcissism, preserves it subliminally only in the
outward projection of object-relations, in the pursuit of
the ego - ideal as ideal self achieved through work and
status, and in the attraction to the love-object as the
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manifest form of the original self; love for the other,
then, particularly as falling-in-love, is in the first
instance narcissistic self-love masked as nostalgic return.
The narcissism of the woman, by contrast, is such as to
remain self-contained, intact, not ruptured in such a way
as to open an endless quest for its lost original form, but
self-absorbed - a fascinating other that does not want to
give of itself, that lives within a measured complacency.
Even if taken as a particular type of femininity, the
characterisation is intriguing; more intriguing here is its
aptness as a characteristic of Zhuangzi's concept of self.
If Freud valorises female narcissism as the fascinating
other, does that fascination remain if the same narcissism
is manifest in male form? The question does not simply
apply to Zhuangzi, for in the west the virtues of
complacency and self-absorbed non-action are central to
Stoicism, and have been extensively thematised,there and in
earlier and later thinking, around the contrasts of
immanence-transcendence, and contemplation-action, where
transcendence/action focusses on the original male
other-directed narcissism, the outwardly-moving quest for
the lost self. If Zhuangzi's self is the feminine for
Freud, (a feminine of which Freud stood in awe), it is a
feminine already appropriated as a masculine ideal - such,
with Zhuangzi, because he, as Laozi, allows no space for
women in the articulation and attainment of virtue, despite
the residuum in his text of an imagery of women.
It is the outward, other-directedness of ren as
Confucian virtue that Zhuangzi criticises - an outwardness
that marks a loss and forgetfulness of the self. In one
example, pointing to the diverse behaviour and responses to
the world evinced by different animals in different
contexts, he makes the Nietzschean point that there are as
many different stances in the world as there are forms of
life, each incommensurable with the others.
5. XUNZI'S PRAGMATIC CONFUCIANISM
Xunzi's stance is essentially forged by Zhuangzi's
criticisms, by the need provoked by Zhuangzi to rethink
Confucianism along non-foundationalist lines. If Zhuangzi
encapsulates the sense that all life-forms, in their
differences, are of equal value (or equally without value),
Xunzi responds that customs and methods (li and fa) have
long been developed to enrich and complexify, in an
important way, the life-options available to individuals
and communities, that the option for reclusive cultivation
of one's own qi is of minority interest, and that the
Confucian stance is one which, tried and tested over
generations, emerges as the best prescription for social
order. Acknowledging that one can no longer use the
foundationalist imagery of tian and xin, Xunzi gives
primacy to li as the network of practices shown
historically to organise life successfully to the maximum
advantage of all [43]. [This utilitarian formula, nowhere
theorised as such but presented as a central notion by
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Xunzi, is reckoned to have profoundly different
consequences from Mohist utility (li) ; while Mozi urges a
minimalization of "adornments" in his doctrine of
frugality, Xunzi urges the maximal fulfilment of desires in
the opportunities afforded by culture, though limiting that
fulfilment to an elite group whose membership is determined
solely by skill and achievement,not by inheritance.]
Within the framework of li, ren is given little overt
articulation, though it is assumed nonetheless as a central
virtue, in conjunction with yi_ (righteousness). Its
relative displacement through li is comparable to the
displacement of li through ren that we saw with Mencius.
Xunzi predicates the priority of li_ not only on the
testimony of the sage-kings and history, but also on the
requirements of human nature; here he is usually taken to
present human nature as evil, in contrast with Mencius1
reading of nature as good; li_ is thus validated as the
necessary constraint and formation required by a nature
that would otherwise run to excess. (His position here
raised a problem for later Confucians that was not resolved
until Zhu Xi1s metaphysical reformulation of xing as
essentially good). For Mencius and Xunzi the structural
dynamic of the heart/nature is the same; seeds that,
without interference, grow to virtue; desires that, without
interference, precipitate conflict or chaos. Xunzi
envisages a Hobbesian state of nature that requires li and
kingly rule if conflict is to be overcome and individuals
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enabled to pursue their several ends [44],
While Xunzi seems unequivocal here and elsewhere on the
question of original evil, there are other passages which
let human nature be read as originally neutral, if not
positively good. A point of critical importance here is
that, in thinking about human nature - and in thinking
about psychology - Xunzi is extending the scope of
philosophical conceptuality beyond the range hitherto
achieved. His treatment of Confucian rationality, for
instance, incorporates an attention to argumentation
learned from later Mohist disputation, together with an
original account of psychological functions that really
marks the beginnings of philosophical psychology in China.
His view of human nature specifically fields a claim not
evident in Mencius or Zhuangzi: human nature as such is
universally constant; cultural practises create its various




FROM HAN CONFUCIANISM TO CHAN BUDDHISM
Of the various meetings between cultures known in world
history, that between India and China, realised in the
medium of Buddhism, is amongst the most significant,
involving profound differences in language, worldview and
philosophical method. Buddhism displaced Daoist and
Confucian thinking for seven hundred years and, in some
readings, confirmed its hegemony in a sublimated form
within the neo-Confucianism advanced by Zhu Xi and his
peers. Yet Zhu sought to place Buddhism outside the sphere
of a newly positive Confucian vision. Furthermore, in this
vision it was not Buddhism alone that corrupted and
betrayed the spirit of Confucius, but the whole of China's
unified imperial heritage; the 700 years of Buddhist
vitality had indeed seen the loss of the Confucian Way, but
- the claim went - that Way had been lost earlier, 1500
years before Zhu Xi, and its last articulate spokesman
(indeed, one of its few significant spokesmen apart from
Confucius) had been Mencius. Zhu saw himself in a sagely,
prophetic role, resuming the true Confucian discourse at
the point where Mencius left it.
While Zhu pictured himself thus, it is clear that
despite the rhetoric of immediacy, and of the transparency
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of the transmitted text - suggesting his work as hermeneut
to be the pure, undisrupted re-presentation of an original
truth - Zhu's writing bears the density of historical
residue, as his vision receives the impress of a series of
images shifting through a telescopic chain of differently
resolved lenses. To control this shifting series and order
it around the notion of a single transmission of truth,
daotong, is the strategic move Zhu makes in order to secure
the authenticity of his commentary on the classics [1].
Yet formally this move is one already made for him in
Buddhism - in Chan the theory of transmission of mind
outside the teaching, premissed on an ideal Indian Buddhist
patriarchate responsible for preserving the essence of
wisdom, establishes the notion of a verbal transmission of
truth, in an ideal relationship between master and
disciple [2]. Zhu transforms this into an ideal textual
transmission, suggesting further that there is an original
mind present in the scriptural sources that speaks directly
to the mind of the sage, making the written medium a
transparent form transcending history.
Furthermore, Zhu's status as sage, offering his wisdom
in verbal exchange, echoes that of the Chan masters, just
as it echoes the verbal teaching style of Confucius and
Mencius: indeed, the crystallisation of speech in written
records, yulei (Classified Conversations), developed as a
device to preserve the force of oral instruction within
Chan, is used in turn by neo-Confucians to preserve the
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teachings of their sages.
Any attempt to grasp the shifting trajectories of
history between Xunzi and Zhu Xi can only be partial, but
some reading of them - some reading of the ways in which
the contextualisation of ren came to be written and
re-written - is required if the force of Zhu's thinking is
to come to the fore.
(i) HAN CONONFUCIANISM; DONG ZHONGSHU.
We remarked earlier that Dong Zhongshu (-179? to -104?)
can be seen as the first systematiser in Confucian
thinking; yet the point requires some modification.
Everything presupposes system: the making of individual
speech-acts (parole) presupposes the differential system of
language (lanque) as the permissive matrix for speech as
such; any act presupposes a cultural framework from which,
even as rejection, it draws shape or meaning; any original
expression of ren, with Confucius, presupposes the network
of l_i; any intuitive Daoist naturalism (perhaps)
presupposes a system in nature. Of significance in
philosophy is the movement of reflexivity which attempts to
bring a presupposed and inherited system to rational
articulation. At the same time this process of ordering
and grading is one of repression and displacement. Based as
it is on a set of "foundational" taboos, any society is
committed to presuming certain conventions to be natural in
such a way that an acceptable account of them will be a
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rationalisation which, in missing their darker, arbitrary
aspect, leaves the foundations of culture secure; this
move, as we have seen, can be particularly evident in
philosophy, and marks the kind of rationalised system that
Dong Zhongshu produced [3].
In providing a framework of belief for Han Confucians,
and an organisation of knowledge which expressed itself in
the curriculum of the imperial university,Dong drew on a
set of cosmological notions formerly distinct from the
ethical reflections of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi [4].
These served to legitimate Confucianism as a prophetic
religious system, as a principle of bureaucratic
organsation, and as a theorisation of the, ritual more than
moral, functions of imperium. Here Confucius became
confirmed as the hidden King of the Zhou, and raised to
cultic status as an object of state veneration. Within
Dong's quasi-magic world the parallelism of macrocosm and
microcosm, of nature and society, was worked out in
profound detail. The slightest unexpected occurrence in
nature could carry grave implications for the organisation
of the state; the imperial task of monitoring cosmic order
through ritual was a continuation of that compulsively
charged repetition we remarked earlier within Shang and
Zhou religious practice. One reported story for the Han
period gives something of the flavour:
Once when (the statesman) Ping was travelling, he
encountered a crowd of brawlers, some of whom had
wounded or killed one another. To the surprise of his
entourage he passed them by without stopping. Soon
afterward, however, he met a man leading an ox which
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was panting with protruding tongue. At once he
stopped his horse and inquired of the man how many
miles he had been traveling. On being criticized by
some of his followers for this seeming triviality, he
told them that the brawlers could be left to those
officials whose particular business it was to deal
with such matters; the harmonizing of the yin and
yang, however, was a matter of concern to the highest
officials. "The Three Highest Ministers act to
harmonize the yin and yang. Just now it is spring,
when the lesser yang is operative in affairs, so that
there should not yet be any great heat. Nevertheless,
the ox is panting because of a summer-like heat,
which, I fear, means that the seasons are out of
joint." From The History of the Former Han dynasty,
Quoted Fung 1953:10.[5]
In the syncretism of Dong's writing the Mohist
personalist reading of tian becomes appropriated as the
foundation for Confucian religiosity. Heaven's will is
positively directed towards human well-being, and Heaven,
for the first time in Confucian thinking it would seem, is
precisely identified as ren:
The beautiful expression of love (ren) lies in Heaven,
for Heaven is love. Heaven protects and shelters all
creatures, generates and produces them, nourishes and
forms them. Its work is without end; when it reaches
a conclusion, it returns again to its beginning. And
everything that it produces it hands over to man for
his service. If we examine the purpose of Heaven, (we
see that) it is boundless and infinitely loving. Man,
receiving his life from Heaven, (likewise) receives
from it love and is thereby himself loving...The
purpose of Heaven is ever to love or confer benefit;
its work is ever to nourish and create growth.
Chunqiu fanlu 44; Fung 1953:52-3.
Heaven functions in Dong in a dual sense, sometimes
referring to the universe as an integral ordered whole,
sometimes referring to one pole of a duality between Heaven
and Earth. In either case, however, Heaven is not a
transcendent originating principle, as with a god creating
ex nihilo: rather it names the immanent principle of
1*7
growth, energy and creativity within the cosmos. There is
no radical separation between Heaven and Earth as there is
between God and the world in Judaeo-Christian thinking.
[That much said, Dong does speak of an Origin (yuan) from
which things arise, and the Origin is prior to the
distinction of Heaven and Earth. It is the task of the sage
to relate all things to the Origin. Even if yuan is a
designation of Tian in its broader sense, however, the
movement of origination is not one of creation as an act of
divine will, a creation of being from non-being, but
rather, apparently, one of emanation, with the basic
principles of being originally present within the source.
Yet the nature of that presence is far from clear: the
acknowledged sequence of origination is yin and yang, the
five elements or agents (wuxinq), Heaven and Earth, and
man, but a certan metaphysical priority is given to yin and
yang and wuxinq insofar as these are the interactive
elements from which all beings are produced, just as a
teleological priority is given to man as the goal of
completion towards which the process of the universe tends:
Of the creatures born from the refined essence of
Heaven and Earth, none is more noble than man. Man
receives the mandate from Heaven and is therefore
superior to other creatures. Other creatures suffer
troubles and defects and cannot practice humanity
(ren) and righteousness (y_i); man alone can practice
them. Chunqiu fanlu ch.56; Chan 1973:280.
In their metaphysical aspect yin and yang and wuxinq
approximate to Plato's Forms insofar as they characterise
the transcendence of origins as positively substantial
rather than empty, (while Dong incorporates aspects of
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Daoist thought, he does not accept the Daodejing's reading
of the origin as wu, emptiness or non-being); they also
approximate to the Forms insofar as they come to be
materially substantiated in the natural and human
universes, giving to things their specific identities; they
differ, though, insofar as they are not principles of
identity as such, not universals, but rather specifications
of the basic qualities and energies from which entities
emerge; and they differ also insofar as they incorporate a
dynamic element within transcendence, representing
principles of movement and change rather than formal
abstractions [6].
The question of emanation, or creation through divine
will, is further focussed by Dong's ascription of
attributes to tian. Tian is loving and creative, and is
also possessed of intelligence. In presenting his
anthropology, Dong notes:
The mind possesses the power of thinking, which
corresponds to (Heaven's) power of deliberation and
calculation.Chunqiu fanlu 54; Fung 1953:31
Again, it is not clear in which of its two senses Tian is
spoken of here, and therefore where the quality of
intelligence is metaphysically grounded. Within the
statement's context the distinction between Heaven and
Earth is invoked, and it thus seems that the Heaven which
emerges from the source is the locus of intelligence. If
so, we have a formal parallel with the thinking of
Plotinus: as for Plotinus mind (nous) as being, and as the
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locus of the Forms, emerges from the One as non-being, so
for Dong Heaven as intelligence emerges from yuan. [A
difference in the comparison would be that, for Plotinus,
the One is beyond characterisation, with metaphysical
attributes only predicated of nous. while for Dong the
existence of basic metaphysical principles is ontologically
prior to the existence of (secondary) Tian].
(i) Dong's Anthropology; the Divided Self and the
Secondariness of Woman.
The naming of Heaven, the attribution of qualities to
it, is for Dong powerfully geared to identifying the scope
and functioning of human life and political order: in tian
this is linked to man (almost solely conceived male, as we
shall see) by way of resemblance:
Only man faces (Heaven) directly, with head erect and
upright posture...In the physical form of man, for
this reason, his head is large and round, like
Heaven's countenance. His hair is like the stars and
constellations. His ears and eyes, with their
brilliance, are like the sun and moon. The
penetrating understanding that lies within his breast
is like the spiritual intelligence (of Heaven)...The
symbols of Heaven and Earth, and correspondences
between the yin and yang, are ever (found) established
(also) in the (human) body.
Chunqiu fanlu 54; Fung 1953:31 [7]
This macrocosmic mirroring and foundation of the human
body and its attributes is not, however, without its
problems. Dong characterises both man and Heaven as ren.
yet, in one aspect of his theorisation of human nature, ren
is not an innate but an acquired characteristic. Taking a
middle road between Mencius and Xunzi, Dong sees xing as
neither innately good nor evil, but rather as a resource
with possibilities for both good and evil. Contrasting silk
as a spun and finished product with the silk fibers held in
the cocoon, Dong claims the latter,are not yet silk, but
simply have the potential to become so: similarly the seeds
of ethical disposition planted in xing are not as such
good, but the potential for goodness:
Someone says, "Since nature contains the beginning of
goodness and since the mind possesses the basic
substance of goodness, how can nature still not be
regarded as good?"
I reply, "You are wrong. The silk cocoon contains
(potential) silk but it is not yet silk, and the egg
contains the (potential) chicken but it is not yet a
chicken. If we follow these analogies, what doubt can
there be? Heaven has produced mankind in accordance
with its great principle, and those who talk about
nature should not differ from each other. But there
are some who say that nature is good and others who
say that nature is not good. Then what is meant by
goodness differs with their various ideas. There is
the beginning of goodness in human nature. Let us
activate it and love our parents. And since man is
better than animals, this may be called good - this is
what Mencius meant by goodness." Chunqiu fanlu ch.
35; Chan 1973:27718].
Dong does not pursue the metaphors he offers, but
presumes them self-evident as an explication of his
position. One difficulty is that, as he gives a dual
meaning to tian, so also does he ascribe a dual meaning to
xing: in its broader sense xinq is inclusive of all
potentialities, for good and evil, whilst in a narrower
sense it is contrasted with qing, feelings or emotions - in
that contrast, xinq is good (characterised as productive of
ren) and qinq evil (productive of tan, covetousness). The
contrast is further consolidated by linking xinq with yang,
the masculine principle, and qinq with yin, the feminine
principle, a move which, as we shall see, issues in a
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necessary social subordination of women in Dong's eyes.
The Bohutong (Comprehensive Discussions in the White
Tiger Hall) provides an extension of Dong's concept here,
and in the contrast of xing and qing the translator chooses
to render the former term not "nature", but "instincts."
What do (the words) qing and xing mean? Xing
(instinct) is the dispensation of the yang; qing
emotion is the working of the yin. Man is born
through the reception of the yin and yang fluids,
therefore he harbours the Five Instincts and the Six
Emotions. The Goumingjue (an Apocryphal Book of Filial
Piety) says: "Emotion arises from the yin, it is
desire (based) on momentary reflection; instinct
arises from the yang, it is (always) attached to
reason. The yang-qi (stands for) consideration for
others, the yin-qi (stands for)
selfishness...Therefore emotions have desire of gain
(as their origin) instinct has consideration for
others (as its base).
What are the Five Instincts? They are 'consideration
for others' ren, 'sense of the correct principles' yi,
'ceremonial behaviour 'li, 'wisdom' zhi,
'trustworthiness' xin. Tjan 1952:565
In one sense Tian is beyond good and evil, as yuan; in
another, Tian is positive good, ren, and supreme
intelligence. While yin and yang emerge from the source
and constitute the material from which Heaven (in its
secondary sense) and Earth are constituted, Heaven (again
in its secondary sense) has the power to control the
turbulence of yin and yang, and this controlling function
is a model for the way in which man should organise his
feelings:
That which confines the multitude of evil things
within, and prevents them appearing externally, is the
mind. Therefore the mind is known as the
confiner...Heaven has its restraints over the yin and
yang, and the individual has his confiner of the
feelings and desires; in this way he is at one with
the course of Heaven. There the yin in its movements
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is not permitted to concern itself with spring and
summer, and the moon when it is new is always obscured
by the sun's light, sometimes completely and sometimes
partially. Such is the way in which Heaven restrains
the yin. Why, then, should one not diminish one's
desires and check one's feelings, in order thus to
respond to Heaven? Chunqiu fanlu 35; Fung 1953:35
Of particular interest here is the formal acknowledgement
that Tian controls the yin and the yang, followed by an
account where only the yin requires control: in fact, and
precisely in its controlling function, Heaven here is
appropriated to yang, and the principle of turbulence and
disruption, at this metaphysical level, is simply yin [9].
The similarity between Heaven and man that Dong wishes
to focus is, I think, one where both are engaged in a work
of perfection: Tian, at a cosmic level, receives a heritage
(of potentially disruptive yin) from the Origin yuan, and
it maintains cosmic order by containing yin within
appropriate bounds; man, in his nature and in his world,
receives a heritage (of perhaps greater disruption) which
he must order, working co-operatively with Tian. At the
metaphysical level there seems here to be no easily held
notion of an original goodness, nor is there an image of an
original historical or transcendent utopia; there is,
rather, a notion of perfection yet to be achieved: no
longer is a golden age of the sages a principal locus of
appeal, whilst the existence of evil and disorder at a
cosmic level is acknowledged but not problematised - the
work of overcoming it is the point, not a theory of its
emergence, or at least, no more of a theory than is
required to let the work get underway:
I
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Why does the Spring and Autumn Annals value the origin
(yuan) highly and talk about it? The origin means the
beginning. It means that the foundation must be
correct. It expresses the kingly way. The king is the
beginning of man. If the king is correct, then the
original material force will be harmonious, wind and
rain will be timely, lucky stars will appear, and the
yellow dragon will descend. If the king is not
correct, then strange transformations will take place
in heaven above and bandits will appear...Chunqiu
fanlu ch.6.
It is only the Sage who can relate the myriad things
to the One and tie it to the origin. If the source is
not traced and the development from it followed,
nothing can be accomplished.... the first month of
spring is a continuation of the activities of Heaven
and earth, continuing the activities of Heaven and
completing it. The principle is that (Heaven and man)
accomplish together and maintain the undertaking.
Ibid. ch. 13 Chan 1973:284-5.
The Bohutong carries an interesting elaboration on the
cosmic linkage of Heaven and man. Identifying the Five
Instincts, xing, as ren, yi, li, zhi and xin, and the Six
Emotions as xi joyr BB anger, cri grief, lo happiness, a_i
love, and wu hate, it proceeds to link the instincts with
the five elements, the five directions, and the five
principle organs of the body (liver, heart, lung, kidneys
and spleen). Ren is linked with the liver in the following
way:
Why (does) the liver (represent) consideration for
others? The liver is the ssence of wood;
consideration for others (expresses) love for the
living. The east (represents) the yang, (there) the
ten thousand things begin their lives. Therefore the
liver resembles a tree, green-coloured, with branches
and leaves. Why are the eyes its watch? The eyes can
shed tears, but admit no objects. Likewise the tree
shoots out branches and leaves, but nothing can enter
it. Tj an 1 952:566
The other-directedness of ren that is figured here in this
physical and corporeal imagery is the primary point for
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Dong Zhongshu. Contrasting ren and yi, he notes that ren
is relational, directed outwards, whilst yi. directed
towards the self as a principle of righteousness and
self-control:
The standard for love lies in showing affection, ai,
to others, not to the self. That for righteousness
lies in rectifying the self, not in rectifying
others.Chunqiu fanlu 29;Fung 1953:38.
Whilst ren in principle remains the primary Confucian
value, in practice the major ethical focus in Dong's
thinking is the three bonds, sangong, the relations between
ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife: in
each of these, the first term is linked to yang and the
second to yin, and the relationship is hierarchical. The
principles of power, subordination and inferiority are thus
metaphysically grounded, as is clear elsewhere when Dong
speaks about yin: yang and yin are not equal complementary
dualistic categories, but categories set in a hierarchical
balance precariously held, where the principle of imbalance
is yin.Do]
We noted in chapter one how philosophising about human
nature has always implicitly been a philosophising about
maleness, a point well evident in Dong and in the Bohutong.
Yin is linked with qing, linked in turn with woman,
fallenness, turbulence, disruption: the woman must be kept
in place, and the organisation of social codes maintains
her in the home:
Why is it that according to the rites the man takes
his wife, whereas the woman leaves her house? It is
icr
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because the yin (to which a woman belongs) is lowly,
and should not have the initiative; it proceeds to the
yang in order to be completed. Therefore the zhuan
says "The yang leads, the yin'conforms; the man goes
(ahead), the woman follows." BHT, 235; Tjan 1949:244.
The reason that, (even) when the husband behaves
badly, his wife has no right to leave him lies in the
principle that Earth does not separate from Heaven.
Though the husband (behaves) badly the wife is not
allowed to leave him. BHT, 247; Tjan 1949:251.
Of particular significance, marking the way in which the
feminine is overwritten with the codes of male
relationships, we find that, at the heart of her
relationship with her husband, the wife's role is
explicated entirely in terms of the interplay of inter-male
bonds:
The wife serves her husband according to four
principles. (Firstly), on the fist crowing of the
cock she washes her hands and rinses her mouth. She
combs her hair, draws over it a scarf of silk, fixes
it with a pin, and fastens it, then she meets (her
husband): this is the principle of (the relation of)
Lord and subject. (Secondly), she feels affection
(for him to such a degree that his loss results in)
deep sorrow: that is the principle of (the relation
of) father and son. (Thirdly), she keeps account of
what there is and of what there is not and this is the
principle of (the relation of) elder and younger
brother. (Fourthly), within the doors (of the women's
apartments) she sits with him on the mat: that is the
principle of (the relation of) friends. BHT, 261b;
Tjan 1949:260.
[I take friendship also to be understood as between males;
as a form of relationship, and in significant contrast with
the theorisations of friendship we find with Plato,
Aristotle and Cicero, Dong lists his friendship as the last
in his sequence of relationships [11].]
In this presentation the feminine is inscribed as
maleness, the unknown is grasped as knowable in male
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discourse, in two sense: the explication of the feminine
occurs within the categories of male relationships and the
essence of woman is thus shifted into a relation between
men; and the status of woman is reduced to that of
subordinate male within the male relationship. In terms of
her complete containment within male discourse, and unlike
the form of her presence within Daoism, woman here remains
doubled, present to herself only through the lens of the
male, so that even were it to be claimed that she should
cultivate ren, that ren would be the secondariness and
displacement of another's identity.
2. WANG CHONG: THE CIRCULARITY OF CRITIQUE.
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of
that universe which is dispersed into numberless
twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which
clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most
arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history", but
nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had
drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed,
and the clever beasts had to die. - One might invent
such a fable, and yet he still would not have
adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and
transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human
intellect looks within nature...this intellect has no
additional mission which would lead it beyond human
life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and
begetter takes it so solemnly - as though the world's
axis turned within it. But if we could communicate
with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies
through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels
the flying centre of the universe within himself.
Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,
Nietzsche, 1979: 79.
Man holds a place within the universe like that of a
flea.or louse under a jacket or robe, or of a cricket
or ant within a hole or crevice...
Supposing insects had intelligence, they would scold
man saying: "You eat the produce of heaven, and we eat
it as well. You regard us as a plague, but are
unaware that you yourself are a calamity to us."
Wang Chong, Lunheng chs 43 and 49; Fung, 1953: 154-5.
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Dong Zhongshu, and with him a large section of Han
Confucianism, wished to articulate a sense of cosmic
purpose behind the Confucian option - a purpose nonetheless
freighted with anxiety insofar as the burden of maintaining
cosmic order and individual integrity had to cope with a
powerful residue of resistance and imbalance at the heart
of all things, natural and human. Wang Chong, spokesman
for a purposeless naturalism, questioned the point of
Confucian aspiration, as also the ground of anxiety.
Differences between Dong and Wang Chong focus on the
question of home. Wang insists there is no special sense
in which the universe exists as a home for man - there is
no cosmic scheme of things within which man has a
privileged place, no correspondence between tian and man,
no particular significance coded in the acts of nature,
regular or irregular. The universe is as empty as Pascal's
infinite spaces, as completely a self-subsistent phenomenon
as the world of Lucretius. Man's existence is, rather,
louselike, parasitic on reserves that were not created for
him and that he does nothing to perfect: the reserve's
existence is as spontaneous, unpredictable and unplanned as
man's own. Wang's critique, more savage in its irony than
Zhuangzi's (though also more moralistic), is appropriate to
the denser body of assumption evident in Dong in comparison
with Mencius.
Not that Wang separates himself completely from Dong's
assumptions: he holds, for instance, to the significance of
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the five virtues, ren included, as practical ways of
organising life, and acknowledges with their functioning a
provisional form of perfection; he notes the inevitability
of an individual lot or destiny, minq, that cannot be
circumvented; despite his own arguments to the contrary, he
comes close to Dong's perception of human nature as
essentially mixed; the constituents of his universe are
equally yin and yang, wuxinq, and Heaven and Earth.
Textuality is a form of parasitism, an inhabiting and
feeding on what has gone before:
Now in the Lunheng the current literature is taken up
with the object of defining right and wrong and
distinguishing between truth and falsehood. It is not
an original production of something that did not exist
previously. LH 87
Parasitic on the words of authority, on the identity of
Confucius himself, Wang sculpts himself as a Confucian
junzi in order to prove his credentials for critique:
Wang Chong had a pure and sterling character...was of
a cheerful and easy going disposition, and did not
strive for wealth and honour...learned to behave with
politeness, humility, benevolence, obedience,
propriety, and reverence, - had the will of a great
man. LH 66,67,65.
And so here the parsite has his day, his house is in the
body of what already exists, from here he speaks:
Jade is being confounded with stones. People cannot
distinguish it...Right is being turned into wrong, and
falsehood into truth. How is it possible not to speak
of it? LH 89
Here and elsewhere Wang himself assumes the status of
parasite in relation to previous traditions, in extension
of his more generalised view of human life as parasitic in
essence. In one sense the claim parallels Zhuangzi's: we
are caught, thrown, in the midst of a relativistic
universe, there is no step beyond change to a position of
changeless perfection, no step beyond conflict to a moment
of original order, no step out of time to a timeless
beyond: we latch onto what is at hand, and use it just as
it in turn uses us.
Man eats grain, and wears silk and hemp...Heaven does
not produce grain, silk and hemp purposely, in order
to feed and clothe mankind. LH 92
Men in clothing live within the animals they devoured.
And the same thing for plants. We eat rice, wheat,
apples, the divine eggplant, the tender dandelion; but
we also wear silk, linen, cotton; we live within the
flora as much as we live within the fauna. We are
parasites; thus we clothe ourselves. Thus we live
within tents of skins like the gods within their
tabernacles. Serres: 1982, 1 0. [12]
With Wang, in the process of parasitism, men become as gods
through clothing themselves in the texts of tradition, in
the words of Confucius and Laozi, in the garments of li,
and this process is one where men assume for themselves the
eyes and mind of Heaven and Earth, because
we know that Heaven possesses neither mouth nor
eyes...(that) the body of the Earth is formed of
earth, and earth has neither mouth nor eyes. LH, 93
This position is itself finally an orientation to death
that marks the inscription of death within life, knowing
that death is merely a seam in the continuous fabric of
living forms, or life but a passing design on the larger
fabric of death. And here
I have written the essays on Death and on the False
reports about the Dead to show that the deceased have
no consciousness...as soon as my readers have grasped
this, they will restrain the extravagance of the
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burials and become more economical. LH, 90
Wang would thus have us accept our parasitism within a
given order, an order functioning as an economy against
excess. Here the appearance of excess, of transcendence,
ideality, is itself read simply as the mask of a different
parasite, one with the form of an ideal economy organising
the play of expenditure without reserve. Wang shifts
between the identities of these two parasites, living on
the borders, in the margins of a text which he has consumed
- which has consumed him, devouring the space of his memory
from his earliest years - but hoping also at the heart of
his text to preserve the jewel of a non-parasitic truth,
the splendour of worldly integrity [13].
But where? Heaven acts spontaneously; things come to be
by chance; everything bears the mark of conflict:
If Heaven had produced its creatures on purpose, it
ought to have brought them to love each other, and not
to prey upon and destroy one another. LH 104
However
The sighs of ten thousand people cannot move Heaven.
LH 113
Heaven simply names the processes of natural fate and
destiny (LH 119) - its virtue is less than human virtue (LH
123). In this economy, skill, cunning, strength, speed are
the marks of the parasite's survival, and are explanatory
categories enough for life's changes, neither requiring a
theory of wuxinq nor susceptible of containment within it.
If at times Wang seems to fit Heaven into an economy of
virtue ("It is human law to like good, and hate evil, to do
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good as reward, and to inflict evil as punishment. The law
of Heaven must be the same." LH 1-25), what is in fact at
stake is a fundamental law of the universe whereby one
principle generates its opposite, or another, necessarily
and inevitably, as a balancing or culminating response
("Walking upon frost, one knows that hard ice will
necessarily follow. This is Heaven's law." LH 127). And
yet the authority of Heaven is retained:
The heart of high Heaven is in the sages. When Heaven
reprimands, it is done through the mouths of the
Sages. LH 129.
This double-handed preservation and destruction of
Heaven, in a doubling of the wisdom of Confucius and Laozi,
leaves Wang Chong with a language for ethics which, in
eschewing pragmatism and extolling the Sages, borrows a
rhetoric in excess of argument, shining in the light
reflected from sagely wisdom, this disguising the only
possible authority open to his text beyond critique, that
of productive fiction (14). Wang criticises Confucius yet
clings to him: there will always be the genius of
criticism, yet also that charisma in the sage which still
eludes criticism. Luck, chance, fortune are the names of
the game, and the sage's supremacy is his fated (ming)
ability to respond to fortune to the utmost. Here, even if
Confucian ethical categories are retained, ("By nature man
is endowed with the five virtues" LH 104; "Confucius took
(Zilu) under his guidance. By degrees he polished and
instructed him. The more he advanced in knowledge, the
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more he lost his fierceness, and his arrogance was
broken...this is a stirring example of how a man's
character was changed from bad into good" LH 376), the
ground of ethics is ambiguous.
In many readings it is a naturalistic fate which
equally produces good and evil; but the Sage can also undo
the original endowment of heaven ("he who has a wicked
nature changes his will and his doings if he happens to be
taught by a sage, although he was not endowed with a good
character by heaven" LH 377); and while human nature can be
a mix of good and evil, an assumption also emerges that
evil is something secondary, a disorder contaminating
original goodness ("Men who are not good have a disease of
their nature" LH 377) [15]. Ethical training is like a
Daoist alchemy working to transmute base natures into ren:
"Provided that bad-natured men are of the same kind as
good-natured ones, then they can be induced to do
good. Should they be of a different kind, they can
also be coerced in the same manner as the Daoists cast
gems...Enlightened with learning and familiarised with
virtue, they too begin by and by to practice
benevolence and equity." LH 378.
Thus in a text which opens the issue of the parasite the
implications of parasitism are evaded. The mutual
devouring of each by each, the perception of each as
use-value for the other, the existence of all within an
economy that cannot know excess, entails equally the
reduction of ren as co-operation to the idealised form of
parasitism, the reading of virtue and perfection as a play
of power towards a pointless self-enhancement, and the
inevitable form of human parasitism on nature as a
devouring of animal and natural reserves in a one way
process that gives nothing in return.
3. THE BUDDHIST TRANSFORMATION.
The issue of parasitism could also figure in our
reading of Buddhism, but it is rather on the question of
enlightenment, and the possible conflict between
enlightenment and ethics, that we will focus here as one
means of reading through Buddhism to the text of Zhu Xi.
To read the implications of Buddhism for Confucian
thinking, even at the major points of intersection -
monasticism and the institutions of the family; the
foreigner and national identity; transcendence and social
engagement; metaphysics and pragmatic ethics; simplicity,
meditation and the burden of scholarship; the contrasts of
language; the question of rebirth; the alternative
traditions of bodhisattva and sage - would be an exercise
demanding full attention in its own right. Here we will
look at the implications of one school of Buddhism - Chan
(Zen) - which was a powerful presence in Song China,
considering both the practical and philosophical aspects
present in it [16].
The famous contrast in Chan between northern and
southern schools, focussed on the alternative priority
given to gradual or sudden enlightenment, is in one sense
an issue peculiar neither to Chan, nor indeed to the
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Chinese context as such; it is a dilemma of the mind in
search of wholeness or salvation (focussed in St. Paul, as
we noted in chapter three, as a contrast between faith and
works or faith and the law). Both sides of the dilemma are
there in Confucius: an emphasis on xue that leads to
completion of the self late in life, but also an emphasis
on the proximity of perfection: if I want ren, it is here
at hand. If the stress on immediacy, spontaneity,
directness came to be a central preserve of Daoism - and in
all major aspects Chan is Zhuangzi's rebirth in Buddhist
clothing - some first perceptions of the Confucian-
Buddhist contrast saw Confucius as the master of simplicity
in relation to the burdensome discipline of the Buddhist
vinaya:
According to the doctrine of the Buddha, the Way of
the sage, though remote, may be reached through the
accumulation of learning. Only with the ending of the
ties (of existence), and the shining forth of the
mirror (of the mind), can there come the response of
gradual (chien) enlightenment. But according to the
doctrine of Confucius, the Way of the sage is
mysterious, even though Yen (Hui) almost reached it.
One must become identified with non-being (w^_) and
mirror the whole, for Truth (Li) is one and final.
Xie Lingyun, Bianzong Lun (Discussion of Essentials);
Fung, 1953: 274-5.
The image of the mirror is of primary significance, as
also the concept _li (here translated as "truth" but
elsewhere more generally as "principle" or "pattern") which
became a lynchpin of Zhu Xi's teaching. The mirror serves
to focus a reading of the person as originally good in a
radical sense; the doctrine of radical goodness was
furthermore, in certain Budhist schools, extended to all
reality, according to the notion that all beings possess
the Buddha-mind or Buddha-nature, and on the assumption
that the worlds of nirvana and samsara are in one sense
equivalent, it being the defilements of desiring experience
that makes them different.
The idea of equivalence entails a theory of perception.
Building on the original Buddhist teaching that desire and
attachment are the prime causes of suffering, the claim
here is that samsara is simply a product of disordered
perception and action - it possesses no essential structure
itself, but arises as a function of the mind's confusion.
The clear mind is like the mirror, unattached and
reflecting things as they really are without interference;
it is thus a principle of radical subjectivity, permanently
anterior to any particular state of mind but suffusing
states of mind with the qualities of clarity and
compassion.
At stake here in part is an application of the idea of
dependent co-origination: entities and qualities are not
self-subsistent but come into being in relation to each
other and, as items of knowledge, exist through the
mediation of particular structures of interpretation. The
worlds inhabited by animals and by persons are different
worlds, not the same world differently perceived: the
differently structured perceptual and nervous systems, and
the absence or presence of a linguistic system, create the
world differently in each case. The notion that it might
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be the same world differently perceived presupposes the
existence of an unbiassed, more an "unstructured", simple
observer capable of adjudicating between different
perceptions and, an option which Chan in principle should
exclude, capable also of giving an account of things as
they really are. Samsara is the co-origination of a
desiring agent and a world structured by desire.
But what of the language of truth (Li) and the function
of the mind as mirror: surely on this basis the mind works
as a simple unbiased observer, yet in terms of what we have
just said nirvana and any transcendent reality should also
be read as a structure of the mind? On the basis of
Nagarjuna's dialectic, a philosophical cornerstone for
Chan, the idea that the world is in such a way is neither
admissible nor inadmissible, since it can neither be
demonstrated nor refuted; equally, the idea of the world as
a human construct is neither admissible nor inadmissible
for the same reason: both its denial and its assertion
presuppose access to a world unconstructed, to a real
ground of judgement. Nagarjuna holds that the ground of
judgement is undecidable and permanently elusive. Thus
while the mirror gives an appearance of a real world - the
image suggesting a commitment to ontological and individual
realism - the real world of the enlightened mind (nirvana)
is in fact simply the co-origination of the world and a
mind newly structured, through Buddhist practice, to the
form of a mirror. The mind, as the mirror, at some point
passes away. Or does it?
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One early commitment in Chinese Buddhism was to some
concept of a permanent abiding self (in contrast to the
Buddha's teaching on anatta, no-self), to a mind thus that
might be radically interior and the subject of rebirth. In
some aspects the language of Chan suggests retention of
this idea of the essential self, the mind as subject of
enlightenment and the ground of true perception. This is,
for instance, apparent in the famous verses of Hui-neng,
the sixth patriarch:
Bodhi originally has no tree,
The mirror also has no stand.
Buddha nature is always clean and pure;
Where is there room for dust?
and
The mind is the bodhi tree,
The body is the mirror stand.
The mirror is originally clean and pure
Where can it be stained by dust. Yampolsky 1967: 132.
The thrust of these verses is to deny the premise of the
gradualist approach which, also taking the mind as a
mirror, used the image of constant dusting as a way of
focussing the need for steady cumulative practice;
Hui-neng's point is that, through a radical shift in one's
perspective, through the moment of enlightenment, one comes
to see one's own nature as always originally clear, empty,
void of any differentiating or individualising
characteristic. The mind is always clear, no dust ever
settles, the point is to realise this [17],
Realisation is a conversion in which a completely new
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stance on life is assumed; but central to that stance,
suggested at least by the form of the verses as we have
them here, is some hold on the mind as fundamental bedrock:
the mirror and the Buddha-nature do exist. A later version
of the same text, however, carries an important
modification, and with it a more radical doctrine of
emptiness. In this the third line of the first verse is
changed: instead of reading "Buddha nature is always clean
and pure", it reads "Since the beginning not a thing is" -
rather than a substantial mind we thus have a doctrine of
no-mind, and the issues at stake in this are the
significant ones for us here.
(i) The Doctrine of No-Mind (wuxin)
A story on the original transmission of mind declares
that the Buddha showed a flower to his disciples to test
their enlightenment, and one only, Kasyapa, smiled his
appreciation of the gesture. One reading might be that the
gesture is towards naturalness: the flower grows, blooms,
dies, unforced, striving for nothing, simply being what it
is - that this naturalness is its Buddha-nature, and that
to be enlightened is to live in a similarly non-striving
way. At once this opens us to the kind of naturalism
encountered with Laozi and Zhuangzi and to its problems;
what in man is natural, how can that be judged, what
follows from an affirmation of naturalness? The flower
perhaps focusses the light side of nature but what of the
dark, the moments of savagery and violence, how much of
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that is natural to man, in what sense, to what extent?
One position here is reminiscent of Krishna's advice to
Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita: from the viewpoint of
Buddha-nature there is neither killing nor being killed.
Buddha-nature is non-active and beyond destruction, but
what is the status of this teaching and what position does
it leave for ethics? Are we presented here simply with a
koan (kong'an), a puzzle directed towards provoking
enlightenment, one which leaves the ethical issues around
killing in the background to be resolved later by the
enlightened mind; or are we presented with a radical
separation of spiritual and social worlds, of enlightenment
and ethical practice, such as Krishna suggests when he
leaves the field of social dharma intact and argues the
Tightness of killing in war as part of fulfilling one's
social duties? How here should we read stories of the Chan
masters who were at times violent towards their disciplies,
even killing them, in their move to find that sudden
gesture which might provoke satori?
Since Chan enlightenment is situated in a context of
practice which is both meditational and moral, any idea of
naturalness espoused is problematised from the start; which
indicates that the enlightened instincts of the Chan adept
(I eat when hungry, drink when thirsty) are to be
distinguished from the instincts of the person still living
in samsara, precisely becasue they are instincts structured
through discipline. One Tang dynasty saying indicates the
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basis underlying a revised naturalness:
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Chan, I
said: "Mountans are mountains, waters are waters."
After I got an insight into the truth of Chan through
the instruction of a good master, I said, "Mountains
are not mountains, waters are not waters." But now,
having attained the abode of final rest (that is,
Awakening), I say, "Mountains are really mountains,
waters are really waters." (Abe, 1985: 4).
It is in the middle stage of this progression that anything
natural disappears: what might objectively seem to have the
utmost solidity and presence is rendered empty,
insubstantial, and when this insight is applied to values,
all are rendered conventional rather than absolute. Here
the move is the same as Zhuangzi's in his reversal of
Confucian ethical and social distinctions, and it
transpires that all value-systems are seen as games: they
possess no necessary intrinsic merit, but are ways of
getting on in certain circumstances, and if this
problematises any concepts of good, it no less
problematises concepts of evil, at the same time
diminishing any ability to hold such concepts in an
unreflective way.
One means to focus the issue here is to note that the
world is mind-dependent, constituted by the mind's powers
of perception and language. "Mountains" are not mountains,
they are signifiers, and the separation of language from
the world, the insertion of the human in a play of
perception and language which cannot be said to refer,
since the judgement oh reference presupposes some means of
escape from the play, is the insight focussed in this stage
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of development. The final stage in the progression,
however, is the one that must be affirmed if judgements
about the world, and about ethics, are to be securely
forwarded. I take this stage as marking a shift from the
emptiness of the world to the emptiness of the mind and of
individual identity. One aspect is that the mind's
projective powers are dissolved: the tendency to structure
the world through the forms of desire for ontological
security is overcome insofar as the mind conceived as a
real entity is itself dissolved.
More precisely, the mind as the final object of
attachment is released, as indicated in Chaochou's (778
-897) famous koan wu:
A monk asked Chaochou: "Has a dog the Buddha-nature or
not?" Chaochou said, "Wu", meaning "No"1 Completely
puzzled, the monk thought to himself, "From the
highest Buddhas down to the lowliest creatures such as
ants, all have the Buddha-nature. Why is it that a
dog has not? Why did Chaochou say "No" (Wu)? Why?
Why? Park 1983:75
While the problem is put in terms of a dog's Buddha-nature,
at stake more fundamentally is the problem of attachment to
the very idea of Buddha-nature: the idea itself can become
an obstacle to enlightenment if it is affirmed as any kind
of entity, whether subjective, transpersonal, or common to
all living forms. To speak of Buddha-nature is to speak of
a way of being without desire or attachment, where the
problem of death has been transcended; if hypostasised,
however, Buddha-nature can serve as a shield precisely
against the problem of death.
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Enlightenment, the great awakening, is spoken of as the
moment of death, which it is more profoundly than any
biological event since it opens the radical contingency and
impermanence of the person. If the movement towards
enlightenment involves a gradual deepening of the concept
"I", a shift of the principle of subjectivity away from any
particular states of mind with which it might be confused,
enlightenment empties the "I" of any particular
significance, and in the process releases the world back
into the only way of being it might have for the person:
whatever one may say of mountains "in themselves", to the
person freed from projection, and from the quest for an "I"
that might transcend time and change, mountains can only be
mountains.
While the natural world might be thus reconstituted, and
the abiding features of the social world reaffirmed as the
arena for human action (as occurs for instance in the
famous ox-herding pictures), the question of an ethical
stance, as of a preferred form of social engagement - two
vital areas with Zhu Xi - remains completely open: we have
no evaluation of the behaviour of Chan masters such as Lin
Ji, whilst the development of Zen in Japan,and its links
with the ethics of the Samurai, points to the profound
ambivalence on ethics that could arise within the Chan/Zen
tradition. The movement towards excess in order to overcome
the self and release deeper springs of imagination and
activity - evident in contemporary form, for instance, in
the theatre and writings of Artaud and Bataille - carries
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no assurance of ethical value, that value being only a
function of the context within whi.ch the moment of excess
occurs. For Artaud and Bataille it is the bounded moment
of theatre or literature that is this context, for Chan it
can be the moment either of monastic or of martial
discipline. If the latter becomes more fully an issue
in Japan, the former as the primary Chan context in China
marks the limitation in the outworking of Buddhist
enlightened life as this is judged from Zhu Xi's
perspective.
The monastery may exist as the privileged context for
nurturing enlightenment, and appear as such as a moral
order - however much the principle of respect for life
might itself be abrogated in the drive towards enlightened
life as the only worthwhile form - but the limitation of a
monastic ethic in relation to larger problems of social
order, even when that ethic is instinct with the virtue of
compassion, is the point on which Zhu focusses. Here, as we
consider how he reads the Confucian mind, and sets the
question of enlightenment within a broader framework of
social concern, scholarship and ethical self-cultivation,
we can also ask whether the Confucian sage might transcend
anxiety in the face of death, diminishment, and the
structure of his own mind and world, or whether Buddhist
equanimity remained for Zhu a permanently elusive quality.
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CHAPTER 6
REN IN THE CONTEXT OF ZHU XI1S PHILOSOPHY
It was against the tow of a Chan vision that Zhu at
first struggled, being in youth inspired by Buddhist
philosophy and for a time also incumbent of a Daoist
temple. The failure of Buddhism in the political and
social realms, at a point when Northern China lay in the
hands of invaders, was a powerful motive force in Zhu's
advocacy of Confucianism, but the stream of neo-Confucian
thinking in which he inserted himself, and which he then
harnessed as the supreme intellectual and spiritual
resource, is one itself deepened and transformed by the
lessons of Daoist and Buddhist piety, and represents one
from a range of Confucian options available in the Song
period [1].
Chan emphasised the given purity of the Buddha-mind
beyond the defilements of desiring experience, and so
focussed in acute form the problem of human nature that had
never been satisfactorily resolved within a Confucian
framework: how to perceive xing, as good, bad, or an
admixture of conflicting qualities? Building on the work of
Cheng Yi in particular, Zhu put forward a Confucian vision
of innate goodness that served to liberate a Confucian life
of moral and spiritual enthusiasm: to what extent his
philosophy managed the problem of evil as it had plagued
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Confucianism earlier will be one of our chief
considerations here in interpreting his doctrine of ren.
1 . ZHU'S METAPHYSICS; AN OUTLINE.
(i) Taiji
From the reserves of thinking already
available in the first developments of Song
neo-Confucianism Zhu spun an all-embracing metaphysic,
appropriately referred to as a form of organicism, in which
Heaven, Earth, Man and the ten thousand things are
interlinked according to a fundamental pattern (JLL) of
being and goodness. These transcendental attributes of all
existents are grounded in xing, nature, when this is
understood both as human nature and as the nature of all
that is. Xing itself is grounded in taiji, the Great
Ultimate, the principle which Zhu developed from Zhou Dunyi
as a cornerstone of his metaphysic, and taiji is a point of
both radical immanence and radical transcendence,
containing all l_i collectively as the principles of
individual existents and as the principles of forms of
energy.
As the respository of ljL taij i is on some readings
considered identical with the totality of JLi, and thus
constitutes a way of naming that totality as such:
The Great Ultimate (Supreme Ultimate) (taiji) is
simply the undifferentiated and maximum principle
(li). It cannot be described in terms of material
force (cjij or physical form. Among ancient classics,
and explanation of the Great Ultimate can only be
found in the Book of Changes (Yijing). In its
'Appended remarks' it is said "In the system of Change
there is the Great Ultimate." Change is nothing but
the change and transformation of yin and yang (passive
and active cosmic forces). The principle of their
change and trnasformation is the Great Ultimate. Beixi
ziyi 141; Chan 1986a:115
Taij i simply means 3^. Why is Li called j_i? Ji_ means
reaching the ultimate, because it is in the center
serving as the axis. Huangji (supreme principle
governing the empire), beiji (the North Pole), etc.,
all have the meaning of being in the center... Take
the ridgepole of a roof. It is called wuji (terminus
of a building). It is simply the converging point of
all building materials from the various directions,
reaching their terminus at this center. They are
distributed to the various controlling members,
balanced and well distributed in all directions
without any excess or deficiency. In the case of a
pagoda, its pointed top is called the ultimate. In
the case of the Polar Star, stars all around revolve
around it but it itself does not move and thus is the
axis of heaven. In the case of the Great Ultimate,
however, it is understood in terms of principle. The
reason why heaven forever rotates, the earth forever
exists, and man and things forever produce and
reproduce without cease, is that each of these does so
not of its own intention but because in each case it
is directed by the principle inherent in it. Hence
each naturally does so. The Great Ultimate is so
called because, being the master of heaven and earth,
it is undifferentiated to the highest degree. The
principles of heaven and earth and the ten thousand
things all converge on it and extend to the highest
degree and do not go any further. As it is scattered
to become heaven, earth, man, and things, each of
these is balanced and well distributed without any
deficiency. Hence it is called the Great Ultimate.
The Great Ultimate simply means the sum total of the
principles of heaven, earth, and the ten thousand
things. It cannot be separated from them and be
spoken of apart from them. As soon as principle is
separated from them, principle and things become two
different sections. Ibid. 143 and 144; Chan
1986a;117-8.(2]
Chen Chun and Zhu Xi do not however offer a final
account of tail i and l_i that is without difficulty or
contradiction, and we might note certain of the
difficulties arising so far. First, while taiji is a
centering and foundational principle in relation to the
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psychophysical universe, it is also a principle of
dismemberment and dissemination: taiji is "scattered to
become heaven, earth, man and things." We have here a
proximity to the Hindu doctrine of creation, where the
primal man, purusha, is dismembered to give birth to the
universe; a proximity also to the Stoic and Christian
doctrine of the logos spermatikos, the divine logos that is
disseminated in seedlike form within all entities; a
proximity again to Kabbalist and neo-Platonist notions of
the primal light that is fragmented to exist as the divine
spark in the heart of all individuals. There is thus a
tension in the reading of taili between notions of original
foundation and disseminated principles. And second, there
is a tension around the idea that taiji might be "the
master of heaven and earth": as we already noted with Dong
Zhongshu on tian, there is the problem of the kind of
mastery that can be presupposed within a naturalistic,
uncreated universe. A.C. Graham fixes well some of the
attendant issues here:
The Sung philosophers do not conceive the origin of
things as "creation" by Someone standing outside the
universe, but as "breeding" "growth" (sheng) from
Something at the root of the universe. The analogy
behind their thinking is not a man making a pot, but
rather a tree growing from its hidden root and
branching out ... The idea that the universe must have
had a beginning in time, which seems obvious, even a
logical necessity, to many Europeans, is quite foreign
to Chinese thought; thus Chu Hsi, who held with Shao
Yung that the universe is annihilated and reborn every
129,000 years, took it for granted that there were
other cycles before the present cycle. Nor, of
course, did the Sung philosophers have any idea of
universal causation, in terms of which every event is
explicable except the event which started the series.
On the contrary, it is precisely because the
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production and growth of things is not explained by
preceding physical causes that it is necessary for
them to postulate an unseen source out of which things
are continually manifesting themselves. For example,
in Chou Tun-i's system the Supreme Ultimate does not
stand at the beginning of time; the Yin and Yang are
constantly growing out of the Supreme Ultimate, and it
is this which keeps the universe in motion. Graham
1958:108-9 [3].
Taili is thus the foundational, disseminated principle within
CLA eternal universe. Part of the issue of origination is focussed
oJ$o in the designation of talii as wuji (the Ultimate of emptiness of
non-being):
Master Lienxi (Zhou Dunyi) said: The Ultimate of
Nonbeing, wuji, and also the Great Ultimate, taiji.
"The operations of Heaven have neither sound nor
smell." And yet this (Ultimate of Nonbeing) is really
the axis of creation and the foundation of things of
all kinds (ultimate being). Therefore "the Ultimate
of Nonbeing and also the Great Ultimate." It does not
mean that outside the Great Ultimate there is an
Ultimate of Nonbeing. (Zhu Xi, Commentary on the
Tailitu Shuo). Chan 1967:5
Having neither sound nor smell simply means having no
physical shape. As soon as there is any sound or
smell, physical shape is involved and the Great
Ultimate will be reduced to a direction and a location
and can no longer be called the Ultimate of Nonbeing.
In using the saying about sound and smell, Wen Gong
(Zhu Xi) was explaining the fundamental meaning of the
term talii. The expression is not compelling but the
principle is clear by itself.
Chan 1986a:189
Given that the Ultimate is named in two ways we can
acknowledge that two themes are at issue. Firstly, by
speaking of taiji Zhu separates a Confucian metaphysic from
Buddhist and Daoist positions where the theme of wu
(emptiness) was central. This was not an idle move, since
major consequences followed for one's way of operating in
the world, and Zhu's metaphysic is not simply speculative
but geared towards providing a basis for Confucian action.
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And secondly, by speaking of wuji Zhu argues a sense of the
Ultimate that lies beyond characterisation, thus affirming
that it cannot be identified with the totality tout court,
but that it is also in some manner "more" than li.
Taiji/wuji is also more than Heaven. In fundamental
terms taili generates yin and yang and yin and yang
generate the wuxinq, in turn generating heaven and earth;
but it is not clear whether yin and yanq and wuxinq, as one
constitutive system, are generated from taili, or whether
they are part of the original structure of taiji itself.
Insofar as constituted by yin and yang, taiji is seen as a
field of energy marked by the permanent interplay of
opposite forces. But again, what that interplay might be
and whether we are dealing here with metaphysical
principles, or with a consistently physical and materialist
system, is difficult to determine. As we have seen, Zhu's
universe is eternal, its patterns of change cyclical
rather than teleological, though within each cycle there is
a process of completion appropriate to it. But if taiji
names the principle behind the universe, rather than an
aspect of the way in which the universe is, then we have a
problematic notion of purely metaphysical change within
taiji:
In the final analysis, before there was heaven, earth
and the ten thousand things there was necessarily this
principle. But this principle (.li.) is not something
suspended in the air. As soon as there is the
principle of heaven, earth, and the ten thousand
things there is their material force (cji) , and as soon
as there is their material force, principle is
preserved in their midst. As Master Zhou has said,
"The Great Ultimate through activity generates yanq"
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and "through tranquillity generates yin." This means
that as there is the principle of activity, it can be
active and produce yang. As soon as yang is generated
through activity, the principle is already completely
present in the activity of yang. As there is the
principle of tranquillity, it can be tranquil and
produce yin. As soon as yin is generated through
tranquillity, the principle is already completely
present in the tranquillity of yin. This being the
case, as soon as there is principle, there is material
force, and as soon as there is material force,
principle is completely present in it. The way they
are connected leaves not the slightest cleavage. How
can we distinguish which comes first and which later?
As it has been said, "Activity and tranquillity have
no beginning and yin and yang have no starting point."
If they could be distinguished as being earlier and
later, principle would be one-sided and not
undifferentiated and completely merged to the highest
degree. Chan 1986a:118 [4]
The formulation of ideas here is rendered problematic
insofar as Zhu, for all his attempts to provide a unified
account of the universe, finally offers a system which
remains fundamentally dualistic. He maintains a
fundamental and unresolved contrast between l_i (principle,
pattern, form) and gi (material force, energy), reckoning
them in one reading to be eternal and equally formative and
constitutive of the universe, and in another to be
hierarchically ordered, with metaphysical prioity
consistently assigned to JLi over gi, and with a doubling of
the structure of things insofar as much that can be said of
qi is also said first of JLi [5]. Thus, yin and yang and
wuxing are, strictly speaking, forms of qi, yet as
indicated in the text above, they also presuppose some
specific ljL as their individual structuring principles:
Chen acknowledges that there is "the principle of activity"
which can be "active and produce yang", thus separating
yang as gi^ from the specific principle (Li) that gives rise
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to it, and leaving us with the question whether yin and
yang should not each be thought of under a double-aspect of
li and qi. Yet there is another issue here, when Chen
speaks of JLi producing yang, for elsewhere it is stressed
that JLi can produce nothing, but rather constitutes a
passive world of metaphysical form that is expressed and
appropriated through qi's productive force.
There are thus problems in the designation of taili as
li, insofar as, and in those places where, Zhu is clear
that J^ is a metaphysical principle, whilst qi is the
characterisation of the universe as psychophysical energy;
and there is an evident ambivalence in Zhu's reading of
taij i between its designation as (the totality of) JLi^, and
its (hidden, subliminal) designation as qj^. On _li, for
instance, Zhu declares:
Li has neither emotion nor will; can neither plan nor
create.. .
Li is a clear world of emptiness; it has no form and
no ability to create anything. Zhuzi yulei 1:3a
All movement, change and becoming in the universe is
associated with qi, and if qi^ is contained within tail i -
again, one of the standard readings of Zhu's position -
then taili itself is characterised by change and movement
and thus marks a reality subject to time.
The questions arising here relate in essence to two
crucial issues; the status of taiji within Zhu's philosophy
as a whole, and the provenance of the term taili.
Traditionally Zhu is reckoned to have based his philosophy
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on taij i; to have acknowledged Zhou Dunyi^s Tail itu shuo as
a profoundly fruitful articulation of taiji, and thus as a
fundamental moment of the daotong; and to have linked taiji
with ljL as his foundational metaphysic. Yet Zhu's style of
neo-Confucianism became known as lixue (the study of
principle), an acknowledgement that li is throughout the
guiding term by which his philosophy is ordered, rather
than taiji. And it has recently been argued that taili is
not a fully integrated term within his system - not being a
consistently hermeneutical and foundation principle in the
way that Li is - but rather occurs in 2 precise contexts of
commentary, when Zhu comments on the Tailitushuo, and on
the "Appended Remarks" of the Yijing, where taiji made
its first appearance as a philosophical term. The
conclusion here is that taiji sits rather awkwardly as a
supplement to Zhu's philosophy.
In developing the Taijitushuo Zhou Dunyi was drawing on
and modifying Daoist philosophy. In Zhou's work, as in the
tradition before him, taij i has the connotation of cji
rather than li_: it appears as the ultimate designation of
the material energy of the universe in its foundational
aspect, not unlike the materia prima of the scholastics (if
this is taken to be a term of physical rather than
metaphysical designation)[6]. According to one recent
commentary
In the generative theories offered by these
philosophical schools (ie philosophical schools from
the Han to the Tang) T'ai-chi was commonly regarded as
yUan-ch'i (the ultimate or original material force).
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And in one theory of generation, the Five Evolution,
(wu-yun) theory, a sequence is followed from Great Change,
taiyi, to Great Beginning, taichu, to Great origin, taishi,
to Great Simplicity, taisu, to Great Ultimate, taili« Here
taili is the last in a sequences of existences prior to the
separation of heaven and earth and
is regarded as the place closest to individual things
in the real world...where "physical nature and
physical form are already provided.[7]
It was Zhu Xi who modified this reading of taili to bring
it into line with jy rather than gi_, whilst preserving in
the process the ambivalence we have noted. And indeed, on
the rare occasions when Zhu speaks of taili other than in
direct commentary on Zhou Dunyig and the Appended Remarks
he seems overtly to preserve its earlier linkage with qi:
It is necessary to see taij i within the ever-moving c[i
and to see the original nature, benxing, within the
ever-working mind. To depart from the ever-moving c[i
in order to seek for taiji or to depart from the
ever-working mind in order to seek for the original
nature will probably lead to the absurdity of the
Buddhists and Daoists. Zhuzi daquan 32:14a
(ii) Taiji, li, and qi.
The problem of the excess of reality beyond the
categories of its coherence is the crucial element
encountered by Zhu in his attempt to formulate an account
of taiji that might integrate perceptions of immanence and
transcendence within a naturalistically conceived universe.
Taiji is at once beyond and within, negative and positive,
emptiness and plenitude, the ultimate source of all and the
inmost proper ground of being of any existent. In part the
problems of ambivalent characterisation encountered here
have already been noticed in relation to Dong Zhongshu's
alternating descriptions of heaven, (tian) and nature,
xinq. By making taiji the foundation of tian, Dong's
difficulty with tian is moved to a more abstract
metaphysical level, but the difficulty is preserved
nonetheless.
The issue for both Deng and Zhu here, in dealing with a
fundamental uncertainty about the basic structure of things
- where for Zhu 31 becomes the source of evil and
disruption - is the same kind of issue at work in Christian
thinking, where the doctrine of original sin is an attempt
to focus a basic flaw running through all creation. For
Zhu, though, it is not simply the flawed aspect of things
that is an issue (we shall look at this in considering 31),
but the very existence of change as such. The vision of li^
is of an unchanging metaphysical paradise, of a world of
pure and constant form at the heart of change, which it is
the purpose of the perfected mind to understand [9],
Taili is the collected network of LL. Li constitute
principles and forms of differentiations, but taiji as Li
is an undifferentiated oneness:
Collectively speaking, there is only one
undifferentiated principle. And there is only one
Great Ultimate. Separately speaking, heaven, earth,
and the ten thousand things each have their
principle, and each has its own Great Ultimate. But
all of them are completely merged with each other
without any deficiency. When they are considered
separately, they become many principles, but when the
ten thousand things are considered collectively, the
ten thousand things are merged with one another and
are only one Great Ultimate. As man has this
principle inherent in his mind, his mind becomes the
Great Ultimate. That is why Master Shao (Shao Yung)
said, "The Way is the Great Ultimate," and also said,
"The mind is the Great Ultimate."
By the Way being the Great Ultimate is meant the Way
is identical with the Great Ultimate and there are
not two different principles.* And by the mind being
the Great Ultimate is meant that all principles are
gathered in the mind which is undifferentiated and is
one principle. As the Way operates, it comes forth to
deal with things in many ways and numerous details,
each obtaining the principle as it should be and each
becoming a Great Ultimate. But when the ten thousand
things are collectively spoken of, in reality there
is only one principle as before, which is the one
Great Ultimate completely merged as one. Take for
example a large lump of mercury. How perfectly
round I As it is scattered into tens of thousands of
small lumps, every one is round. When tens of
thousands of lumps are combined to become once more a
big lump, it is as round as before. This is
precisely the meaning of Chen Jisou's analogy,
"When the moon is reflected on the river, it is round
(perfect) everywhere." That is why the Great
Ultimate stands outside of heaven, earth, and the ten
thousand things yet operates in their midst, and
existed before the Ultimate of Nonbeing countless
generations before but penetrates the Ultimate of
Nonbeing countless generations later. From countless
generations in the past to the very end of countless
generations to come, generally speaking there is only
one undifferentiated principle which is collectively
one Great Ultimate. In its operation, this principle
is round (perfect) everywhere, without any deficiency
anywhere. As soon as it is deficient anywhere, it
becomes partial and cannot be called the Great
Ultimate. In its basic substance, the Great Ultimate
is naturally round (perfect). Beixl ziyi 147; Chan
1986a:119
Here we see how a commitment to ontological realism
ascribes a priority to taiji over wuji, in a statement that
is stronger than those we have noted so far as
specifications of their inter-relationship. More
importantly, though, we see how the reference to
apparently incorporates two languages kept quite distinct
in Western philosophy, the language of transcendentals and
of universals. As a specification of transcendental
properties, there is a sense in which Li can be predicated
of all entities (as beauty, truth, goodness), and thus a
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sense in which all entities can be said to be the same
analogically. But as a specification of universal forms JLi_
should of necessity remain a concept specifying
differentiation, not sameness: the forms of a tree, of a
house, of a star, are different, and there does not seem to
be any gain by saying that they are all one and
undifferentiated within taiji [10],
While this would emerge as a first criticism there is
however a case against reading li^ as form or principle in
the sense of universals. Fung Yu-la takes li_ to specify
universal, in the manner of the Platonic Forms, but A.C.
Graham argues that a contrast between universals and
particulars is not part of the neo-Confucian philosophical
agenda. Thus, while he acknowledges the various ways in
which Li can be read as specific structuring form, as
individualising principle, he observes that what is at
stake here is, rather, a vision of an organic universe
where entities come to be from each other and merge back
into each other. Following the etymology of Li. as
reference to the lines in jade or the grain in wood he
observes:
Principle (li.) seems to be conceived as a network of
veins; however much they diverge from each other, the
veins prove when we "extend" them to be one; on the
other hand we can also go on indefinitely making finer
and finer distinctions among them, finding as we
proceed that not only classes but individuals and
parts of individuals have li which distinguish them
from each other. Graham 1958:13.
Again, the contrasting metaphors of growth from a primal
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seed and fashioning from primal clay might be instructive.
If the universe is originally a seed, then everything
within it grows from, remains linked with, and returns to
the one originating source, and there can be a sense in
which the li^ of different things presuppose each other and
contain each other: taiji is thus complete and
undifferentiated within each entity. If however a creator
imparts specific focus on an original formlessness,
differentiating it into specific types and categories, then
the differences between entities, and their individualising
principles, will be more a matter for concern than their
sameness and interconnectedness.
Eric Voegelin's comment on the experience of
participation in a community of being, insofar as this is
worked out at an early mythic stage of experience, serves
as a valuable elaboration of the kind of worldview at stake
in the philosophy of 11:
Whatever man may be, he knows himself a part of
being. The great stream of being, in which he flows
while it flows through him, is the same stream to
which belongs everything else that drifts into his
perspective. The community of being is experienced
with such intimacy that the consubstantiality of the
partners will override the separateness of
substances. We move in a charmed community where
everything that meets us has force and will and
feelings...where the underground sameness of being is
a conductor for magic currents of good or evil force
that will subterreaneously reach the superficially
unreachable partner, where things are the same and
not the same, and can change into each other.
Voegelin 1956:3
[Voegelin introduces the experience of participation as the
aspect of "the process of symbolisation"; it is of interest
also that he identifies the second aspect as preoccupation
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with the process of change, and concern with constancy
beyond change. We have already noted how for Zhu Xi LL
designates a world of constant, unchanging perfection.
After speaking of li as interconnectedness, Graham
immediately goes on to note how the next basic connotation
of Li is permanence:
The Ch'eng brothers lay great stress on the idea that
li is changeless, that behind the perpetual flux of
the visible universe there are "constant principles"
(ch'ang li), "fixed principles" (ting li), "real
principles" (shih JLi). They also assume, like Ch'en
Ch'un, that imperviousness to change is a proof of
reality (shih, literally "solid"), although they do
not, like the Buddhists, regard change as a proof of
unreality (hsu, literally "void"). Graham 1958:14.]
If 3^ marks the constant, unchanging normative pattern
underlying and informing things, thus constituting the
specific nature xinq of things (and the source here is
often given through the compound term xingli) , then gi
represents flux, turbulence, change, and also that process
of darkening and limitation in entities whereby their
normative structure is obscured. The endowment of things
and persons with a particular type and quality of gi is the
consequence of ming, usually translated "fate" or "destiny"
but, in the absence of any symbol that might designate a
power and a process governing destiny, just as
appropriately translated •chance' or 'fortune' [11].
With Dong Zhongshu we encountered the notion that man
was the point of perfection in the process of nature. We
encounter the same notion in Chen Chun and Zhu Xi, and in a
22<?
sense the issue is here more strongly put: if gi_ is the
original material that comes to be formed as different
entities, then man (and perfected man, as sage) is the only
worthwhile form it can take: it is not simply that all
entities have their appropriate standards of perfection, in
relation to which individual tokens or markers of a class
are judged; it is rather that any entity other than a sage
has an imperfect, "cloudy" portion of gi. that fails to let
xingli fully manifest itself: it would be better for a tree
to be a perfect man than a perfect tree (there is no
concept of a perfect tree):
Originally there is only one material force. In its
division there are the yin and yang. Yin and yang
are further divided into Wuxing. As the two and the
five divide and combine in their operation as they
do, irregularities and inequality ensure. Some of
them are pure and others impure. Some are thick and
others thin. Let us talk about man and things
together. They share the same material force, but
man is endowed with material force in its correctness
whereas things are endowed with it in its partial
character. In man material force moves freely
whereas in things it is obstructed...Having received
the excellence of the Wuxing, man is therefore the
most intelligent of the ten thousand things. The qi
of things is blocked up and does not move freely,
like smoke which is shut in. That is why things do
not understand principles. Beixi ziyi 3; Chan
1986a:39-40
The implication, here and elswhere, is that the gi of
things is always and necessarily blocked, and that this
constitutes a kind of flaw: man only "is endowed with
material force in its correctness." Yet the reason for
this flaw remains beyond explanation, and while c[i_ remains
the source and locus of evil and disruption within Zhu's
metaphysic, the reason why gi is thus - or the reason why
some gi_ takes the blocked form of material things rather
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than all cji taking the perfected form of the sage - lies
permanently out of account. Thus we shall see that, while
on one level, in his theory of Li, Zhu Xi solves the
problem of the goodness of human nature, on another level,
as regards the g_i, the existence of evil and the permanent
anxiety it could cause in he quest for moral perfection
remained a troubling issue.
(iii) Xing (nature) and xin (mind)
Zhu Xi presents an account of the unity of the world in
terms of two separate yet interacting discourses, that
relating to Li and that relating to c[i; it is his failure
adequately to integrate these discourses that makes his
system a form of dualism. From the perspective of li, all
entities are united, and indeed are in a sense the same,
insofar as the totality of JLi^ as tail i is present in any
entity as its inmost structuring source and foundation.
From the perspective of c^i all entities are also united,
and in a sense the same, insofar as it is the same basic
matter and energy that constitutes their substance.
Because li^ and £i constitute two perspectives from which
to view the nature and structure of things and persons, and
because c[i, even though in a sense secondary in relation to
the metaphysical order of Li, nonetheless controls the
manifestation of Li on the forming nature of any entity,
then the ontological "goodness" that is ascribed to li
remains subject to the chance and haphazard endowment of £i
as opaque or transparent. This raises particularly vexing
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issues for Zhu Xi in terms of a possible perception of the
person, insofar as the dualism of ljL and cji^ is worked out
at the heart of personal identity: the nature (xing) of the
person is understood in terms of ljL, while mind (xin) is an
aspect of cji.. There thus exists for Zhu a basic problem in
the process of self-perfection, in that the mind must learn
to control its own turbulence in order to manifest xing
(ultimately) as its essential sage-like nature[12]. On the
other hand, Zhu evades the problem and paradox already
specified in Buddhism, whereby the turbulent mind somehow
has to control the mind and find its ontological bearings
from the operation of mind alone, by stressing that lj^ is
objectively as well as subjectively manifest: l_i can be
known and understood through the natural world and more
particularly through the accumulated wisdom of the
Confucian dao, in a more direct and secure manner than that
available through introspection and quietistic meditation.
Zhu thus emphasises study and the investigation of things
(zhizhi gewu: "the extension of knowledge through the
investigation of things") as the primary means (in
conjunction with jungzuo, sitting meditation) of
disciplining the mind and manifesting the nature [13]. In
this, he differs from his contemporary Lu Xiangshan who, in
stressing the centrality of the mind alone rather than the
investigation of things, remained caught for Zhu, like the
Buddhists, in the endless snares of illusion. Although a
dualist, Zhu thus remains a realist in comparison with the
idealism of Lu's method.
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In Zhu's eyes, the mind, for Buddhists, was marked in
its fundamental nature as emptiness (wu), while for
Confucians the mind contained, or could access, the basic,
Heaven-conferred moral principles that governed social
relationships:
Take the human mind, for example. There is
necessarily in it the Five Relations between father
and son, ruler and minister, old and young, husband
and wife, and friends. When the Buddhists are
thorough in their action, they will show no affection
in these relationships, whereas when we Confucianists
are thoroughgoing in our action, there is affection
between father and son, righteousness between ruler
and minister, order between old and young, attention
to their separate functions between husband and wife,
and faithfulness between friends. Zhuzi daquan 60:14a
Chan 1963:648
And countering the notion that, in Chan (Zen) meditation the
practitioner is meant to arrive at a perception of xingli Zhu
remarks *—
As to your contention that in Chan, entering into
meditation is to cut off thought and reveal xingli
completely, this is especially wrong. When thinking
is correct, there is xingli. In all operations and
functioning, there is none which is not a revelation
of xinqli. Does it need to wait to have all thoughts
cut off before xinqli can be revealed? Furthermore,
what is this that we call xinqli? Are ren, yjL, li.
and zhi not xinqli? Are the five human relations
between ruler and minister, between father and son,
between old and young, between husband and wife, and
between friends not xinqli? If the Buddhists have
really seen xinqli, why should they violate and
confuse (truth) like this, destroy everything, and
darken and delude their original mind without
realizing it themselves? Zhuzi daquan 60;31a-32a
Chan 1963:652-3.
Already in this we can recognize some of the difficulties
that Zhu encountered in formulating a theory of mind that
might counter that put forward in Buddhism. Zhu wants to
argue that in essence the mind is the moral mind (daoxin),
possessed of the principles of Confucian morality rather
than empty as it is for Buddhists, though strictly speaking
the mind cannot in essence be thus if xin is taken as an
aspect of gi, rather than Li. It is at a point such as
this that Zhu argues for the complete interdependence of Li
and c[i., though the argument is strained in comparison with
the distinction he posits elsewhere. At one place Chen
Chun views things thus:
Generally, man receives the principle of Heaven and
Earth to be his own body. Only when principle and
material force are combined can there be mind. The
mind is the master of the body because it possesses
an unobstructed intelligent consciousness. This
unobstructed intelligent consciousness issues from
principle in some respects and from material force in
others. They are different. Beixi ziyi 18; Chan
1986a: 56-7
Here the statement is clear enough that xin arises from the
combination of LL and gi; Chan also notes though, that
there is a sense in which the (human) mind (renxin) is
simply an aspect of g_i, while the (moral) mind (daoxin)
implies the interaction of Li. and gi. Speaking of the mind
as a vessel which contains principle (J^i) and commenting on
Shao Yong's imaging of xin as the outer city wall of xinq,
he remarks:
the enclosure is the mind. Within the enclosure
there is a great deal of human habitation, similar to
the principles embodied in the mind. These embodied
principles are one's nature, which means that what is
embodied is the original substance of the mind. As
principles are embodied in the mind, there is
wonderful functioning in many ways. The consciousness
that proceeds from principle (Li) is the mind of ren,
yi, li and zhi; it is the daoxin. If the
consciousness proceeds from one's physical form and
material force, that is renxin which is easily
opposed to principle. Chan 1986a: 57
Chen uses here the categories of substance (t_i) and
function (yong) as a means of indicating the unity of xinq
and xin; these categories served neo-Confucianism well, but
it would seem that, if any function of c[i involves some
manifestation of l_i (to the extent that li^ and £i are
always interdependent) then renxin must always already be a
function of li_, though in a different degree from daoxln.
Yet this is something that Chen does not easily allow, and
there remains also a permanent unsatisfactoriness in Zhu
Xi's interlinking of xing and xin, as is evident in the
following comment:
Xing is comparable to taiji, and xin to yin and yang.
Taiji exists only in yin and yang, and cannot be
separated from thm. In the final analysis, however,
taiji is taiji and yin and yang are yin and yang. So
it is with xing and xin. They are one and yet two,
two and yet one, so to speak. Zhuzi daquan 45 1a;
Chan 1963:630
2. Zhu Xi's Reading of Ren.
(i) Confucian Universalism: Zhang Zai's Ximinq (Western
Inscription)
Cheng Yi's theory that "principle is one but
its manifestations are many" served, as we have seen, to
provide the unifying motif behind Zhu1s metaphysic, letting
him draw together in one system the diversity of physical
social and ethical worlds; though the unity he achieved,
must be read primarily in terms of its persuasiveness
within the medieval climate context. While Zhu might have
considered himself to be a universal rational metaphysic,
the guiding metaphors by which he presents it, the
elusiveness of the concept li, and the permanent tension
between _li^ and cjjL, all make of his achievement as much an
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act of faith and rhetoric as of free rationality. The
difficulty of acknowledging the power of his rhetoric - of
acknowledging, for instance, that he had satisfactorily
resolved the problem of the emergence and scope of physical
disorder and moral corruption, rather than shifting the
provenance of these to the remotest ground of his
metaphysic, in the precariously uncertain ambivalence of
talji as Li or £i - marks our separation from his vision.
Yet for his contemporaries - despite an initial rejection
of his work as "false learning" - his presentations had
a profoundly salvific tone.
In part Zhu was able to draw here on the optimistic
tenor found in Zhang Zai' s Xi'ming, where a strong sense of
world-security, of being deeply and properly a part of the
universe and linked to all within it, served as the basis
for Confucian commitment.
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even
such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in
their midst.
Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as
my body and that which directs the universe I
consider as my nature.
All people are my brothers and sisters and all things
are my companions. Chan 1963:497.
Here the universalism is somewhat akin to that of Averroes,
insofar as the latter argues for the existence of a
universal intellect, the common property of all mankind, a
form transcending and grounding individual powers of
intellection. But Zhuang1s extension - followed by Zhu -
is greater: all existents participate in a common resource
of psychophysical energy, and participate also in a single
diversifying principle and nature, xingli. This universal
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linkage, drawing its inspiration particularly from Buddhist
perceptions of the inter-linking of all existents, provides
the basis from which ren as primary foundational virtue is
now read. In its first theoretical sense, prior even to
designating an individual capacity for virtue, ren, as a
naming of xingli, is a principle of ontological goodness
pervading all reality, a way of affirming the universe to
be a generalised network of co-operative entities, an
organism within which the power of conflict is contained.
Not that the containment was easily achieved: while the
foundation of disorder is metaphysically remote, the
ever-present possibility of disruption figured in the power
of c^i is existentially at hand, the more so since the
pwerson as an individual psyche and social agent is
constituted by c^i: if xing marks an ontological sphere
governed by l^i, xin, the individual heart-and-mind, is part
of the consolidation of Whether an individual's c[i is
harmonious, easily expressive of the goodness of l_i and
malleable according to the standard Confucian categories of
right conduct, or whether it is resistant and refractory,
making of self-cultivation a hard-won victory, is
determined by the apportionment of fate (tianming), and in
exploration here of the range and types of human
constitution and fortune Zhu makes no significant advance
beyond the position already encountered in Dong Zhongshu
and Wang Chong. Indeed, in terms of the different
explanatory functions performed by JLi and cj_i it is
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difficult to see how any advance could be made: in
itself is a principle of randomness and immense ambivalent
fertility, but to ascribe to JLi the originating power to
control and shape it would be to rob of its value as
absolute goodness, ascribing to it instead the
responsibility for unequal and "unjust" distributions of
li . In the affirmed constant conjunctions of and g_i, li
holds hierarchical priority as original goodness whereas gi_
seemingly has the capacity to subvert the hierarchy and
manifest itself in clear or discordant formations, which it
is then the "task" of li^ to organise and control.
All of this is to put the matter in a highly unsatisfactory
way, but the problem lies in the categories with which Zhu
has provided us. The difficulties can be further
appreciated by reckoning how it is that the mind, as a
manifestation of cji, is able to pass through the turbulence
of its own constitution to perceive, and act in conformity
with, jLL. Chan Buddhists acknowledged the paradox of using
the mind to overcome the mind, but the same paradox holds
for neo-Confucians given the deployment of the categories
li and <ji. While Zhu emphasises the importance of
stilling the mind's turbulence, stilling gi_ in order to
perceive ljl, he does not evade the problems either of how
the mind might ever become motivated so to still itself, or
of whether the mind stilled might not yet continue to
function somewhat as Descartes' evil demon, a veil of
illusion permanently obscuring and distorting the realm of
li.
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As I have said, the issues here will be picked up again
below. We have seen how quick Zhu Xi is to characterise li
in terms of the basic virtue of Confucianism, and thus to
locate the structures of family and social order at the
foundation of cosmic order itself. Zhang Zai follows the
same notion in the Ximing, viewing all under Heaven as
members of a single family (thus reminding us of the
original etymology of tian as signifier for the body of the
royal ancestors), and seeing members of the State as
younger brothers of the emperor who is the oldest son of
Heaven and Earth. Within the context of this universal
family the sage is one whose love extends to all without
limitations:
The sage identifies his character with that of Heaven
and earth, and the worthy is the most outstanding
man. Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or
sick; those who have no brothers or children, wives
or husbands, are all my brothers who are in distress
and have no one to turn to. Chan 1963: 497
The aspect of universal love here, which is perhaps now at
its strongest point of affirmation within Confucianism,
comes close to rendering null the particularity of any
given family in its stress on the universal family of all
under heaven. At this point we can see Mozi fully
assimilated within Confucianism, though the kind of change
manifest with Zhang Zai is a result not so much of Mozi's
influence, as of the Buddhist doctrine of universal
compassion exemplified in the figure of the bodhisattiva.
Neo-Confucian responses to the stress on the bodhisattiva
led to a renewed vision of the sage as world-redemptive
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figure, with a stronger emphasis on the goal of sagehood as
an individual perfection, and with an increase in the
experience of tensioned anxiety also, insofar as the
perceived distance between one's given endowment of c^L and
the perfect manifestation of JLi could be profoundly felt.
[The tension here was particularly acute in that it was
entirely an inner-worldly perfection to which
neo-Confucians aspired. They did not subscribe to Buddhist
belief in a series of rebirths, whereby the process of
perfection could be carried through in a number of
different incarnations. Nor did they believe in any form
of afterlife which would incorporate a continuing process
of perfection, a belief which, as we shall see, was central
to the notion of perfection in caritas to which Aquinas
subscribed].
(ii) Zhu Xi's Renshuo (Treatise on Ren)
Zhu situates ren foundationally within the given
capacity of the psychophysical universe to function as a
naturally productive system: the mind of Heaven and Earth
is to produce things; man and things receive the mind of
Heaven and Earth and are in turn productive. The original
qualities of Heaven and Earth (characterised, in terms
taken from the first hexagram of the Yijing, as
origination, flourishing, bringing advantages, and
firmness) are appropriated within the human mind as the
four attributes of ren, yi, li and zhi; and just as
origination is taken to sum up the other qualities of
2«0
Heaven and Earth, ren sums up the attributes of the mind.
Zhu identifies the four moral qualities of mind as
substance (ti), in contrast with their manifest functioning
(yong) as the feelings of love (a_i) or compassion (ce),
respect, being right and discrimination (shih-fei); just as
ren is the foundational virtue incorporating all others, so
love and compassion are the feelings which incorporate all
others [14]. Here Zhu assimilates the position of Mencius,
though with an interesting reversal. Mencius identifies
feelings as the seeds of the heart, from which the virtues
eventually grow. For later Confucianism, however, feelings
became a highly unpredictable quantity, a point we have
seen already manifesting itself with Dong Zhongshu. It is
part of Zhu's argument for the essential goodness of xinq
to locate perfection and fulfilment in one sense at the
origin, rather than as a later manifestation. The
expression and manifestation of love and compassion is
thus a showing of what is already originally given as ren.
Here the process of perfection for Zhu has a cyclical
quality, comparable to the cyclical movement of perfection
that we shall note later with Aquinas: perfection lies in
a return to the origin, it is a movement of anamnesis, of
remembrance of what is, and will remain, man's essential
nature at an ontological level.
In making ren the essential attribute of xinq, Zhu argues
also that it constitutes and summarises the Confucian dao.
Here, while ren, in its active expression as love for
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others, might be read in one sense simply as a principle of
unity in human affairs, binding together differences and
overcoming obstacles that might disrupt the flow of human
relationships, its designation as a summary of the
Confucian dao comes as a reminder that ren can only be
adequately understood within the context of hierarchically
graded relationships organised through the specific details
of l_i (rituals). Thus, Zhu is anxious to avoid any concept
of unity as an undifferentiated oneness or blurring of
distinctions. He stresses rather that the proper respect
of social distinctions is in fact given with xing insofar
as Li (which we would here read as an active capacity for
and tendency topwards hierarchically ritualised behaviour)
is an aspect of xinq; and he carries \Li to the heart of ren
itself insofar as he claims that li, together with the
other virtues, is actively contained in ren.
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CHAPTER 7
EROS AND THE STRUCTURE OF METAPHYSICS
1. The Voice of Eros
(i) Speech, Logos and Inferiority
In China it is only with the advent of Buddhism that a
philosophy of mind and a metaphysic based on on a reading
of the mind - began to make its mark, and that a sense of
inner space governed by an extensive discourse on mental
life began to focus a radicalised thematic of immanence and
transcendence. Under the pressure of Buddhist practice and
disputation, Song neo-Confucians shifted from Xunzi's
psychological behaviourism and Dong Zhongshu's cosmological
speculation to a decidedly mentalistic reading of Confucian
virtue (though for Zhu with the safeguards against Lu
Xiangshan's crypto-Buddhism that we have already noticed).
In the West the situation has been profoundly different.
We can trace a strongly developing sense of mind, the
emergence of an inner space of moral reflection, discourse
with the gods, and apprehension of transcendent truth, in
the shifting designations of roles and psyche from Homer to
Plato. And in Plato's extended excursions into a realm
governed by an idea of mind, and of the mind's capacity for
being, truth and goodness we find the opening of a
categorisation of the terrain of metaphysics - governed by
a recurring set of rhetorical procedures and conceptual
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polarities - that has held until a certain contemporary-
restructuring, if not dissolution, of the fictive space of
subjectivity [1]. Thus Derrida marks the links between the
mind and the voice, phone, privileged principle of
inferiority and guarantor of the mind's capacity for truth:
The privilege of the phone does not depend upon a
choice that could have been avoided. It responds to
a moment of economy (let us say of the "life" of
"history" or of "being as self-relationship"). The
system of "hearing (understanding) oneself speak"
through the phonic substance - which presents itself
as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore
nonempirical or noncontingent signifier - has
necessarily dominated the history of the world during
an entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of
the world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from
the difference between the worldly and the
non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and
nonideality, universal and nonuniversal,
transcendental and empirical, etc. Grammatology,
p. 78.
the essence of the phone would be immediately
proximate to that which within "thought" or logos
relates to "meaning", produces it, receives it,
speaks it, "composes" it. If, for Aristotle, for
example, "spoken words (ta en te phone) are the
symbols of mental experience (pathemata tes psyches)
and written words are the symbol of spoken words" (De
interpretatione, 1, 16a, 3) it is because the voice,
producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of
essential and immediate proximity with the mind...The
feelings of the mind, expressing things naturally,
constitute a sort of universal language which can
then efface itself. Ibid. p.11.[2]
There is, as we noticed in chapter one, a difficulty
with some of Derrida's positions when he himself, as here,
assumes the voice of Western universalism to characterise
the situation in a non-Western domain (the significance of
the voice "has necessarily dominated the history of the
world during an entire epoch"). For our interests it is
precisely the absence of the domination in the Chinese
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context that is significant, since it entails that, when an
inner mental world did become a matter of significance in
China, the metaphors of the voice, of inner speech, of the
interior word as a moment of transcendental truth, did not
become deployed. (Nor, I think, were they in the Indian
context which eventually opened the Chinese domain: while
consideration of this is beyond our range here, we might
note that the Indian concern with the power of the spoken
and inner word was perhaps more linked to its incantatory
qualities, its abilities to organise, control, and express
the powers of mind in a battle against illusion, maya, than
to its cognitive capacity to apprehend transcendental
truth. Greek and Indian contrasts of truth and illusion
are different. [3])
The Greek perception of the phone/logos as radical
interiority is basic to Western ideas of human and divine
freedom and creativity (the Judaic resource here will be
dealt with in chapter 8). The inner voice as root and
origin of the self, as resource for self-mastery through
anamnesis and apprehension of the logos, the process of
recollection as a return to the transcendent origin of
inwardness in a communion through the phone/logos with the
world of the Forms, and the rational Forms themselves as
principles and exemplars of creativity - all of this marks
the delineation of a space of inner freedom, and its
contrast with the fallenness, contingency and
instrumentality of the external and material: the body as
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instrument of mind, world as expression of form, the inner
and spiritual as free, and freely mastering, the weight of
matter as constraining and potentially overwhelming.
Within this the movement of the soul as the Plotinian
"flight of the alone to the Alone" is but one inevitable
expression of the distinction between immanent-transcendent
psuche and matter [4].
The conceptual distinctions first formulated in the
Greek period mark thus a crucial difference in the West as
opposed to China. We have encountered more than once the
notion of a continuity between Tian or taji and the world,
rather than any idea of radical distinction. The emphasis
on an immanent world foundational principle as part of an
organic universe - together with the implicatons this
carries for distinctions between the metaphysical and the
physical, and spiritual and the psychological - is one
instance of the ways in which Chinese philosophy handled
foundational issues without passage through the
transcendental theorisation of the inner voice. Without
that theorisation - and with a vision of a universe shaped
by immanent patterns (wen and li), rather than governed by
objective laws established by Tian as transcendent
lawgiver - certain issues (of self as separate from the
world, of free will, of the conflict of good and evil), are
not figured through the same kinds of polarity within a
metaphysical schema as they are in the West. It is not, of
course, the case that the original Greek separation of
transcendental and material entailed a necessary theory of
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absolute, free, divine creation: the issue is problematic
in Plato, while Polotinus has a world-process governed by
spiritual-intellectual (nous), rather than psychophysical
(qi), emanation. The Platonic crystallisation of the
inward phone/logos with an accompanying secondariness
ascribed to materialist and writing, is however the crucial
step in this direction. In China, by contrast, this
polarity if there at all was oppositely perceived, with
perhaps a greater privilege granted to writing over speech.
(ii) Voice and Writing: Egypt and China
Since Egypt was blessed by having on earth a god as
king, law proceeded from his mouth, always ritually
renewed, and no codification was necessary or even
proper. Wilson et al, 1954: 6.
It is not required of us to pursue the question of
Plato's links with Egypt, and his possible reception in
Heliopolis of Egyptian wisdom, in order to note a profound
similarity between the voice/logos of the Memphite theology
and that presented in Plato's own system: the move towards
the Platonic position through the pre-Socratics is
sufficient to make of the Egyptian thematic a point rather
of profound congruence than seminal influence. At the same
time it is not wise to abandon here, as does Derrida in
reading Plato's myth of Thoth, a consideration of the
genealogical in favour of the structural:
One cannot, in fact, speak - and we don't really know
what the word could mean here anyway - of a
borrowing, that is, of an addition contingent and
external to the text. Plato had to make his tale
conform to structural laws. The most general of
these, those that govern and articulate the




good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, sun/moon, etc
also govern, and according to the same
configurations, Egyptian, Babylonian and Assyrian
mythology. Derrida, 1981: 85. [6]
What is crucial in this affirmation is not the broad
distribution of structural laws but the assumption that
they generally achieve "the same configurations"; since for
Derrida part of that configuration is the hierarchical
priority of the first term over the second (no structural
relation being simple or innocent but always in conflict)
the claim does again argue a universal priority of speech
in relation to script.
By contrast, however, China always accorded script an
originary and semi-sacred status (different from Western
concepts of sacred scripture, or of the book of nature as
God's script: writing here remains derivative, an external
expression of a truth always originally present in its
verbal simplicity within the mind of God). Writing "begins"
in China with the script of divination, a public overt
record that itself marks a public "written" divine
communication: the messages from the ancestors in the Shang
dynasty were communicated through the cracks appearing in
ox scapula and turtle plastra consequent on the application
of heat. The patterns thus released into the world through
the power of fire were themselves an original
communication as writing, to be recorded in that other
writing which was the Chinese script proper [7],
Certainly the reading of the first writing required a
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hermeneutic art; it required a trained priestly-scribal
elite; and it required practices of preservation and
transmission. What it did not require, and seemingly did
not in any broad sense engender, was a theorisation of the
individual xin/psuche as the privileged locus of
hermeneutic experience. (The partial exceptions here would
for instance be Mencius, and the Lu-Wang strand of
neo-Confucianism.)
The idea of an overt, public pattern manifest in the
operations of nature was variously expressed in Chinese
thinking. The patterns of the stars gave to astronomy from
early on a privileged status that made it a central element
of Confucian craft. The geometric patterns of the Yijing
served as a key to the process of the cosmos. When divine
revelations occured in the Han dynasty they could take the
form of mysterious written documents, as for instance the
He Tu (River Chart) delivered by the river god. The
emphasis on spontaneity in the practice of calligraphy was
an attempt to catch the creative movement of qi as it gave
birth to form, rather than to contemplate a divine truth
and then express it graphically. The point could be
developed further, but the examples are sufficient I think
to indicate how the script remained primary, not so much
revealing a transcendent truth behind reality as drawing
attention to the shaping powers and patterns (wen and li)
operative within the psychophysical universe. All of which
is not to say that Chinese lacked the experience of
internal monologue, of s'entendre parler; it is to note,
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instead, that they did not develop, from that experience, a
privileging of the voice and a radical bifurcation between
transcendent and material worlds [8],
(iii) The Space of^ Psuche
It is the powerfully sensed awareness of such
bifurcation that we find figured in the Platonic vision of
the soul as locus of an erotic quest for truth and of
congruence with others engaged in such a quest. At the
same time the heritage of conflict and ambivalence
associated with eros, from Homeric and pre-Socratic
traditions, made it a theme to be handled carefully if it
were ever to become a dynamic that might be well lived. An
understanding of the space of psuche was thus crucial for
Plato if the power of eros were to be harnessed and
directed towards the good.
"Harnessing" is indeed an image that Plato himself
provides in the Phaedrus. The Republic marks a threefold
division within psuche: the loqistikon is that aspect which
calculates and reasons, the epithumetikon "that with which
(the psuche) loves, hungers, thirsts and is stirred by
other desires", and the thumoeides that spirited portion
which is angered at injustice and desires righteousness.
Reason, passion, desire, spirit, conscience, movement,
deliberation, arbitration, and unpredictability are here
all situated at one point or another within psuche. In the
Phaedrus this tripartite soul becomes metaphorically
figured, and it is clear that the distribution of powers is
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hierarchically perceived. Psuche is likened to a
charioteer and chariot drawn by two horses: the alliance
between the charioteer (logistikon) and the noble horse
(thumoeides) against the disruptive power of the other
(epithumetikon) marks a profound division within psuche
itself. At the same time the priority of the intellectual
is affirmed as the given task of controlling the two other
powers so as to achieve that vision of transcendent value
which is the goal of psuche, and which is its sole purpose
for undertaking its journey (cf Phaedrus 253c and
following).
Plato here incorporates into psuche some attributes (of
hindrance, disruption) which elsewhere he locates within
the body, soma. Nonetheless, however we read the
progression of the dialogues (we will consider soma further
in relation to eros), the separation of soma and psuche,
the priority of psuche over soma, the capacity of psuche to
live an independent transcendent life beyond death, the
immortality of psuche contrasted with the corruptibility of
soma, the privileging of the intellectual, the intellectual
destiny of the soul as vision of the Forms, the liability
of the soul to rebirth and the capacity of the soul to
choose its soma, the function of knowledge as recollection
of truth originally known, the privilege of the philosopher
as the ideal existent - all of this marks a central
constellation of ideas within the Platonic corpus (though
the way in which we might choose to read the mythic
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formulation of certain of these themes is crucial) [9].
The death of Socrates - though not this alone -, the
decision of the noblest democracy to put to death its
noblest son, the issues raised by Socrates as to the very
nature of nobility and the purchasing power of terms such
as agathos, kakos and arete, provoked that pessimism
evident in the Platonic text regarding the given forms of
social life, and opened a vision of the burdensome weight
of material existence in contrast to the light and
splendour of the ideal Forms. It is towards the light,
towards the transcendent sun as progenitor of original
goodness, and away from the pale reflections cast on the
walls of a cave - the passage out from the cave being a
journey from the maternal womb to stand with pride before
the gaze of the father, becoming thus transparent to the
inmost recesses of one's psuche - that Plato moves; it is
for this progression that he seeks to know psuche.
As early as the Phaedo psuche is identified as an
eschatological principle: its immortality is tested in
various ways, finally to be mythically affirmed.
But there is a further point, gentlemen, said
Socrates, which deserves your attention. If the soul
is immortal, it demands our care not only for that
part of time which we call life, but for all time.
And indeed it would seem now that it will be
extremely dangerous to neglect it. If death were a
release from everything, it would be a boon for the
wicked, because by dying they would be released not
only from the body but also from their own wickedness
together with the soul, but as it is, since the soul
is clearly immortal, it can have no escape or
security from evil except by becoming as good and
wise as it possibly can. For it takes nothing with it
to the next world except its education and training,
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and these, we are told, are of supreme importance in
helping or harming the newly dead at the very
beginning of his journey there.
This is how the story goes. When any man dies, his
own guardian spirit, which was given charge over him
in his life, tries to bring him to a certain place
where all must assemble, and from which after
submitting their several cases to judgment, they
must set out for the next world, under the guidance
of one who has the office of escorting souls from
this world to the other. When they have there
undergone the necessary experiences and remained as
long as is required, another guide brings them back
again after many vast periods of time. Phaedo
107c-e.
At this stage psuche might appear as ground of radical
individualism: certainly the individual figures here more
profoundly than for Confucius, Mencius or Xunzi. Yet one
crucial task in Plato's work is to overcome the prevailing
competitive ethos that was the given basis of Athenian
life. It is not that he sets the individual against the
community, but that he aims so to deepen the understanding
of the individual - to eliminate the sources of conflict
and competition - that a community of virtue might prevail.
Paradoxically, the individual becomes in this process a
more profoundly singular entity, and conflict is resolved
by the necessary elevation of the virtuous individual over
the mass.
(iv) The Power of the Erotic
a. The Conflictual Element in Eros
If in its formative foundational text the Zhou erased
the site of conflict in privileging Wen over Wu, the early
Greeks through Homer acknowledge conflict as an integral
element in, if not the very stuff of, cosmic and social
life. The capture of Helen by Paris, the ten years' war
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with its manifest texture of violence and blood-letting,
the intimate engagement of divine forces in the war-arena,
the foundation of the whole Homeric tale on love and death,
violence and sexual passion, brings together themes of eros
and conflict that will engage us henceforth. Nowhere is
this conjunction more graphic than at the point where
Paris, on the threshold of death at the hands of Menelaus,
is spirited by Aphrodite from the scene of war to the scene
of love, joined there by Helen:
This time Menelaus with Athena's help has beaten me;
another time I shall beat him. We have gods on our
side also.
Come, then, rather let us go to bed and turn to
love-making.
Never before as now has passion enmeshed my senses,
(eros phrenas amphekalupsen)
not when I took you the first time from Lakedaimon
the lovely
and caught you up and carried you away in seafaring
vessels,
and lay with you in the bed of love on the island of
Kranae,
not even then, as now, did I love you (hos seo nun
eramai) and sweet desire seize me.
Iliad 3, 439 - 446; Lattimore, 1969: 112.
If Homer presents us with a well-wrought tale, with a
muthos that is logos through its epic form, with a
conception of a totality that can be mapped and known - and
the totality given over to repetition and return as in
Levinas' reading of Odysseus [10] - and if the epic economy
contains a concept of divine retributive justice - the dike
of Zeus - so that the powers of life exist in a balanced
competition, order resting finely on the brink of chaos,
one violent excess calling forth its opposite, it remains
nonetheless that this is a darkly energised text where any
economy is a scarcely founded theatre of force
presided over by the gaze of Zeus. The original
transgression of Paris is reduplicated in the scene above,
and in that moment of utmost absolute excess where the
intensity of passion rises from the proximity of
annihilation, we approach a point of total expenditure of
meaning and value. Here - throughout the text - Homer
provides us with a recurring return of the repressed, a
confrontation of the network of desire excluded in the
founding of the social, a sense of its terror and delight -
but in what way? How here do we choose to read the
cathartic, as we pass through a narrative whose dramatic
movement, and ultimate closure through the formulae of
retribution, are known in advance?[11]
The distribution of conflict is constant throughout the
rhetoric and structure of the text. Figures such as
Agamemnon, Odysseus and Achilles are marked by their
exorbitant masculinity and cunning, and it is this in the
Iliad that constitutes a specific siting of the erotic,
beyond those moments where eros is manifest. [Empedocles
later focussed this interlinking of the conflictual and
erotic by structuring the cosmos through the two principles
of eros and eris (strife).] The conflictual here - later
making of the agon (public competition) a founding metaphor
for Greek life in Nietzsche's eyes [12] - became
paradoxically the crowning value of culture, and served to
usher in the particular form of homosexual desire as
privileged eros that marked classical Athenian practice
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(the ethos of the Japanese samurai has in this a similar
component)[13]. Just as with desire, so here also with the
excess of bloodshed, with the close description of
brutality and death - whether of sacrificial animals or
humans - that we meet as part of the conflictual order, the
question arises of the space of the cathartic, the
containment and release achieved in recitation and writing
[14].
The question was itself urgent for Plato: the banishment
of poets from the Republic marks his wrestling with the
forms of culture and paideia inherited from Homer and the
tragedians, his attempted dissolution of the excess they
figured. What he sought to project in an ideal state had
already been achieved in China more than once by the time
of Confucius, as we have noted: the reduction of the canon
of the Shijing, just as the erasure of the memory of the
Shang, left Confucius with a relatively homogeneous space
for thematising a culture of co-operative virtue (even if
the Zuozhuan preserves a record of violence and intrigue
that matches the Homeric, it does not elevate this to a
component of virtue as was the case with the articulation
of arete). In a potentially self-defeating move, however,
Plato sought to banish what was precisely the process of
that deepening and opening of the space of psuche that he
himself drew upon, a space that he wished to master and
illuminate in a non-tragic way. It was the agony, not the
pride, of conflict taken up by Aeschylus and Sophocles that
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gave to their ethical visions a depth and intensity that
Plato himself absorbed. Again, the contrast with Confucius
is instructive. We have noticed the absence of ethical
conflict, of ethical choice, as an issue in the Analects;
choice, indeed, is not a philosophical problem for any
pre-Han thinkers; and such horrendous consequences of
mistaken choosing as those met by Oedipus do not darken the
ethical horizon.To the same extent, the deployment of
tragic experience as one route to an inner psychic space
was not a Chinese option [15].
b. The Experience of the Tragic
Any intensive reading of Greek tragic forms now moves in
the shadow of Nietzsche; his claim that Aeschylus and
Sophocles (these were his two tragedians) achieved the
tragic as a moment of deepest order out of darkest chaos,
through confronting the Dionysiac wisdom of Silenus -
"Ephemeral wretch, begotten by accident and toil,why do you
force me to tell you what it would be your greatest boon
not to hear? What would be best for you is quite beyond
your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be
nothing. But the second best is to die soon." The Birth of
Tragedy p.29 - is part of his larger claim that the best,
the most luminous Apollonian aspects of the Greek world
were spun from the play of Dionysus as a fictive
life-enhancing vision: to be, with the utmost intensity, is
achieved only at the sheer edge of darkness in the
knowledge that beyond the edge lies nothing. If access to
this knowledge is for Nietzsche the structural principle
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governing vitality in any culture, thus making of The Birth
of Tragedy as much a reading of the cultural state of
contemporary Germany and the place of Wagner within it as
an excursion into classicism - (the former being the only
justifying criterion for any classicism), then the reasons
for its disappearance, for the death of tragedy, are given
also in the turn away from the Dionysiac and its
containment in an economy of reason - the expulsion of the
repressed from the stage of representation. For Nietzsche
this occurs in the period after Sophocles, in the conjoint
rationalism of Euripides and Socrates, in the privileging
of the rational and discursive, even with tragedy, over
against the abyssal as a therapeutic power.
If we turn thus to consider the placing of eros by
Euripides we do so aware that the space of conflict is
already changing, and that the change is crucial for how
Plato came to understand psuche. Despite the strong
working of fate in Aeschylus and Sophocles, both writers
are profound visionaries of freedom, of the destructive or
ennobling choices that become possible in straitened
circumstances: under the excessive pressure of fate freedom
figures as the ability to acknowledge and shape one's lot
at the point of insight, rather than be carried haplessly
by unknown forces. In Oedipus Tyrannus the force of
blindness is reversed in the moment of insight: Oedipus
switches from spiritual to physical blindness as he makes
the transition from worldly to moral authority. His stance
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here is whole and his vision single, choice being the
essence of his person. [The distribution of knowledge and
ignorance as the founding pivot of tragedy will be central
also to Plato's reading of hamartia.3
In the Hippolytus Euripides focusses the impossibility
of steady choice under the pressure of eros. From the
outset Aphrodite presides over a scenario of desire and
vacillation thai dissolves the tragic into a process of
deferral, or that reconstellates it around the
impossibility of choice. Eros is presented as means to a
necessary retribution, instrument of divine vengeance:
Hippolytus has angered Aphrodite by his purist masculinity,
his sublimation of desire in devotion to Artemis;
affronted, Aphrodite chooses to strike Phaedra, his
step-mother, with desire for him, using her as an
expendable means to effect Hippolytus' downfall:
Renowned shall Phaedra be in her death, but
nonetheless
die she must.
Her suffering does not weigh in the scale so much
that I should let my enemies go untouched
escaping payment of that retribution
that honour demands that I have.
Hippolytus 46-50; Greene and Lattiraore 1955:165.
In ignorance of Aphrodite's guiding intention the
protagonists struggle to manage their lot. Hippolytus,
narcissistic in his self-contained innocence, signing his
innocence with a garland of flowers for his cruel mistress
(71ff) - "The innocence of the flower religion, which is
merely the self-less idea of self" Hegel, Phenomenology
p.689; and Theseus' judgement on his own son: "Yes, in
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self-worship you are certainly practiced" (1. 1080) -
chooses to live within the bright orbit of the sun,
rejecting Aphrodite's "nocturnal powers" nukti thaumastos
(105), stepping back thus from the brink of tragic vision
(and we would need to know how Plato faces the sun without
the night's vengeance) [16]. But Phaedra too would of her
own have chosen light ["It would always be my choice/to
have my virtues known and honoured (402-3)...Time holds a
mirror, as for a young girl/ and sometimes as occasion
falls, he shows us/ the ugly rogues of the world. I would
not wish/that I should be seen among them" (427 - 30)].
This preference for the light (characterised later by
Diotima in the Symposium as the desire for immortality
through the glory of a good name) becomes, in the pragmatic
rationalism of the nurse, advice to retain passion in
secret, rather than opt for the conjunction of passion and
death favoured by Phaedra ["how many erring sons have
fathers helped/ with secret loves? It is the wise man's
part/ to leave in darkness everything that is ugly."
(464-6)]. While the nurse acknowledges the power of love,
the cloak of darkness with which she would veil it (and the
logos with which she would defer death), serves as a cipher
for worldly rather than tragic wisdom, a prudential stance
posited as superior to Phaedra's "noble-sounding moral
sentiments" (1.501).
Her advice to Phaedra complete, the nurse fulfils it
with the offer of a love potion: the ambivalence of this
pharmakon (poison or cure, 516) marks the systematic
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ambiguity of rational logos as healing or destructive power
throughout the play as a whole.
It is the nurse's logos, its inability to match the
power of eros, that initiates Phaedra's downfall: failing
to foresee that Hippolytus could not hear of Phaedras'
passion without disgust, as equally that Phaedra could not
live with the shame evoked by Hippolytus' response, even
though he had pledged himself to secrecy ["Had you not
caught me off my guard and bound/ my lips with an oath, by
heaven I would not refrain from telling this to my father"
(657f)3 the nurse provokes the death that Phaedra had
earlier sought but postponed. The space of that earlier
deferral, though, becomes in turn the space for Hippolytus'
downfall; now in order to subvert the shame that Hippolytus
through speech could bring to her, Phaedra leaves a
death-note branding him as her seducer: corpse and writing
thus become the signs designating Hippolytus, ciphers for
that living corpse he has already become in renouncing the
life-force of Aphrodite.
Through Phaedra's death and its message the narcissistic
closure of Hippolytus, the virginal maiden soul (parthenon
psuchen echon, 1006) that identifies itself with the hard
feminine and appropriates that as a male preserve whilst
consigning the female generally to the sphere of
defilement, is breached in a writing that sets light
against light, Phaedra's need against Hippolytus', and that
marks the rupture of ideal self-presence through the force
Zbi
of exteriority, a detour and death for each.
2. The Dialectic of Eros in the Symposium.
Love distills desire upon the eyes,
love brings bewitching grace into the heart
of those he would destroy.
I pray that love may never come to me
with murderous intent,
in rhythms measureless and wild.
Not fire nor storm have stronger bolts
than those of Aphrodite sent
by the hand of Eros, Zeus' child.
Hippolytus 525 ff.
(i ) A Reading of the Text.
We might note here, for consideration again below, the
possible proximity of Hippolytus-as-type to the Platonic
psuche. In the Symposium the eros that Plato seeks to
know, that is the force behind his knowing, is an aspect of
the masculine psuche caught within the closure of its own
self-reflection, wide-ranging though that may be. Indeed,
in its formal mise-en-scene the dialogue makes the point:
through the power of anamnesis the philosopher retrieves
events from twenty years prior, dealing with the
foundational elements of culture and cosmos, which were
themselves a form of anamnesis, and he stands thus within
the theatre of memory as spectator of his own and his
culture's genesis, identifying the shifting designations of
eros in a phenomenology of the mind's progress towards
truth[17].
The Symposium records a dinner party where speeches are
delivered in praise of eros (and in identification: it is
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precisely because the identity of eros shifts that I do not
use any personification here, despite the fact that for a
good part of the proceedings eros is a god). The form of
the conversations is governed by the movement of dialectic
as Plato takes stock of the received wisdom on eros,
modifying and nuancing the understanding of eros as he
proceeds, and transforming eros into the most powerful
aspect of psuche in its passage to transcendence. The
outline of that passage here, though, is developed in terms
of its world-immanent features rather than in its
conclusion as eschatologically triumphant vision.
The gist of Diotima's speech is to identify a movement
of transcendence from physical to spiritual eroticism; the
relationship between Socrates and Alicibiades reinforces
this point, though in a complex manner. But whatever the
final status of the physical in the dialogue, the general
tenor and force of male homosexual desire is preserved as a
norm both in the idealising of the inter-male relationship
- explicitly in the speeches; and formally in the
dialogue's structure as a conversation between, and in the
presence of, men (the woman flautist is dismissed at the
beginning, 176 e) -, in the functions ascribed to the two
female figures exemplifying or representing aspects of eros
(Alcestis and Diotima), and in the identification of
philosophy as an expression of male desire springing from
the structure of eros within a given cultural economy [18]
[as part of that consider, for instance, the conjunctions
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of women, eros, madness, darkness and death in Euripides in
general and compare these with the opposite conjunctions
Plato insists upon: men, eros, reason, light, immortality].
Through the tension of the dialectic - Socrates
acknowledges its competitive element - the agon in Greek
life is preserved under the form of a shared struggle
towards the good.
a. Phaedrus
Phaedrus begins by repeating the oldest wisdom on eros:
it is a power unbegotten, progenitor of the gods. In his
speech the cosmic, political and ethical dimensions of eros
are adumbrated: this is the lowest stage of the dialogue's
progress, but we have here the first seeds of truth that
will flower in the words of Diotima. We have also a first
problem, of how to read the examples Phaedrus offers.
There is for instance the question of Phaedrus' own
perspective: as the beloved of Eryximachus, who delivers
the third speech, he is the passive partner in a love
relationship: how then does he focus the different
balencies of eros in relation to the lover (erastes) and
the beloved (eromenos)? Renowned for his beauty, Phaedrus
also serves as as the occasion for lovers to give birth to
works of love they carry within them, according to the
sense in which Diotima later speaks of eros as giving birth
to virtue on to kalon (beauty). To what extent in praising
eros does Phaedrus praise himself as eromenon, and in what
way?
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Within the ethical domain, he offers Alcestis as his
first example: her self-sacrifical eros, exchanging her
life for the life of her husband, is presented as one of
the high points of eros in the Greek heritage. If, in
consequence of a Christian tradition of self-sacrifice,
this seems now to move straight to the essence of love -
exemplifying also for Phaedrus the centrality of courage to
any vision of excellence - we will see that Plato construes
things differently, insisting on the self-interested nature
of eros [20]. Also this sole citing here of a woman as
exemplar of love should give us pause, constituting a
gesture that is at no later point in the dialogue fulfilled
through an adequate statement of feminine eros and feminine
virtue [21], And we should observe furthermore a complex
switching of roles: Phaedrus, the female to Eryximachus'
male, praises a woman; the woman praised, however, takes
the male role of active eros; that role is in turn
subverted by the pusillanimity of the man for whom she
dies, so that her eros can hardly be said to lead to great
virtue; and the glory of her death is further reduced by
the fact that the gods bring her back to life.
Orpheus is introduced next as an instance of the failure
of eros: he is a lukewarm lover condemned by the gods to
meet his death at the hands of women, and his fate as a
singer is a fate to which Plato would also consign eros as
lyric enthusiasm. Achilles, by contrast, is the power and
courage of the beloved personified: he gives his life in
avenging the honour of his lover Patroclus. Yet is his act
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inspired by eros or gratitude? Nowhere in the dialogue
does the notion of eros as reciprocal love get established,
though it is raised as an issue in Aristophanes' speech
(covered by the term philia, which is not here a central
term) [22]. In praising the virtue of the beloved Phaedrus
in fact seems not to praise eros, but rather to introduce a
claim about an order of virtue other than, and superior to,
that founded by eros, an order of virtue as gratitude.
Would we be right to remember here all that Nietzsche says
on gratitude as an exemplification of a slave morality (is
not anyone in the moment of gratitude in the position of
the slave)? Yet Nietzsche would hardly want gratitude
insinuated in Greek morality, the form of heroic assertive
morality, prime instance of the will to power. But
Phaedrus does elevate Achilles' devotion to Patroclus over
eros - not directly, since he claims that the active force
of eros is nearer to the gods - but indirectly, by having
the gods give Achilles the reward of immortality for "they
are even more amazed, delighted and beneficent when the
beloved shows such devotion to his lover, than when the
lover does the same for his beloved." [We should note that
throughout Plato incorporates the assumption that the older
man is the lover, drawn by the beauty, to kalon, of
adolescent youth - Phaedrus stresses that Achilles is
"still beardless", and far younger than Patroclus. The
idealisation of youth here, a quintessential hallmark of
the classical Greek world, is at a signal remove from the
Confucian reverence for age, though physical grace, as we
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have noted, is a recurring motif in the Shijing. For Plato
the beauty of youth is a cipher for immortal beauty, the
beauty of the Forms.] Finally we might note, in
qualification of our comment on reciprocity, that Phaedrus
does stress the devotion of Achilles; we will need to
assess the force of this notion later.
How much of the substance of his presentation does
Phaedrus grasp reflexively, in the range of its
implications? Plato focusses the power of eros to achieve
its goals despite a man's ignorance of them, with awareness
only coming later .in the process of anamnesis♦ Phaedrus
indirectly here broaches the issue of a dual eros, both in
his opening quotations from Hesiod, and in his view that
the gods reward the power of eros (Alcestis) and of
devotion (Achilles). Firstly, then, we can ask, Does eros
belong with the other elements of the cosmos, the Ouranian
forces, or with the more recently-born Olympians? How does
it relate to these two cosmic orders once in conflict, and
to the political orders derived from them? Phaedrus offers
a partial quotation from Hesiod, and in so doing makes eros
part of the Ouranian order, excluding the Olympians (the
section in parenthesis is missed by Phaedrus):
Chaos was first of all, but next appeared
Broad-bosomed Earth, sure standing-place for all
[the gods who live on snowy Olympus' peak,
And misty Tartarus, in a recess
Of broad-pathed earth,] and Love most beautiful
Of all the deathless gods
[Eros, hos kallistos en athanatoisin theoisin]
Theognis 116 - 120; Wender 1973:27
We can, I think, take it - this would be confirmed by the
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way Pausanias takes his cue from Phaedrus - that the full
text of Hesiod was known to the audience, and that
Phaedrus thus opens, directly or indirectly, a
consideration of the role of eros in sustaining political
order. Yet in his speech he seems, in different ways, to
favour both cosmic orders: the Ouranians are granted a
priority in that eros is linked with them (and thus as we
shall see with a naturalistic science that does not require
the Olympians as explanatory principles), but the Olympians
are also granted the power to award outstanding devotion.
The nature and status of eros are quite insecure at this
point [23],
b. Pausanias
Pausanias stresses this insecurity by developing the
theme of the two forms of eros, speaking of the heavenly,
Ouranian, and earthly-Olympian, Pandemon, and noting that
any praise of eros must establish to which it is addressed;
he thus raises a question of definition that will be more
to the fore later. Earthly love is that evidence by the
vulgar masses (hou hoi phauloi ton anthropon erosin 1816),
is an entirely fortuitous, tuchei, principle which draws
men to women instead of to boys, paidon, is based on the
flesh, and has no orientation to virtue. Heavenly love
"springs from a goddess whose attributes have nothing of
the female but are altogether male" (all' arrenos monon,
181c) and, in turning towards men, moves there towards the
intellectual, ideally leading the older lover into faithful
companionship with his beloved.
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Several points of interest already emerge at the opening
of Pausanias' speech. Firstly, he raises the question of
chance, tuche. The play of fortune constitutes one of the
founding themes for tragedy: how to live a morally
worthwhile life when, by accident or necessity, one commits
wrong and remains responsible for its consequences.
Oedipus marries Jocasta out of blindness, through chance;
Agamemnon sacrifices Iphigineia as a necessary step to
resolve the conflict of Olympian powers. The world
governed by the Olympians was one where the conflict of
those powers themselves, in their impress on the human
arena, made self-cultivation, the attainment of arete, a
precarious affair. Plato objected to the portrayal of
conflict and of base passion in tragedy, considering it to
lessen the chances of moral constancy; by the same token he
objected to the divided cosmos of the Olympians. Pausanias
here reduces Olympian eros in favour of Ouranian. Olympian
(Pandemon) eros is marked by tuche, which in turn is linked
with women; constant eros is linked with men. Plato wants
to remove the element of chance in human affairs,
eliminating the tragic inherent in the flux of diverse
circumstances and moving towards the constancy of the forms
and the intellectual element in man [24].
The reduction of woman in her link here with chance is
not as direct as it might at first appear. Dover notes
that the Greeks recognised different forms of male sexual
desire and practice as appropriate to different stages of a
Zf\
man's life. A young man will be drawn to women, but it is
a hazardous affair to find himself a partner. An older man
will be drawn to young men, and established conventions
make the likelihood of satisfaction high. This latter
appears to Plato to be a more rational arrangement,
reducing tuche or eliminating it from the erotic quest.
The rational element is also prized by the older man in his
choice of a boy as partner: Plato, through Pausanias,
focusses on the intellectual aspect of psuche, dismissing
from account, or reducing to a minimum, physical and
emotional factors. [The reduction of the female is achieved
here by characterising the true goddess of eros as male].
A second point concerns Pausanias' stress on constancy:
the lover will be prepared to spend his whole time with his
beloved, sharing his life with him (181d). We can ask here
whether constancy amounts to, or involves, reciprocity, a
recognition of the individual as lovable in his own right.
In Diotima's speech the individual as a focus of love seems
to fade in relation to the need of the lover to give birth
to his own virtue through the medium of the beloved:
Diotimas' eroticism seems to be supremely narcissistic,
rather than other-directed. Vlastos raises some of the
issues here:
We are to love persons so far, and only insofar, as
they are good and beautiful. Now since all too few
human beings are masterworks of excellence, and not
even the best of those we have the chance to love are
wholly free of streaks of the ugly, the mean, the
commonplace, the ridiculous, if our love for them is
to be only for their virtue and beauty, the
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individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of
her individuality, will never be the object of our
love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato's
theory. It does not provide for love of whole
persons, but only for love of that abstract version
of persons which consists of the complex of their
best qualities.
Vlastos, 1973: 31.
We will take up the qualities of beauty again, since it is
a specifically Greek appreciation that Plato inserts into
his theory. Insofar as the status of the individual in
Pausanias' speech is concerned, it would seem that the
issue cannot be decided: the constancy of the lover is
perfectly compatible with his appreciation the beloved
simply as a continuing occasion of his own progress in
virtue. To put it thus sounds strange to us no doubt, and
a major difficulty lies in fixing the degree of
estrangement between Plato and ourselves. Plato is talking
about passion, not friendship (though his theory of
friendship remains, if not narcissistic, profoundly
self-interested). Passion, whatever else, surely
incorporates that thrill of delight occasioned by, and only
by, a singular individual. Pausanias acknowledges such
passion, eros, as leading to constancy. Do we assume that
within constancy the other fades as we become aware again -
this sense having been lost at the point of passion's
intensity - of the centrality to us of our own pursuit of
virtue, our own self fulfilment in the attainment of fame
and glory? How do the motivational and the moral orders
relate here - is the motivation of eros itself something
moral, or is it only open to moral scrutiny in terms of the
fruits it bears? And how does the press of emotion and
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desire relate to intellect: in speaking of an attraction to
the intellectual element is Pausanias still not leaving us
with narcissism, with the intellect in search of itself as
mirrored in the other? We will attempt some resolution of
these issues as our reading proceeds.
Finally we might note, a third point, that Pausaias as
the lover of Agathon, is as likely as Phaedrus to betray
self-interest in his characterisation of eros as active
force, praising the virtue of the lover over the beloved.
We should be alert, then, to a degree of special pleading
in his presentation.
Pausanias soon complicates his presentation by focussing
on the beauty of youth as a cipher of unpredictability: who
knows how the beautiful young will turn out, and whether
love for them will be any more than spent passion, a
fruitless climax of desire; to prevent such waste "there
should be a law to forbid the loving of mere boys" 181e.
But who is such a law to protect? - it seems to constitute
a device preventing the man of substance from wasting
himself, rather than an instrument for protecting youth,
but then it is claimed that the man of substance is already
a law unto himself (181e 3-4). $ince he stands above, and
does not need, law it is suggested that law exists to
regulate the behaviour of the earthly lover, who needs some
external constraints. This then serves to introduce a
discourse on law where the question of waste is abandoned
in favour of a reading of law as protection of the good
name of eros. Here the superiority of the Athenian law
code, in the complex privilege it grants to the status of
the (true) lover, serves as a confirmation of Pausarias' own
active nature as erastes. At the same time the Athenian
code guards against the beloved yielding to his lover
before the lover's virtue is known. For Pausanias, then,
the code serves to confine eros within the rule of virtue
(in this the nature of eros becomes ambivalent: the
distinction between immoral and moral eros, insofar as
these terms characterise the nature of eros is shifted;
eros is now characterised as neutral, (oute kalon einai
auto kath'hauto oute aischron 183d, 4-5), its value only
being detained by consideration of the acts resulting from
eros insofar as these are evaluated within a particular
moral economy. Law here is thus external to eros, a
supplement to guide and direct it; law is an addition to a
neutral natural order; heavenly eros/Aphrodite is outside
the moral domain.
c. Eryximachus
The separation of natural force and moral containment, an
ambivalent point with Pausanias, is picked up by
Eryximachus, a doctor who offers a physicalist account of
eros that conspires with the naturalist presuppositions of
Phaedrus, and who, in that account, stresses the
distribution of eros as cosmic energy: the influence of
eros is evident throughout every activity whether sacred or
profane (kat' anthropina kai kata theia pragmata 186bz).
From a medical viewpoint Eryximachus distinguishes two
in
sorts of desire, that manifest by a sick and that by a
healthy body. Given the high concentration of medical
knowledge and practice in classical Athens, we can take it
that Eryximachus draws upon the experimental style of a
well-established position. More to the point here, he
raises a materialist challenge whose resolution by Diotima
can be seriously questioned. If one recognises the
implication of desire in the texture and tissue of the
body, is it ever possible to speak of that purely
intellectual vision which Diotima proffers as the
culminating fruit of desire? In some sense such a vision
is always a function of a bodily state,and implicates such
if it is to be achieved, but the reading of the body can be
varied. Do we for instance accpet epilepsy, with
Dostoyevsky's prince Myshkin, as the privileged moment
whereby the solidity of material existence is breached and
a spiritual world seen? Do we encourage the frenzy of
madness as a shamanistic moment of excess in which the
divine finds us worthy recipients of visitation? Do we
seek physical mutilation as a way of checking the body and
releasing the force of spritual eros? (These questions can
also be read in relation to later gnostic handling of
Plato). Even if one opens a discussion of desire in
relation to health and sickness, it is in no manner
self-evident how one should evaluate the nature, let alone
the significance, of health, even though Eryximachus and
Diotima in their different way each presume self-evidence
[25] .
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By undercutting a distinction between sacred and profane
Eryximachus claims that eros is open to the empirical
inspection of natural science; his dualism of
health-sickness is an empirical, not theological or
transcendental one. Medical science has as its aim to
overcome conflicting desires as these are encountered in
the body; its aim here is also to replace some desires with
others, as seems necessary:
And if he (the physician) can replace one desire with
another, and produce the requisite desire when it is
absent, or, if necessary, remove it when it is
present, then we shall regard him as an expert
practitioner. 186d 2-5.
In explicating Aristophanes' speech Nusshaum quotes from
Brandt on the possibility of replacing a love that has been
lost:
If a person is disappointed in love, it is possible
to adopt a vigorous plan of action which carries a
good chance of acquainting him with someone else he
likes at least as well.
The question of the replacement of one object of desire
with another, in an ascending hierarchy, is central to
Diotima's account of the ascent of eros; her therapeutic
art is akin to the art of the physician. But the question
of replacement again touches on the status of the
individual. We desire persons or objects because of their
individual appeal to us, either wholly as an individual or
in terms of some individualising feature; precisely as
individuals, persons or things seem irreplaceable. Yet
we will need to bear in mind whether, for Diotima, love of
individuals or for certain individuals, is not some kind of
27?
addiction, a lack of health. And if certain love-objects
must be replaced by others, if this replacement is a
necessary change from sickness to health, what status do
individuals as such have in the final visionary scheme?
The physician seeks harmony within the body; eros is
that which brings about harmony, in the body and in any
other sphere; any art, insofar as aimed at producing a
harmonious growth and development, is under the direction
of eros. Within the sphere of iurnan activities Ouranian
eros is the principle of harmony, while earthly love, the
Muse of many songs, is the principle of chaos. Here the
physician would have us abandon the Olympian dispensation,
with its inevitable burden of conflict, and its tragic
vision, and its religious practices as a healing resource,
in favour of that oldest order of Nature which operates
without conflict and in a rational manner. [Although
Eryximachus speaks of a diviner's art in relation to both
forms of eros 188c, it seems clear that the need for
divinatory understanding of Ourian eros would be obviated
if Olympian eros did not exist; not only is the latter
many-tongued, and so internally in conflict, it also
conflicts systematically with the former eros. Under
Ourian eros opposites would be in harmony, not in conflict,
and the order of the world would be transparent to reason.]
d. Aristophanes
Aristophanes moves to undercut Eryximachus' secular
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rationalism by claiming eros as the highest divinity: if
this were generally recognised, he would be accorded
supreme religious honours, 189c. Aristophanes offers us a
cosmic fable in order to explicate eros; the purpose of the
fable is to establish the real nature of man (dei de proton
humas mathein ten anthropinen phusin 189d 5), and the shift
here is twofold, to the specifically human sphere, and to a
new stage in the process of definition: the dialogue is
manifesting in its structure that movement of eros as
progressive ascent towards to kalon that will later become
the point of thematic explication with Diotima.
-fhe fable focusses the primal wholeness of the human race.
Just as Nietzsche offered us the fable of the clever
beasts, taking an estra-terrestrial standpoint in order to
view the pathos of the human condition, so Aristophanes
invites us to see ourselves from outside as utterly
strange, and through the force of that strangeness to come
to a sharper understanding of eros. The fable speaks of
three original forms of erotic self-sufficiency: one male,
one female, one hermaphrodite. Each original creature was
cylindrical in shape,
with rounded back and sides, four arms and four legs,
and two faces, both the same, on a cylindrical neck,
and one head, with one face one side and one the
other, and four ears, and two lots of privates, and
all the other parts to match. They walked erect, as
we do ourselves, backward or forward, whichever they
pleased, but when they broke into a run they simply
stuck their legs straight out and went whirling round
and round like a clown turning cartwheels.189e -
1 90a.
The original self-sufficiency of the three sexes was
ruptured by Zeus when they tried to scale heaven: as
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punishment for their hubris they were split in half, their
desire for heaven thus deflected into a desire to find and
unite with their missing part. Eros is now the desire to
re-establish an original self-sufficiency; and the 3 forms
of sexual desire - man for man (the highest, just as the
original all-male sex was the highest, descended from the
sun 190b, 192a) woman for woman, and men and women for each
other - represent the three forms of the search for
wholeness [27].
The characterisation of the human thus as permanently
wounded in its flesh, a deformed half of its original self,
consigned always to a search for fusion with a singular
other as the only source of healing, raises an important
network of questions in our interpretation of eros. Here,
more than anywhere else apart from in the speech of
Alcibiades, the significance of the individual that Vlastos
reckoned to be excluded from Platonic eros is given a
place; paradoxically, though, that place marks also a
certain death of the individual in the encounter with the
otheer, insofar as this would constitute a moment of
absorption. Not just a moment, either, insofar as this
might be our current experience in an ecstatic sharing of
flesh and spirit: the dynamism of eros that Aristophanes
focusses is towards a permanent fusion, or re-fusion, an
impossible permanent commingling of flesh through
re-absorption in an original oneness. [Where psuche
figures in this is not apparent: Aristophanes does not
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mention whether, with our divided bodies we also have
divided souls.]
The degree of chance in the erotic quest is sharply
focussed by Aristophanes: of all the different persons we
might encounter in life, only one figures as the missing
half that will make us whole. Not here Brandt's argument
that one love might eventually be replaced by anqther. On
the other hand, the stress on singularity focusses not only
the chance element that Plato seeks to overcome, but also
the absurdity of investing so much in the uniqueness of one
other person. This is not indeed the recognition of the
other as valuable in his or her own right, but merely as an
extension of self, with a form of narcissism that seeks not
the mirror but the missing half. Precisely because it is
just one missing half, all the other individuals one might
meet in life are rendered relatively insignificant [28].
The state of ultimate fusion that Aristophanes projects
serves also to focus whether it is in fact fusion that
is desired, or that thrill of eros that draws us to it.
Although the fable of original self-sufficiency focusses
the whole (bipartite) individual as active, this has a
distancing effect from any ordinary experience of the
fusion of intimacy as a passive, self-contained moment that
entails activity again once fusion and the transport of
ecstasy has passed. At the heart of eros is the real
desire for desire, or for the suspension of desire in
communion?
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Here it is not clear also whether Aristophanes would in
fact reckon eros to be absent in the state of oneness. His
fable has the original creatures attempting to scale heaven
in an act of hubris: should we not see that act as
motivated by some eros, some desire to be like, or to
overthrow, the gods? And if now there is desire an
original self-sufficiency, is there not also, within that
desire, the capacity for an uninhibited will to power at
present circumscribed by the gods?
Finally, we might note that Aristophanes himself appears
clear about the prior claims of fusion over anything else,
admitting the readiness to be merged into an utter oneness
with the beloved. Considering whether lovers, in their
oneness, would choose to be welded together by Hephaestus
if given the choice, Aristophanes suggests there is nothing
they would like better. This introduction of an external
divine agency as instrument for the permanent completion of
eros parallels Socrates introduction of Diotima as final
purveyor of the truth of eros. [The metal working god was
pre-figured in the comparison of individuals with two
halves of the same coin, each looking for the opposite half
that tallies, 191d. Without welding, persons form a broken
currency, any place in an economy of exchange ruptured
until we have found completeness.]
e. Agathon.
In considering the nature of the person Aristophanes
wanders from the question of generativity (though he does
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point out that the gods introduced the possibility of sex
and procreation in order to prevent the divided monads from
dying out 191 b-c], Yet the theme of generativity is one
we have already referred to, acknowledging that for Plato
it is an issue to be secured in the final exposition of
eros. In the search for the missing other Aristophanes
privileges reintegration at the expense of generation [29].
To what extent he focusses here Plato's assessment of
established tragic and comic art, in relation to the new
art of philosophical dialectic, is a question we cannot
consider in all its implications. But we should note that
Plato privileges the literary form of the dialogue as
precisely that means capable of giving birth to truth
through an ordered progression of argument and inquiry.
From Plato's viewpoint received tragic and comic art can be
seen as those forms of art which reintegrate us in the
given order and flux of society, rather than as forms now
capable of giving birth to the new order of philosophy.
That much said, it is nonetheless the possibility of
generativity through the eros of the poet that Agathon
focusses. But the possibility comes also with a warning.
The Symposium is set the day after Agathon won first prize
with the performance of one of his tragedies. Before he
speaks now Socrates reminds us how he "took the stage with
the actors the other day" 194b; it is as if Socrates warns
us that the words of the poet belong only with the mimesis
of the actor, that they are a kind of performance or
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representation of another truth that is never known as
truth but rather apprehended as doxa (opinion) or expressed
through the ravishment of poetic intoxication. The eros
that Plato will finally give us is the eros of knowledge.
If Aristophanes gave us the nature of man, Agathon would
give us the nature of the god eros 195a - thus the
movement. Reversing the earlier priority of the Ouranians
within which eros (or true eros) existed as part of the
oldest order of reality, Agathon considers eros the
youngest of the gods, (neotaton auton einai theon kai aei
neon 195c) the enemy of age (195b) - here the young
eromenos Agathon praises the youth of love. And love's
imperishable youth prepares us for the unchanging constancy
of the Forms.
The record of violence amongst the gods evident in
Hesiod and Parmenides is the work of necessity (ananke) not
eros: eros is a co-operative principle, a principle of
harmony. By implication eros is also to do with freedom,
in contrast with the compulsion and constraint of ananke.
[The readiness to speak thus of eros is rooted in Agathon's
status of eromenos: he does not speak here out of the
urgent experiences of the erastes.] Eros is characterised
in a generally feminine manner; delicate, settling in the
softest of men's hearts, tender and supple (95d - 196a),
belonging to the gentlest order of nature, to the religion
of flowers separate from the world of conflict ("where the
ground is thick with flowers and the air with scent, there
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he will settle" 196b 2-3).
So far as the moral excellence of eros is concerned,
this is exemplified in righteousness, temperance, courage
and in the genius of artistic inspiration and creativity
(196b-e). The creativity of eros both brings everything to
life, and is the guarantee of fame for the brightest works
of creation. Here the thrill of poetic speech does not
distinguish for us between bringing to life in general, and
bringing to life only what is excellent and beautiful. Is
eros the life force generally - in which case how do v/e
account for the presence of ugliness (to aischron), the
more so since love's orientation towards to kalon is
stressed (197b)? Or is love, as the youngest of the gods,
consigned to manifesting itself in a field already governed
by the force of ananke. And is ananke here some
alternative life-force, marking the world consigned to a
play of conflictual repetition? If love is a secondary
principle does it constitute a kind of supplementary
creation, a healing and making whole of a original but now
fallen creation? And was the original creation ever whole,
or was it not from its inception governed by conflict? If
so does this set a permanent limitation on the work of
eros, letting it create a fragile world of beauty and
friendship - such as that evident in the shared
conversation of the Symposium itself (197d) - only against
a necessary and inescapable backdrop of duress and
violence? And - granting a priority to ananke - is eros,
as the richest ornament of heaven and earth (197e),
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anything other than mere decoration, superfluity, the
excess of aestheticism - offered to a privileged few who
rely on the toil of others, the surplus-value of democracy
arising from an investment in slave-labour as the field of
ananke?
f. Socrates
Socrates makes his entrance by distancing himself from
the rhetoric of the previous speeches, distinguishing the
adornment of style from the pursuit of truth, and
suggesting that, like Hippolytus, he agreed to involve
himself in the discussion in word only, not intention,
199a5. Speaking nonetheless, he claims that it is now the
truth he will offer us. Acknowledging the rightful
centrality accorded by Agathon to questions of the nature
of eros (hopoios tis estin ho eros, 199c5), Socrates first
seeks to know whether eros is directed towards something or
nothing (ho eros eros estin oudenos e tinos 199e 6-7). The
question of intentionality is crucial for what follows: in
establishing that eros always has some object, however
vaguely apprhended, Socrates shifts the question of
generativity into a broader frame (Agathon, though raising
the issue, still had a monadic sense of the poet giving
birth to works from within his own psuche). Understanding
"nothing" as total indeterminateness - rejecting its link
with eros - Socrates suggests that eros is directed towards
what is perceived as a lack; that lack becomes known
through the presence of beauty, to kalon, and insofar as to
kalon is the object of eros, eros itself cannot be
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characerised as kalon - a first correction of Agathon's
position. Lack is thus an emptiness in eros - in the
desiring agent - that seeks its fulness in Kalon [eros as
dynamic emptiness bears valuable comparison with the wu of
Zhuangzi and Chan], The notion of lack here is continuous
so far with the claims of Aristophanes.
To pursue his formulation of love Socrates introduces
his discourse with Diotima [the dialogue thus in its
structure intensifying the movement of anamnesis, situating
memory within memory]. Diotima identifies eros as neither
beautiful nor ugly, but as midway between these two
extremes, 202a-b. Situated thus in the in-between, the
metaxu, eros is also figured as neither human nor divine
but rather as a very powerful spirit, thus defining a space
between transcendent origin and goal (and thus, though
distinguished from the human, standing also for the best in
the human: for psuche that lies between heaven and earth,
moving from origin to goal in the process of birth and
rebirth). Love is the great hermeneut, drawing the human
towards an understanding of the divine. The man informed
by eros has a spiritual power (daimonios aner 203a5), in
contrast with the technical skill and knowledge possessed
by others (e peri technos e cheirourgias tinas banausos
203a 6-7). Here - although the spiritual skills associated
with eros are at this point characterised as prophetic and
priestly crafts 202e 7-8 - Plato begins that overturning of
the empirical scientific knowledge favoured by Eryximachus:
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such knowledge is consigned to doxa, the non-rigorous
organisation of apparent fact, in contrast with the
foundational knowledge of ultimate structures that eros
brings through the vision of the Forms. Thus begins the
move to retain and incorporate empirical science within a
metaphysical ontology that will have a central place in
Western thinking until the rise of Baconian inductivision.
Eros, conceived of Need and Resource on Aphrodite's
birthday, is characterised by Diotima as partaking equally
of his mother's poverty and his father's skill, hence his
cunning in proving to kalon and to agathon (203b-d). "fhe
affirmed permanent fragility of love, now flourishing now
dying, is a problem to be overcome within Plato's scheme,
though it is not clear that he himself does overcome it,
but rather simply leaves it in his consideration of the
forms. It is moral and intellectual constancy that Plato
wants to focus, but eros here, even as hermeneut and as
opening to the Forms, does not of itself offer constancy.
Instead it seems to offer a powerful, but vacillating,
motivation. Two areas of constancy are focussed: the gods,
who in already being wise cannot be said to desire wisdom
204a; (here Plato corrects the Olympians as principles and
exemplars of conflict and inconstancy); and the ignorant
(hoi amatheis 204e3), who have no desire for wisdom. [Yet
who are the ignorant? In the next section, 205, Diotima
speaks of eros as common to all mankind (koinon...einai
panton anthropon 205a6), as the basic and generalised
desire for every kind of flourishing (eudaimonia) and good
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(agathon). On this assumption it could not be allowed that
there is any simple locus of constancy in ignorance
(representing some form of absolute inertia); and eros as a
dynamic principle is furthermore soon attributed to all
aspects of reality. As inconstancy, though, eros requires
an appropriate environment if it is to become a steady
orientation towards to kalon].
In correction of Aristophanes, Diotima claims that eros
is never the search for the missing half simply, but only
insofar as it constitutes to agathon 205e; eros is indeed a
longing for the good as a permanent possession. Here eros
is seen as a "bringing forth" tokos upon to kalon, a desire
awakened by beauty to give birth to what one (the male)
carries within: "In this passage Diotima treats the
ejaculation of semen by the male, rather than the complete
process of creating a child, as a token of that with which
the male is 'pregnant'" Dover, Symposium, p147. Eros thus
becomes not desire for possession of to kalon (modifying
what was said above) but rather a desire for generation
(gennesis) - a securing of the theme of generativity
already adumbrated, but a powerful retention at the same
time of the narcissistic foundation: the male desires to
propagate himself through means of the beautiful, to secure
his own continuity; birth here is not a mutual process of
generation but a solipsistic moment of self-generation, the
quest for glory and a cipher of immortality.
This indeed is the next point: eros is a longing for
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immortality (tes athanasias 707a3). In one sense this is
already there with Aristophanes: eros as the desire for an
endlessly lasting fusion with the missing beloved.
Diotima, however, presents immortality not in terms of
this everlastingness, but rather as an achievement to be
won through fame and offspring. As desire for offspring,
eros is already manifest in the breeding instinct of
animals and birds [30] : for Diotima , all animate reality
thus seeks immortality through offspring; in this the
mortal does all in its power to achieve immortality (he
thnete phusis zetei kala to dunaton aei te einai kai
athanatos. 207d1-2). Individuals change constantly
throughout their lives; only by leaving something of
themselves behind do they mitigate that process. 207d -
208a. In the human sphere, the desire for fame and glory
constitutes the orientation to immortality; this was the
motivating principle behind the self-sacrifice of Alcestis
and Achilles (Diotima thus robs their actions of the
element of altruism or gratitude that Phaedrus introduced,
together with any simple relation to death he might have
premissed: their action is precisely geared to their own
transcendence of death).
Diotima distinguishes between those (men) who are
pregnant (enkumones) with the fruit of the body (soma), and
those pregnant with fruit of the spirit (psuche) - the
former turn to women and raise a family to obtain
immortality through offspring, while the latter bear the
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fruits of the spirit (it is clear that Plato intends here
and in what follows, that it is only in the company of
other men that a man might bear the fruit of virtue. There
is an implied structural contrast here between body: woman
and psuche: man. Note that even in the case of desire for
physical immortality it is presented that the man is
pregnant with his own offspring, using the woman as the
occasion to give birth. Here Plato appropriates for the
man the kuein/enkumonoun usually used to indicate pregnancy
in a woman - cf Dover, Symp. 147.
The man of virtue chooses a virtuous friend in order to
give birth to virtue, drawn first, as always, by the beauty
of the body 209b. Although presented as forming a kind of
family bond with his (male) friend, with both of them
raising the offspring of virtue, it seems clear that, while
the lover undertakes his partner's education (epicheirei
paideuein 209c1-2), it is primarily the offspring of the
lover that are being raised; the beloved, as the instance
of the beautiful, is merely the occasion for the lover's
self-generation in virtue. Thus it is that Homer and
Hesiod gave birth to their poetry, that Lycurgus and Solon
gave birth to law, (209d). Two points are worth noting
here. Firstly, it is implicitly argued that it was the
beauty of Sparta and Athens, beloved by Lycurgus and Solon,
that enabled the latter to give birth to their creations -
thus we have moved beyond the beauty of the individual
person to that of the whole community, as part of the
process of ascent through degrees of beauty that Diotima
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next explicates. And secondly, Plato corrects here the
account of law given by Pausanias earlier; what could have
been read there as a form of social contract theory changes
now so that the vision of to kalon alone is offered as the
generative occasion whereby great-minded men achieve and
give birth to law. Laws are not so much here the
outworking of a democratic process, as the fruit of vision
achieved by a few (cf the suggestion at 209a that not many
desire to give birth to the things of the psuche). Plato's
aristocratic temperament here transcends the fragility of
democracy represented at the end by Alcibiades.
The final revelation that Diotima offers is the
progression of eros through degrees of beauty, moving from
particular to universal by means
of a ladder (epanabasmois chromenon, 211c3),
from one to two and from two to every lovely body,
from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions,
from institutions to learning, and from learning in
general to the special love that pertains to nothing
but the beautiful itself - until at last he comes to
know what beauty is. 211c.
The step here through the final elimination of desire -
eros having served as ladder - is to a fully contemplative
vision of
an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor
goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such
beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as
now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to
every worshipper as it is to every other.
Nor will this vision of the beautiful take the form
of a face, or of hands or of anything that is of the
flesh. It will be neither words nor knowledge (oude
tis logos oude tis episteme 211a7), nor a something
that exists in something else, such as a living
creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything
that is - but subsisting of itself and by itself in
an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes
of it in such sort that, however much the parts may
wax and wane, it will be neither more nor less, but
still the same inviolable whole. 211a-b.
Of this kalon spoken of by Diotima we can take it that
Socrates is the incarnation, constant in his interrogation
of others, given to spells of contemplative distraction -
one of these occurs at the beginning of the dialogue,
delaying his arrival at the house of Agathon; another is
mentioned by Alcibiades at the end - provoking in others
the erotic philosophical quest, his own transcendence of
eros metaphorically figured by his permanent sobriety, even
after extensive drinking, his vision of to kalon now
finally set beyond any threatening inconstancies of
intoxication. All of this becomes clear with the arrival
of Alcibiades.
g. Alcibiades.
Alcibiades comes a drunken garlanded reveller at a
gathering that had foresworn the intoxication of alcohol
for that of love. He comes the lover of Socrates, a man
whose constancy towards to kalon as transcendent beauty he
had never been able to sway by his own earthly beauty, not
even arousing his desire on the night they lay together.
He comes the younger lover of an older man, reversing the
priority given to youth thus far as the prime instance of
beauty: it is Socrates now, older, known for his physical
ugliness, in whom the secret of to kalon resides. [And it
is a secret: Socrates is like the model of a silenus that
you have to open to find the god within 215a-b. Here
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beauty is no longer the apparent flush and bloom on the
surface of things, but something intractable that has to be
sought and worked for.] He comes the token of Athenian
democracy and beauty, looking to an older beauty and wisdom
for a stability it cannot of itself provide - thus Plato
corrects democracy in favour of an aristocracy of virtue.
In Socrates as described by Alcibiades Plato presents us
with a vision of human constancy that transcends the
pressures and contingencies of life. Socrates shows no
sense of conflict; his moral vision does not appear as the
fruit of a Sophoclean struggle with the fortunes of chance
and fate; whatever eros there was in him has now carried
him beyond the bounds of a normal life; he is the midwife
who brings to birth the virtue in others but has nothing
left to bring forth in himself. He is a man marked by an
unutterable strangeness, different inside from out, engaged
in a constant game of irony 216e. In contrast with the
softness of love spoken of by Agathon - a softness, however
much expressed through the vision of poetic intoxication,
that is at the heart of the most ordinary sense of love as
a moment of vulnerability - Socrates is hard, golden,
godlike (216e7), the personification of the hard masculine
Goddess spoken of by Pausanias. But even here the hardness
transcends masculinity; it is instead a moment of
inhumanity. Socrates is strange even to other men, to men
engaged in the most masculine of endeavours: he deals with
the hardship of campaigns better than others, remains
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always untouched by drink, can wear the thinnest garb in
winter and walk barefoot on icy ground without noticing,
remains rooted in one spot a full twenty-four hours,
sunrise to sunrise, wrestling with some problem, and then
carries on the next day as if nothing were untoward, is
completely unconcerned in battle (219e - 221b), and at the
end of the dialogue - which has now become a full-blown
drinking bout - spends the remainder of the night drinking
and discussing with Agathon and Aristophanes before leaving
at dawn, the others asleep, for a day's philosophising.
With this Socrates Alcibiades is in love, maddened by
his philosophy as if poisoned by a snake 217e-218b. But
what is it to be in love thus? Certainly at least for
Alcibiades it is to have the inconstancy, the intense
extremes, of his own lifestyle focussed and called nto
question - but this in itself is no more than a realisation
of the meden agan (nothing in excess) of received Delphic
wisdom. And if love is for Plato to follow the route of
Diotima how do we wish to assess that option? To achieve
the final vision beyond words and knowledge is to have lost
all particularities and individualities in their
uniqueness, this transcendence of particularity being
precisely the way to overcome conflict. But it is the
particularity of Socrates that Alcibiades loves - a man
unique, no-one else like him 221c4-5. - and it is in this
singular way that Socrates becomes the incarnation of
transcendent beauty. But who here is the ironist, Socrates
or Plato himself? Could we, on this reading of Socrates,
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ever pass beyond the vision of beauty in an individual man
to that of humanity in general, pass thus again to the
beauty of laws and institutions, or are we not ineluctably
tied to the particular, to the fragments of divinity inside
any silenus? And who are we if we are tied thus - do we
rank with Socrates or Alcibiades? For Socrates, as the man
who has transcended, the particular individual seems to
matter in no other sense that as an occasion for his own
maieutic art, a subject to be awakened to its inherent
possibilities of transcendence. Yet this man would not
abandon the particularity of Athenian institutions, would
not choose exile in preference over death; but what exile
can there be for the one who has achieved his universal
vision?
In the end the dialogue leaves us in a state of
indecision, but it is the passage of inquiry that matters
as much as any final resolution, and that passage is for
Plato his version of the cathartic movement of tragedy and
of the distancing mirror-effect of the comic. Through the
passage of inquiry the space of psuche is deepened and
widened, and also given a proper equilibrium that might
free it from the chance effects of tuche. As the dialogue
ends, before Socrates leaves, he is discussing comic and
tragic art with Aristophanes and Agathon; his claim is that
the tragic poet might be a comedian as well. The claim, of
course, is Plato's own, its realisation his own also, to be
found in that fusion and transcendence of opposite genres,
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the creation of the dialogue-form as the only fit vehicle
for philosophy [32],
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Plato focusseel for us the power of narcissism, the
individual's profound and seemingly ineluctable desire for
self-fulfilment. Rejecting Aristophanes' fusion of lover
and beloved, he finally offers a fusion of the transfigured
mind with the object of its quest, only to focus on the
individual once more in the unique persona of Socrates.
An important treatment of the idea of agape begins with
the quotation from Kirkegaard:
Erotic love is determined by the object; friendship
is determined by the objet; only love to one's
neighbour is determined by love. Since one's
neighbour is every man, unconditionally every man,
all distinctions are indeed removed from the object
[1 ] .
The danger with such a statement is its distance from a
detailed reading of particular texts. Plato recognises a
love for every man as one stage in the ascent of psuche.
Kirkegaard here is close to Nygren, whose radical
separation of Platonic eros and Christian agapel^s been a
major focus of debate since it was first argued [2]. Yet
we can ask whether Plato has not, in the Symposium,
comprehended in eros all that might be said in the name of
agape.
In remarking Plato's comprehensiveness I do not wish to
exclude the question of differing intentionalities at work
m
in the Platonic and the New Testament material relative to
each other, nor to conceal the ways in which "Plato" and
the "New Testament" themselves constitute names for sets of
differing intentionalities. There are varying ways in
which we might choose to read eros and agape within the
Platonic and the New Testament texts. The Symposium is one
occasion where Plato reflects on eros, but a different
reading might be generated from the Phaedrus or the
Republic. Equally, the notion that the New Testament
might contain a singular stance of any sort became
profoundly problematic when acknowledgement is made of the
diversity of New Testament theologies, and when these
themselves are internally disrupted through the force of
contemporary critical reading. Given this, there are
varying ways in which we might read the relations between
eros and agape. We might see these terms as simply naming
quite different kinds of ethical and religious experience
and stance, thus having a minimum degree of overlap. With
Nygren we might consider agape to name a more profundly
religious orientation than that which eros focusses - the
question of radical difference, problematic as it is,
becomes here also a hierarchical placing of agape over
eros. We may with Nietzsche view the christian materials
in general as expressive of a slave morality, supreme
instance of a religion of resentment that has worked a
corrupting influence on Western culture, and give the
privilege instead to a Greek concept of heroic arete that
has eros as its dynamic principle. Or we might
2V
alternatively claim that there is an extensive overlap in
the attitudes and lifestyles designated by the two terms,
remarking the difficulties of reading that must be worked
through if the terms are at all adequately to be
understood, and acknowledging also that these difficulties
only become fully apparent when a comparison of terms is
pursued.
1 . Founding Fathers: Socrates. Jesus, Confucius.
Each of the primary terms that we are considering -
eros, agape, and ren - is focussed in a particular way,
according to the tradition of interpretation within which
it is articulated, in the life and teaching of a particular
individual; the different ways in which those individuals
themselves were perceived, when seen in relation to each
other, might help us to a first recording of differences
between these terms.
Socrates appears for Plato as a man of knowledge and a
moment of revelation; his changing status in the dialogues,
passing from simple historical subject to cipher of
transcendence, marks the movement in Plato's knowledge of
the world Socrates disclosed. A similar transition can be
seen from the three synoptic gospels to the gospel of John:
the historical Jesus becomes progressively the sign of
divine transcendence as his status in the world becomes
more open to reflection. The movement here is through and
beyond the individual as such towards the transcendence he
is reckoned to focus. While Mencius speaks of Confucius as
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a sage, the concern in early Confucianism is not with
Confucius as transcendent figure but rather as wise teacher
who carried on an already existing tradition of virtue:
when Confucius becomes a focus of state veneration in the
Han period, his status as sage secured, this should
certainly be viewed as an act within political theology -
within the theorisation of cosmic order that Han Confucians
undertook - but it should not be read as making Confucius
the singular focus of transcendence.
Jesus is presented as opening a radically new religious
and moral order. He supercedes what has gone before and,
depending on the emphasis, either completes an earlier
imperfect religious vision or annuls its significance. In
speaking of agape he is reckoned to be the incarnaton of
God himself as agape. Socrates also seems to open up a
radically new stance, at least as Plato understands him:
the move here is from the tragic inconstancy of everyday
life to the constancy of the Forms. Socrates opens for
Plato a vision of the philosophical quest which completes
and annuls previous partial readings of eros: as Plato
would dismiss Homer, so we see him finding in Socrates a
new teaching that might replace the old dispensation.
Socrates is not identified with eros; rather, in the eyes
of Alcibiades, he is the human incarnation of that kalon
which is the object of eros. Socrates bears originally the
mark of Delphic wisdom; if he can be said to possess eros,
it is as a desire to waken others to the truth. Confucius
specifically claims not to offer a new teaching (though his
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teaching is in fact new) but rather to preserve the wisdom
of the ancients. This already embeds any concept of
transcendence within a normative tradition [3] . Jesus and
Socrates both claim openness to, and visitation by, a
divine voice as source of their wisdom and teaching
authority. Confucius claims simply to interpret what is
already established. Jesus and Socrates both put a
relationship with transcendence at the heart of their
teaching; Confucius ascribes centrality to a normative
human community and its ideal past [4],
Jesus and Socrates were both put to death by, or with
the support of, their communities, and the style and
content of their teaching served strongly to precipitate
this. Indeed we can say that both men courted and finally
chose death as an inevitable consequence of fidelity to
their vision and of belief in its significance. Jesus
carried on teaching in Jerusalem in circumstances where
death could not be avoided. Socrates chose hemlock over
escape and exile. Both men thus indicated that the
practice of agape and the erotic pursuit of to kalon
entailed a choice for open confrontation with the given
political order when this was against agape, or when it did
not give credence to philosophical eros. [From within the
gospel tradition Jesus' death is already viewed
theologically as an atoning sacrifice. We will see that
there are no grounds for thinking Jesus himself saw his
death in this light. Nonetheless, such early theologising
has left its mark on subsequent readings of agape as
self-sacrifical love]. The confrontational element evident
in Confucius' life - as this is recorded for us - and in
his teaching on ren is, by contrast, of a minimum.
Confucius accepted his daughter's marriage to a man in
prison, but we are not told that his followers should
expect prison or punishment for following his dao, and
Mencius specifically excludes that a Confuciuan, ru, should
spend time in prison. Given the mandate to preserve life
and honour the ancestors, there is a strong basis (evident
also amongst the Daoists as we have seen) to link virtue
with longevity. There is no transcendent goal to complete
a life terminated early in the pursuit of virtue, though
Confucius does say if he must choose between life and
virtue he will choose virtue. Meucius spoke out aganst the
corrupt exercise of rulership, and his stance was crucial
for later Confucians who would criticise rulers of the day.
Mencius nonetheless preserved his life, and there may be in
his work an aspect of indirectness and allegory such as
transforms later Confucian moral and political exhortation
into a veiling of critique that might thus preserve the
critic's safety.
In the case of Jesus, it is often as much his actions as
his teaching that focusses the nature of agape, whereas
with Socrates and Confucius actions are not so central or,
perhaps better, speak in a different way. For Alcibiades
Socrates' deeds - his fits of abstraction, moments of
bravery, abstention from sexuality - manifest part of what
301
is at stake in philosophical eros; and Confucius' behaviour
at meals, funerals and at court, indicates his adherence to
li and ren. But with Jesus actions are reckoned to have a
particularly transfiguring effect, whether they are
presented in stories of healing or in those other
occurrences marks by the word "miracle." "pie life of Jesus
itself seems to be viewed as a more potent force by the New
Testament traditions than does that of Socrates or
Confucius by their immediate traditions, and his death is
also seen as a powerful act that initiates the work of the
Spirit. With this stress on the miraculous we have the
sense of a strongly transfigured world made manifest by a
particular individual. On the other hand, Fingarette
emphasises that for Confucius virtuous behaviour in general
is a holy, transfiguring act, and it is clear that
Alcibiades saw the world differently once stung by
Socrates' particular beauty. The comparative assessment -
indeed, comprehension - of the different visions of life at
work here is thus deeply problematic [5].
One crucial point is the way in which the life and
teaching of each individual came to be figured in
subsequent narratives. Socrates and Jesus both provoked
styles of writing that were unique in relation to their
received traditions. We have seen already how Plato
constructed the philosophical dialogue as a means of
purveying the kind of truth that intrigued him,
distinguishing his stance from received tragic and comic
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genres; within this dialogue-form Socrates played a leading
role, and his style of inquiry - linked with his
philosophical daimon - can be taken as progenitor of it.
But the details of his life figure also in moments of
narrative, or centrally in such a dialogue as the Apology:
the person, as much as his philosophical style, is at stake
here. Jesus' work also left its mark on literary form,
provoking the singular event of four canonical theological
biographies, without parallel as a genre in extant Jewish
and Near Eastern writings of the period or earlier. But if
the life and teaching of each of these men served to
inaugurate a new writing, then the same holds true for
Confucius: the Analects marks a new departure in the Zhou
world and - even though the prior literary tradition is not
extensive, so that there was still broad scope for
different literary forms to emerge - it took its place as a
record of the essence of the man of li as of his teaching,
inaugurating a tradition where philosophical conversation
remained crucial.
We might finally note how each of these men concentrated
on different aspects of the person in their teachings on
eros, agape, and ren. Plato favoured the intellectual
aspect of psuche, severing psuche from soma and
distinguishing its intellectual and valorous moments from
the mass of turbulent emotion. There is no easy vision
here of the heart as a principle of love and affection.
This, by contrast, is of the essence in Jesus' teaching: at
the centre of agape is a notion of unbounded openness to
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and concern for others, an affectionate stance limited by
neither class, nationality, gender or religion. And if we
take the Mencian reading of Confucius, we find here also a
vital place given to the compassionate heart (we have
remarked, furthermore, the appropriate translation of xin
as mind-and-heart). For Confucius, the given community,
and the bonds of virtue and decorum uniting it, is central;
the intellectual function of xue is a knowledge of the
community and its traditions. [We could complicate the
account here by noting that Plato's stress on intellect is
in order to secure the ultimate rational principles of the
ideal community, thus marking a different intentionality
from that implicit in xue [6]. By contrast again , the
place accorded to study, scholarship, or intellect in the
Gospels is minimal, though a tradition of scholarship with
which Jesus was familiar can certainly be presupposed.]
2. Agape and Self-love
Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all
your soul, with all you strength, and with all your
mind; and your neighbour as yourself. Lk. 10:27
With these two commandments Jesus offers an
interpretation of the essence of Jewish ethical and
religious experience. What is at stake here will be
explored in different ways in this chapter; to start with
we can focus on the question of self-love.
On a first reading the command to love one's neighbour
presupposes self-love. The ethical stance that Jesus
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enjoins thus seems to incorporate an aspect of
psychological possibility and plausibility confirmed by
contemporary thinking: love for others is only consequent
on a degree of positive self-regard. Self-regard and
self-love, however, are not necessarily the same thing: an
adult capacity for positive self-regard arises from the
experience of having been loved consistently in childhood;
analogously, it might be argued that Jesus presents the
requirement to love others as consequent on the fact that
the individual has already been loved unconditionally by
God. [The love-relationship of God with his chosen people
has already been focussed in the earlier Jewish writings,
and so is taken for granted].
If, however we make a distinction between self-regard
and self-love it need not be to exclude self-love from
self-regard; it could be argued that self-love - or the
wholehearted acceptance of self with whatever faults and
failings - is a much more difficult thing to achieve than
self-regard. It may be then that, in suggesting that one
loves others as self, Jesus is pointing to the difficulties
in loving others that exist precisely because of
difficulties in loving self. In the guise of an ethical
imperative, he perhaps thus presents us with an ethical
conundrum that works towards an awakening of insight into
the nature and difficulties of love, a strategy that, as we
shall see, he employs more fully in his parables.
Speaking of self-love can be distracting if "self" is
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thought of as a term of relationship, analagous to
"others". Certainly I can make myself an object of
reflection and concern in various ways: I can examine my
beliefs, v/orry about my health, wonder what kind of person
I appear as to others. When writers such as Kierkegaard,
Nygren and Niebuhr seek to exclude self-love from the
ethical stance of Jesus, they perceive self-love as
involving a kind of division in the self of this sort: the
individual thinks about, and calculates on behalf of, self
at some level and in some way in any concern for others:
self-love thus implies a root level of selfishness. We can
indeed consider whether some such measure of narcissism is
not an inevitable feature in any human life. But we might
establish first that it is in fact possible to speak of
self-love in a different way: self need not be thought of
as the permanent hidden object of one's love, "self-love"
may instead refer to a state of completest well-being and
self-acceptance, the only possible point of departure from
which we can approach others without a measure of
self-seeking. We can consider how plausible such a notion
is.
Plato's eros is the main object of attack for Nygren and
others: they find it fully premissed on a notion of
self-seeking, and we have already remarked the recurring
narcissistic element in the Symposium. But eros is
presented there in terms of an ascent, a formation through
various stages; and while the lover who chooses a partner
in order to give birth to his own virtue can certainly be
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said to be self-seeking - seeking the immortality of his
own name - we can reflect on the degree to which the
passage towards the vision of to kalon is a path of
self-transcendence which, in opening psuche to an infinite
world beyond itself, moves away from any possibility of
attachment to self. This movement of ascent seems also to
imply a movement of return: this is not explicated, but it
appears that Socrates is one who has achieved the vision of
to kalon and who then returns to the market place of
Athenian life - much as the Chan monk does - to direct the
eros of others towards a path of self-transcendence [7].
That much said, it can be asked whether there is a point
within the ascent of eros where the self is transcended, or
whether this only comes in the final vision where eros as
such as transcended. As this question is pursued, the
nature of self-transcendence becomes problematic: even when
the concern is no longer with production of one's own
virtue, but rather with the beauty of laws and
institutions, as one passes from the particular to the
universal, how might one assess the degree of attachment to
self as subject of this visionary intellectual experience?
There is no obvious criterion that can be introduced for
evaluation here. We might suggest the individual becomes
progressively more open to others in his passage to the
universal. But what of the mathematician or scientist who
becomes so absorbed in the world of theoretical reflection,
of apparently universal laws , that other individuals
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become of negligible concern? We might claim that the
individual becomes more active for the good of society in
general,once he loses concern with the attainment of his
own virtue. But what of the almost solipsistic pleasure
that can come from reflection on theoretical concerns, the
primacy of contemplation over action? We might suggest
that, instead of valuing others for the satisfaction we get
from their manifest beauty, we might with Alcibiades come
to love that which, like Socrates, is manifestly ugly,
thence to discover a different kind of beauty "within",
which can only be found once we have relinquished that
concern with self-satisfaction that beauty can awaken.
But Diotima makes plain the point that holds for Athenian
culture generally: it is manifest beauty that is prized,
and will always be prized, as the initial focus for eros;
with the singular exception of Socrates, that which is ugly
is excluded from the erotic vision.
There are passageways here of desire, attachment and
self-seeking that are labyrinthine and interminable; they
must be followed, however, in trying to get a first siting
of agape in relation to self-love.
A component in eros that Nygren would exclude from agape
is the movement of quest: eros marks a human quest for
transcendent beauty and goodness, while agape marks a human
disposition that is only found as the the product of
transcendent goodness manifesting itself freely, quite
independent of any quest. Any quest for transcendence is
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for Nygren an act of hubris - though I think we can take it
here that Plato has circumscribed the area of hubris
sufficiently for it to be progressively eliminated in the
erotic journey. Nonetheless, there is an important
difference in intentionality between New Testament writers
and Plato on the issues here. Jesus inherited a tradition
of thinking which made the Jewish people, if anything, the
objects of God's quest - in Amos and Hosea the people take
the passive role of the beloved in relation to God's active
desire [8] . That desire evinces, in a paradoxical way, a
lack in God that only the people can meet. If the people
love God in return, it is because they are in the position
of Phaedrus and Agathon: their eros - if we can use that
word here - must take the form of gratitude. The love
shown by the beloved rather than the lover is what Jesus
focusses in agape. That love is an active love insofar as
it is directed towards the well-being of others, but it is
not insofar as geared to one's own self-fulfilment: the
search for self-fulfilment is made redundant insofar as
God's unconditional love is pre-supposed.
All of this is a surface phenomenology of certain
dominant aspects of the relevant texts. We might
complicate things by asking two questions: to what extent
might Socrates' disposition, after the vision of to kalon,
be characterised as agape - is the return to the
marketplace an exercise of agape? And to what extent are
certain active dispositions which are recorded in the New
Testament analogous to eros before the full force of divine
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agape is known? On the latter, for instance
simply note the progressive stages through which the
followers of Jesus pass in coming to understand him and his
teaching [9] . This might be regarded as an ascent to the
vision of transcendent beauty manifest in the form of Jesus
- a necessary pedagogy if the full incorporation of agape
into an individual life is to be achieved, and thus a
progressive awakening of eros as an ascent to agape. And
on the former, we might say that the sense of absolute
flourishing and well-being (eudairnonia) consequent on the
vision of to kalon might be reckoned similar to the well
being that comes from knowing the love of God; Socrates
thus returns from his vision with a sense of agape. This
much can stand as a first inter-reading of these terms and
texts.
3. Agape and Love of Others.
Jesus presents the command to love as a command to love
one's neighbour; the definition of the neighbour is
obviously crucial here in establishing the range of agape.
There are two issues that open up as we begin to consider
this question: to whom, and under what circumstances,
should one show agape; who, and under what circumstances,
is capable of showing agape.
We have seen that Confucius would extend his teaching
work to the barbarians, and that he reckoned them thus
capable of accepting Zhou culture. Whether his
relationship with them would have been characterised, on
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his part, as ren, and whether they might have been
considered, in any sense, as capable of attaining ren, are
undecidable from the text; as part of any conclusion we
would require a more differentiated concept of
"barbarians." But Confucius is sure of the superiority of
Zhou culture, and sure that it is the barbarians who would
change in accomodating themselves to it.
Plato and Socrates seem equally sure of the superiority
of Hellenic culture in general, when contrasted with that
of the Persians and other barbarians; and of the
superiority of Athenian culture within the Hellenic world
[10]. Socrates philosophised within the laws of Athens,
and in the Symposium Pausanias argues the superiority of
the Athenian code in its treatment of eros. Plato
presupposes a well-ordered community of virtue as the
necessary context within which the fruits of eros might be
borne. To stray beyond that context is by definition to
risk intellectual and moral sterility. Furthermore, the
extent to which outsiders might communicate in an Athenian
community of virtue is problematic. Resident aliens,
metoikoi, constituted a recognised non-franchised group
within the city, but it is not clear how Plato would have
perceived their participation in Athenian life, and the
presence of foreign Sophistic teachers such as Gorgias and
Protagoras was taken by him as one sign and cause of
Athenian decline: their ethical relativism intensified the
possibility of ethical conflict that he sought to transcend
in an ontology of ethics, or - to focus a different side of
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the issue - their relativism revealed ethics to be simply
that play of power which he sought, through the greatest
exercise of power, to reduce to harmony [11],
It seems, in contrast with the polarity of
propriety-barbarism which we find with Confucius and Plato,
that Jesus sought to remove any barrier to the practice of
agape: all individuals are loved by God, all can equally be
the focus of human agape, all whatever their background,
are capable of showing agape. Jesus thus breaks with any
notion that one has to belong within Judaism in order to
receive or show agape; he abrogates the particular codified
details of Jewish life in favour of the twofold command to
love God and love one's neighbour. We might consider to
what extent the Jewish law - the notions of propriety, the
people, the homeland - might be read, with Mencius and Lu
Xiangshan , as footnotes to the loving heart, but we should
remark first that it is the power of the heart to love
unconditionally that Jesus seeks to focus.
[This much said we should note that Jesus' sayings and
notions are embedded in New Testament writings which do not
necessarily agree with his stance. We cannot cover the
range of New Testament diversity here, but we should note
that there is at least one contrast, after Jesus' death,
between a Jewish Christianity that would keep his teaching
within the orbit of Jewish life, as a fulfilment of it, and
retain Jewish codes as a pedagogy in Christian virtue, and
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a Gentile Christianity which separated Christian practice
from any necessary link with Judaism].
ill Jesus and The Kingship of God.
It is commonly recognised that Jesus preached the coming
or presence of God's basileia (whether kingdom or kingship
we will consider), that preaching was an essential part of
his work, and that he associated himself in a particular
way with the advent of the basileia. One recent study
interprets the issues thus:
"The Kingdom of God" denotes the manifest rule of God
whose intervention will bring to an end the history
of this world as we know it and its judgement...we
must recognise this expectation of the Kingdom of
God's imminence to be part of Jesus' Kingdom,
otherwise we do scant justice to a key and
characteristic emphasis of his public
proclamation...But even more distinctive of his
kerygua was his proclamation that the Kingdom of God
was in some way already being realised through his
ministry.
Dunn 1977: 13-14.
One approach to the ideas here is to consider basileia in
relation to concepts of law. We have examined Confucian
organicist philosophies, where the notion of law as
principle, l_i, is a notion about the immanence of normative
patterns within nature as part of the given structure of
things. The world is an organic, self-regulating,
self-developing whole, and the concept of it as in some
sense a formed and fashioned object, the work of a
transcendent maker and lawgiver, is almost totally alien.
In Mesopotamian and Jewish religious traditions, however,
the idea of God as creator, lawgiver and lord, with the
correlative notion of God as radically other than the
world, is central [12]. Jewish literature is replete with
the idea of law in a twofold sense: God ordains the
processes of nature, governing the movement of the stars,
the seasons, the alternation of day and night; and God
reveals to the human community that law whereby it might
perfect itself in holiness in the image of God himself. In
principle there is here a presumed continuity between the
law revealed in nature, as of nature, and that revealed
through the inspired words of the prophets. By the time of
Jesus - for some centuries prior - there is also the notion
that the process of divine revelation is complete: the law
has been given, and there s nothing further to be added
apart from scribal and levitical practices of commentary
and intepretation. That interpretation, however, carried on
in the flux of changing circumstances, is by definition an
interminable process, a necessary feature of the world's
continuing course.
In speaking of the basileia of God Jesus breaks with
received Jewish interpretations of the community of law,
stepping beyond that community in one sense in order to
affirm the possibility of a direct relationship with God, a
possibility of healing and wholeness outside the law
(whilst also maintaining a certain personal commitment to
the religion of synagogue and temple). One reading of this
stance is that Jesus saw in himself and his work the moment
of realized eschatology: the end of time had come, these
were the last days, the old law was overcome, and a new
dispensation would obtain for the short sp ell before the
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imminent termination of all history. The Kingdom expected
was, in some literal sense, the rule of God on earth.
However, while it seems that many early Christians
subscribed for a time to such a view of Jesus' work, and
the change it had inaugurated, there is in fact no evidence
to confirm that this is what Jesus himself believed, while
the vision presented in the parables - which I take to be
teaching devices developed to explicate the notion of
basileia - is of quite a different sort [13].
Almost consistently the parables - as other items of
Jesus' teaching - focus on the most natural features of the
world and of social life, whilst presenting them in such a
way as to make of what is given, received, "natural", an
occasion of wonder and challenging confrontation, thus
breaking down preconceptions and awakening insight into the
possibilities of love as a universal relationship between
persons. The basileia is both a visionary event - an
insight into the natural world as a spontaneous harmonious
process, and into the human world as a community of persons
open to agape - and also a moral event, a receptiveness to
the lives and needs of others that entails disavowal of any
received structure of self-perception and identity. As a
teacher Jesus has the form of a Chan master, his parables
the form of koans; taking the parables alone, we might
conclude that he dispenses with any concept of a
transcendent God, focussing instead on the immanence of the
basileia in the world-process, and characterising it as
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that restructured space open to and supportive of the
practice of agape. Viewed in this light the basileia
becomes the ever-present possibility of being radically at
home in the world, and radically open to others; the
end-time is a shift from chronos to kairos which is itself
a shift of vision. The special relationship Jesus has with
the basileia is that he understands these things and works
to communicate their significance [14].
(ii) Agape and the Parables.
In a variety of ways in the parables Jesus turns
received and current Jewish wisdom upside down. The charge
against him of keeping company with tax-gatherers and
sinner - with those collaborating with the occupying power,
and those ritually and morally unclean in the terms of
orthodoxy -, whilst constituting a criticism of him in the
eyes of his Jewish adversaries, constitutes more
fundamentally an acknowledgement that even the most outcast
social elements were recipients of his agape. The same
point holds when he heals the son of a centurion: agape
extends to enemies, even to those who circumscribe and
threaten national identity. [We v/ill give further
consideration below to the command to love one's enemies,
and the implications this has for any moral theory].
One author defines parables as "paradoxes formed into
story by effecting single or double reversals of the
audience's most profound expectations." Crossan 1976:98.
In this he emphasises that the use of paradox in the
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parables forecloses any reading of them as example-stories:
it is not so much that parables convey moral teaching, as
that they overturn received expectations about moral
values, leaving it to the audience to re-formulate its
moral stance within a new perspective. We encounter here a
difficulty in reading paradox that is similar to that
already met in relation to Zhuangzi and Chan: does the
paradox leave us completely without ground or foundation,
or does it, by means of some exemplary moment in its
presentation, show us a specific way towards a new form of
behaviour? My reading here is that, paradoxical though the
parables of Jesus may be, they are also at times exemplary
of new forms of ethical behaviour, focussing in particular
on behaviour governed by agape.
Much that supports this point can be found in the
parable of the good Samaritan (Lk 10:30-35) - a parable
which in its title carries the kind of illuminating
contradiction that the narrative manifests: as a tale told
to a Jewish audience, its focus is on the goodness of one
who was a heretic and outcast according to the lights of
Jewish orthodoxy, a man who showed love and concern in a
most exaggerated manner to one who should be considered his
enemy; the Samaritan's generosity is further heightened by
the failure of the representatives of Judaism to care for
their own [16], Thus, the man left for dead by thieves is
ignored first by a priest and then by a Levite: these two
pillars of orthodoxy cannot risk an act of mercy for fear
of the ritual pollution they would suffer if they happened
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to have contact with a corpse; the Samaritan, already
ritually unclean in Jewish eyes, is, precisely here as an
outsider, shown also to be outside any system of law that
might distinguish between one's own and others, and so acts
with an immediacy of compassion that is akin to that
directness characteristic of the Mencian heart-and-mind.
Here firstly there is a reversal of the values
clean-unclean: the ritually clean priest and Levite are
judged in the story morally unclean: the ritually unclean
Samaritan is morally without stain. And secondlythere is a
reversal of expectations about care: the leaders of the
Jewish community do not know how to love their own, whereas
a traditional enemy of the Jews shows one of them love
without apparent inhibition or limit.
In one sense the parable does not give the example of
love for neighbours that its setting in the gospel
suggests. The context Luke provides is that where a
lawyer, having summarised the Law as love of God and of
one's neighbour, asks Jesus "And who is my neighbour?" (Lk
10:2). If a simple example of love of neighbour were at
stake and if the intention were to disrupt the category of
"enemy" by saying that all men are one's neighbours without
boundary - then it would have been sufficient to have a Jew
showing care to an injured Samaritan. Instead, however,
Jesus presents an indictment of Jewish orthodoxy as a
massive failure in love, and focusses on the enemy as the
one who is capable of agape; thus raising for his audience
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the question of whether, in their received tradition, with
its detailed rules and regulations governing life, it is in
fact possible under any circumstance to be neighbours to
each other.
The reaction against the current practice of the Law
that Jesus presents here is in fact a questioning of the
possibility of any law, any system of rules, rights and
proprieties, to found a community of love. Mencius does
not perhaps call Confucius' _li into question in quite the
same way, though he does show a marked disdain for the
functions of Li. With Jesus, anything other than the most
minimal formulation of law emerges as a problem; law is
seen as marking a concern with self-seeking, with
establishing one's own virtue and integrity, with
possessing a certainty that one is on the right path and
that that path is superior to the path of others; law and
the formalisation of human behaviour is thus shown as
something that systematically closes off any possibility of
direct response to need as encountered [17] . In
particular the indictment of the law is the indictment of
power and authority: analogously once more with Mencius -
though drawing on direct contact and experience that we
cannot presuppose with Mencius - Jesus finds in the daily
life of the common people a certain locus of virtue: God is
with the poor not the powerful, with those suffering under
law rather than those formulating it and enjoying its
privileges. This at least is part of the case; though the
status of "ordinary life" is not left undisturbed.
Commenting on an impulse behind Wittgenstein's
philosophy, Stanley Cavell remarks
What motivates Wittgenstein to philosophize, what
surprises him, is the plain fact that certain
creatures have speech at all, that they can say
things at all. No doubt it is not clear how one
might go about becoming surprised by such a fact. It
is like being surprised by the fact that there is
such a thing as the world. Cavell, 1979:15.
This kind of surprise that anything _is appears also as a
basic sense of surprise shared by Jesus: it is evident in
relation to the natural world, in certain parables of
growth, such as that of the mustard seed, where the focus
is not on the process of growth as a natural law-bound
phenomenon capable of interpretation according to any
received schema, but rather on the world and its change as
a wondrous occurrence, a marvel in its very existence
irrespective of how one might try to understand it [18].
To wonder at things thus, however, and to extend that
wonder to a questioning of the how and why of any
community, is to remove the possibility of security in life
for anyone receptive to the question, whether exercising
power or subject to it. The space opened by the parable of
the Samaritan is vertiginous in that it throws into
question any demarcation of neighbours and enemies, of
one's own and others, thus rendering questionable any
concept of community. What is community, why does it
exist, why is it rule-bound and can it be otherwise, which
rules are worth maintaining, why remain with one community
rather than the other, why have hierarchy instead of
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equality of status, why any unequal distribution of
material goods? If these questions work to render the
familiar strange they are not, however, nihilistic, though
they do mark the opening of a challenge to rethink basic
assumptions - the opening, that is, of the space of
rnetanoia, the transformation of mind and heart,
characterised as rebirth, that is given as a condition of
entry to the basileia. Yet with Jesus these questions
involve more than a change simply in individual attitude:
they are also oriented to the refounding of community and
this marks a significant difference in the specificity of
paradox in Jesus' life and work in comparison with Zhuangzi
and Chan. In both of the latter instances we have seen how
the world is left unchanged after the passage through
paradox and enlightenment: certainly one's own way of
viewing the world changes radically, but the Chan adept, if
not to the monastery, returns to the everyday life of the
market place, whilst the ethical stance that derives from
Zhuangzi's teaching is difficult to determine. Jesus, by
contrast, extends the force of questioning into a pattern
of social action, healing, working wonders, confronting
those in authority, getting followers to continue and
spread his teaching. While we can take it that he did not
specifically found a church - the early Christian community
itself writing into the gospels its own founding charter -
he did nonetheless gather around him a community refounded
on the idea of agape. He thus used paradox to begin to
make the world otherwise, and that making is an essential
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continuation of his teaching. There is an ethical
imperative at work here; Zhu Xi also, as we have seen,
founded neo-Confucianism in part on the perceived failure
of Chan in the ethical and social apheres.
To describe things thus is, however, only one way of
putting issues, and perhaps not the best; for while we have
seen that Zhu focusses on the failure of contemporary
Buddhist practice in relation to the larger social order,
we have also noticed how the Buddhist monastery, together
with the charitable foundations it inaugurated, and
together with its focus on the profoundly agapeic figure of
the bodhisattva, constituted both a refounded community and
a set of strategies for extending the way of that community
into the social sphere. Certainly it is difficult to read
a concern with community into Zhuangzi, but in a sense the
times were against him on that point; on the other hand, we
did note the village utopianism of the Daodejing, and the
ideas marked there remained an inspiration in Chinese
tradition relating to new communities founded on
simplicity.
4. Agape and Love of Enemies.
Whatever else has been done to damage the powerful
and great of this earth seems trivial compared with
what the Jews have done, that priestly people who
succeeded in avenging themselves on their enemies and
oppressors by radically inverting all their values,
that is, by an act of the most spiritual vengeance.
It was the Jews who, with frightening consistency,
dared to invert the aristocratic value equations
good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favoured-of-the-g
ods and maintain, with the furious hatred of the
under privileged and impotent, that "only the poor,
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the powerless, are good; only the suffering, si
and ugly, truly blessed. But you noble and mighty
ones of the earth will be, to all eternity, the evil,
the cruel, the avaricious, the godless, and thus the
cursed and damned1We know who has fallen heir to
this Jewish inversion of values...From the tree trunk
of Jewish vengeance and hatred - the deepest and
sublimest hatred in human history, since it gave
birth to ideals and a new set of values - grew a
branch that was equally unique: a new love, the
deepest and sublimest of loves. From what other
trunk could this branch have sprung? But let no-one
surmise that this love represented a denial of the
thirst for vengeance, that it contravened the Jewish
hatred. Exactly the opposite is true. Love grew out
of hatred as the tree's crown, spreading triumphantly
in the purest sunlight, yet having, in its high and
sunny realm, the same aims - victory, aggrandizement,
temptation - which hatred pursued by digging its
roots ever deeper into all that was profound and
evil.
Nietzsche, The Geneaology of Morals
Nietzsche's critique of the slave-morality of
Christianity - a morality which for him constitutes the
supreme outworking, in all its details, of a philosophy of
resentment - is perhaps nowhere more pointed than with
reference to the command to turn the other cheek once
struck, to love the enemy, the persecutor. In this we have
part of what Kristeva reads as a position of abjection, a
radical denial of any possible self-worth, which links here
paradoxically to the claims of absolute self-worth
consequent on being seized by the redeeming love of God
[19]. To suffer maltreatment willingly, abjectly, can be
at once the most profound denial of self, a hatred equally
of body and soul as ineluctably tainted, and an act of
pride in the fact that the God who sees all will in the end
punish the wrongdoer and reward the righteous; resentment
here thus incorporates knowledge of a righteousness greater
than that of the enemy [20],
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In one sense the command to love one1s enemy can thus
evoke a sense of absolute moral superiority: whatever the
enemy does one will always be able to go beyond him in
forgiveness. In Stoic philosophies at the time of Jesus
the desire to remain superior to the enemy at all costs is
also evident, though the way followed here is continuous
with the heroic arete of Greek culture, and the stance
assumed is more one where enemies are ignored as a nuisance
in their wrongdoing rather than forgiven for it [21]. The
Stoic seeks that position of apatheia and ataraxia which is
one of immunity to harm or insult; thus Epictetus
He will feel no pain, no anger, no compulsion, no
hindrance but...will pass (his life) in tranquillity
and in freedom from every disturbance... He
contemplates and reflects, "How no evil can befall
me, for me there is no such thing as an earthquake,
everything is full of peace, everything full of
tranquillity; every road, every city, every
fellow-traveller, neighbour, companion, all are
harmless
Discourses III 13.11,13.
And Seneca indicates that the Stoic ethic incorporates an
essentially public stance of preserving honour and avoiding
shame: by responding to a harm done to him the honourable
man lowers his own dignity:
"But of course there is some pleasure in anger11 you
say, "and it is sweet to return a smart." Not at
all; for it is not honourable as in acts of kindness
to requite benefits so to requite injuries with
injuries. In the one case it is shameful to be
outdone, in the other not to be outdone.
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The dignity focussed here is already a feature of the
morality of the master outlined by Nietzsche, even if in
Stoicism this is to be reckoned in decline from its
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Athenian grandeur; its difference from the stance of the
slave, who must in humility swallow any concern with
dignity - and who lacks anyway the power to reinforce his
dignity should he choose - is thus profound.
The slave swallows his pride; but, more than that, he
holds, by swallowing, the defilement that can never come
upon him from outside but only from within: "nothing that
goes into a man from outside can defile him; no, it is the
things that come out of him that defile a man" (Mk. 7:15);
"a man is not defiled by what goes into his mouth, but by
what comes out of it" (Mk. 15:11). But the things that
come out of a man - pace possession through demonic forces
- are the things that are always already there: the inner
defilement, to which the enemy can add nothing, is
originally given as a state of sinfulness before God.
Here, much as we may read in the teaching of Jesus an
abrogation of the old Law, we must reckon nonetheless the
power of that Lav? - the power of received jewish thinking
on man's relations with God - as the formative matrix
within which a new doctrine of love was rooted. Part of
that matrix is the movement, within Jewish history, towards
an increasing internalisation of the sense of original
sinfulness; first the geographic representation, departure
from a place of original innocence, consignment to labour
and to a sexuality known as painful; then the ritual order,
laws governing a structured field of clean and unclean, the
external location of defilement with emphasis on a set of
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practices which bring pollution if they are infringed;
finally the order of ethics and individual spirituality,
where the heart is poisoned at birth and the healing that
comes is found within the mediating righteousness of the
community as it mantains its fidelity to the Law.
Whether we read the stress on inner defilement and
original sinfulness as part of Jesus' view of humanity, or
as a perception of the early Church taking stock of Jewish
teaching, we thus nonetheless find Jesus' teaching on love
rooted in the play of Jewish semiosis, where the innermost
heart of the person is construed as radically evil (and
here we should contrast Mencius on the radical innate
goodness of the mind-and-heart). This context also
focusses the symbolic distance, and the leap required, if
one is to achieve a stance of self-love. Here, while the
command to love enemies might seem to constitute the
hardest of the christian virtues, in many respects it is a
stance profoundly compatible with the main thrust of Jewish
thinking: abasement before God, incorporating an original
self-hatred, extends readily to become abasement before
others, with advice to turn the other cheek simply an
extension of this attitude. Self-love, on the other hand -
the recognition of self as worthy of esteem - becomes
deeply problematic [22].
Whilst part of the psychological basis for love of
enemies is thus already prepared in this way within
Judaism, it would be a mistake to conduct our reading
entirely via a Nietzschean philosophy of resentment. To
turn the other cheek might well be a sublime inversion and
in Jesus' teaching, as we have seen in the parable of the
Good Samaritan. This involves a deconstruction of the very
category "enemy", a questioning of that foundational
polarity of "own" and "others" whereby religious and
cultural values ar established. The move here is an
invitation to take the position of "the enemy", to view the
world from his or her perspective, whilst also moving out
of one's own world by coming to find it strange and
disconcerting. A move of this sort can transform the enemy
into the neighbour or brother, the one with whom one can
share a life of empathy, recognising the joys and
sufferings that are part of the common lot of humanity.
Given a move of this sort, we have perhaps two readings
of "enemy", one strong and one weak. On the weak reading,
the enemy is simply the neighbour in disguise. Certainly
the disguise might be very effective, the encrustation of a
centuries-old ideology, an often-necessary projection in
order to maintain a sense of cultural identity, but a
disguise that can nonetheless be seen through, insight thus
leading to new more inclusive forms of relationship. Here
the enemy is in part one's own creation. On the strong
reading the enemy chooses to sustain himself in an
oppositional stance, maintains himself as the one who hates
and would destroy, resisting any overture to redefine his
role as that of a neighbour. It is before this enemy that
retention of hatred, also another move at work
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one turns the other cheek, and it is the status of this
enemy that has been profoundly problematic in Christian
thinking.
The reading of Jesus' death as a redeeming
self-sacrifice is the utmost extension of the argument not
to resist the force of the enemy, whilst at the same time
maintaining one's own integrity. The human world given
over to sin is viewed as the enemy of God. In loving this
enemy to the point of death Jesus is reckoned both to have
robbed it of its power as enemy - removing the mark of sin
- whilst at the same time showing, as far as is humanly
possible, that it is never necessary to maintain the stance
of enemy, that it is possible to change, and that one can
love those•who refuse to change. All of this is set within
a theological context, a vision of movement from God and
return to God, that makes the possibility of this form of
love capable of realisation. On this point, for instance,
Paul is clear: to love one's enemies without reserve and
not be reborn with God is the sheerest folly; the
possibility of a resurrected life is the necessary
presupposition for Christian agape:
if the dead are not raised, it follows that Christ
was not raised; and if Christ was not raised your
faith has nothing in it...If it is for this life only
that Christ has given us hope, we of all men are most
to be pities. But the truth is, Christ was raised
to life...As in Adam all men die, so in Christ all
will be brought to life...1 Cor 15:16-22.[23 ]
Whilst this view of a resurrected life is central to New
Testament belief - and allows for the healing power of
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divine agape to change the material cosmos itself - there
is a sense in which it leaves the practical question of how
to love one's enemies unresolved; or rather, it leaves in
the background the question of that structural order
whereby a community of agape might sustain itself in time
and history in relation to those identified as "enemies".
Voegelin has emphasised what he terms the metastatic faith
of Paul, a faith which draws on the vision of a radically
new life opened up by Jesus, and which stresses the
deepening and fulfilment of that life beyond death.
For such faith the given historical time is viewed as
liable to immineiit curtailment, and any extended ethical
stance takes on an interim significance: Paul is more
concerned to elaborate the meaning of his vision of Christ,
and the immediate implications of the experience of
salvation, than to envision the detailed structure of a
community maintaining itself within an open-ended
historical order. His concern with communal order is
focussed on the order of the Church as a faithful and
worshipping community awaiting its own experience of
resurrection, rather than on the church's relationship to a
larger ecumene.
5. Agape and The Form of Beauty
At Mk 12:18-21 the author quotes part of the servant
song from Isaiah 42; at 1 Peter 22-25 the theme of the
suffering servant is developed from Isaiah 53. Whether
Jesus identified himself with the servant, or whether this
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identification was an act of the early Church, the form of
the suffering servant as a figure of redemption was quickly
assimilated to the perceived form of Jesus' death as a
redemptive sacrifice. The Isaiah hymn has the following
lines which, though not quoted in New Testament reflection,
can be taken as implicit to it:
he had no beauty, no majesty to
draw our eyes;
no grace to make us delight in him;
his form, disfigured, lost all the
likeness of a man
his beauty changed beyond
human semblance.
He was despised, he shrank from
the sight of men,
tormented and humbled by
suffering;
we despised him, we held him of
no accout,
a thing from which men turn
away their eyes. Isa. 52:2-3. [24]
It is impossible now to get to these words fresh, beyond
the layers of theological and liturgical reflection
resting on them; we will however try to get close enough to
focus the particular theological vision of beauty at work
in the New Testament in relation to agape, and its contrast
with the Platonic vision of to kalon linked with eros. For
New Testament writers beauty is known specifically in the
manifestation of the glory of god, evident in the v/orkd and
teaching of Jesus in general, and in his death and
resurrection in particular:
So the Word became flesh; he came to dwell among us,
and we saw his glory, such glory as befits the
Father's only Son, full of grace and truth. John
1.14. [25]
As John presents it, the beauty of agape that is
evident in Jesus is a hidden beauty that becomes manifest
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in stages as the significance of Jesus' work and teaching
is recognised: there is thus here a notion comparable to
the Platonic dialectic, a progressive unveiling of a value
that founds all values. To call it an unveiling, though,
requires some qualification. The Platonic journey is
towards the light: even if to kalon is hidden in the form
of Socrates, the ascent towards transcendence is a movement
of increased transparency until finally the last veil
obscuring direct intuition is removed. Here the journey is
intellectual, empowered by eros. The New Testament journey
has a different metaphorical structure: in its strictest
sense it is a movement of faith towards an encounter with
divine agape at the heart of darkness. As the first
christians reflected on the promised form of the Saviour
evident in the Hebrew scriptures, they had to deal with the
fact that the one whom they called Christ bore little of
the trappings - particularly in his criminal's death - of
the manifest worldly glory associated with the Messiah. It
is in reflection on the death of Jesus that the notion of
God's hidden beauty, and thence the hidden beauty of the
world in general, become focussed.
This beauty is shared with those who are faithful to
Jesus: the story of the transfiguration on Mount Tabor
records the manifestation of divine beauty to a select
number of companions. Conversely, the disciples on the
road to Emmaus can fail to recognise the divine in the
human figure accompanying them. The concealment of beauty
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is given as something deliberately chosen: the story of the
temptation of Jesus illustrates how the option for overt
manifestation of the divine through worldly power is a
considered and rejected option. This choice nonetheless
leaves a measure of ambiguity around the stress on
miracles: those miracles that are acts of healing can
certainly be read as expressions of love not power, but
precisely as miracles it is power that they manifest. Any
such use of power is however carefully circumscribed. The
focus on the miracles in the gospel narratives is on their
occurrence in response to need, and in John's account
miracle stories are structured into a gospel of signs
within which the incarnation of divine agape is
progressively shown.
We have here a strong interlinking of love, power and
beauty. We might note, though, that in the gospel
narratives the power of Jesus is never manifest to the
detriment of an individual's freedom to reject or accept
what it brings, although that situation becomes more
complex in relation to the overwhelming vision of Christ
which was Paul's, where the sudden radical transformation
of an individual life is reckoned to be the direct result
of divine intervention. Even if now we would substitute a
religious psychology for Paul's theological interpretation
of his conversion, the experience that he focusses - of
being radically overwhelmed by love, instead of being
gradually led to an understanding of it - presents us with
an important occasion for drawing out some of the further
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features of agape in its relations to power and beauty
[26] .
(i) Beauty, Rapture and Economy.
The beginning of the erotic journey in Plato constitutes
a moment of rapture that is repeated on different levels as
one passes through different forms of enchantment, but that
opens also onto a progressively structured economy of
noesis. In trying to curb the unpredictable passion
focussed in tragedy - the experience of intense disorder
that destroyed any economy of individual and social life -
Plato presents an account of the attainment of virtue that
constitutes a gradual perfectionism comparable to the form
of perfectionism argued by Confucius. As Christian writers
such as Matthew looked back on Jewish history, they too
read the sum of experience recorded in the Hebrew
scriptures as an account of divine pedagogy: God gave the
Law progressively, in order to draw the Jewish community
closer to him, both in relationship and as an image of his
perfection. In the gospels also we have seen Jesus
awakening faith in himself and his work in a gradual,
cumulative manner. Paul, however, presents a different
kind of situation: divine agape is something that
overwhelms and shatters, that dispenses with the pedagogy
and constraints of the Law, that opens the heart directly
in relation to the neighbour, that makes faith not so much
a journey towards understanding as a radical conviction
about what has already occurred, and that lifts the
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individual out of his ordinary life in expectation of the
imminent transformation of the parousia. It can perhaps be
questioned whether the ecstatic experience of agape that is
at work here ever, in Paul's teaching, received its
inscription in an economy of virtue comparable to Plato's
inscription of eros [27].
The experience of eros, at any stage, is given as a pull
towards the other as the source of one's own completion;
the completion of the other ( as a person), whilst not
ignored in this, is more a secondary consequence of that
individual fulfilment which the other occasions. Beauty
here is the charm that awakens love. The experience of
agape is of being loved in such a way - to the innermost
recesses of one's heart, beyond any darkness that can be
named as sin - that one finds oneself radically beautiful,
participating in the glory of Christ, and finding that
beauty manifest also in all others. Agape is known first,
though, as an experience of beauty conferred rather than
sought. Agape renders one free and equal to others (pace
Nietzsche), not seeking in the other the occasion of one's
own completion. In one sense the starting-point of agape,
as least as Paul understands it, is comparable to the
end-point of to kalon (as Form) as Plato presents it
(acknowledging the progressive induction to agape put
forward by Jesus).
Plato's world transfigured by to kalon is one of
manifest intellectual beauty, cosmos and society both
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resplendent in their intellectual foundations; it is a
beauty of the ruling function. Paul's world transfigured
through agape is one which, previously a scene of radical
conflict between God and human sinfulness, now constitutes
a cosmic and social order that is read both as a
manifestation of love and as a process that, in the
Resurrection of Christ,has achieved its essential
perfection. Insofar as this vision of agape is rooted in
the brutal death of a particular individual, and finds in
suffering its point of departure, the tendency is always
not only to see beauty where it might otherwise be thought
hidden, but even further to locate beauty at the heart of
what appears most repellent. Given these general structures
and tendencies, beauty can have a quite different location
within Platonic and New Testament intentionalities
respectively. Socrates discusses eros over a drinking
party with free Athenian males; Jesus eats with publicans
and sinners and separates himself from the political and
cultural elite. Socrates educates young men of power and
influence; Jesus teaches and heals those who are poor and
suffering. Socrates speaks of the beauty of political
institutions, Jesus of the basileia of God that seems to
disrupt any political order. Whether or not these
contrasts amount to conflicting intentionalities can only
be dealt with after a detour through two further topics.
6. Agape. Nature and History.
Commenting on one aspect of the spirituality of the early
Church, John Zizioulas remarks:
Unlike the Greek and pagan religions of that time,
the Church's outlook was not cosmological but
historical; it was based not on the observation of
nature (seasons, cyclical movements of stars, etc),
but on events... Humanity1 s relation with God did not-
pass through nature but through obedience to the will
of God, a fact that gave to Christian spirituality an
ethical character...and a strongly personalist
dimension.
McGinn and Meyendorff, 1936:23.
It is well to introduce certain qualifications here.
Homelessness and exile were recognised as essential aspects
of Hebrew experience: their centrality ruptured any sense
of the transcendent as the power of locale, and robbed the
divinities of place of any particular significance. Yahweh
transcended the cosmos and hence transcended any particular
location: experience on this point differed from more
general Mesopotamian experience of transcendence, where
Marduk for instance remained figured as a god within the
cosmos. The attraction of place remained, however, and one
feature of prophetic exhortation is its attack on the
seductive power of the baals, the divinities of the earth
[28] . Insofar as the world is a locus of transcendence in
the Hebrew scriptures, it is as an item interpreted through
Torah and hence known in its relations to Yahweh. In
writings such as the psalms in particular the world i_s
known as a cosmological order, but one which issues from
the creative will of the one God and in its regular laws
reflect his glory. On Paul's reading, part of the bondage
of sin lies in being given over to the principalities and
powers of the cosmos, that is, in experiencing one's
worldly life to be governed by multiple and arbitrary
cosmic forces that are not seen as subordinate to the will
of God. Christian freedom is to know a single power of
agape that orders all: sin by contrast is the acceptance of
one's lot in a variously empowered universe.
Hebrew experience was of a God manifest in particular
actions that were constitutive of the life of the
community. History was not an experience of thrownness,
nor of fate, nor of endless meaningless events: it was an
experience of order and salvation within time over
generations. Confucius, too, viewed history in the same
way, and Zhu Xi: the way of heaven and the daotong were not
manifest in the sum total of events past, but in a
selective order that required a special telling if it were
to become clear. Thucydides had a similar experience:
history was not a random concatenation of occurrences but a
logos, a process that had a rational order which was tied
in a particular way to the Athenian experience of empire
[29] . Considered against this broader background, the
Hebrew reading of history which the church inherited is one
instance of a transition from cosmological order to
historical order which was figured in different ways in
different contexts; while some would claim that the Hebrew
experience of a God active in history is the most powerful
known description of significance to history, we would need
to consider the point more fully in a comparative context
before subscribing to such a judgement [30].
If for the early Christians divine agape is known in
particular through the event of Jesus' death and
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resurrection, the status of the cosmos as a scene of agape
is affirmed nonetheless: we have, for instance, seen Jesus'
imaging of the presence and processes of the basileia in
the operations of nature, while Paul speaks of the cosmos
giving birth to a new form of life in consequence of the
workd of Jesus, and emphasises that the cosmos is a single
order expressive of the power of God. This reading of
nature is not, however, central, and the development of a
Christian account of nature was a matter more for
post-apostolic writers [31] ; the focus on the scriptural
traditions is on the significance of agape in the life of
the community, and on the relations between God and history
that Jesus disclosed.
7. Agape, Community and History.
The Hebrew sense of being a chosen community standing in
a privileged relation with God is taken up and intensified
in early Christian reflection; within this, the primacy of
the community as the locus of agape and salvation is
stressed - thus Zizioulas:
Unlike other nonbiblical forms of spirituality,
which could be understood individualistically,
Christian spirituality was ecclesial in its nature.
The church was not a means by which one would become
spiritual in the sense that it provided the necessary
instruction, worship, grace etc. for such a purpose.
The church was a set of relationships, which provided
one with a new identity, different from the identity
given by natural birth or society. op. cit. p28.
We mentioned briefly in the last chapter the intense
individualism that is focussed in the Plotinian ascent of
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eros, reckoned as "the flight of the alone to the alone".
It may well be asked, though, to what extent and in what
senses nonbiblical forms of spirituality more generally are
understood individualistically. To put the point simply,
how far, in those contexts where the individual apparently
does stand at the centre of a structured spirituality,
should this spirituality be read as having an individualist
bias, or as constituting instead a way whereby the
individual might achieve a new sense and practice of
community? Again, to resume the theme mentioned a number
of times already: Socrates returns to, remains active in,
the Athenian community after his experience of the daimon,
and chooses death in Athens rather than life in exile. For
Plato, as for Confucius, "the identity given by... society"
is as such a spiritual identity when understood and pursued
in its ideal sense. Society is the given form within which
a fulfilled existence might be achieved, and in the
transcendent symbolisation of political order that order
itself images the principles of perfection.
Our attention here, then, is on the particular forms of
imagery and reflection in the Christian scriptures within
which the ecclesia as a community of agape is interpreted.
[I move fairly freely across different writings in order to
bring out some leading features of the thinking on
community. A more extended critical approach would deal
with the specificity of the writings in their address to
particular groups, and in their temporal location within a
developing Christian reflection. For Aquinas and medieval
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writers, however, the scriptures in general were given
equal consideration as divine revelation, and our treatment
of imagery and ideas here will thus, in its method, move
towards part of the approach of Aquinas. The importance of
a holistic approach to the form and intentionality of
scriptural tradition has also been emphasised by a number
of recent writers.]
For John the transition from death to life is marked by
the capacity to love those in the Christian community. The
church is a brotherhood or fellowship of persons united n
acknowledging God as father [Jesus' use of abba as a term
for God had marked an utmost sense of trust and intimacy,
characteristics which now governed the church's relations
with God]. God is known as love, and the closeness of the
relation with him is put metaphorically in the language of
immediacy: "he who dwells in love is dwelling in God, and
God in him"Jn. 4:16. While the relation with God is
mediated through the community, it is immediate to the
individual as the utmost presence, internal, a closeness to
self that is the radical antithesis of the closedness to
self known as sin. This closeness is also a form of
transparency, a life governed by light rather than darkness
1 Jn 1:5-7.
The language of intimacy is elsewhere developed through
the strongest of physical metaphors: the church is a body
with Christ as its head, the church is a bride with Christ
as the bridegroom. In the latter instance, even if
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marriage is spoken of as a process of two becoming one
flesh, it is not the sexual or erotic aspect of love that
is at work through the metaphor, but rather the linking of
the transcendent with the human through a network of
virtues and social practice. This operates at different
levels. Firstly there is a doctrine of signs: the
institution of marriage has its validity not primarily as a
manifestation of love between two persons, but as a
manifestation, through the form of that love, of Christ's
love for the church. Secondly, there is a presumption of
hierarchy: the husband has status and charge over his wife
as Christ has over the church. Thirdly there is an
assumption that the church already constitutes part of the
order of transcendence. Whilst we have mentioned the
contract between God and the world, figured through a
doctrine of creation, as a specific siting of transcendence
within the Hebrew tradition, and its difference from
Confucian approaches to transcendence, one central feature
of that tradition and of the Christian scriptures is the
contrast not between God and the world but between God and
sin. To be part of the Church - ritually to have passed
through baptism and to participate in the eucharist - is
thus already to be part of an order of transcendence that
will receive its completion in a finally resurrected life.
Existence in the church is, through this kind of
imagery, established as a central manifestation of divine
agape, a continued manifestation in the lives of church
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members of all that was known through the death of Jesus.
The church here has a passive feminine function in relation
to Christ; the value of that femininity is however
something that is not its own possession, but rather given
to it by Christ: Christ himself prepares the bride for
marriage, Christ creates that beauty in the Church whereby
he himself is then attracted to it. In one sense this
could be read as a form of divine narcissism: only by
making the church in his own image can Christ love it - the
church is not loved in its otherness, but only as an
extension of the same. At the same time this way of
perceiving the church robs it of any active function. In
the Song of Songs the bride prepares herself for the
bridegroom. And in the erotic imagery of Chu Shamanism the
shaman dresses and perfumes herself in order to woo the
god. While there is some such imagery at work in later
Christian nuptial mysticism, it is not a feature of the
Christian scriptural tradition.
(i) Individual and Community.
We have remarked already the irruptive force with which
Paul experienced divine agape; the vast flow of metaphor at
work in his writings evidences his attempt to render stable
an experience which could be disruptive of any continuing
human existence. Paul's use of the corporate body and
marriage themes constitutes a specific style of construing
stability, though his vision of the institution of marriage
as a permissible matrix for the expression of desire -
desire being construed as a forra of weakness - marks an
ambivalence towards that institution which bore profound
consequences for later Christian thinking. Insofar as he
considered himself to be living near the end of time, Paul
saw in the practice of voluntary celibacy a signal and a
wish that the world-process of creation and procreation
might be brought to an end. The influence of this notion
on monastic and clerical practice will detain us in the
next chapter, but we might conclude here by considering the
end-of-the-world theology at work in Paul's writing, and
the bearing this had on agape in the context of individual
and community ethics.
Paul presents to the Corinthians his sense of mystery;
we shall not all die, but we shall be changed in a
flash, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last
trumpet-call. For the trumpet will sound, and the
dead will rise immortal, and we shall be changed.
This perishable being must be clothed with the
imperishable, what is mortal must be clothed with
immortality.. 1. Cor.15:51-53.
Plato saw the soul's structure as an orientation and active
inclination towards transcendence, a layer of eternity
within the cycles of transience; yet his awareness of how
the eternal might more generally become manifest in the
temporal as to kalon and to agathon led him to stress the
importance of perfection in life, rather than flight from
life to a perfection in the beyond. This existence in
metaxu is for insLance focussed in Diotima's speech in the
Symposium, where eros is presented as occupying a middle
ground between riches and poverty, knowledge and ignorance,
gods and men. Individual and civic life should ideally
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constitute a participation in the divine reality of th
Forms, and in its existential coloration this life is
partly known as a being towards death, the beyond of death
in turn identified through myth as the fully realised locus
of eternal existence.
Paul tolerates the tension of life towards death,
transience towards permanence, ignorance towards the
unknown beyond, to a far less degree than Plato. His sole
and overwhelming desire is to be with Christ: although not
named as such, in its ecstatic urgency - an urgency that
wishes now to experience fully the form of the resurrected
life - this desire which grows from the agapeic experience
of being loved by God is a more intense eros than the
Platonic. The apocalyptic element in it, the wished-for
moment of the lightning-flash when the perishable will
become imperishable, entails that much in the Pauline ethic
is geared to the expectation of a radically new existence.
The communities to whom Paul writes wait for the second
coming of Christ - Paul's prayer is that this might be
soon. The famous paean to agape in 1.Cor.13 achieves part
of its intensity from location within this horizon of
expectancy. Preceded by a detailed account of the church
as constituting one body in Christ, the reading of the
qualities of agape focusses the virtues appropriate to a
community of persons living a changed life and expecting
its imminent fulfiment. The three primary qualities of life
Paul considers marked by permanence - faith, hope, agape,
m
with agape as the greatest, 1.Cor.13:13 - are three
qualities geared to a proximate end of things: faith that
Christ has changed the given order of the world and that he
will come again, hope that his coming will be soon, agape
as the bond uniting a community that has already been
lifted out of a worldly (sinful) existence to anticipate
the permanent union of the resurrection.
The specific attributes of agape which Paul names are
ones which work to build the life of the community. Agape
is superior to the ecstatic gift of speaking in tongue, to
prophecy, to giving one's goods to the poor (1 Cor:1-3) -
valuable as these qualities might be, they do not
necessarily build community. Positively, the patience,
kindness, truthfulness and permanence associated with agape
are what sustain and fortify the community life. Although
this community is not considered to be one living "under
the law", the life-style which governs it is in part drawn
from received Jewish practice: agape here is at once
tolerant of hierarchy, as of the exclusion of women from a
leading role in the community.
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CHAPTER 9
CARITAS IN THE THOUGHT OF AQUINAS
To go directly from Paul to Aquinas; to traverse without
comment more than a millennium of philosophical and
religious thought in the West; to attempt to read Aquinas
in his bearing towards us, rather than as the inscription
of his own past - to proceed thus would be to miss the
layers of formation that are both latent and manifest in a
text such as the Summa Theologiae. Yet to question that
formation, to interrogate all the shifts whereby eros and
agape became fused as caritas, to examine the structure of
neo-Platonism at work through Augustine and
pseudo-Dionysius in the writing of Aquinas, and to note the
routes of its linkage with Aristotelian metaphysics - to
proceed with these questions alone would hold us
indefinitely from a reading of caritas as Aquinas came
finally to determine it. Caught in such a manner, all we
can do here is approach the text of the Summa Theologiae
direct, exploring its formative traditions as we examine
the outworking there of caritas. Our focus will be on the
articles on caritas in S.Th.2a2ae, 23ff, and on the
Disputed Question De Caritate.
1. Caritas as Friendship
Aquinas begins by questioning whether caritas is a form
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of friendship - utrum caritas sit amicitia [1 ] . The
philosophical framework first established is drawn from
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, where the virtue of
friendship is discussed in Books 8 and 9. Following the
standard procedure^ Aquinas raises three objections to the
point he intends finally to support, turning the argument
at the mid-point of the article with the sed contra; the
move here is heuristic in that the way the objections are
formulated serves to open up central aspects of the final
position. The introduction of Aristotle might be read in
different ways. At first it could seem that the
Philosopher is brought in only in order that his distance
from Christian theology might be marked. Aristotle's
account of amicitia (philia) is seemingly separated from
caritas on three counts. Aristotle speaks of friendship as
a dwelling together with one's friend (convivere amico
2a2ae 23, 1; ouden gar houtos esti philou hos to suzen,
N.E. 1157b19), whereas caritas, transcending the relations
between persons marks the relationship with god; he speaks
of friendship as entailing mutual love (non sine
reamatione, ad 2; gar estin antiphilesis ou lanthanousa,
hoi de philountes allelous boulontai t'agatha allelois
taute he(i) philousin, 1156 a 8-10), whereas the gospel
precept is to love one's enemies (diligite inimicos
vestros) - caritas thus transcends reciprocity; and he
speaks of three kinds of friendship, based on utility
(amicitia utilis), pleasure (amicitia delectabilis) and
worth (amicitia honesti) ftria de tes philias eide...dia te
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chresimou...di'hedongn...teleia d'estin he ton agathon
philia kai kat' areten homoion, 1156a 7-b8], whereas
caritas is none of, or more than, these three. If part of
Aristotle is used in this way to focus the specificity of
caritas, the point is certainly not yet a reading of
Aristotle whole in order to circumscribe his value; it is
more an extension of christian thinking via a passage
through the Aristotelian matrix. And it is Aristotle who
is introduced again at the responsio in order to clarify
the nature of amicitia, and thus substantiate Aquinas'
argument (based on the Johannine text that followers of
Christ have become friends of Christ) that caritas is
friendship [2].
We might nonetheless note that caritas as a form of
friendship between man and God (manifestum est quod caritas
amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum) is a notion
specifically excluded by Aristotle. Commenting on the
degrees of proximity necessary for friendship, Aristotle
removes from consideration friendships governed by a strong
hierarchical principle, as of subjects in relation to a
ruler or of lesser men in relation to those "who are
outstandingly good or wise", remarking that "where there is
a great gulf, as between God and man, friendship becomes
impossible" [polu de choristhentos, hoion tou theou, ouketi
(menei he philia) 1159a5]. Focussed here is a difference
between the Aristotelian and the Christian God.
Aristotle's God is an abstract principle, the prime mover
governing an eternal universe, a principle of
self-sufficiency, a form of self-absorbed reflection
(noesis noeseos). The God that Aquinas articulates is one
known as creator and saviour, deliberately choosing an
incarnation that makes friendship with the divine a human
possibility, establishing in that incarnation a basis of
equality that completes the love relationship already
opened in the Hebrew scriptures.
This friendship with God that Aquinas situates at the
heart of caritas, whilst culturally rooted in
Judeo-Christian thinking, is not however without its
support from the Platonic and neo-Platonist strands of
Greek thought, as we shall consider below. Here, through
Augustine, Aquinas preserves the Platonic sense of human
life as a participation in that divine source from which it
takes its origin; and while this Platonism does not
strictly incorporate a theory of friendship with the divine
- although there is affinity and connaturality - it does,
prior to Aquinas, in Augustinian and Cistercian
spirituality in particular, provide a framework within
which a Christian theory of love and friendship with God
might be set.
In the responsio Aquinas draws on Aristotle to
distinguish between different kinds of love, in particular
between amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae - the
latter can be a simple desire for passive objects,
entailing no element of reciprocal well-wishing (mutua
benevolentia) or sharing (communicatio). Amor amicitiae,
however, does involve communicatio, and when communicatio
has the form of fellowship with Christ then "amor...super
hac communicatione fundatus est caritas". With
communicatio Aquinas takes up the scriptural theme of
koinonia, and opens his thinking towards the Pauline
account of christian incorporation into the mystical body
of Christ, predicating this in particular on the theme that
man has a dual existence (duplex est hominis vita, ad.1):
una quidem exterior secundum sensibilem et corporalem..
alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem
- the latter aspect of the duality is the basis of
conversatio with God. Here the Platonic and Aristotelian
privileging of mind is fully at work: mind is the principle
of identity (and eternity) at work in the life of each
individual. Separating himself from the Averroist
Aristotelianism represented in Paris by Siger of Brabant,
according to which there was a single intellect common to
all humanity, Aquinas made of the intellect an aspect of
the individuating principle of each particular person; it
is this which has a central part in that divine conversatio
where each redeemed person, qua individual, has his or her
place.
The contrast between inner and outer, mind and body,
spirit and senses, allows Aquinas to remark that the
perfection of caritas lies not in this life but in the
homeland/fatherland, patria, that is entered at death [3] .
Here the material world is left and the individual acquires
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a spiritual body (already spoken of by Paul as the body of
the resurrection). While Aquinas abandons a Platonic
separation of soul and body in favour of that Aristotelian
hylemorphisrn which recognises the soul as the form of the
body, - and thus in one sense overcomes a dualism that
would render matter as such a principle of fallenness and
separation from the divine - he also changes Aristotle's
reading of the soul as a form which perishes when the body
perishes to one where the soul, as a given principle of
immortality, comes finally to rest in a life of eternal
beatitude or damnation; this makes the reading of the
bodily and material a more complex affair, and we will need
to consider later how far, for Aquinas, matter as such
constitutes a force of resistance to the divine. Here we
might simply note that the inwardness of the soul/mind
oriented towards its divine patria allows, within material
existence, a participation in divine caritas (ad.1).
On the question of friendship, reciprocity, and caritas
(ad.2), Aquinas distinguishes between the relationship with
a friend in and for himself (suiipsius), which is
reciprocal, and the extension of that friendship to those
connected with the friend (children, servants etc). Here
the dependents of a friend can be loved even if they behave
as enemies: et tanta potest esse dilectio amici, quod
propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum, pertinent etiam si
nos offendant vel odiant. At work within this comment is a
vision of the radical unity of the human and natural world
insofar as it issues from God: existence as such is an
expression of divine caritas - God creates in order to
share his love further - and even those who act as enemies
owe their existence to God and are to be loved on account
of God. The psychology of ethics is thus used to elucidate
a theological vision, and also to further a vision of
wholeness: it is not individuals as such in their
relationship with God that Aquinas stresses - he thus
corrects the excess towards which an earlier mysticism of
love could tend - but individuals in their God-given
relationship with each other and with all others [4] .
The starting point in psychology constitutes a
demonstration that the world as such is already
interconnected in this way, that all parts have their place
in a larger whole and are to be understood and related to
in terms of the whole, and that this inherent wholeness of
the natural order is something developed and perfected in
caritas (a frequent remark with Aquinas is that God's grace
does not destroy but perfects) [5] . It is not that
Aquinas uses Aristotle as a teaching device, but rather
that he deliberately accepts and builds upon Aristotle's
vision of the wholeness of man and nature. Finally, in
relation to the third objection, and in extension of the
point just established, Aquinas counters the argument that
Aristotle's three kinds of friendship all differ from
caritas by remarking that caritas is a form of amicitia
honesti (Aristotle's friendship rooted in arete and to
agathon); precisely as such it is capable of extension to
others who are not themselves honesti.
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2 Classical Theories of Friendship
In order to elaborate further what is at stake, and what
hidden, in the link thus made between caritas and amicitia
we might briefly consider how those classical ideas of
friendship on which Aquinas draws were articulated, and
where they situated friendship in relation to other aspects
of a moral life. We have remarked how Aquinas sets caritas
in an inner mental space of divine conversatio, thus
erasing any traces of social differentiation the term might
have. His discourse is placed first in a world of
essences: the essence of man in its relation with God, and
the relations between men as premissed on an original
equality of essence. It is in this essentialist light that
he reads Aristotle's agathon and arete as honestus, where
the term refers not so much to an aspect of social
relations as of essential qualities. The social
determinants of ethical terms are, however, far closer to
the surface of the text of Aristotle (and Cicero) than this
reading allows.
(i) Aristotle on philia
Already in speaking of philia Aristotle has a long
heritage of reflection to draw on, together with a shift in
the use of philia which he himself intensifies by partly
veiling its received social usage so that it becomes
valuable coin in his philosophical currency [6] . We have
already remarked the deeply conflictual. background to Greek
culture, evident from the Homeric period onwards. Such
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central Aristotelian ethical terms as agathon and arete
show this burden of conflict, but the issue is much more
sharply focussed and shaped with Homer. In the Iliad and
the Odyssey the agathos is a warrior-chieftain in charge of
his own household (oikos); arete constitutes the set of
competetive skills he must acquire in order to secure his
own and his household's survival in a world of competing
agathoi; philos - and its associated terms philein and
philotes - covers the area of things and persons he must
rely on (partly thus including co-operative relationships)
in order to secure his passage through conflict.
As an adjective governing various terms, Homeric philos
appears at first not to be directly translatable: someone's
own limbs can be said to be philoi, as can persons and
objects, and current English lacks the semantic net that
might focus the meaning in one word. One commentator
remarks:
We are not acutely conscious of possessing a limited
stock of persons and things on whom our very
existence depends. The Homeric agathos is; and it
follows that his possession of them is of the utmost
importance to him. I stress the word "possession."
He has these persons and these things which he can
employ to ensure his continued existence. These
things are his own: all else is hostile or
indifferent, and the possessive affection he feels
for what is philon is based on the need and desire
for self-preservation. Adkins, 1963:33
Whatever is philon exists in a passive relation; the
verb philein governs the active expression of "concern"
towards that which is judged to be philon, and in relation
to persons "includes giving food, lodging, and protection
to transients" ibid p.36. The xeinos (guest stranger), who
relies on the hospitality of an agathos, and who enters a
relationship of philot.es with his household only, not with
the remainder of society, can only be judged philos if he
is likely to philein in return, ie if he is of comparable
status to the agathos, so that at some point he might
return the benefits of hospitality. The structure of the
philotes-relationship is thus governed by benefit and use.
Philein
is not, of course, an altruistic act. It makes, and
is intended to make, the other person a philon object
on whose help one can only rely when one needs it,
perhaps at some distant future time if he is a philos
from some distance, almost at once if he is a member
of the same oikos. Philein is an act which creates
or maintains a co-operative relationship; and it need
not be accompanied by any friendly feeling at all
ibid p. 36.
As a co-operative relationship, philotes also covers, for
later generations, relations between members of oikoi whose
forebears were once philoi to each other.
[What we have termed here a co-operative relationship
should in fact be more strictly spoken of as selfish
reciprocity, for central to it is the way in which each
partner becomes philon to the other by showing a form of
concern which has his own, rather than his partner's,
benefit as the ultimate goal.]
We have already seen that Aristotle distinguishes three
kinds of philia. Introducing that distinction he contends
that not all things are the objects of philia (ou pan
phileisthai), but only to phileton, which is so insofar as
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it is judged to be good (agathon), pleasurable (hedu) or
useful (chresimon) N.E. 1155b 18-19; he then questions
whether chresimon is phileton as such, or only insofar as
it is instrumental in securing agathon and hedone (di'hou
ginetai agathon ti e hedone, 1155b 20). This also raises
the question whether it is objective good that people seek
(philousin) or good (as it appears) for them (e to hautois
agathou 1155b 22).
Assuming the three forms of phileton, Aristotle goes on
to note that a philesis for inanimate objects (ton
apsuchon) does not constitute philia; here there is no
return of affection (antiphilesis) nor any wish for the
good of the object (boulesis ekeino agathou) one does not
wish good (t'agatha) on wine , but only on a philon (to de
philo), (1155b 27ff) [7]. Even wishing someone well
(eunoia) does not, however, constitute "friendship"; that
term is reserved for the situation where there is
reciprocal concern (eunoian gar en antipeponthosi philian
einai 1155b 33-4); for one can have eunoia towards a person
whom one has never seen, but whom one judges to be
chresimon; and such a person can in turn have comparable
eunoia on account of to chresimon; but two such persons
could not be said to be friends, for friendship involves
being concerned for the others' well-being for his own sake
(ekeinou heneka, 1155b 31), not on account of what one
might gain from him. Antipeponthosis, as antiphilesis,
thus constitutes mutual concern for the other as other -
though we will need to see how far that notion can be
pushed.
We might note two points. First, the ground here has
shifted when compared with the contours of the Homeric
world. Homer's agathos can have philesis with someone he
has never seen, precisely on account of to chresimon: the
notion of wishing the other well for his own sake simply
does not arise. Aristotle seems to be claiming for
friendship the un-Homeric quality of mutual affection
(though "affection" will require qualification). And
second, the case is more complicated than we have so far
suggested. Aristotle remarks that, not only must friends
wish each other well, each for the sake of the other, but
also that someone must recognise he is held in esteem for
his own sake if his relationship with the other is to
constitute friendship: no matter how much I am regarded for
my own sake, if I am not aware of this then the mutuality
of friendship does not exist. With mutual goodwill
existing and known friendship can then exist on the basis
on to chresimon, to hedone, or to agathon, 1156a 4-5.
It is important to note that Aristotle is making no
claim here for disinterested friendship: all friendship has
some self-interest, a point that Aquinas holds strongly in
his assimilation of Aristotle. And Aristotle is clear that
wishing the other well for his own sake is quite compatible
with friendship based on to chresimon. But we should
consider then what possible conflict there might be between
these two notions; can we in fact combine other-regard and
use-value? Two strategies are possible.
1. A cares for B because B is useful to A; and B
cares for A because A is useful to 8. Here there is
reciprocity in use-value, but other-regard seems
somewhat thin. A wishes that B might continue to
flourish, but only because the flourishing of B
benefits A; and vice versa. Other-regard constitutes
a for form of self-regard mediated through the other.
2. A cares for B in his own right, and wishes for B
those things that are useful for B; and B has a
similar disposition towards A. Here the other-regard
is high, focusssed on the chresimon for the other,
but the grounds of friendship are inexplicable: if B
is not in some sense chresimon to A (this was the
Homeric ground for something becoming philon) then it
is not obvious how A and B are drawn together in
friendship at all. (It might be replied that they
are so on account of hedone or agathon, but exactly
the same difficulty arises if the formula is applied
here: if A cares for B in his own right, wishing for
him those things that are hedu or agatha for him,
then how does A come to care for B in the first
place, and why does he persist in so caring). (It
could also be claimed that this further example is
redundant since, despite Aristotle's earlier claim,
agathon and hedone might be reduced to chresimon. and
might simply constitute ways of identifying various
of the more subtle or refined chresima; we will
consider this later).
Despite the suggestion that the other be regarded for
his own sake, the way that Aristotle proceeds to talk about
friendship suggests that, for hedone and chresimon at
least, the friend is loved for purely selfish reasons. He
notes that those who love each other dia to chresimon
precisely do not love each other on their own account as
persons (ou kath1 hautous philousin 1156a 11), but on
account of the particular benefit they derive from each
other; and the same holds for friendship based on hedone.
Friendships of this sort are accidental (eudialutoi), and
once the use- or pleasure-value dissolves the friendships
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come to an end (ean gar meketi hedeis e chresimoi osi,
pauontai philountes 1156 a 20-21). [On this conclusion,
Adkins points out an inconsistency in Aristotle's earlier
argument against the possibility of philia with wine, on
the grounds that one cannot wish for the good of wine.
That argument seemed to insist on some reciprocal concern
for the other as other, whereas now the concern for the
other is purely selfish. One thus has a formally identical
relationship between philon for a person and for wine: one
wishes that the person and the win be good (eg hedonen) in
order that one might enjoy each for selfish reasons].
The final form of friendship - the form we have already
seen Aquinas make important use of - allows us to draw out
further implications in the account so far. Aristotle
speaks of this as the completed or perfected form, teleia,
a friendship between agathoi and based on a similarity of
virtue (kai kat' areten homoion, 1156b 7-8). To speak of
philia as teleia opens an important aspect of Aristotle's
natural philosophy. In beginning the discourse on philia,
Aristotle remarks that philia exists by nature, phusei:
friendship seems to be naturally present (phusei
t'enuparchein eoike) in the mutual bond between parent and
child, and is similarly present in the bonds between
animals and birds of the same species (ou monon en
anthropois alia kai en ornisi kai tois pleistois ton zoon).
Friendship thus has its roots in the natural order, but
that order is for Aristotle teleological; it tends towards
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a perfection [8] . The point we have now reached in the
discussion, focussing on the question of teleia philia, is
to do with that high ground of natural perfection that can
be reached by man only.
That much said, it should be noted that the idea of
teleological perfection can be read in at least two
different ways, with different implications for our
understanding of philia; and Aristotle seems to endorse
both readings. In the de Generatione Animalium he
apparently envisages a single form of philia developing
through the relationships between animals, and coming to a
perfection in the human sphere where philia is realised
particularly in conjunction with phronesis. On this reading
it would not seem appropriate to say that there are
different forms of bonding relationship, each involving a
philia, that these are manifest in different bird and
animal species, and that each has its own particular
perfection appropriate to each species. It seems rather
that there is one telog for philia, and that that is
achieved with man.
Against this reading, Aristotle specifically warns that
it is mistaken to think that there is only one kind of
friendship which can be read as possessing different
degrees of development. (NE 1155b13). He therefore allows
in principle that there might be different forms (eide) of
philia, though he retains the notion that those forms might
be hierarchically ordered: it is possible to have relations
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of greater and lesser between things which are nonetheless
of different form (dechetai gar to mallon kai to hetton kai
ta hetera to eidei, 1155b 14-15). This allows him to order
sequentially the forms of philia, as forms, that are
evident in different species, just as it lets him rank the
three forms of human philia.
Aristotle thus comes to the third form of human philia,
teleia philia, with the assumption that it is superior to
the other two; yet as he discusses it the grounds of its
superiority begin to disappear. From what we have read so
far, we would expect the friendship existing between
agathoi who are similar kat'areten to consist of mutual
well-wishing without regard to benefit or pleasure, and
this is what is first suggested: agathoi wish each other
good things, t'agatha, precisely as agathoi, and being
philoi is in particular this wishing good things for the
friend for his own sake (hoi de boulomenoi t'agatha tois
philois ekeinon heneka malista philoi 1156b 9-10);
friendship of this sort is based on essentials, not on any
accidental qualities (ou kata suumbebekos 1156b 11); it is
also rare.
The sort of agathoi that Aristotle has in mind here are
absolutely, self-sufficiently so (haplos agathoi), and
precisely in respect of being such they are maximally able
to be of benefit (ophelimoi) and afford pleasure (hedeis)
to each other [9], It is at this point that the Homeric
agathos makes his return, for we have suggested already how
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an assurance of self-sufficiency was a necessary feature of
survival in the Homeric world. The need for
self-sufficiency does not preclude relationships based on
use-value but, on the contrary, requires such relationships
if self-sufficiency is to be maintained; and the agathos
who wishes t'agatha on the other agathos is one who does so
first of all in the assurance that he himself is agathos,
and then in the knowledge that the possession of agatha by
others is a necessary feature of his own continued
well-being.
The structuring power of the facts of Greek social life
warn against any simple reading of Aristotle's account of
philia as descriptive of the essence of this particular
form of human relationship (the fact that Aquinas reads
this as an account of essences is an index of the
consolidation of a metaphysical vision by the medieval
period; and at the same time the Christian writer presumes
a less competitive individualism as the governing horizon
of the Aristotelian text). Aristotle says that teleia
philia of the sort he describes is rare, and this can
easily be read as an indicator of the difficulty of ethical
accomplishment (a perhaps appropriate reading in a treatise
on ethics). It can also be read, however, as a comment on
the Athenian social scene, a remarking that those who
possess the material resources and social status to be
agathoi are few, and that those amongst them who manage to
construct a network of co-operative relationships are fewer
still.
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If we return to our question of whether agathon and
hedone might be reducible to chresimon, we can now
establish why, from Aristotle's point of view, they are
not. Clearly within a certain philosophical discourse such
a reduction can be considered possible: Bentham's hedonic
calculus operates on the assumption that different
utilities might be measured against each other insofar as
they provide different degrees of the same kind of
pleasure, so that the analysis behind utilitarian choice is
one of purely quantitative calculation; and we have seen
also how, on one reading, Aristotle seems to be talking
about a single kind of philia manifest to different
degrees. His stress in the Ethics on three different,
non-reducible kinds of philia is, however, an important
one, not primarily insofar as it identifies three different
kinds of moral intentionality, as that it specifies
different social locations within which relations between
individuals might occur. Here as we have seen the crucial
distinction is between agathon on the one hand, and
chresimon and hedone on the other. I take it, for
instance, that it would be inconceivable to Aristotle that
philia kat'arete might occur between slaves, metoikoi, or
women: these might within their own groups share
relationships based on reciprocal use- and pleasure-value
but, lacking the qualifications to become agathoi, would
not be able to have philia based on an exchange of agatha.
The specific social examples Aristotle gives when
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speaking of his three philiai are ones which link constancy
and unchangingness with to agathon, and flux and
inconstancy with chresimon and hedone. Philiai involving
use-value occur particularly between the elderly, or
between those at other stages of life who are pursuing
their own advantage, hosoi to sumpheron diokousin 1156a
26-7; they last for as long as the individuals are of use
to each other, and then dissolve. I take it that the
agathos does not act within this category of relationship
(apart from entering into trade-relationships with
foreigners, which last insofar as they bring him advantage
11 56a 31 ) because he already possesses to sumpheron and can
thus allow himself a superior distance from profitable
concern. [While we have noted the use-value operative at
the heart of Homeric philia, and preserved by Aristotle in
philia kat'areten, we should note that its preservation is
more as structuring form than as manifest, thematised
content: Aristotle actually attempts to displace Homeric
value into the two forms of philia he records as secondary,
rather than acknowledge its force in philia kaAreten. In
separating teleia arete from profit he also makes a
similarly aristocratic move to that made by Mencius in the
separation of ren from Mohist li (profit)]. Finally,
philia based on use-value can often exclude pleasure
altogether.
The young know the pleasure (hedone) of affection
(pathos) and love (eros), and it is on this that their
philia is often based, but precisely insofar as pathos and
eros are changeable then philia di'hedonen is subject to
periodic, and perhaps frequent, reversal. Whilst Aristotle
wishes to preserve hedone within philia kat'areten, it is
the constancy of the final form of friendship that holds
his consideration most. To take one's stand on hedone
alone is to live in a world of flux. Aristotle's choice
for constancy over flux is a choice not for the constancy
of the Platonic Forms, but for that constancy within the
flux of life which individuals (of a certain social group)
can achieve as the final flowering of an innate natural
tendency [10].
(ii) Cicero on Amicitia.
As a reader and translator of Greek philosophy, Cicero
presents an account of amicitiQ. which preserves much that we
have already considered; amicitia is for him the privileged
perfection of noble male relationships. Apart from the
formative role his thought had for Augustine however, and
for medieval monastic accounts of friendship, what is of
particular interest here is the place that Cicero ascribes
to sentiment and to the movement of the heart in his
account of amicitia.
I mentioned earlier that Aristotle locates affection
within philia - indeed, he seems to open this as the basic
issue when, at the beginning of his discourse, he suggests
that philia is the great mainstay of life in any
circumstances, 1155a 3ff. We have already remarked,
though, that friendship with Homer is a matter of actions
not sentiment, and it is not easy to determine what
structure of sentiment and affection Aristotle does ascribe
to philia, though the importance he attaches to hedone, in
itself and as a moment in teleia philictj indicates that it
has some place. [Hedone should not be too narrowly
translated "pleasure" - the kind of conversational exchange
in Plato's Symposium would constitute hedone, for instance;
but at the same time the difficulty we found, in reading
Plato, of shifting away from desire and self-interest
bespeaks the problem of trying to locate a structure of
warm, interpersonal affection in either Platonic or
Aristotelian thought].
For Aristotle teleia philia incorporates trust (to
pisteuein NE 1157a 22-3), and is characterised by the
choice constantly to spend time together 1157b 19. The
feeling of attachment is an affection, whereas friendship
as such is a state (eoike d'he men philesis pathei, he de
philia hexei, 1157b 28-9); teleia philia is exclusive, and
in this like eros, in that one cannot have many friends at
any one time, and it takes time furthermore before one can
know someone well as a friend 1158b 10ff. In unequal
relationships, as between father and son or husband and
wife, the form of philia differs in each case, and from
each side of the relationship 1158b 11ff. To be active in
friendship (philein) rather than to be the object of
another's friendship (phileisthai) is the mark of genuine
philia - mothers, for instance, get joy from loving
(philein) their children 1159a 28 [11] . On the other
hand, the foremost structure of concern seems to be in
relation to self: some form of self-love is taken as
primary, and the relations of philia that individuals might
have with others are an extension and mediation of the
concern with self (ta philika towards neighbours are
derived from those towards self, ek ton pros heauton
eleluthenai 1166a 1-2). The spoudaios (the man who is
complete in arete) is a principle of complete
self-sufficiency, and from that standpoint of completeness
(he is integrated, homognomonei heauto, and desires with
his entire soul, kata pasan ten psuchen 1166a 13-14) he
acts in those ways that are to his own advantage 1166a
17ff; from this basis of self-interest the spoudaios finds
in his philon another self (esti gar ho philos alios autos
1166a 31-2) .
These themes partially open for us the affective world
that Aristotle envisages; to consider it further here would
hold us from other readings. What Aristotle says is not
without its contradictions, but a key quality is
undoubtedly that of self-sufficiency within community; and
philia is situated within a life of individual flourishing
(eudaimonia) where the fulfilment of human intellectual or
theoretic capacities is taken as the highest goal. The
solitude of intellection contemplation (theoria) thus
stands above the affective bonds of community life.
The tone of Aristotle's descriptions and analysis veils
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the affective sense; that veiling is entirely absent from
Cicero's De Amicitia, where an affective warmth permeates
the writing, spreading particularly from the Platonic form
of anamnesis within which it occurs, as Cicero writes to
Atticus recalling an occasion on which he heard from
Scaevola a discourse on friendship which Scaevola had in
turn heard from Laelius, Laelius himself having enjoyed a
particularly noteworthy (maxirne memorabilem, 1. 36)
friendship with Scipio Africanus; furthermore, it is as a
friend that Cicero writes to Atticus, and their own shared
relationship is as another writing hidden in the text,
within which Atticus might recognise himself (legens te
ipse cognosces 1. 52).
The movement of thought lies in the shadow of death,
near the wellspring of grief, for Scipio is not long dead
and Laelius, etched first as a man of Stoic virtue, is
known also not to have reduced his passions to nought but
to possess still the warmth of humanitas. Beyond the shadow
of death, moreover, there shines on this reminiscence the
light of immortality, both through belief in the
immortality of the soul, and through the fact of Scipio's
earthly immortality, his achievement of success and virtue
that would never be forgotten. And in this context the
discourse identifies amicitia as the greatest of human
achievements, the means by which one might live in the
greatest harmony with nature (nihil est enim tarn naturae
aptum 5,10). The fulfilment of life lies in the mutual
goodwill of friends (in amici mutua benevolentia
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conquiescant 6.20), in the sweetness of sharing with
another as with oneself (Quid dulcius quam habere, quicum
omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? 6.20 - 22). From the
great network of relationships that nature brings into
being, amicitia exists as a special bond of affection,
caritas, between two or a few people, 5.40 - 43; amicitia
is thus a consensus (consensio) on all things, deepened by
mutual goodwill and affection (cum benevolentia et
caritate, 6.2). Born of nature, amicitia is a cosmic force
that draws together in harmony whatever it is that moves
7.17ff. Even in the space of theatre, applause at the
representation of acts of deep friendship is a response
provoked in us by nature 7.24ff.
Insofar as springing from natura, amicitia does not
constitute the completion of a lack (it is thus not based
on need and use value) but represents rather an expression
of the most fundamental form of things; as an aspect of
amor, from which it derives linguistically, amicitia thus
represents a natural fulness rather than indigence (a_
natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia
8.17-18). [Hidden in the discourse here is Plato's
reflection on eros as born of penury; Cicero presents a
universe where this lack is a minimal feature, where natura
represents the maternal womb of perfection from which all
things flow]. The generosity expressed in friendship does
not arrive out of a desire for recompense, but is the
expression of an innate liberality (natura propensi ad
liberalitatem sumus 9.27-8). Amicitia is not to be reduced
to the animal-form of pleasure-seeking (ad voluptatem,
9.30-1); and the affective concern of friendship thus
arises from a nature (natura qigni sensum diliqendi et
benevolentiae caritatem 9.35-6) which is a normative
foundation that excludes voluptas as an end in itself;
because nature itself is constant (natura mutari non
potest) then true friendships are everlasting (verae
amicitiae sempiternae sunt 9.45). The desire to reduce
friendship to utility is a form of cosmic perversity: to
deny that amicitia is essentially the warmth and light of
caritas is comparable to attempts to pluck the sun out of
the heavens (solem enim e mundo tollere 13.25). In
contrast with an extreme philosophy that would rid man of
sentiment, reducing all virtue to the hardness of iron
(virtutem duram et quasi ferream 13.45) Cicero argues for a
concept of life which can praise amicitia as a soft and
yielding quality (tenera atque tractabilis 13.46-7). [The
hardness of iron here might remind us of Laozi, with his
concern to reduce life to the formlessness of the uncarved
block, though Laozi himself uses imagery of softness in
referring to the flow of water, and speaks of the
"softness" of compassion. But we did note the absence of
growth metaphors in Laozi, in contrast with Mencius. And
while Cicero does not speak specifically of growth, natura
is for him a normative foundational principle of growth in
virtue - just as for Aristotle philia springs from phusis].
It is certainly true that Cicero balances the rational
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with the affective in his account of amicitia; at one point
he wants to subject the force of sentiment, which draws
individuals unwittingly into friendship, to the constraints
of rational reflection. It is the case also that he
presumes himself throughout to be talking about sentiments
shared between men. Although women do constitute an
example in terms of their maternal concern, this is
presented as a lower function in contrast with the
fulfilment of amicitia in the relations between free,
active males dedicated to public service. Neither forms of
relationship between women, nor between men and women, are
examined as instances of amicitia. or reckoned to shed any
light on our understanding of it. The incorporation of
"soft" "feminine" characteristics in amicitia thus raises
the problems of rhetorical strategy that we have already
encountered with Daoism, where the "real" "historical"
feminine is reduced to an aspect of the male psyche in the
male text: the softness of the woman is of no interest
here, other than as a male possession, and this strategy is
at work time and again in the elaboration of the Christian
texts.
3. From Agape to Caritas: Aspects of Christian Thinking.
We have already noticed with Cicero several of the terms
that were to become crucial in the translation of
Christianity from its Greek to its Latin expression:
natura, amicitia.amor. caritas. Cicero's deployment of
these terms in his own translation of Greek philosophical
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terminology, as in his letters and writings more generally,
provided a matrix of Latin value-expressions (some of them
already established in Stoicism and many of them diffused
throughout Roman culture), which constituted an established
usage and framework of thinking for early Latin Christian
writers and translators.
We remarked how Cicero links caritas with amicitia, both
terms identifying an expression and flowering of natura.
It was caritas that came to translate agape in the
christian scriptures (amor in Latin generally capturing
more of the force of Greek eros)[12]. We should note,
however, that there are two aspects to Cicero's caritas.
If De Amicitia focusses an apparently universalist side,
then other of Cicero's writings concentrate on caritas and
its derivatives in the frame of family and civic virtue;
both aspects account for the complexity of Cicero's
identity as devoted Roman citizen and universalist Stoic
thinker. These aspects were definitely held in union,
however, for it was part of Stoic thinking that the larger
social order was an outgrowth of familial order.
(Chrysippus, for instance, maintained that altruism was a
natural inclination, having its origins in the familial
inclination from which the first societies proceed. In
this - in making the family itself part of the natural
order - Stoics were in continuity with the thinking of
Aristotle, though in sharp distinction from Plato).
Cicero acknowledges society to develop in a series of
in
concentric circles, a notion we have already encountered as
a cultural ingredient in Confucian philosophy [13] .
Marriage is the first order (prima societas in ipso
conuigo); then the relation with children (proxima in
liberis). At this stage the originating and unifying bond
is referred to as amor; it is when the "natural"
relationships extend further (to cover uncles, cousins,
in-laws) that Cicero begins to speak not of amor, but of
caritas and benevolentia. [We cannot follow this point
here, but there are distinctions in Cicero's notion of
natura that need consideration, particularly regarding the
shift from amor to caritas. Natura here functions as a
developing teleological principle in the same way that
phusis does for Aristotle, and amor and caritas mark
different phases in that development]. The state consists
of a multiplication of families, and the bonds at work in
it are caritas rei publicae and caritas patriae:
Omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior
quam ea, quae eum republica est unicuique nostrum.
Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui,
familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una
complexa est. De Officiis 1,17.
It was one of the achievements of Augustine to shift from
Roman civic virtue to the transcendent spiritual virtue of
the Christian City of God, so that in his thinking the
classical virtues took on a different dimension; and we
encountered earlier one consequence of that shift for
Aquinas: the Christian homeland (patria) is a transcendent
heaven, and the caritas patriae, Cicero's deepest civic
bond, becomes the transcendent fulfilment of all human
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relationships.
(i) Caritas and the Growth of Spirituality
The relationship between caritas and civic virtue is
an issue addressed by a number of early Christian criters
- Tertullian, for example, is at pains to show that
Christian life is not in conflict with Civic life. the
strongly transcendental concern that marked Christianity
from its origins, however, entailed that much thinking and
reflection on caritas was set within the context of
spirituality rather than ethics, within the pursuit of a
perfection that was reckoned to be profoundly
other-worldly. Here the monastic context soon emerged as
the privileged context within which a Christian life might
be lived, and, even though he was for long teaching in
Paris, it is still strongly in relation to the horizons of
monastic thought that Aquinas' work is defined.
The rise of monasticism in the West is in parallel with
its emergence in China (for the latter, this covers both
the native development of neo-Daoist reclusiveness at the
end of the Han, and the advent and flowering of Chinese
Buddhist monasticism). Explanations of the phenomenon of
monasticism and its place in religion - its function as a
male preserve within a patriarchal order - might help us to
uncover a deeper dynamic governing the emergence of forms
of spirituality and disciplines of life within the monastic
milieu, but any close reading of such issues exceeds our
concern here. What I would note is that while common
structural principles may govern monasticism in different
religious and cultural contexts, there is a specific
intentionality within Christian monasticism that, for the
medieval period at least, gave it a distinctive colour, and
that is the privilege granted to virginity as an
anticipation of life in the Kingdom of God. Here, the
monastic order became an extension of that apocalyptic
tendency already noted in the scriptural tradition, whereby
an imminent end to the world-order was anticipated. The
practice of virginity, the retreat from the procreative
cycle of birth and rebirth, was seen as an actively willed
choice to terminate the world-process, and to step from the
world into an anticipation of transcendent perfection.
Monastic life was seen as a foretaste of the perfection of
heaven, and throughout the entire period that we are
considering here the institution of marriage was given a
profoundly secondary status [14].
The Platonic and neo-Platonist vision of the universe
saw degrees of reality within a hierarchy of being. As
Christian thinking came to redesign, recut and wear the
garments of Greek and Latin thought, questions on the
compatibility of scriptural and non-scriptural visions of
the world came to the fore. We have already seen how
Nygren stresses the radical difference between spiritual
agape and Platonic eros; such, however, was not the common
perception of the developing Christian community. And,
while there were exceptions to this, the major formative
thinkers used the philosophical resource positively within
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a complex marriage of Greek and Hebraic traditions. We
have noted how the Renaissance theme of a philosophia
perennis identified a community of thinking between ancient
philosophy and christian belief; for many of the Fathers
this community was marked in the characterisation of
philosophy as a praeparatio evangelii, a preparatory
paideia for the divine truth of the gospel.
Within this context - and whether for Greek or Latin
Christianity - eros and agape. eros. amor and caritas were
used as terms to focus a single kind of love, which at
times is characterised by differences in intensity. [Some
writers speak of eros as a spiritually more intense form of
agape [15] ]. As we have seen, scriptural agape did not
cover the idea of love for God, but rather the sense of
being loved by God, with the corollary that love should
then be shared with the community. Yet the allegorical
interpretation of the Song of Songs - which came to be read
as an account of the soul's loving search for God - and the
eros-mysticism of Plato and Plotinus, jointly served to
focus a christian spirituality where love for God had a
primary importance. Here the practice of the virtues -
much as the Buddhist practice of sila - served as a
purification of the individual and a deepening of his
capacity for love. [Though the virtues were no mere
preliminaries, but constituted perfections themselves, and
their attainment marked an anticipation of the perfection
of interpersonal relationships in the Kingdom of Heaven].
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At the same time the transformation of erotic love into
spiritual love eventually involved a transfer of the
language of inter-personal eroticism so that it came to
characterise the individual's relationship with God or
Christ.
The notion that there is a single form of love, and that
love is the means of the soul's ascent to God, is focussed
in Origen, for instance, when he reads the world as a
symbol of spiritual reality where the soul penetrates the
symbols to different degrees in its journey to Christ.
Here he specifically states that different words for love
designate the one substance:
Nihil ergo interest in Scripturis divinis, utrum
charitas dicatur, an amor vel dilectio.
Augustine similarly claims that amor. dilectlO
and caritas are used interchangeably. Love that is
directed in an upward ascent to God is caritas; love that
moves down towards the world is cupiditas: amor is neutral,
becoming caritas when directed to the good, and cupiditas
when focussed on evil. On the equivalence of amor.
dilectio and caritas. and against the idea that amor marks
an orientation to evil, he notes:
nonnulli arbitrarvtur aliud erse dilectionem sive
caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enin dilectionen
accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. Sic autem
nec ipsos auctores saecularium
Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono,
amorem in malo. Sic autem nec ipsos auctores
saecularium litterarum locutos esse certissimum
est...Sed scripturas religionis nostrae, quarum
auctoritatem ceteris
omnibus litteris anteponimus, non
aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem vel caritatem,
insinuandum fuit. De. civ. Dei 14,7.[17]
Pseudo-Dionysius, as we have seen, acknowledges a single
love with different intensities. Love is first the
movement within God whereby the universe comes into being,
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and then that movement in man whereby he seeks his return
to God through the different degrees of reality: aspects of
the world form a hierarchical symbolism whereby the soul
rises, and reality constitutes a flow of love from its
divine source and back again. This style of thinking
entails a contrast between a material world and a spiritual
world, carrying this into distinctions between the inner
man and the outer man, and between the inner and outer
meanings of scripture: to perceive the inner meaning
requires a specific, spiritual hermeneutic, and the
scriptural text can at times take the form of a riddle
designed to waken spiritual insight (this understanding of
scripture has obvious affinities with the Zen understanding
of koans).
(ii) Two Forms of Love
While Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius emphasise the fact
that love has a single form with differing intensities,
other writers seem to favour a radical contrast between two
forms of love. This contrast (identified by some
commentators as between a 'physical' and an 'ecstatic'
conception of love) is rooted in the classical period,
though not fuly focussed there, and involves a contrast
between eros, as a love that seeks the self's fulfilment,
and philia, as a disinterested concern for the well-being
of the other [18]. [We have remarked Aristotle's
ambivalence on the separability of philia from self-love;
in
Cicero, however, is stronger on disinterestedness and this,
combined with the way that Aristotle came to be read in the
medieval period, consolidated a Christian belief that
disinterested love - of God in particular - was not only
possible, but marked the highest conceivable expression of
love. It would be impossible to cover fully here the
psychological and cultural factors that gave rise to the
idea of disinterested love - the twelfth century
renaissance with its new appreciation of Cicero was one
such; the troubadour doctrine of fin'amors (pure love)
which, although directed to an idealised woman, perhaps
carried overtones of the sufi doctrine of annihilation of
self in love of God, also played a part (and also requires
its own explanation); the emergence of a humanist culture
that was rich enough to move away from need-relationships
was a factor; and so also was the need of the monastic
world - Cistercian in particular - to provide a new
interpretation of Christian love that was richer than the
secular versions increasingly available.[19]]
Heloise and Abelard, each in a somev/hat different way,
focus the contrasts between selfish and unselfish love. A
line from Cicero's De Inventione rhetorica bore particular
significance for Abelard, and for followers in his school;
it characterised a strongly other-directed friendship:
Amicitia est voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum,
illius ipsius causa, quern diligit, cum ejus pari
voluntae.
Caritas constitutes now a love of God for his own sake, and
Abelard claims that this is the force of the New Testament
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teaching on love: caritas is more akin to unselfish human
friendship (philia) than to self-centred love (eros). [We
should note that Abelard's caritas in its turn differs also
from what we noticed in the scriptural account of agape:
there it was God's love for man; now it is man's
disinterested love for God][20]. Whatever other factors
focussed Abelard's thinking here, the love he received from
Heloise was of prime importance; a relationship governed
powerfully by passion on his side, it was governed on hers
by a concern for his well-being as a leading thinker of
the age. There is however a double irony here, for while
Abelard could find a philia with God but not with Heloise,
Heloise masked in her love for Abelard a need which she
felt he alone, not God, could fill; for each of them the
language of disinterest bears the mark of self-deception.
Bernard of Clairvaux, opponent of Abelard on other
issues, shares with him that reading of love as a movement
beyond self-concern, as a passage towards God in which the
individual transcends and loses self. In the De Diligendo
Deo he distinguishes four stages in the ascent of love:
first, man loves himself for his own sake; then he loves
God for his (man's) sake; then loves God for God's sake;
and finally loves self again for God's sake. It is
impossible to appreciate fully what is at work here without
a passage through the rhetoric of Bernard's love-mysticism,
and rather than offer that I will below provide such a
reading of Aelred of Rievaulx's account of spiritual
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friendship.
On the notion of love as concern with self, though, all
I would note is that Bernard really seems to be talking
about a transition from Aristotle's chresimon to hedone:
love based on self-interest is based on a (perhaps crude
and manifest) awareness of personal inadequacy, whereas
love of God for Himself rests on the pleasure of divine
conversatio. as the individual engages in those religious
and spiritual disciplines that open him to a sense of the
divine. In the imagery of the Song of Songs, that
conversatio is put in the context of a spiritual marriage
between the soul and God, and the intensity of erotic
transport becomes a figure for the blissful loss of
self-awareness that can occur within deeply prayerful and
meditative practice.
The friendship with God that Bernard sets at the heart
of caritas is a friendship also with his fellow men - men
in particular, since his was an all-male community; men of
a particular sort, since many amongst the Cistercians would
have been Crusaders, used to an all male fraternity and
doubtless part-nourished in their campaigns on the intense,
restrained eroticism of the troubadours [21] . Bernard is
content to transfer the intensity of his love to his fellow
monks - a love which he would characterise as "in Christ",
and thus geared solely to the well-being of the other. It
is found, for instance, in the feeling with which he tries
to persuade a monk to return to the monastery:
I am not writing in order to contend, but to end
contention...I pass over what has happened; I do not
ask how or why it happened. I do not discuss faults,
I do not dispute as to the circumstances, I have no
memory for injuries. I speak only what is in my
heart. Wretched me, that I lack you, that I do not
see you, that I am living without you. To die for you
would be to live; to live without you is to die. I
do not ask why you have gone away; I complain only
that you do not return. Come, and there will be
peace; return, and all will be made good.
(iii) Aelred on Spiritual Friendship
In the prologue to the De Spiritali Amicitia Aelred
acknowledges his original indebtedness to Cicero, only
proceeding to remark that, the more familiar he became with
Christian writings, the less inspiration he gained from
him. Cicero nonetheless served as a certain model, insofar
as Aelred decided, in the absence of a specific Christian
treatise on friendship, to produce one where the Roman
exemplars of virtue were replaced by Christian and biblical
figures; and he is more than model insofar as the Stoic's
language and categories keep breaking through the
Christian's text. Aelred's avowed departure from Cicero
into a world of Christian experience serves in a way as a
metaphor for the kind of break between different forms of
love that the ecstatic conception favoured over the
physical, though we should not press that contrast too far
with Aelred since he views the ecstasy of friendship as a
perfection of the natural order, in a sense continuous with
it, and the stress on a pure, disinterested love is not a
major feature of his text. Nonetheless, the context for
disinterested love is there in reflection on the relation
with God (marked by pleasurable intimacy, not need) and on
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the shared existence with others "in Christ".
Aelred begins by reducing the force of the Ciceronian
text:
it is evident that Tullius was unacquainted with the
virtue of true friendship (Constat enim Tullium verae
amicitiae ignorasse uirtutem) since he was completely
unaware of its beginning and end, Christ. 1.8.
And in opening his conversation with Ivo he stresses 'that,
in the intimacy of that conversation, Christ constitutes a
third presence, 1.1. Intimacy is indeed a palpable quality
throughout the discourse, and the writing at times
represents a delicate holding and balancing of desire -
thus an intensification of desire - on the edge of
fulfilment, a restrained eroticism that locates disinterest
in the intensity of pleasure without consummation. As
appropriate to the intention of reciprocal pleasure, the
writing takes the form not of a treatise given by one man
to another (Ivo asks Aelred for instruction on friendship)
- were it to be such, there would not be that equality on
which true amicitia depends - but rather of a shared
conversation whose purpose is a Heideggerian gelassenheit,
a releasing of the constituent features of friendship as a
Christian experience. The charm of Ivo, whom Aelred as
known and watched closely, and the questions on friendship,
open a path that both of them might follow: thus Aelred:
For you yourself love opened the way for both of us,
and have enkindled that brilliant light on the very
threshold of our inquiry, which will not allow us to
wander along unknown paths, but will lead us along
the sure path to the certain goal of our proposed
quest 1.9
The path thus opened, Cicero is no sooner dismissed than
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called back again to provide the initial definition of
friendship:
Friendship is mutual harmony in affairs human and
divine coupled with benevolence and charity.
(Amicitia est rerpm humanarum et divinarnm cum
benevolentia et caritate cnnsensin) 1.11, De.Am. 20
With this text as a starting point, and with a stress
placed on the classical criterion of everlastingness
(amicitiam aeternam esse 1.21) Aelred proceeds to establish
that true friendship is rarely evidenced outside the
Christian community. Against Ivo's concern that friendship
is in general difficult and rarely found, he remarks
however on its relative frequency in the Christian world,
linking this to the fact that the Christian can rely on
divine grace to achieve perfection in virtue, 1.26-30.
Ivo's concern is specifically with spiritual friendship,
and to bring that more fully into focus Aelred
distinguishes three kinds of friendship: carnal friendship
(amicitia carnalis), worldly friendship (amicitia
mundialis) and spiritual friendship (amicitia spiritalis):
The carnal springs from mutual harmony in vice; the
worldly is enkindled by the hope of gain; and the
spiritual is cemented by similarity of life, morals,
and pursuits among the just 1.38
Spiritual friendship is characterised by the dignity of its
nature (ex propriae naturae dignitate) and by the sentiment
of the heart (humani pectoris sensu) (pectus here carrying
more of the softness of sentiment that cor); the fruit of
friendship's perfection is a feeling of sweetness
(dulcedinem sentiendo 1.46). The particular structure of
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sentiment that Aelred is beginning to establish here, set
within a discipline of ethical cultivation, is one where
spiritual friendship is finally known as a self-validating
experience, and indeed as a perfection of human
relationships. [There is also at times almost a sense in
which it is superior to caritas; since caritas can be shown
to enemies and does not imply reciprocity, 1.32, it does
not entail the intimacy of an interpersonal bond that
Aelred sets above all else. Elsewhere, though, Aelred holds
that it is only through caritas that perfect friendship is
possible].
Aelred sets the roots of friendship deep within the
structures of nature as it issues from God:
Suppose we begin with inanimate creation - what soil
or what river produces one single stone of one kind?
Or what forest bears but a single tree of a single
kind? And so even in inanimate nature a certain love
of companionship, so to speak, is apparent, since
none of these exists alone but everything is created
and thrives in a certain society with its own kind.
1/54.[22]
Animals and angels equally are united with their own kind
in friendship; and insofar as woman was created from the
very substance of man (de ipsius substantia masculi 1.57)
human relationships are from the start fundamentally equal
in nature, so providing the basis for true friendship.
Nature itself thus originally established a desire for
friendship and charity (natura mentibus humanis, ab ipso
exordio amicitiae et caritatis impressit affectum), but
with the fall of man and the cooling of charity (cum
refrigiscente caritate) nature introduced contention
whereby individual benefit was set against the common good
1.50. From the moment of the fall a distinction between
caritas and amicitia became important: it was stressed by
the good (boni) that caritas be shown even to the wicked,
whilst amicitia came by natural law (naturali lege) to be
shared only between those few who were good (paucos bonos)
- for them friendship rested in the grace of mutual charity
(in mutuae caritatis gratia 1.59).
The conversation in Book 1 establishes something of the
nature of spiritual friendship; Book 2 - where instead of
Ivo, Walter and Gratian converse with Aelred - explores the
qualities of friendship further; and not to lose the point,
friendship is again confirmed as the highest of the stages
leading to perfection (2.14-15). It is now that a
transformed language of eroticism comes more directly to
the fore. Persons bound together in friendship ascend
through stages of love to a mystical encounter with Christ,
where union with Christ is imaged in the experience of the
soul1s kiss:
per amoris gradus ad Christi conscendens
amicitiam, unus cum eo spiritus efficitur in
osculo uno. 2.22
Aelred distinguishes three kinds of kiss, a physical, a
spiritual and an intellectual:
The physical kiss (osculum corporale) is made by
the impression of the lips; the spiritual kiss
(osculum spiritale) by the union of spirits; the
intellectual kiss (osculum intellectuale)
through the Spirit of God, by the infusion of
grace (per Dei spiritum infusione qratirum) 2.24
It is with the spiritual and the intellectual kiss that he
is particularly concerned: with the shared psiritual
intimacy between tso friends, and with the mediated sense
the individual can have of union with Christ, and it is the
imagery of the Song of Songs that is drawn upon here to
carry the presentation [23], It is clear that in this
account Aelred is entering a complex discursive space with
profound implications for the organisation of monastic
life, and Walter shows his awareness of this by remarking
that "we are trying to set up for ourselves a definite
limit as to how far friendship ought to go" 2.29. True,
Walter avoids putting the question of limits in terms of
physical intimacy, but the placing of his question, and his
reference to Gratian's over-friendly nature, indicate that
this issue is just beneath the surface of the text.
Gratian refers to their meeting as a spiritual banquet
(spiritale convivium 2.17) and for us this opens the
question of the organisation of homosexual desire within
the Christian monastic community (and in the all-male
communities of the crusaders) just as Plato's
'banquet1focussed the homosexual desire of the Greek world
and set it in a philosophical framework. For Plato and for
the Christian writer the issue concerns the management of
eroticism, with its direction towards moral, spiritual and
intellectual goals; and the preservation of the erotic
tenor in the pursuit of these goals gives to the
philosophical and monastic life a jouissance that thirsts
for consummation and hovers at the brink of physical
ecstasy (this less perhaps for Plato than for Aelred; since
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for the latter the goal is not to become hard and gemlike,
as Socrates, but soft and receptive, so that the dissolving
haze of ecstasy is closer to his writing).
The structure of the discourse following Walter's
question on limits has almost the character of a
withdrawal, as the moral considerations surrounding
friendship, and surrounding the choice of an appropriate
friend, are brought more fully to the fore. Aelred does
not offer the same intense mysticism as Bernard, and his
placing of amicitia and caritas within the very foundations
of nature is closer to the physical than the ecstatic
conception of love. He does, however, strongly separate
the reciprocal intensity of amicitia from other forms of
caritas and amor (at one point he acknowledges that he
loves and is loved by all the monks in the monastery, but
holds that such love is not amicitia: amicitia is possible
only with a few people, 3.82ff). There is thus a kind of
break that occurs with amicitia, and even if there is a
general ascent through love to God, amicitia marks a lift
and intensification in the process (in this it is not
unlike the eros of pseudo-Dionysius, which marks a more
intense form of agape).
4. Aquinas and the Ascent of Being to God.
One way to view the ecstatic concept of love is to
consider it premissed on the significance of the person, as
an attempt to focus the intimacy and ravishment that can be
known in interpersonal love, and to transfer that sense to
the experiential frame of a mysticism ordered to a God
perceived as infinitely lovable. In part then we can view
Bernard, Aelred, William of St. Thierry, Hugh of St. Victor
and others as offering first of all a phenomenology of a
certain type of mystical experience, structuring their
reflection through the themes of the Song of Songs, the De
Amicitia, and other writings, and attempting thus to focus
both the process of desire and its fulfilment in a pleasure
known as intimacy with Christ.
Aquinas holds strongly to a movement of desire as one
pole of the order of the cosmos, a reditus in Deum of all
Being insofar as it is marked first by its issuance, its
exitus a Deo; indeed the whole structure of the Summa
Theologiae is governed by the theme of the cyclical
movement of being, its origin in and return to a Creator
known as love; and in this movement created being is a
mirroring of the eternal movement and rest with the
processions of the Trinity. Love is the essence of the
divine life first, and then the structuring form of a human
life which is recognised as a participation in the
divine[24].
Aquinas' philosophy of love is a full elaboration of the
physical against the ecstatic conception. This is not to
say that his philosophy is completely against the
phenomenology of ecstatic experience; when he does write on
love, however, it is to criticise the philosophical
presupposition according to which disinterested love or
loss of self might be reckoned an ontological possibility,
and in that critique thus to limit the place ascribed to
the pursuit of intensity as a self-validating experience.
At the same time he retains many of the Bernardine insights
on love, but sets them within a more extended philosophical
framework.
In part the ecstatic-physical contrast centres on the
question whether one can transcend self-love in relation to
another or to God; and its force is compounded by the
identification of God as the summum bonum, that highest
good which constitutes man's fulfilment, since if God is to
be desired in what he represents for man then any love of
God will be mediated through love of self. For Aquinas
self-love is a premiss of any loving, not for psychological
but for metaphysical reasons: the metaphysical orientation
of all beings is towards God as their perfection, and all
being is thus possessed of a teleological structure [25] .
Here Aquinas draws on Aristotle's thought that all movement
is a form of desire, ultimately desire for God; a text such
as the following from the De Anima has a crucial
significance:
to de kinoun kai kinoumenon to orektikou (kineitai
gar to kinoumenon he oregetai, kai he orexis tis
extin he energeia)
De Anima III 10,433b 16-18
(i) A Single Form of Love
Aquinas uses a rich terminology to cover different
aspects of love and desire, and I will consider only
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aspects of that here. The structure of desire as a
universal search for perfection is clearly stated:
Ultiraus finis est beatitudo, quam omnes appetunt, ut
Augustinus dicit. S.Th.la2ae 1.8
And at the same point the issue is also established in
relation to human desire: anything that is desired is
desired not so much in itself, but rather insofar as it is
a token of, carries a promise of, an ultimate perfection:
Necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat
propter ultimum finem...ultimus finis hoc modo se
habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis
motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod
causae secundae moventes non movent, nisi secundum
quod moventur a primo movente; unde secunda
appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in ordine ad
primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.
S.Th.la2ae 1.6
This orientation towards an ultimate end entails that,
whatever is loved, even insofar as evil or destructive, is
loved as a form of good; amor names any orientation towards
the good:
aliquid dicitur amari quod appetitus amantis se habet
ad illud sicut ad suum bonum. Ipsa igitur habitudo
vel coaptatio appetitus ad aliquid velut ad suum
bonum amor vocatur...Unum quodque amamus inquantum
est bonum nostrum. In.Div.Nom. 4.1.9.
Together with the universal desire for God that Aquinas
unfolds here, there is also a strongly holistic reading of
the universe. All beings are interlinked in a single
network of being; truly to desire one's own good is to
desire the good of the whole, of which one is a part, and
to desire one's own proper functioning within the whole;
the tendency towards God is a tendency towards others
insofar as they bend towards God. With love and being
considered thus, the possibility of radical disinterest is
sytematically excluded [26],
If it is thus excluded, it is nonetheless important to
note that an attitude apparently very close to disinterest
is included as a central feature of love; this is an
attitude tied precisely to the tendency to favour the good
of the whole over one's own apparent good or the good of
any of the parts taken in isolation:
To love God above all things, more than self, is
natural not only to the angels and to man, but also
to any creature insofar as it is capable of loving
through either sense or nature (aut sensibiliter aut
naturaliter). For natural inclinations
(inclinationes naturalae) can be most clearly
recognised in those (creatures) which act naturally
without deliberation; since anything in nature acts
according to its inborn capacity to act (sicut aptum
natum est agi). We see that any part has a natural
inclination to act for the good of the whole, even
when it is in danger of disadvantage to itself
(detrimento proprio) - this is evident, for instance,
when someone fends off a sword with his hand in order
to defend his head, on which the well-being of his
whole body depends (ex quo dependet salus totius
corporis). Thus it is natural that any part, in its
own way, loves the whole more than itself. And so,
on the basis of this natural inclination, and on the
basis of civic virtue (politicam virtutem). a good
citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for
the common good. It is clear, however, that God is
the common good (bonum commune) of the entire
universe and of all its parts, so that any creature
thus naturally loves God more than itself: anything
insensate in a natural way, animals by means of their
senses, rational creatures by means of that
intellectual love (per intellectualem amorem) which
is called dilectio. Quodl. 1 a.8
The kind of position outlined here can only be reconciled
with earlier statements about desiring God as one's final
end and perfection if it is acknowledged that the principle
of love is twofold, that the self-perfective tendency is
also an innate instinct to locate the good of the self
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within the good of the whole, and that within any apparent
conflict between the good of the self and of the whole,
that of the whole is to be preferred insofar as, in some
[27)
way, it always includes the greater good of the self I. Jit
should also be noted that the possibility of this
conclusion is for Aquinas strictly premissed on a
theological principle that is more precisely Platonic than
Aristotelian. For if it is from Aristotle that he draws a
natural philosophy which stresses the interrelatedness of
all parts within an organic whole, it is also from
Aristotle that he knows of the dissolution of the
individual form (soul) at the moment of death (although the
form of the species is transmitted in the process of
generation and procreation). It is from Plato, indirectly,
that he draws the sense of a return of all things to their
transcendent origin, and it is on this Platonic basis that
any apparent loss occurred by the individual acting for the
good of the whole is finally recuperated [28].
(ii) Love as an active or passive force.
The structure of love in the metaphysic of Aquinas has
the form of the journey of Odysseus, an outward movement of
love from the divine patria, a return through a process of
self-fulfilment; for Levinas the circularity of movement
here stands in betrayal of the true ethical imperative, the
approach to the other as a moment of radical alterity which
is also a refusal to view the other as an aspect of the
same within the bonum commune.
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As we have remarked, Aquinas sets amor within the life
of God: amor identifies a kind of movement or appetite,
will (voluntas) is in particular an appetite, and God is
possessed of will (ostensum est autum in Deo esse
voluntatum S.Th.1.20 Resp.). The identity of God in
relation to the world, and the nature of God's relation to
the world, is thus significantly different here from the
identity and relations that Zhu Xi ascribes to taiji and
the world. Taiji can indirectly be designated ren, insofar
as taiji names the network of li, and ren is situated
within li, but ren here is not an active force, nor can
taiji be spoken of as active: taiji is the being of the
world in its deepest foundations, not a creative
originating force; taiji is stillness rather than movement;
taiji is not possessed of intelligence and will which for
Aquinas are two of the primary attributes of God.
While the language of appetitus, desiderium and
inclinatio focusses the active tendency in love, Aquinas
holds strongly also to a sense of love's passive moment,
reflecting this in terms such as formatio, informatio. and
complacentia. One argument is that, as Aquinas
progressively absorbed Aristotle's thinking and
terminology, the motif of active desire became a
predominant one in his metaphysic, while the passive aspect
of love can be seen in sharper characterisation in his
early writings; against this it has been argued that
reflections on the active and passive valencies of love
constitute two equal but unintegrated strands within his
text as a whole. I do not intend to adjudicate this
debate here, but rather to raise for consideration those
passive features of love which we have not so far
considered.
In some respects the passive is figured as a completion,
a coming-to-rest of appetite in possession of, conformity
to, the form of the desired object. Love here is
essentially the transformation of the lover insofar as it
takes on the form of the loved according to its capacity to
receive that form. [ I use the word "love" here to
translate "amor" which is somewhat strained in relation to
the usae of Aquinas, insofar as he intends by amor any kind
of movement in any entity towards its end; I consider this
below. As a principle and process of transformation amor
is spoken of as a "virtus unitiva"
quia est ipsa unio, vel nexus, vel transformatio qua
amans in amatum transformatur, et quodammodo
convertitur in ipsum. Vel dicendum quod quietatio
affectus in aliquo, quam amor importat.
In Sent.Ill d.27 q.1a.1 ad 2
The terms transformatio and quietatio convey the sense of
rest as the end term of love - love here remains first and
foremost an active principle; desire precedes formatio and
tends towards it as its perfection. The notion that the
lover in some sense (quodammodo) becomes what it loves is a
powerful notion, excluding the possibility of any radical
difference or divergence within the order of being. Indeed,
the unity that is achieved in the transformatio is for
Aquinas a certain reappropriation at the level of
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individual existence of an original ontological unity
within which all entities are aspects of the same: ens at
unum convertuntur, though unity functions not as a univocal
but as an analogical notion.
The quietatio that occurs in the transformation of amor
is also apoken of as a certain kind of peace. Peace is not
distinguished from love but is an aspect of love (pax non
distinguitur ab amore, sed est aliquid amoris). Pax is a
certain stilling of the appetite, (quietationem appetitus)
whereas amor specifies its final transformation and
conversion into what is loved (amor dicit ulterius
transformationem, et quandam conversionem in amatum;In
Sent.Ill d.27 q.1a3 ad 5). Amor is a more profound entry
into a thing than knowledge (cognitio) (amor magis intrat
ad rem, quam cognitio) - knowledge relates to something in
terms of what the knower receives (cognitio est de re
secundum id quod recipitur in cognoscente) whereas the
relation of love is one where the lover is transformed
into the thing itself (amor autem est de re, inquantum ipse
amans in rem ipsam transformatur[ In Sent III 3.27. q.l a.4
ad 10).
The language of transformation leaves us here with an
apparently absolute proximity to the language of loss of
self in the mystiucal love literature. The transformation
into what is loved, the entry into what is loved, the
qualitative change in the lover insofar as it takes on the
form of what is loved, all point to a change - which one
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could view either as diminishment or enrichment by
considering the nature of the object of love - whereby the
lover might be reckoned to lose its own nature. It is
worth considering how this early formulation of the issue
compares with the ideas on amor presented in the Summa
Theologiae, with its full incorporation of Aristotle's
philosophy of natural desire.
a. Amor in S.Th 1 a 2ae 26 .
Aquinas begins by remarking that all amor is a form of
appetitus (1. resp.), thus initially seeming to identify
amor with its active manifestation. Yet the first
designation of appetitus naturalis seems to reverse that.
Moving through stages (appetitus naturalis, appetitus
sensitivius, appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus) he
remarks that the latter two forms of appetite are governed
by the kind of knowledge that the subject has (consequens
apprehensionem ipsius appetentis), whereas appetitus
naturalis is governed by the way in which an entity has
itself originally been known (per apprehensionem
instituentis naturam; ibid.). This strange-sounding formula
leads into Aquinas' theology of creation, where through the
knowledge and will of God entities come to be out of
nothingness; appetitus naturalis thus derives from the
impressed mind of God, as the tendency of an entity to fill
its appropriate place in the cosmic order: through creation
entities bear the mark of the divine idea whereby they are
of a certain form and occupy a certain ontological
formation, and it is this mark that constitutes their
appetitus naturalis [30].
We can clarify this by noting how Aquinas specifies
three requirements whereby an entity is teleologically
ordered towards a specific end (finis, which is also bonum)
- these are a nature proportionate to that end (natura
proportionata ad finem ilium); an inclination to that end,
which is a natural desire for that end (inclinatio ad finem
ilium, quae est naturalis appetitus finis); and a movement
towards that end (motus in finem). In illustration he
considers the element earth. Earth has a certain nature
which qualifies it for being in the centre (in terra est
natura quaedam, per quam sibi competit esse in medio); in
consequence of this there is a tendency according to which
it naturally moves towards this place (hanc naturam
sequitur inclinatio in locum medium, secundum quam appetit
naturaliter talem locum); thus, with nothing in the way,
earth is always moved downwards (nullo prohibente, semper
deorsum movetur), (De Ver. 27.2).
[It should be noted here that appetitus naturalis is not
just predicated of what is insensate and non-rational, but
can also specify a range of functions and responses in
sensate and rational creatures. Newton's law of gravity,
for instance, would represent a universal instance of an
appetitus naturalis, designating the tendency in all
material beings to move earthwards. At this level of his
discourse, and together with the Aristotelian resource,
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Aquinas incorporates in his own manner the earliest Greek
cosmological reflection on eros as the moving power of
attraction within all things. At the same time he excludes
any vision of a cosmos divided betweeing competing
principles of eros and eris (strife). Even though his is a
fallen cosmos - and the idea of the fall structures what he
can say about appetitus in man - it is at the same time a
redeemed cosmos, within which any force of conflict is
controlled and secondary. The order of being is thus for
Aquinas one of maximum harmony: it is the nature of all
things to move towards their divinely implanted end in
ordination to the bonum commune, and in moving to this end
they are neither led nor forced (cf De Ver. 22.1; S.Th. I,
103 1 ad 3). As we remarked in contrasting the situation
with Zhu Xi, being is an intellectual order ordained
towards an intellectual goal].
What Aquinas says on appetitus naturalis, as a
characteristic of all entities, opens for us here the
second aspect of passivity in amor: instead of that
passivity now being the term, the quies and transformatio
of amor, passivity is the origin, the informed aptness of
an entity to enjoy a certain kind of movement. For all
forms of appetitus, Aquinas notes that amor is the
principle of movement (amor dicitur illud quod est
principium motus tendentis in finem amatum S.Th. 1a 2ae 26
1. resp), and this principium is referred to as
connaturalitas (for appetitus naturalis) and coaptatio and
gcentia boni (for appetitus sensitivus and
intellectivU,s). In terms of human agency this entails that
the will is already originally marked by the complacentia
boni and in this sense is one with its goal before any
active process of willing is engaged. Before desire,
complacentia thus marks a radical acceptance of the good, a
moment of concord and harmony with all things, and thus a
quality which profoundly mutes the tone of active desire.
It is an ontological characterisation which is caught in
the famous words of Julian of Norwich, that "All is well,
and all is well, and all manner of thing shall be well",
and which, independent of any theology of grace, makes a
certain gratitude and acceptance the source of any willing.
At this point there is a marked convergence between amor as
complacentia boni for Aquinas, and ren as an aspect of
ontological order for Zhu Xi: insofar as ren is part of
human nature and of the natural order, it marks the given
state of being-as-goodness prior to any active structure of
desire, the tranquillity of l_i_ within the movement of qi,
just as the complacentia boni marks the harmony of the
intellectual creature with being before any active movement
of will or desire.
b. Amor, dilectio and amicitia.
From what we have considered, we can thus see that
Aquinas notes two passive movements in amor, the term
whereby amans is transformed into amatum, and also the
origin whereby amor is connaturalitas, coaptatio.
complacentia boni, at which point amans is in some way
IfOO
already conformed to amatum. And while we have noted that
he predicates amor of God as an active power linked with
voluntas, he also allows that amor marks the moment of
receptiveness within the life of the Trinity. Aquinas
understands the trinitarian processions as a circularity of
movement and rest within divine esse. The order of created
being is also marked by a circular movement, from origin to
goal. And within creation any particular operations of
love in turn take on a circular form.
Thus, in specifying that amor est passio Aquinas draws
on Aristotle to show that the movement of love is circular:
(appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in de Anima).
First, he notes that what is desired moves the appetite
(appetibile enim movet appetitum) establishing itself in
some way within the intentio of appetite (faciens se
quodammodo in ejus intentione) - at this point appetitus is
passive, and prior to any movement towards the object of
desire it is already in a sense identified with it: the
appetibile is the active principle which changes the
appetitus, and appetitus is in passive, receptive identity
with it before movement. After the effect of the
appetibile, appetitus then moves towards it, and the term
of its movement (goal) is thus the same as the principle of
its movement (origin) (ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit
principium (S.Th. 1a 2ae 26 2 resp). The sequence is
described thus:
Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur
amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia
appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in
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appetibile, qui est desidkrium; et ultimo quies, quae
est gaudium. Ibid.
And in conclusion he remarks specifically that amor does
not designate the movement of an appetite towards its
object (non nominet motum appetitus tendentum in
appetibile) but designates rather that prior change in an
appetite whereby an object is known to be attractive (ei
appetibile complaceat, ad 3).
We have already encountered various ways of linking
terms such as amor, caritas, and amicitia. Cicero, for
instance, spoke of caritas so as to make it a more complete
or perfected form of amor. Aquinas discusses differences
by remarking that amor, dilectio, caritas and amicitia are
four similar, but not interchangeable, terms (S.Th. Ia2ae
2b. 3 resp). Amor is the most extensive term, so that any
moment of dilectio or caritas is a moment of amor. but not
vice versa (omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed
non e converso). Dilectio carries the connotation of
choice; it is thus rooted in the will and is solely a
property of rational creatures. Caritas is a perfection of
amor, and indicates that the object of amor is held in high
esteem (id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur).
In speaking of amor and dilectio Aquinas notes that,
insofar as they are located in the intellect, they are the
same (in parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et
dilectio, ad 3) - this is in accord with what has already
been established regarding amor intellectivus as a
complacentia boni. But he adds that, when speaking of amor
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and dilectio as aspects of will, amor specifies a more
divine quality (nomen amoris esse divinus nomine
dilectionis, ad 4); what is superior in amor is its passive
aspect, in contrast with the active process of rational
reflection implicit in dilectio - the passivity of amor
marks a more direct attraction to God:
Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem
passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc
eum ratio propria ducere possit, quod pertinet ad
rationem dilectionis. ad 4
In this it is the passive moment in will, will as reception
and acquiescence rather than active choice, that is
primary. Here, despite the full assimilation of Aristotle
on desire, and despite the privilege granted to human
rationality and free will, it is the ontological moment of
amor as reception of being, secundum modum recipientis,
that is selected above any other. It is at this point also
that contact could be made with Zhuangzi and Huineng, in
the moment of spontaneous natural response to the order of
being, in a passive acceptance of one's place within it -
though for Aquinas the original goodness of being (ens et
unum convertuntur) would be carried to a specific
ontological foundation, and a theological ground, that
differs from the emptiness of Daoism and Chan. Within the
priority of amor over dilectio the process of willing
becomes more a process of non-willing (wu-wei). of reducing
the process of rational deliberation so as to open the
space of contemplative acceptance - thus the Christian way
first as a via receptionis, though the whole style of
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thinking about being here could readily be shifted into a
post-Christian, Heideggerian key.
We might finally note that Aquinas speaks of amicitia at
this point by situating it within amor, in such a way as to
distinguish two fundamentally different kinds of amor, amor
concupiscentiae, love-of-desire, and amor amicitae.
love-of-friendship. [Given that the word "concupiscence"
has now in English - or did have, when it was more commonly
used - pejorative overtones, it is important to remark that
for Aquinas "concupiscentia" is a much more neutral term].
His distinction between these two kinds of amor allows
Aquinas to make more precise a distinction which we found
not to be fully worked out in Aristotle's account of
friendship; it concerns the process of "wishing good for
someone." Aquinas notes that two aspects are involved:
amor concupiscentiae relates to the object desired, whether
that object is desired for oneself or for another; amor
amicitiae relates to the person for whom the object is
desired. [He does not make it clear at this point, but his
exposition allows that amor amicitiae could be towards
self, as the one for whom a bonum is desired]. Not all
friendship is amor amicitiae: insofar as a person is loved
for what we desire from them by way of use or pleasure,
then that person becomes a bonum desired through amor
concupiscentiae [S.Th la2ae 26 4 ad3]. Amor amicitiae, by
implication, is desire for the well-being of a person -
whether self or other - insofar as that well-being is
considered in relation to the bonum commune.
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5. Aspects of Caritas
(i) Caritas and amor, grace and nature
We have seen that Aquinas considers caritas to be a
perfection of amor; that brief reference might seem to let
us situate caritas within an entirely naturalistic frame:
amor is the general tendency to perfection, caritas is the
quality marking chosen and valued affective relationships -
we would here be very close to what Cicero has to say. The
relationship between amor and caritas should, however, open
for us a different issue, that concerning relations between
the order of nature and the order of grace: here we would
situate amor within the area of the general movement of all
entities towards God, and caritas within the area of that
human responsiveness to God and to persons which is only
reckoned possible through the work of Christ's incarnation
and redemption [31].
Here, as we deal with part of the contrast between
nature and grace, it should be noted from the start that
Aquinas' "nature" is already a fully theological
conception: nature issues from God, bears the mark of
divine creation, is oriented towards God and desires God as
its natural perfection. The ultimate end towards which
intellectual creatures are ordered is, for Aquinas, an
intellectual end, a vision of the divine essence, and this
is affirmed in a theology where God is known as Ens
intellectuale:
Visio...divinae substantiae est ultimus finis
cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae 3C.G. 58 Item
Nonetheless, if that is the perfective end of any human
life, and as such its natural end (omnis intellectus
naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem 3CG 57
Item), it is reckoned an end not capable of realisation
through the order of creation, but only through grace. The
orientation towards this end is capable of partial
realisation in this life, according to the exercise of
reason alone - it is in this respect that Aquinas reckons
philosophy already to constitute a participatio
beatitudinis - but its final fulfilment is only set within
the divine patria. In focussing this issue Aquinas speaks
of two forms of felicitas, one achieved in via which is a
knowing that does not attain to essences, the other
achieved in patria which is a vision of essence through the
lumen gloriae
duplex est felicitas hominis. Una imperfecta quae
est in via, de qua dicit Philosophus; et haec
consistit in cognitione substantiarum separatarum per
habitum sapientiae: imperfecta tamen, et talis
qualis est in via possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsa
quidditas. Alia est perfecta in patria, quae ipse
Deus per essentian videbitur, et aliae substantiae
separatae: et haec felicitas non erit per aliquem
scientiam speculativam, sed per lumen gloriae. de
Trin. 6.4.3.
Aquinas evinces a certain ambivalence over the capacity of
persons naturally to desire a vision of the divine essence
(part of his problem here was to determine what orientation
to perfection was enjoyed by such "pagan" philosophers as
Socrates and Aristotle who lived before Christ), and at
times it appears that what is naturally desired is only a
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limited perfection that might be possible and known without
grace. Remarking that beatitude designates the ultimate
perfection of a rational nature, a perfection naturally
desired as such, he qualifies things by saying that a final
perfection is twofold (Ultima autem perfectio rationalis
seu intellectualis naturae est duplex, S.Th. 1a 62.1.c):
there is a perfection that can be desired by nature, and
such was desired by Aristotle; there is another perfection,
the vision of the essence of God, which can only be desired
through grace:
videre Deum per essentian, in quo ultima beatitudo
rationalis creaturae consistit, est supra naturam
cujuslibet intellectus creati. Unde nulla creatura
rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum
ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a super naturali
agente. Et hoc dicimus auxilium gratiae. S.Th. la
62.2.c
And he goes on to remark that a turning towards the final
beatitudo is rendered difficult and beyond nature (supra
naturam) because of the corruption of the body and the
effect of sin (ibid ad.2). [We might note that it is at
this point, if not elsewhere, that the notion of matter as
a certain resistance fo the divine - a question we raised
earlier - might be located. In general Aquinas' concept of
matter is of a pure passivity that is shaped by a
structuring form - in the human sphere the soul is the form
of the body, instead of something contained in the body as
it was for Augustine. Yet the body here does set a limit,
not through the effect of sin alone but as a result of its
materiality, to that vision of the divine essence which is
a purely intellectual affair].
tfO-7
Insofar as a failure or limitation of natural desire
results from the sin with which, for Aquinas, all men are
marked through the fall of Adam, then the lifting,
perfection and transformation of natural desire is only
achieved through the life and death of Christ, which
constitutes the prime locus of caritas. The death of
Christ takes away a barrier erected by man between man and
God. God's love is constant (Aquinas quotes Jeremiah 33:
In caritate perpetua dilexi te, S.Th Ilia 49.4 ad2), and
Christ's work, a cleansing and a recompense for wrongdoing
(ibid.), restores, or creates a new, human openness to
God.
(ii) Caritas and virtue
Within a theology of the virtues - and it is this
framework which allows the only possible final articulation
of virtue and its tendency that Aquinas can acknowledge -
caritas plays a foundational role: it is the form, the end,
the mother, the motor, the root of all virtue. It is
caritas for instance that directs all virtues towards their
ultimate end
(per caritatem ordinatur actus omnium aliarum
virtutum ad ultimum finem, S.Th. 2a 2ae 23.8. resp)
constituting thus the form of the virtues and their
efficient cause:
caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutem, non
quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis
effective inquantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit
secundum modum praedictum. ad 1
[What is covered in the secundum modum praedictum is the
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position established in the responsio: all virtues are
directed towards an end, which is identified as principale
bonum hominis (cf 23.7 resp); ends are however identified
in a twofold way, as we have already seen; and it is
caritas that directs any particular virtue from a proximate
end towards a final end (ultimus finis) (cf 23.7. resp)].
Aquinas links caritas with the direct activity of God in
the life of an individual, though specifying this in such a
way as to attempt to preserve individual freedom. Within
an individual's life acknowledgement is made that
perfection in caritas is a cumulative process, passing
through discrete stages (an analogy is offered with the
natural stages in life through which an individual grows,
S.Th. 2a 2ae 24.9 resp).
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
"How big the world is. They keep telling us it's
getting smaller all the time. But it's not, is it?
Whatever we learn about it makes it bigger. Whatever
we learn about it makes it bigger. Whatever we do to
complicate things makes it bigger. It's all a
complication. It's one big tangled thing." She began
to laugh. "Modern communications don't shrink the
world, they make it bigger. Faster planes make it
bigger. They give us more, they connect more things.
The world isn't shrinking at all. People who say
it's shrinking have never flown Air Zaire in a
tropical storm." I don't know what whe meant by this
but it sounded funny. It sounded funny to her too.
She had to talk through her laughter. "No wonder
people go to school to learn stretching and bending.
The world is so big and complicated we don't trust
ourselves to figure out anything on our own. No
wonder people read books that tell them how to run,
walk and sit. We're trying to keep up with the
world, the size of it, the complications.
Don DeLillo, The Names
We might begin with a criticism of a certain reading of
Plato:
As for the properly philosophical configuration of
Platonic thought, it is but an anachronistic project.
So many anachronistic categories and architectonic
violations imposed, under the pretext of fidelity,
upon the thought of the philosopher who recommended
respect for the articularities of the living
organism, and thus for those of discourse.
Derrida, 1982:221, 223.
The criticism returns us in an obvious way to the points
outlined in chapter one: the difficulty of reading, the
problem of interpretation, the recognition of the other as
other. Here Derrida suggests that the discovery of a
system in Plato is an importation: system is more a
function of the metaphysical tradition developing from
Plato than an aspect of his own free and supple thinking.
Yet Derrida's reading itself apparently sits here in the
shadow of metaphysics, bear the metaphysical concern with
truth that has since been imported into hermeneutics, the
belief that a text might finally yield one true
interpretation, that once the encrusted layers of
systematic philosophy are removed the true impulse and
tendency of Plato's philosophy might be seen. A different
approach is perhaps indicated by Dewey:
Plato's generation would, I think, have found it
difficult to class Plato. Was he an inept visionary
or a subtle dialectician? A political reformer or a
founder of a new type of literature? Was he a moral
exhorter or an instructor in an Academy? Was he a
theorist upon education, or the inventor of a method
of knowledge? We, looking at Plato through the
centuries of exposition and interpretation, find no
difficulty in placing Plato as a philosopher and in
attributing to him a system of thought. We dispute
about the nature and content of this system, but we
do not doubt it is there. It is the intervening
centuries which have furnished Plato with his
technique and which have developed and wrought Plato
to a system.[1]
Here Dewey and Derrida agree on the consolidation of a
certain Western reading of Plato but disagree on how to
approach the Platonic text. Dewey finds many Platos
disseminated throughout a series of writings, and sits
comfortably with the idea that these differences are simply
that: to be a philosopher is no greater than to be a
rhetor, to be a visionary no worse than to be a teacher:
the functions of each are different, each contributing in
its own way to a larger enterprise. Derrida in part seems
at first to want to reduce differences to a set of
structuralist laws governing the formation of texts,
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inverting the Forms so that instead of giving us a
metaphysical otherworld he provides a structuralist
underworld, abandoning Plato the systematiser in favour of
Plato the maker of inferiority from the myth of writing.
He offers a more subtle reading elsewhere, however, and at
those points there is greater convergence between his sense
of textual indeterminacy and Dewey's sense of textual
differences; it is on that shared idea of the text as a
manifold, a plurality not a unity - precisely thus a text,
and not a book - that I wish now to draw within a partial
commentary on the readings I have offered in the previous
chapters [2].
1 . Reading Traditions.
Do we sit necessarily in the shadow of the past,
listening still to the ghostly voices of our ancestors
breaking through the fixed solidity of any present writing?
Does this otherworld, the beyond of our traditions from
whose constraints the enlightenment of reason has worked to
set us free, still claim our allegiance, and if so for what
reasons and to what ends? Is our task as readers one of
filial piety, gathering the fractured logoi spermatikoi of
forgotten voices and drawing them into a whole of meaning
and value, erecting thus a monument that might observe and
govern our lives today? Or do we simply walk down other
paths, consign the past to an appropriate oblivion whilst
gathering from it anything reckoned useful for us now,
constructing en route those rituals of parricide that might
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free the heart from its dark entwinement with its
oppressor? How much of this has been done already?[3]
ILL Different Pasts, Different Presents.
It has been one hallmark of the modern era to proclaim
itself as new, to separate itself from the old order and to
find in its own fresh-minted practices something marked by
difference. Virginia Woolf's observation that, on a
certain day in 1914, human nature changed, serves as a
crystallisation of a sense of newness that has survived the
chaos of subsequent decades, even if what is reckoned new
is now thought more problematic than when it was first
announced. Marx and Darwin, Freud and Nietzsche stand more
solidly over this century's course than almost any other
figures, and each bears a sign of no return: no return to
innocence, to simplicity, to transcendence, to providence,
to a theological order within which the human figures as a
summit of protection. As we saw earlier with Serres, the
mark of the human is the mark of the parasite, as it is for
any other organism. The rethinking of human nature and its
prospects within this framework has to be complete, and
seemingly from other foundations than those established in
previous ages [4 ] .
Within this framework, accepted, perceived and rejected
in a variety of ways, the question of the status of the
past has been variously answered, scarcely once without
inherent anbiguities. In analytical philosophy, for
instance, the function of philosophy has come to be seen in
terms of problem solving, and of clarification of the
language within which philosophical (and other) problems
are put. Here Plato and Aristotle might be preserved
within a philosophical paideia, though somewhat unsteadily
if all the problems they raised have all either been
settled by later philosophers or abandoned as
pseudo-problems (in which case, why begin the paideia two
and a half thousand years ago, rather than with Quine?)
And since some analytical philosophers do read historical
texts for the problems they contain, there emerges a
question of circularity concerning the process whereby one
comes to know which texts still carry interesting and
unresolved issues. The editorial policy in the recent
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy is one which
chooses for consideration only those philosophers, and
those aspects of their work, which remain philosophically
germane - but the very process of achieving that policy
entails a prior substantial act of faith in the extensive
reading of historical philosophical texts, in order to
distinguish the still 'living' works and issues [5] . The
analytical philosopher is himself here parasitic on the
work of historical inquiry, whilst at the same time
abandoning history in favour of perennial philosophical
truths or issues, leaving unresolved the question why one
should want to turn to the medievals at all.
The historical naivete of analytical philosophy is
matched by an opposite tendency amongst hermeneutic
philosophers such as Heidegger and, to an extent, Derrida,
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where the continuing significance of the work of reading
traditions is simply taken for granted. If the hermeneutic
enterprise - as evidenced in Herder, Dilthey and
Scheiermacher - is centred on the retrieval of metaphysical
and spiritual truth from the particular historical forms of
its manifestation (and is marked by the organisation of
curricula around literary, philosophical and theological
"classics", which are judged still to be able to speak,
still to be relevant), then the deconstructive turn perhaps
constitutes, within that enterprise, a wandering in
philosophical graveyards, with an invocation to the dead to
speak again but differently. This desire to preserve the
voice of death within the forms of a living culture can
perhaps itself be read as an anachronism, and as an
idealism which lifts the text above the material and social
conditions of its production and operation [6].
Relations of past to present can be as manifoldly varied
as the forms of our contemporary culture, so our question
why read the past can become differentiated into the
indefinite series, why read the past from this perspective?
Here the question of the value ascribed to the perspective
becomes an issue. One reading of postmodernism is that it
marks an uninhibited and eclectic pluralism: if "Anything
goes" becomes with Feyerabend the hallmark of free
scientific enquiry, beyond the constraints of an orthodoxy
of methods, then it becomes also the hallmark of a
postmodern culture which wishes to define itself in terms
of play and creativity rather than as submission to
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orthodoxy or respect for tradition. Yet while pluralism
works for those able and willing to join the pluralist's
game, it remains an undermining option for those positions
which claim some access to the Truth (whether scientific,
metaphysical, political, psychoanalytic or religious).
Hre pluralism puts in question the foundations of truth,
but its own non-founded discourse is itself challenged at
those points where play meets the fixed contours of
authority. [And how far are those contours required for
play itself? Borges remarked that it «s only under the
force of a totalitarian regime that the full
self-enclosing, allegoric and seductive play of literature
could come into its own. Steiner, too, sees in the willed
concealment of art its deepest intensity, premissing this
on the notion that th wellsprings of language lie in
privacy, not in the open forum of public discourse [7].
Even if one takes this stance as characteristic of a
certain style of literary art, the generalised openness of
a postmodern stance is here questioned].
If a new pluralism sees itself as the cutting edge of
the modern - thus implicitly retaining the modernist theme
of an avant-garde, and retaining some of the ideology it
more generally discredits, whilst seeing its own playful
stance as the aufhebunq of these postures (to be post
modern is better than to be modern, to be pluralist more
civilised and democratic than to favour the elitism of a
single orthodoxy) - then its attitude towards less
enlightened positions is rightly one either of critique or
dismissal, which thus, from within the advocacy of
pluralism, sets a series of defining parameters to the very
idea of a pluralist culture. Rorty, although not at this
point specifically addressing a postmodern agenda, thus
argues that the different problematics of both analytical
and hermeneutic philosophy have now been superceded, that a
paradigm-shift has occurred in philosophy, making any
concern with metaphysical or representational truth, and
with foundational positions, a now obsolete issue (which
does not mean that certain philosophers will no longer deal
with such an issue, only that in so doing they will
represent an increasingly irrelevant species: worthwhile
philosophical inquiry will simply be located elsewhere
[8]). In this framework the concern with pluralism can
involve an enlightened tolerance of unenlightened
positions, but more critically it seeks the elimination of
obsolete issues for the cultural agenda.
Insofar as this approach shows a readiness to let
unproductive options die away, then a perspective within it
from which to read the past might be as follows: that one
starts with an aspect of contemporary culture judged to be
important, and incorporates as much of any history as seems
of value to illuminate, further or resolve it. Here,
rather than assuming with the keepers of tradition that we
must read the "classics" first in order to become competent
philosophers and thinkiners, engagement might start from an
issue such as the Holocaust, or some problems of
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translation between English and Chinese, and, in the
development of a philosophy of culture or a philosophy of
language, incorporate as much of a history of philosophy,
culture and etymology as seems required by the topic.
Shifting thus from the forms of what Alice Miller calls
oisonous pedagogy" - the use of learning as an induction
to conformity - we would engage in learning as in a play of
creativity geared towards the enhancement of creativity in
others [9].
That much said, it remains that a postmodern stance is
one option in the contemporary world, and that other
options would negate the projects it might favour. It is
easy enough to read twentieth century Thomism as a
reactionary flight from the complexities of present life
and discourse, but the transcendentalism of which it has
been a guardian remains disseminated, beyond the boundaries
of one specific school. Thus even though Mackie concludes
that theism can no longer constitute a philosophically
coherent option [10], for the philosophy of culture the
fixing of the rhetoric of transcendence within a
contemporary discourse, the reckoning of its force and
provenance, remains a vital issue.
(ii) Aesthetics and Transcendence: the Imagining of History.
Wallace Stevens is perhaps the clearest proponent of
that vision of the imagination which held strong sway
within modernism: rather than speaking of it as a capacity
to apprehend and form transcendent truth (as it was for
Coleridge, but could no longer be after Nietzsche), he sees
it as a fictive power, a power to invent worlds, a human
power that is necessary but fragile, a power that is today
increasingly unsure of its bearings. This freeing of
imagination from truth, this option for aesthetic
enhancement over truthful discourse, marks one contemporary
way of handling the resources of the past. When Peter
Brook directs the Mahabharata he does not require of us an
absolute belief in the intricacies of Hindu theism; his
narrative deconstructs itself as it proceeds, the
storyteller intervenes to remind us that the form of our
engagement is, precisely, a story, the spell of mystery and
transcendence is given its play, dis-spelled, conjured up
once more, in recognition that the gods have always
been ciphers of human power, fertile when perceived thus,
dangerous when reckoned as signs of the Other [11]. So
also Wim Wenders, in Wings of Desire, takes Rilke's
Angel, a late marker of Romanticism, and gives it human
form in contemporary Berlin: through the eyes of the angel
it is the human drama which appears as eminently
attractive, in its joy and pain, longing and pathos - it is
here that the angel comes to rest, not to inspire and
redeem, but to live.
These two examples, expressions of the power of the
human and acts of faith in it represent transition beyond
the structuralist death of humanism remarked in Foucault's
elegy:
One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the
oldest nor the most constant problem that has been
posed for human knowledge. Taking a relatively short
chronological sample within a restricted geographical
area - European culture since the sixteenth century -
one can be certain that man is a recent invention
within it. It is not around him and his secrets that
knowledge prowled for so long in the darkness. In
fact, among all the mutations that have affected the
knowledge of things and their order, the knowledge of
identities, differences, characters, equivalences,
words - in short, in the midst of all the episodes of
that profound history of the Same - only one, that
which began a century and a half ago and is now
perhaps drawing to a close, has made it possible for
the figure of man to appear. And that appearance was
not the liberation of an old anxiety, the transition
into luminous consciousness of an age-old concern,
the entry into objectivity of something that had long
remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies: it
was the effect of a change in the fundamental
arrangements of knowledge. As the archaeology of our
thought easily shows, man is an invention of a recent
date. And one perhaps nearing its end.
If those arrangements were to disappear as they
appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment
do no more than sense the possibility - without
knowing either what its form will be or what it
promises - were to cause them to crumble, as the
ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the
eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that
man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the
edge of the sea. Foucault, 1970: 386-87.
Foucault begins The Order of Things with a problem of
taxonomy, the ordered relationship of entities within
discourses, the construction of a site of meaning within
which similarities and differences might be identified,
placed and known. In his archaeology of modernism, the
groundwork for Rorty's philosophical paradigm shift (for
the French it is a Bachelardian epistemological break) is
already underway, and within this clearing a new play of
meaning which ruptures the boundaries of disciplinary
orthodoxy is set in motion. As part of this play - and we
are still moving here towards a reckoning with tradition -
a new question of "man" is at stake.
Confucianism - in its origins, through its formulation
by Zhu Xi, and beyond - has always placed "man" at the
centre of its discourse; not a "scientific" discourse, not
a discourse that wants to make "man" and "his" achievements
(of language, political forms, religious structures) the
object of an increasingly differentiated network of
categorisation, but one which has instead sought to place
knowledge of self-perfective practices at the heart of its
various agendas. Yet the contemporary reading of this
tradition is problematic, as we suggested in chapter one.
Joseph Needham's retrieval of the practice and theorisation
of the forms of scientific inquiry in China is a work of
modernist scholarship, involving commitment to the idea of
a single line of progress in scientific development and
presenting itself as a chapter in world humanism [12] . As
such, and in various of its aspects it has released a
hitherto obscured set of transformative practices so that
they are now open for pragmatic and aesthetic,
consideration; acupuncture and other aspects of Chinese
medicine may for instance now become prized features of a
broader medical culture. But what value, what cultural
location, can be posited for the retrieval of Confucian and
neo-Confucian humanism? Can its vision of human
perfection,its strategies, its metaphysics of man and
nature, be incorporated into a contemporary philosophy of
culture? To vary what we said earlier: if Whitehead gives
us an organic world view, if a new phase of science is
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beginning to develop within a properly ecological
framework, then do we need an intensive reading of Zhu Xi
in order to deepen our own responsive humanism, or is it
not better - not simply in a time of urgency, but from
mature recognition that the past is past - to acknowledge
that the time of Confucianism is gone, and that appropriate
to our world now is the invention of new forms of humanism
- new ways of viewing "the human", and new networks of
social relationships - rather than any retrieval of what
has been surpassed? Similarly, even though Aquinas offers a
holistic Christian Aristotelianism, is it not better to
acknowledge the intellectual and cultural shifts that
displace his world from ours, to acknowledge thus the
historical specificity and determinateness of his style of
thinking and his world vision, and so to proceed instead to
develop a different holism of man and nature that is
founded on new resources?
To ask these questions is not to suggest that a single
programme can be established for relating to traditional
world views. And while I would be sceptical of the
possibilities here, there is a strongly argued position
that the retrieval of neo-Confucianism as liberal humanism
might constitute a moment in the remaking of
post-revolutionary Chinese humanism, just as it might also
constitute a humanising of capitalist culture within
South-East Asia; if so, and independent of any reasons that
might validate its re-appropriation in an East Asian
context, there would be an argument for its place in
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Western cultural agendas as an aspect of our continuing and
extended awareness of others.
Simply to be aware of differences that exist is thus an
important feature of a pluralist world view. To
acknowledge that there are forms of cultural dynamics other
than that named "postmodernism" in the West is also to
acknowledge that different sets of reasons can be given for
reappropriating rather than abandoning traditions, that
different transcendent economies can also be argued for as
valuable fictive spaces set beyond the imagination of
materialism. It can also be claimed that the remaking of
humanism will incorporate strong elements of physical and
psychological awareness which has been achieved and
articulated in a series of non-Western meditational and
religious disciplines. And even when we accept that the
worldview of Aquinas, as of any Christian theology, is now
superceded, we can perhaps still for a time engage in a
process of re-reading the past by way of a Wittgensteinian
passage of liberation, a distancing from that which still
casts its shadows on our thinking:
after all, this was the proper task of a history of
thought, as against a history of behaviours, or
representations: to define the conditions in which
human beings "problematize" what they are, what they
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Notes to Chapter ^L.
1 . Cf for instance the presentation of Confucian thinking
as enlightened deism and rational tolerance put forward in
the Chinese Catechism, Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary,
pp 78-95; cf also the (not unqualified) presentation of
elite Chinese virtue in the section On China:
the religion of the scholars is admirable. No
superstition, no absurd legends, none of those dogmas
that insult reason and nature...For more than forty
centuries the simplest worship has appeared to them
the best...They are content to worship a god with all
the wise men of the world. Ibid p.115.
The continuing hold on European thought of the rational
model of China can be seen for instance, in Weber's study
of Chinese religion, where the Confucian option is
presented as significantly lacking a mythic dimension:
The prestige of the literati has not consisted in a
charisma of magical powers of sorcery, but rather in
a knowledge of writing and of literature as
such...the Chinese literati-politicians...were
primarily oriented towards problems of internal
administration...This constant orientation toward
problems of the "correct" administration of the state
determined a far-reaching, practical and political
rationalism among the intellectual strata of the
feudal period. Weber, 1964:109-10.
Weber sees Confucius as providing a "pragmatic
transformation of the ancient tradition (of charismatic
warrior kings)" ibid, p.113.
2. Cf for instance the movement of inquiry that occurs in
"A Dialogue on Language", (Heidegger 1971b), where the
shift towards a radical encounter between Eastasian and
European worlds occurs in 3 stages:
- an affirmation of difference -
Some time ago I called language... the house of Being.
If man by virtue of his language dwells within the
claim and call of Being, then we Europeans probably
dwell in an entirely different home to Eastasian man.
(p5 )
-a hesitation that indicates a direction -
I do not yet see whether what I am trying to think of
as the nature of language is also adequate for the
nature of the Eastasian language; whether in the end -
which would also be the beginning - a nature of
language can reach the thinking experience, a nature
which would offer the assurance that European-Western
saying and Eastasian saying will enter into a dialogue
such that in it there sings something that wells up
from a single source. (p8)
j-a tentative affirmation that there may be a common way of saying
(undercuts the dualities of metaphysical and conceptual discourse
It seems to me as though even we, now, instead of
speaking about language, had tried to take some steps
along a course which entrusts itself to the nature of
Saying, (p.54)
Some of the issues at stake here will come up for us later
in our elucidation of Daoist and Chan/Zen thinking. For
further reference, of the other essays in Heidegger 1971b;
the essay "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger
l971a:17-87; Heidegger 1966 and 1968; and in commentary
Wood 1981 , and HGilliburton 1981 .
3. On Rodin cf for instance Judrin et Laurent, 1979.
Achille Delaroche provides an assessment of Gauguin to
which the latter himself was sympathetic:
"Gauguin is the painter of primitive natures; he
loves them and possesses their simplicity, their
suggestion of the hieratic, their somewhat awkward
and angular naivety. His personages share the
unstudied spontaneity of the virgin flora. It was
only logical, therefore, that he should have exalted
for our visual delight the riches of this tropical
vegetation where a free life of Eden luxuriates under
the happy stars ... a local habitation ... unpolluted
as it still is by the lies of our civilisation."
Gauguin 1985a:21.
And cf Gauguin's own fantasising of his visionary guest in
Noa Noa, with his contrast between the deceitful burden of
Western civilisation and the innocence of a young Tahitian
male:
"I alone carried the burden of an evil thought, a
whole civilisation had been before me in evil and had
educated me." Gauguin 1985b:28.
Bataille develops a potent reading of the power of art at
Lascaux, seeing in it the emergence of a new humanity,
possessed of the force of transgression:
"At Lascaux, more troubling even than the deep
descent into the earth, what preys upon and
transfixes us is the vision, present before our very
eyes, of all that is most remote. This message,
moreover, is intensified by an inhuman strangeness.
Following along the rock walls, we see a kind of
cavalcade of animals ... But this animality is
nonetheless for us the first sign, the blind
unthinking sign and yet the living intimate sign, of
our presence in the real world." Bataille 1980:11.
4. Cf O'Flaherty 1976 for a statement on her deployment of
different tools in exploring the layers of Hindy mythology.
5. From "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida, 1978:81.
Derrida incorporates a footnote in the text as marked*
which reads:
That is, to relativism: the truth of philosophy does
not depend upon its relation to the actuality of the
Greek or the European event, p.311
Following Husserl and Heidegger he identifies philosophy as
an event or irruption that lays claim to and gives form to
Greece and Europe; and he quotes Heidegger in elucidation:
(the) word philosophia tells us that philosophy is
something which, first of all, determines the
existence of the Greek world. Not only that -
philosophia also determines the innermost basic
feature of our Western-European history, the often
heard expression "Western-European philosophy" is, in
truth, a tautology. Why? Because philosophy is Greek
in its nature; Greek, in this instance, means that in
origin the nature of philosophy is of such a kind
that it first appropriated the Greek word, and only
it, in order to unfold." Heidegger, 1958:29-31;
Derrida, 1978:312.
Derrida's complicity in the Western tradition at this
point, and his failure to distance himself from Heidegger,
excludes a broader consideration of those other
philosophies which are not given over to the Greeks.
6. Nonetheless it should be noted that, partly in the
wake of Derrida's work, a reappraisal of Sophistic thinking
is underway. For scholarly and philosophical examinations
of the issues for instance, cf Kerferd 1981a and 1981b, and
Cassin 1986a and 1986b; and for a Sophistic re-presentation
within a contemporary philosophical position cf Lyotard and
Thebaud 1981.
7. It could of course be argued that it is precisely the
limit texts in twentieth century writing - with their
moments of reversal, impossibility, contradiction and
deconstruction, the "limits of sense" Llewelyn, 1987, in
figures as varied as Bataille, Artaud, Ponge, Levinas and
Husserl - that Derrida concentrates on, thereby loosening
the solid structure of tradition in a reading that shows
the irruptive other. And Derrida himself acknowledges that
this particular movement of loosening and deconstruction,
already underway, is what he draws upon and expands.
However the location of disruption primarily at this
cultural point, and the acknowledgement - differently
worked from Heidegger's - of a certain veiling process in
the texts of Plato, whence philosophy became dominated by a
metaphysics of speech, presence, self-presence, and the
proper, constitutes a reading that does not focus strongly
on moments of irruptive power elsewhere, whether in the
medieval or Renaissance/Reformation worlds. There is a
sense in which, in his early writings, Derrida over-creates
the solidity of tradition as a kind of terror (perhaps
leaning on Foucault and Althusser), in order to grant a
special favour to certain contemporary readings that might
liberate us from it. That much said, the new intellectual
formation that emphasises writing is prcisely new, and
transformative:
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Now, one can follow the treatment accorded to writing
as a particularly revelatory symptom, from Plato to
Rousseau, Saussure, Husserl, occasionally Heidegger
himself, and a fortiori in all the modern discourses
- sometimes the most faithful ones - that remain
within Husserl's and Heidegger's questions. Such a
symptom is necessarily, and structurally,
dissimulated, for reasons and along pathways that I
attempt to analyze. And if this symptom is revealed
today, it is not at all due to some more or less
ingenious discovery initiated by someone here or
there,. It is due rather to a certain total
transformation (that can no longer even be called
'historical' or 'worldwide,' because the
transformation infringes upon the security of such
significations) that also can be ascertained in other
determined gields (mathematical and logical
formalization, linguistics, ethnology,
psychoanalysis, political economy, biology, the
technology of information, programming,etc"
Derrida 1 981t>: 7
8. I consider the idea of a perennial philosophy further
below. For Thomists the notion that Aquinas provides the
perennial philosophy is a basic datum - cf for instance the
remarks of Copleston:
"how could one find in St. Thomas an answer to some
of Nietzsche's deepest yearnings and struggles - and
yet, if Thomism is the perennial philosophy, there
must be such an answer to be found." Copleston
1944:2
9. Early comparisons linked Zhu Xi with Spinoza, taking
his philosophy as a form of ethical monism similar to
Spinoza's (cf for instance Graf, 1949), or with Leibniz.
The first comparisons of ideas, some of them made by
Leibniz himself (though in quite general terms) date from
the introduction of Chinese philosophy to Europe by the
early Jesuit missionaries in China (who themselves engaged
in much comparative work). A valuable survey of Western
receptions of Zhu Xi can be found in Chan, 1976. On
comparison between Zhu Xi and Leibniz cf for instance
Bernard-Maitre 1937, Needham 1956, passim, the introductory
remarks to Rosemont and Cook 1977, and Mungello 1978. (For
further on Jesuit comparative work cf below on Figurism.)
An abridged translation of Zhu Xi's Zizhi tongjian gangmu
(Outlines of the Comprehensive Mirror of Good Government) -
itself a selective and abridged edition of Sima Guang's
Zizhi tongjian (Comprehensive Mirror of Good Government)
which was planned by Zhu Xi and executed by his followers -
was made by the French Jesuit J.A. Marie de Moyriac de
Mailla under the title Histoire Generale de la Chine, ou
Annales de cet Empire (published in 13 volumes, 1777-80).
Through the Histoire Zhu Xi's Confucian interpretation of
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Chinese history did much to shape European perceptions of
China.
When compared with the attention given to Leibniz or
Spinoza, the significance of a comparison between Aquinas
and Zhu Xi has emerged more slowly. Recent work has been
done in the area, however. A brief outline comparison
between them is presented in Callahan 1950, and fuller
treatment is provided by Graf 1970:293-347 ("Der
Neukonfuzianismus und die Weltanschauung der
Hochscholastik.") A useful schematic comparison of the
metaphysical systems of both can be found in Li Jianqiu
1978; and some of the broader thematic issues are touched
indirectly by Ching 1977.
10. Rorty 1980 (cf particularly pp 357-372) suggests a
basic contrast between systematic and edifying philosophies
which, while of value, robs philosophy of its agony and
desire: there is much more to Nietzsche, or Zhuangzi, than
can be captured by the epithet "edifying", and I would
speak of "disruptive" philosophies in order to catch an
appropriate sense of conflict and energy rather than
gentility.
11. That break is as crucial in Western as in Chinese
contexts, though differently figured. If for China the
question is whether a Confucian past can ever bear any
future significance - being tied, perhaps ineluctably to a
patriarchal and agricultural vision of society - for the
West the question is one of the relations between
modernism, post-modernism and tradition. Tradition-minded
philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida continue to work
with resources that are perhaps profoundly inadequate as
means of probing and articulating the dilemmas of a present
culture, but in doing so they nonetheless focus the
difficulties involved in speaking of the end/destruction,
closure/deconstruction of Western metaphysics.
12. On this aspect of Habermas a useful set of essasys is
Habermas 1979.
13. Foucault's dark vision of history, and of the
possibilities of present emancipation, is very close to
that evident in the late work of the frankfurt,
particularly the writings of Adorno. For Foucault's
reading of Nietzsche "■ ^ ~ ~>say "Nietzsche,
14. I am thus for instance in sympathy with the kind of
reading provided in Maclntyre 1981, though not with his
conclusions.
15. One complex, and poorly-defined space is that of
comparative philosophy. Aspects of Western response to
non-Western traditions can be found in Gay 1973 and Manuel
1959. Collections such as Moore 1968, Raju and Castell
Genealogy, History"
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1968, and Sharfstein 1978 show some formative and recent
trends in comparative study. The comparative histories of
philosophy by Plott 1977 and 1979, and Nakamura 1976 are
significant new developments. Donald Lach1s Asia in the
Making of Europe and Joseph Needham's Science and
Civilisation in China provide a background of broader
cultural materials relevant to comparative philosophy.
16. Figurism - continuous with Renaissance Hermeticism and
with the idea of a single perennial (neo-Platonist)
philosophy put forward under the rubric of philosophia
perennis or priscia theologia - was a hermeneutic strategy
deployed by a number of Jesuits in China during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The basic move was to
overcome the diversity of cultural origins by tracing a
single line of development that led to Christianity: the
otherness of China was thus accommodated on the assumption
that the Old Testament figure Shem had gone to China and
given the original law to Fu Xi, first of the mythic
Chinese rulers; China was thus incorporated within a single
original divine dispensation.
Schmitt, 1966, reckons the first datable reference to the
term 'philosophia perennis' to occur in the work of
Agostino Steuco of 1540, De perenni Philosophia. The idea
of such a philosophy, however, antedates Steuco and is
clearly located in the discourse of early Renaissance
neo-Platonism, which in turn draws on Kabbalism,
Hermeticism, Platonism, and early Christian theology. A
central position, as found for instance in Marsilio Ficino,
was that two streams of truth run through history, one
philosophical, the other theological: true philosophy is
Platonism, true theology Christianity, for the former the
basis is Plato, for the latter Scripture. Here it was also
held, however, that prior to Plato there existed an even
earlier tradition of philosophical truth, referred to as
the prisca theologia (or: prisca philosophia, philosophia
priscorum), and Ficino gives one description of that
tradition as follows:
In those things which pertain to theology the six
great theologians of former times concur. Of whom
the first is said to have been Zoroaster, head of the
magi; the second is Hermes Trismegistus, originator
of the priests of Egypt. Orpheus succeeded Hermes.
Aglaophemus was initiated to the sacred things of
Orpheus. Pythagoras succeeded Aglaophemus in
theology. To Pythagoras succeeded Plato, who in his
writings encompassed these men's universal wisdom,
added to it, and elucidated it." Schmitt 1966: 508.
This tradition is described in various ways by different
writers, with various figures being considered central to
it. For more detailed considerations cf Walker 1972.
It should be noted that not all the early Jesuits belonged
to the Figurist group and that, notably, Ricci was not
amongst them. The four chief members were Joseph Henri de
Premare, Joachim Bouvet, Jean-Alexis de Collet, and
Jean-Francois Foucquet. For further details cf Bernard
1935, Rowbotham 1956, Walker 1972: 194-230, and Mungello
1976. For further on Ricci cf the fascinating study by
Spence, 1984, and also the recent work by Rule, 1 986.
17. If the Jesuits spoke of an original transmission of
law, Hegel saw an original movement of Mind from East to
West, fixing the historical record to deny the independence
of diverse forms of historical order and assimilating all
histories to Western history. Eric Voegelin comments that
Hegel overcame diversity
by interpreting the great civilizational societies as
successive phases of the unfolding Geist, simply
disregarding their simultaneity and succession in
time. Especially striking is the treatment of Egypt
and Mesopotamia. Chronologically, they would have to
be placed at the beginning. But that would have
disturbed the westward march of empire toward
ever-increasing freedom, proceeding from China and
India, through Persia, Greece, and Rome, to the
Germanic World with its climax in the empire of the
French Revolution. Hegel resolves the problem by
demoting the early Near Eastern empires to
subsections of the later Persian Empire that had
conquered them; and the same fate he inflicts on
Israel and Judah. By ingenious devices of this
kind...he manages to herd the errant materials on the
straight line that leads to the imperial present of
mankind and to himself as its philosopher. Voegelin
1974:66f.
Here Voegelin speaks of 'historiogenesis' - the validation
of any particular history through relating it uniquely and
paradigmatically to the primordial origin of all history,
of which it is now the fulfilment - as a type or structure
of thought that 'proves of unsuspected importance... because
of its virtual omnipresence' (p.67).
(He examines this type or structure in detail ibid, pp
59-113; it is clear on this reading that priscia theologia,
philosophia perennis and Figurism are instances of
historiogenesis. )
18. In different ways the work of such phenomenologists of
religion as van der Leeuw and Eliade is geared towards
re-founding an ontology that accomodates diversity within a
single comprehensive grid. Van der Leuuw, in
contradiction of his stated phenomenological methods,
presents ,Christianity as the fulfilment of religion,
drawing this assessment of his work from one of his
commentators:
It attempts a classification of all the basic forms
and powers of religions, but van der Leuuw's
scholarly work...deserves the verdict that it is a
seemingly scholarly work carried out for apologetic
and pastoral motives; its theological points contain
its real message. Waardenburg, 1978:203.
Eliade presents an archetypal reading of religious
structures that is universalistic in a way similar to Jung
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(cf Eliade 1955 and 1958), though premissed on a theory of
original revelation most strongly evident in primal
religions, and on a reading of historically developed
religions as caught in a process of decline; against
diversity and difference he offers a kind of nostalgic
utopianism.
19. This kind of move is not confined to Western thinkers
as we shall see repeatedly: historiogenesis, even in
obvious mythic form, is at work for instance in Buddhist
apologists implanting a Buddhist way of life in China, or
in Zhu Xi arguing for a single normative historical
tradition, daotong. Contemporary apologists present some
form of universalism as a way of undercutting diversity
(here difference is always seen as a threat). D.T. Suzuki
views the enlightened mind of the Zen adept as a
manifestation of the universal Buddha-mind, capable of beng
awakened in any cultural context. Radhakrishnan, 1940 and
1963 sees the universal principle of Hindu religion,
sanatana dharma, as constituting the essential form of all
religion. S.H. Nasr, 1975 and 1981, presents a
neo-Platonist reading of Islam which derives from it a
common core of all true religion. The inability here to
experience difference will be one of our main points of
engagement in this study.
20. Michel Corbin,1976, makes this point for Aquinas, in
contrasting his more open form of inquiry with the system
of Hegel. For Zhu Xi, as for any Chinese metaphysical
thinker, it is doubtful that a totalising system is ever a
matter of concern, partly becasue the language of being is
not a language of universals (basic Confucian and Daoist
approaches to language are nominalist), partly because Zhu
emphasises mystery beyond rationality.
21. Twitchitt and Fairbank, Preface to The Cambridge
History of China, Vol.10 Part 1 p.vi, (Cambridge, 1978).
22. From "Crisis as Transition" in Amin, 1982: 52-3.
Eliade views the assimilation of non-Western religions as a
new humanism and a new renaissance. Cf his essay 'A New
Humanism', Eliade, 1969: 1-11, and the following statement:
Orientalism was a new version of the Renaissance, the
discovery of new sources and the return to forgotten,
abandoned sources. Perhaps, without knowing it, I
was in search of a new, wider humanism, bolder than
the humanism of the Renaissance, which was too
dependent on the models of mediterranean classicism.
Perhaps, too, without realising it clearly, I had
understood the true lesson of the Renaissance: the
broadening of the cultural horizon, and the
reconsideration of man's situation in a wider
perspective. What, at first glance, is further from
the Florence of Marsilio Ficino than Calcutta,
Benares, or Rishikesh? Nevertheless, I found myself
there because, as was the case with the humanists of
t a
the Renaissance, a provincial image of man didn't
really satisfy me, and because, ultimately, I dreamed
of rediscovering the model of a 'universal man'
Eliade, 1978:17.
This comment can only now be read, however, in the context
of the 'death of humanism' debates focussed in
structuralist and post-structuralist thinking. The options
for humanism or post-humanism will engage us later.
23. Although the Jinsi Lu is a compendium of writings from
other neo-Confucian philosophers (compiled by Zhu Xi and
his friend Lu Cuqian) rather than an original composition
in the sense in which Aquinas' two Summae are, its
arrangement bears the impress of Zhu Xi's understanding of
neo-Confucianism, and any difficulties within it were
frequently elucidated by reference to other of his
writings. Translations have been made by Graf,1953, and
Chan,1967. Graf speaks of it as the 'neo-Confucian Summa.'
24. For useful surveys of recent developments in Thomist
thought, cf J. Hennessey 'Leo XIII's Thomistic revivial: A
Political and Philosophical Event', and G.A. McCool,
'Twentieth Century Scholasticism', in Tracy, 1978:185-197
and 198-221. And in further detail cf John, 1966.
Significant figures for consideration are Gilson and
Maritain within neo-Thomism, and Lonergan, Rahner, and
Coreth within transcendental Thomism. Of seminal import
for rahner and Coreth (though not so for Lonergan) has been
Joseph Marechal's quest for a rapprochement between
Kantianism and Thomism, Le Point de Depart de la
Metaphysique (Louvain,5 volumes)
25. In Korea neo-Confucianism in general, and Zhu Xi's
thought in particular, were of seminal import in
establishing the norms of culture and topics of learning
that constituted orthodoxy during the Yi dynasty (1392 -
1910), with the Jinsi Lu eventually becoming the subject of
important commentaries by Yi I (1536 - 84), Kim Chang-saeng
(1548 - 1631), and Chong Yop (1563 - 1625). For a
consideration of the historical background to acceptance of
Zhu Xi's thought in the Yi dynasty, and to
neo-Confucianism's usurpation of the previously privileged
position of Buddhism, cf the relevant sections in Hulbert
1962, and Han 1970. On philosoplhical developments cf Lee
Wu-song 1973 and Yi Tae-jiu 1973; and in fuller detail cf
the essays in de Bary and Haboush,1985.
In Japan Zhu Xi's thought made an early appearance, and
in 1333 discussion took place at Go-Daigo's court as to
whether it should be accepted 'as a basis for the policy of
the new government' Sansom 1964:70. The new government,
however, did not last, with the result that
neo-Confucianism, though of continuing interest to
Buddhists as a syllabus of culture, proved to be of no
political import until the Tokugawa period; then, with
Ieyasu's appointment of Hayashi Razan as Confucian adviser
to the Shogunate in 1608, Zhu Xi's ideas began to be
employed as a coherent and acceptable system of thought,
and neo-Confucianism rose to a prominence similar to that
which it enjoyed in China and Korea. In time more
commentaries on the Jin Si Lu were' produced in Japan than
in either China or Korea (though they did not arrive at
the same level of philosophical discussion or elucidation
that obtained in both of those contexts); standard amongst
these was the work of Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), the Kinshi
roku biko (Notes on the Jinsi Lu for Further
Investigation). On the development of neo-Confucianism in
Japan, cf the relevant sections in C. Chang 1958 and 1961;
cf also Hall "The Confucian Teacher in Tokugawa Japan" in
Nivison and Wright 1959:268-301, Nakai 1980, Spae 1967,
and more generally Maruyama 1975.
For more recent developments in neo-Confucianism cf the
final sections in Chang op. cit., the last chapter in Fung
1953 and Briere 1956. On twentieth century Confucians cf
Alitto 1979 and Masson 1985. Tu 1974 provides a good
overview of the conterporary positive re-readings of
neo-Confucianism put forward by Qian Mu and Mou Zongsan.
With others, Tu is committed to a current renewal of
Confucian and neo-Confucian traditions, and one statement
of his position can be found in his essay "Toward a Third
Epoch of Confucian Humanism," Eber 1986:3-21.
26. For Aquinas, philosophy was the product of reason
alone, without support of Christian faith and revelation.
It could include what was later called natural theology, or
the understanding of God achieved by rational reflection.
Aristotle was the epitome of the philosopher, referred to
by Aquinas simply as "the philosopher." The Christian
revelation fulfilled the philosopher's quest, providing
knowledge of God and his purposes that philosophy could not
achieve, and also serving, through symbolism and ritual, as
a means of salvation for all. (Aquinas argued that, other
considerations apart, revelation was necessary since not
all had the intelligence to become philosophers, an
important point given, for instance, the Boethian
definition of the human person as individua substantia
rationalis naturae, and given the premium set on
rationality in Aquinas' own work). The primacy that
Aquinas accorded to revelation over rationality is
well-evidenced by the following remark:
I
Not one of the pre-Christian philosophers" he said in
his explanation of the Apostolic creed, "could with
all his power of thought know so much about God as a
simple woman since the advent of Christ knows through
faith." Grabmann, 1928:50.
What for Aquinas was a distinction between reason and faith
would now appear more as a distinction between two cultural
traditions (Greek and Hebraic), two forms of faith, and two
interpretations of reason; and the argument that one might
"fulfil" the other cannot so easily be made.
27. He wrote roughly 1000 poems, which are collected in
Zhuzi wenji (also called Zhuzi daquan) (Collected Literary
works of Master Zhu). A few of these are translated in
Chan, 1975; Li, 1972 provides a study of Zhu's poetic
activity, and cf also Lynn "Chu Hsi as Literary Theorist
and Critic", Chan, 1.986b: 337-354. A survey of Zhu's
writings can be found in SBl.
28. Cf for instance his Collationes Dominicales (Sunday
Sermons) and De Duobus Praeceptis Caritatis et Decern Legis
Praeceptis (On the Two Commandments of Love, and the Ten
Commandments). Weisheipl, 1975: 355-405 provides a full
Using of the authentic works of Aquinas.
29. Cf in particular the commentaries on the Gospels of
Matthew and John, and also the Catena aurea Super Quattuor
Evangelia, an explanation of the four gospels using
extensive commentaries from Patristic sources.
30. Of particular importance here are the commentaries on
the Ethics and Metaphysics.
31. Although Aquinas' use of Aristotle separated him from
the Augustinian tradition preserved by Bonaventure and the
Franciscans, he still recognized Augustine as the greatest
of the Latin Fathers. Commentary on Augustine, as on John
Chrysostum, can be found throughout his major writings.
32. Cf the Ln Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus (Exposition
of Dionysius' "On the Names of God.")
33. His commentary on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter
Lombard, written between 1253 and 1255, was the first of
Aquinas' major works in systematic theology, the others
being the two Summae.
34. Certainly Aquinas acknowledges in various ways that
human understanding develops, and that one aspect of this
development is the form of historical progression.
However, insofar as he sees the Christian scriptures as a
past revelation of eternal truths, progression always takes
the form of re-appropriating what has already been shown.
The idea of knowledge as a dynamic process of discovery, as
understood in the West since the rise of an experimental
scientific method, is not present.
35. This point has been made by Reu Jiyu, although the claim is
disputed by Fung Yu-lan; cf Ren 1980, and also Ren, "Chu Hsi and
Religion", Chan, 1986b:355-376.
On the question of the daotong cf for instance Ching 1974b.
Zhu Xi's understanding and definition of an orthodox
Confucian tradition is crucial to his philosophy, as we
shall see later.
36. Only the Analects, the sayings attributed to Confucius
himself, had been of major importance in Confucianism
before the late Tang/early Song (ie before about the +10th
century). The Mencius, together with the Great learning
and Doctrine of the Mean, only became central in
consequence of the development of Buddhism, and in relation
to the doctrines of mind, and of the innate goodness of the
mind or of human nature, which certain Buddhist schools
stressed. For Zhu Xi these early Confucian texts
represented a specifically Confucian source for such ideas,
and hence a way of validating the Confucian tradition
against Buddhism. [The Daxue and Zhongyong were originally
two chapters in the Liji (Collection of Rituals), and were
given independent canonical status by Zhu]. Zhu's famous
edition and commentary on the Four Books (the Sishi
jizhu), which he was still revising at his death,
constitutes the completion of his philosophical position
and have a similar status to Aquinas' Summa theologiae,
though in places they are modified by comments in the Yulei
(Classified Conversations).
37. For further detains on the texts cf SBl; and for
further on specific individuals cf SB.
38. The tradition of Yulei derives from Buddhism,
particularly from Chan (Zen), and marks the point when the
scriptural tradition ceased to be central, and when the
enlightened teacher came instead to be seen as the
manifestation of Buddha-nature: to record his sayings thus
became a crucial way of preserving the dharma. On this cf
Yanagida Seizan "The "Recorded Sayings" Texts of Chinese
Chan Buddhism", Lai and Lancaster, 1983:185-205. This
emphasis on the enlightened Buddhist teacher stimulated and
paralleled the neo-Confucian emphasis on the sage.
39. This, the Zhizhi tongjian gangmu, was planned by Zhu
as a morally didactic abridgement of Sima Guang's Zizhi
tongjian (cf above p.8). Zhu's inspiration here was the
moral intention ascribed to Confucius in his (alleged)
exposition of the Chunqiu (Spring & Autumn Annals): to tell
history by alotting appropriate praise and blame to
individuals and events, and to leave out of account
whatever did not serve this pedaogy. For further on
Confucius and the Chunqiu cf chapter 3.
40. The question of narcissism will concern us in various
ways. Chasseguet-Smirgel 1985b , presents the idea of a
healthy recapitulation of narcissism in the ego-ideal as
the necessary means towards establishing and engaging in
life-projects. Bataille's project of excess - the movement
from restricted to general economy, cf Derrida, 1978:
251 ff, - might be read on one account as an attempt to
break the circle of narcissism only by return to an
original relation with the mother. Relations between
Platonic eros and self-love will be central for us later.
Throughout his work - eg in his reading of Levi-Strauss,
Derrida 1978:292, - Derrida observes the power of
W1
narcissism at play in structuring ethnographic enquiry,
where the surpassing innocence of primal cultures becomes
the excellence of a lost ideal.
41. Cooper, 1975:89, argues for "flourishing" as an
appropriate translation of Aristotle's eudaimonia, which
captures well the meaning of the term. Aquinas
incorporated Aristotle on eudaimonia, but extended its
reference theologically on the basis of such concepts as
resurrection and everlasting life. Despite the rhapsodic
note, "eternal flourishing" expresses precisely the goal of
human life (ultimately, of cosmic life) as Aquinas
perceived it.
42. For a listing and consideration of various translations
of ren cf Chan 1975b.
43. The notion that ren might be a cosmic rather than
merely human virtue (in loose comparison with the way in
which for Aquinas amor and appetitus naturalis can be
predicated univerasally and analogically) is a perhaps
controversial reading which we will consider later.
44. On this point in general cf for instance Green, 1979.
Cf also Derrida's various writings on Artaud, as for
instance "The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of
Representation" in Derrida 1978: 232 - 250. While we may
say that theatre opens the field of repression, that
comment must also be held within the problematic of the
theatre as representation: a marking, then, that only lets
slip the repressed as it tries to veil it. Artaud and
Derrida are clear, with Nietzsche, on this point: that
after Aeschylus/Sophocles Western theatre became the s^aae
of (rational) man - thus Artaud:
Man is quite ill in Aeschylus, but still thinks of
himself somewhat as a god and does not want to enter
the membrane, and in Euripides, finally, he splahses
about in the membrane, forgetting where and when he
was a god.
from Le theatre et l'anatomie, La rue, July 1946,
quoted Derrida ibid. p. 233.
While Derrida tracks the links between "cruelty" and the
idea of presence - thus showing Artaud's inevitable
complicity in the world be critiques— he focusses also that
journey to the other shore of "Eastern" theatre that Artaud
makes in order to loosen the constraints on Western man,
identifying thus a stage in that search for the fascinating
mirror of the East that we have already remarked above.
45. The skill of Zhuangzi as a philosopher of play and
reversal is well brought out in Wu, 1982; I shall say more
on the problem of Zhuangzi's naturalism in chapter 4. For
a first linking of Zhuangzi and Derrida cf Yeh, 1983.
46. Aquinas is clear that, as a pedagogical principle, the
movement of ideas should be from first principles. Zhu Xi,
i\58
however, was uncertain as to whether the text of the Jinsi
Lu should begin with a metaphysical statement, or whether
this might not be too abstruse and disconcerting, with
first attention better given to matters of ethical and
social concern.
47. Derrida exposes the presuppositions of
foundationalism at various points in his enquiries; perhaps
the best occasion is in his essay "The Supplement of
Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics," Derrida: 1982: 175
- 205. Here he shows the inevitable language-bound feature
of metaphysical and ontological categories, and the way in
which, though particular to a given language, they are
inevitable to any thinking about Being insofar as thinking
is linguistic. His critique is highly nuanced,
particularly since he seeks to correct a non-rigorous
presentation of the linguistic nature of foundational
ontological categories offered by Benveniste in his essay
"Categories of Thought and Language" (in Benveniste,
Problems in General Linguistics, tr. Mary E. Meek, Coral
Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971). Derrida notes
that Kant, Hegel and others had already accused Aristotle
of a kind of empiricism as regards his basic categories
(ten in all in Categories IV): Aristotle had just picked
them up as already given to him in the (Greek) language.
But Derrida remarks the same problem as regards Kant's
categories:
When Kant proposes a system of categories governed by
the "faculty of judgement," which is the same as the
"faculty of thought," is grammar still the guiding
thread of the investigation? p. 186.
Derrida's inquiry - fnally and necessarily aporetic on the
relations of thought and language - stresses the
rigorousness of the foundational enterprise as it works not
to be simply empirical, but critical in its basic
categories. He also raises in a more engaging manner than
that we have already observed in Of Grammatology, (cf
above), the question of a necessary link betv/een the verb
"to be" and the very possibility of a "metaphysics",
focussing on the question whether there can be a
metaphysics in a language that lacks that verbal function:
Is there a "metaphysics" outside the Indo-European
organization of the function "to be?" This is not in
the least an ethnocentric question. It does not
amount to envisaging that other languages might be
deprived of the surpasssing mission of philosophy and
metaphysics but, on the contrary, avoids projecting
outside the West very determined forms of "history"
and "culture" p. 199.
For a consideration of the linguistic arguments here as
they relate to Chinese language and philosophy cf the
seminal essays of Graham, and for a summation of
the issues that I think Derrida would resist for its
apparently cavalier point, but which nonetheless grasps his
position without pursuing its intricacies, cf Rorty:
No sooner does one discover the categories of the
pure understanding for a Newtonian age than somebody
draws up another list that would do nicely for an
Aristotelian or an Einsteinian one.
Rorty,1982:167-8.
48. Cf for instance how Prigogine and Stengers identify the
(still operative) primary presupposition of classical
science:
i^the science of Laplace which, in many respects is
still the classical conception of science today, a
description is objective to the extent to which the
observer is excluded and the description itself is
made from a point lying de jure outside the world,
that is, from the divine viewpoint to which the human
soul, created as it was in God's image, had access at
the beginning, thus classical science still aims at
discovering the unique truth about the world, the one
languange that will decipher the whole of nature.
Prigogine and Stengers 1984:52.
49. For a survey of positions here, cf for instance Zhang
1980-81; we will consider the issue in detail in
subsequent chapters.
50. For further relevant work here cf also, for instance,
Kofman 1985.
51. The idea of philosophy as conversation is central to
the Confucian tradition; for some considerations cf Holzman
1956. And for a recent Western reading of philosophy in
this manner cf Rorty 1980:389-394.
52. Obviously Derrida's comment requires reading in terms
of a specific understanding of "metaphysical desire", and
we will return to an assessment of the point after
examining some of the structures of metaphysics within the
western tradition; particularly, there is perhaps a
distinction to be made between 'philosophical desire' and
'metaphysical desire.' For examples of women writers
reworking the issues of metaphysical/philosophical desire
in different ways cf Kofman 1985, and Spivak 1987.
53. Though cf for instance how Mencius draws a parallel
between the uniqueness of the jilin in the animal world,
Lau 1983:80, and the uniqueness of Confucius as sage in the
human world, Mencius 2A2. And for a further reading on the
jilin cf Izusht 1937.
54. Zhu Xi specifically excludes any aspect of
aggressivity from the jilin, as from the concept ren. In
the West the lion and the unicorn were both taken as
symbols of Christ. Zhu Xi, by contrast, makes a specific
distinction between what the lion and the unicorn
implicitly represent, criticising the interpretation of ren
proferred by the Hunan school (of neo-Confucians) (where
ren is read as a aspect of mind, xin, not nature, xing) as
constituting a mistake similar to that of mistaking the
unicorn for the lion. As one commentator puts it:
According to (Chu Hsi), there was a certain Wang
Jih-hsiu who lived during the transitional period
between Northern and Southern Sung (1127 -1279).
Commenting on a passage in Mencius 2A.2 which
proclaims that "the unicorn is the most superior
among all beasts", Wang asserted that the unicorn was
but a different name for the lion. Though there is no
apparent relationship between Wang Jih-hsiu and the
Hunan scholars, Chu is here using the obvious blunder
of the former to ridicule what appears to him to be
an analogous mistake of the latter. The unicorn has
been knov/n as the animal of j en since ancient times,
and has been idealized by the Chinese people as an
animal with a sentient spirit as well as a messenger
of peace. That it is called the animal of jeu and
the king among beasts is due to the belief that it
never steps on growing grass and never eats living
things, and that it is a noncombative, gentle and
tranquil animal. It is definitely not a fierce,
wild, and threatening beast like the lion.
Sato Hitoshi, "Chu Hsi1s Treatise on Jen, in Chan,
1986b: 223. ~ " " ~~
55. William's translations were an important resource for
Aquinas who, having no more than a modicum of Greek, relied
on the Latin test. [Cf Weisheipl 1974: 163: "I presume it
goes without saying that Thomas knew practically no Greek,
except for a few technical words and phrases"] . The
received tradition has been that William undertook his
translations at the request of Aquinas (ad instantium
fratris Thomas), but this is strongly denied by Weisheipl,
who remarks that Aquinas readily made use of William's
work, but that
this is not the same as saying that William made
these translations ad instantium fratris Thomas or
that there was a "collaboration" between thesetwo
scholars. It would seem that William of Moerbeke
turned simply and spontaneously to translating before
he met Thomas and continued long afterward.
Weisheipl, 1974: 152.
56.For consideration of the development of some of the
formative concepts of the courtly love tradition, cf the
articles by Denomy.
57.For specific details on the Jewish reading of Bernard,
and for further consideration of the relations between
monastic concepts of love and courtly love, cf Leclerq
1 979.
58. Cf Kodera 1980.
59. For a general survey of such early contacts as did
exist between China and the West cf Needham 1954: 1 50 -
248. On the question of possible relations between Han
dynasty China and Imperial Rome cf Hirth 1885. For the
medieval period the two classic studies remain those of
Yule-Cordier 1913-16 and Bretschneider 1888, but cf also
Olschki 1960 and Lach 1965: 20-48.
60./ The earlier missionary work of such Franciscans as
William of Rubruck and John of Montecorvino did mark some
important contacts. William was in Karakorum, the court of
the Great Khan, in 1254, and witnessed a religious debate
between Christians (Nestorian), Buddhists, and Muslims.
John was in the Khan's court in Cambaluc (Khambaliq,
Peking) from 1294 until his death sometime between 1328 and
1333: he established a church, and converted many to
Christianity. This contact, however, was primarily with the
Mongol people, rather than with the Chinese. For details
of Latourette 1929: 65-73, Moule 1930, Olschki 1972,
and Olschki 1960: 40-96. For William's account of his
journeys cf Rockhill 1900, and for further details on
John cf Yule-Cordier 1913-16 Vol 3 p. 3ff, together with
translations of John's letters ibid. pp45ff.
61. Certain scientific and technical discoveries, and the
principles underlying them, were transmitted from China to
the West before or during the medieval period. (The
transmission of various alchemical practices is
particularly interesting in this respect: a detailed
treatment can be found in Needham 1980: 323 - 509). The
serious exchange of any philosophical notions, however,
dates, as I have said, to the time of the Jesuit
missionaries. In this respect, commenting on a suggestion
in Needham 1954: 157 of a possible earlier European
awareness of Chinese philosophical notions, Lach remarks
Vague rumours of Confucian and Taoist ideas may have
reached Rome (in the early Christian centuries), but
no clear evidence of such transmission exists, cf
Lach 1965: 17.
62.On influences via Sufism cf again the articles by
Denomy, particularly 1953a. The interaction of different
mystical traditions here is complex, and on its own
provides material for sevral different studies. In terms
of devotional mysticism, the first influence is of
Christianity on Islam: with its concept of the radical
transcendence of Allah, Islam did not at first possess the
resources for that love-mysticism developed in Christianity
in consequence of the doctrine of divine incarnation. The
topic is studied in Smith 1937, and Zaehner comments that
she
has shown how indebted early Muslim mysticism is,
with its overwhelming emphasis on the love of God, to
the thought of the great Christian mystics of a
slightly earlier time. Zaehner 1960:92
Zaehner himself, in looking at Hindu influences on Sufism,
considers more how the Sufi doctrine of annihilation in
Allah is linked with vedanta rather than bhakti (cf his
chapter "Vedanta in Muslim Dress", Zaehner 1 960:86-1 09).
The question of influences between Hindu bhakti and Sufi
mysticism is as yet little studied - Rizvi 1978:322-96
looks at developments that occurred on the Indian
continent. Hodgson plays down the influence of Sufism on
the troubadours (Hodgson 1974, vol.2 pp.363-4), whilst
viewing Hindu bhakti and the love mysticism of Christianity
and Islam as parallel and independent, rather than
interacting, traditions. His cautio observation is that
Relations beteween Islam and Hinduism on the
religious level are as yet only fragmentarily
studied... An adequate theoretical basis for such
studies is still wanting. Ibid. p.558.
(This does seem overly cautious, not only in the light of
Rizvi's work, but also in terms of the studies of Denomy.)
63. For an example of Kalidasa's love-mysticism cf Kalidasa
1 976.
64. For a general introduction to the issues cf Lieu
1979b.
65. Reflections on this point can be found in Mungello
1976, where he notes (p.404) Zhu Xi1s observation that Tian
sometimes designates the blue vault (tsang-tsang),
sometimes it signifies the sovereign worker of all
things (chu-tsai) and sometimes it denotes reason
(li) alone.
66.Schafer 1963 provides a brilliant reading of the
openness of Tang culture to foreign ideas and cultural
influences; and by the Tang period buddhism had already
provoked the most profound opening of Chinese culture that
was to occur before the modern impact of the West (indeed,
it could be argued that Buddhist influence was greater than
that of the West has been so far).
67. This aspect of Aquinas' style won a Church
condemnation of parts of his work in 1277 (rescinded at his
canonisation 50 years later) cf Weisheipl 1974:333ff, and
Callus 1946. Zhu Xi was also at first accused of
propagating a false learning.
68. For historical background to the rise of SuXiSm - cf
Hodgson, 1974, Vol. I 392 - 409, & Vol. II, 201 - 254.
69. Cf Scholem, 1974: 119
As from the year 1200, the Kabbalists began to emerge
U(, Z
\ -
as a distinct mystical group which, while not
numerically significant, had nonetheless attained
considerable prominence in many parts of Southern
France and Spain, The main tendencies of the new
movement are clearly defined, and the modern student
may without difficulty trace its development from the
early stages about 1200 to the Golden Age of
Kabbalism in Spain at the close of the thirteenth and
early fourteenth centuries.
70. Emphasis on the fact that neo-Confucianism was, from
its origins, as much a practical programme in spirituality
as a coherent system of moral, political and metaphysical
theory, has recently been a central strand in (Western)
neo-Confucian studies. Cf for instance de Bary
'Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth Century
1 Enlightenment1' in de Bary (1975): 1 41 -21 6, Taylor (1978)
and (1975), the papers from the symposium 'Modes of
Self-Cultivation in Traditional China' in JCP 6 (1979), and
de Bary (1981). And cf also how Metzger, who in his study
of neo-Confucianism pays attention in particular to its
metaphysics, emphasises that this is not its central
feature:
The Neo-Confucian tradition, writes Professor de
Bary, 'even more than a set moral code or
philosophical system, was a life-style, an attitude
of mind, a type of character formation, and a
spiritual ideal that eluded precise definition.'
Therefore the 'metaphysical superstructure' of
Neo-Confucianism...was not its central aspect.
Metzger (1977): 54-5.
As we have boted,Ren Jiyu argues that the rise of
neo-Confucianism in fact amounted to the founding of a
religion; cf Ren, "Chu Hsi and Religion", Chan, 1986a:
355-376.
71. For a reading of aspects of Song painting cf
Sullivan.
72. It was not until his mid-twenties that Zhu settled on
the Confucian tradition as the orthodox way, after an
earlier experimentation with Buddhist ideas. Aquinas, by
contrast, seems to have been unswerving in the style of his
Christian commitment (at least, according to both
hagiographical and scholarly traditions) from the time he
went to study at the Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino
at the age of 5.
73. As a member of the newly founded Dominican order, the
Dominican principle contemplata aliis tradere (to hand on
to others the fruits of one's own contemplation) served as
the inspiration behind his work.
74. On jing-zuo in general cf de Bary art.cit pp170-72,
and Taylor (1978): 77-88. Different forms of meditative
practice were covered by the term, some approved by Zhu Xi,
and some not. Research at present does not show when and
how a clearly Confucian advocacy of such practice emerged,
though its roots lie in Buddhist, and also Daoist,
meditative practices. Of jingzuo in general de Bary says
It was common to begin and end the day with a period
of quiet-sitting, but not infrequently this kind of
meditation was also practised as a preparation for
study or in alternation with study to refresh and
restore the mind. Art. cit p. 172
On the religious life and practice of Zhu Xi more generally
cf Chan 1987.
75. Of course, "wisdom" and "intuitive knowledge" are not
obviously clear or uncomplicated terms. All I mean by them
here initially is a highly synthesising form of
understanding that is derive as much from the practice of
meditation and moral cultivation as it is from study and
logical reflection. The details of this point - which is
crucial for an understanding of Aquinas and Zhu Xi - will
be considered in later chapters. For a valuable recent




1. We noted in Chapter 1 the difficulties attending any
singular concept of tradition. Here we would stress that
what goes under the name "Confucianism" is in fact a
variety of different life-stances, at times complementary
at times in conflict, within which, apart from the
Analects, various foundational texts and scriptural
resources are given prominence.
2. For analyses that have proved of fundamental importance
here cf Levenson, 1958 and Wright, M.C 1966. Bauer, 1976,
provides a complex reading of Chinese traditions that
focusses the conservative role played by Confucianism, and
the reasons underpinning its failure in the present
century. Despite current attempts to develop Confucianism
as state orthodoxy in Singapore, despite its continued
vitality in Taiwan, and despite the strong reading in
recent Western scholarship of neo-Confucianism as liberal
humanism (cf de Bary, 1981 and 1983), the future of
Confucianism as anything other than an historical legacy
seems extremely limited. Tied to the particularities of
the Chinese world, the Confucian tradition has failed
historically to develop those strategies and forms of
hermeneutic that allowed Christianity and Buddhism, for
instance, to take root in different cultural soil, and that
gave to those traditions a greater resource to respond to
modernity and to cultural diversity.
3. Consideration of the various schools and styles of
philosophy that emerged in the Axial Age can be found in
Plott, 1977. A comparative study of the historical
background and contexts in the different cultures can be
found in Farmer, 1977: 82-124. Voegelin, 1974: 1 ff. and
passim provides a strong criticism of Jaspers and the
notion of an Axial Age - together with the presupposition
it involves - and I shall return to this below.
4. Bauer ties the axial significance of Confucius
precisely to his formulation of the concept ren:
His great discovery was man and the virtue of
"Humanity" (there is no distinction between the two
words in ancient Chinese). However nebulous it might
be in every respect, this concept brought a shift in
thought of epochal proportions. Bauer 1976: 20.
And in an appended note here he adds:
The "Axial Period" which Karl Jaspers (Origin and
Goal of History) believes he has discovered for all
of Eurasia during the middle of the first century BC
can thus actually be verified as regards China. p.
429, n. 35.
Schwartz suggests that it is the significance of Confucius
within a larger movement of cultural reflection in Zhou
China, and the comparable force of that movement to
movement in other cultures that is , the major point -
Schwartz 1985: 2-3,
5. The Shijing - Classic of Poetry, Book of Songs or Odes
- is one o„ the Six Classics, together with the Sh jing or
Shangshu - Classic of History, Book of Documents, the
Chunqiu Spring and Autumn Annals -, Yijing - Classic or
&ook of Changes, Yuejing - Classic of Music, - and a text
on Rituals; these were reckoned to have been written or
edited by Confucius. The Yuejing is now lost, although
parts of it are taken to survive in one chapter of the
Liji, Record of Rituals. The original text on rituals is
also lost, but parts of it are perhaps incorporated in
three texts on rituals that do survive, the Liji, Zhouli,
and Yili.
The older portions of the Yijing definitely antedate
Confucius, and were held in evident respect by him, but the
text has nothing to say on re and is not directly
significant for us here. The Chunqiu is pre-Confucian for
the most part (it covers court events in Confucius' home
state of Lu from -721 to -463), and may well have been
edited by Confucius. Parts of the received text of the
Shujing are pre-Confucian. The 305 odes of the Shijing are
of an early date, and reckoned to represent a selection
from an original total of over 3000; tradition has it that
the selection was compiled by Confucius himself. - for
translations cf Waley, 1960, Karlgren, 1950%
6. The suggestion is made by Karlgren, 1964 110, where he
takes ^ as an early form for •
7. In examining the textual basis for the early use of
ren, and in the conclusion I have reached, I have drawn
considerably on the excellent study by Lin Yu-sheng,
1974-75.
8. The cultural location of the odes is obviously crucial
in determining their intentionality. Granet, for
instance, attempted to argue that the odes were in many
cases representative more of folk or popular, than
aristocratic, traditions in Zhou culture. This position,
however, is rejected by Karlgren:
the idea that these odes are pure folksongs, culled
by the music-masters from the lips of the people in
the various feudal states (an old idea already
advanced by Si-ma Ts'ien), is quite untenable. The
odes are so well-elaborated, with such a strict metre
and rhythm, such a consistent and strict (even rigid)
rime system, and often such sophisticated and
'upper-class' expressions that it is entirely
excluded that they could be the products of
improvising uneducated farmers. This is doubly clear
if we compare this elaborate literature with the
44-7
contemporaneous prose literature (bronze
inscriptions), which still labours with all the
heaviness of a but little developed literary art.
The 'culling' of the music-masters was certainly
limited to the picking up of...popular themes...the
poems must in their entirety be the products of
well-trained, educated members of the gentry.
Karlgren 1942: 75-6.
Maspero, however, supports the style of analysis followed
by Granet, and argues that the odes do give an indirect
access to folk traditions:
These songs are unfortunately not, it seems, popular
songs themselves, but at every point they borrow the
themes of peasant songs, of which they give us an
idea. 1981: 210
Chen Shih-hsiang, 1974, and C.H. Wang, 1974, are both in
line with Maspero's approach, arguing a strong folk or
popular origin for many of the odes, and emphasising their
place in dance, community rituals, and oral tradition.
However, Wang's argument for formulaic composition (in
development of Parry's and Lord's arguments on the oral
tradition preceding Homer), requires rather than refutes
the existence of trained singers and musicians who
memorised the odes, though there is no requirement of an
immediate equation between trained singers and court
singers.
9. It will not be possible for us to study the various
social and cultural factors at work in this transitional
period of Chinese history; a very worthwhile orientation is
that provided by Hsu, 1968, as is Creel's history of the
Western Zhou, Creel 1970; for some central aspects of
cultural development cf Fehl 1971, and on religion cf
Bilsky 1975.
10. For any religion there are varying degrees and forms
of tension between the sense of mystery and its rational
management. We have already encountered Weber's
rationalist reading of Confucianism, and that is certainly
an important part of the picture - indeed, Keightley reads
aspects of this back into the Shang period, speaking of a
Shang state permeated with a commitment to the ancestors,
strongly religious in the totality of its demands
and yet we find that the commitment can be
characterised as nonreligious, nonmysterious, and -
because so explicitly goal directed - rational in its
logic. The logic may be characterized...as
"bureaucratic" in Max Weber's sense of the term.
Keightley 1978b: 214.
Keightley's extended study of Shang divinatory practice
maps well the details of cultic practice, Keightley 1978a,
while Chang Tsung-tung 1970 portrays the texture of
religious belief. Bauer, 1976: 3-9 provides a good initial
sense of the Shang world.
11. The mandate (ming), which was given to the King
specifically, was passed on by him to his representatives
and supporters, so that all rule throughout the Zhou domain
was in a strict sense an extension of kingly rule:
The King charged Hu of Shao '
(wang ming Hu Shao)
(And this charge was published far and wide)
"When Wen and Wu received their mandate
The Duke of Shao was their support."
Mao 262; Waley, 1960: 131
12. Cf for instance T'ang Chun-i 1961; and cf Bauer's
remarks:
Quite a number of documents that have come down to us
clearly show that the Chou engaged in very intensive
political propaganda which suddenly introduced an
entirely new category never mentioned previously:
morality. Bauer 1976: 12.
The moral point at stake is that the Zhou claimed the Shang
had lost the support of Heaven through moral failure, and
tianming was argued as the specifically moral authority to
rule.
Cheng Kwang-Chih notes that, while the specific doctrine of
tianming represents a Zhou concept, the notions on which it
was based go back to the Shang at least, thus casting light
on why the Shang might have accepted Zhou ideology. cf
Chang 1983: 34.
13. Creel reads the doctrine of the Mandate as realpolitik,
and ascribes its invention as a piece of theological
ideology to the Duke of Zhou. In considering how the Shang
might have come to accept the imposition of such an
ideology, he examines the Zhou practices of forced movement
of population, and destruction of the Shang cultural
heritage, as means whereby the Shang were "encouraged" to
forget their own traditions and to accept Zhou ways. For
an extended consideration of Creel 1970: 81-100.
14. There is oviously an issue at stake here over where
one decides to locate the emergence of specific forms of
intentionality that might be deemed moral: as early as the
-12th century, with the Duke of Zhou, or in the two hundred
years prior to Confucius. There seems little doubt that,
whatever its ideological structure, a new moral space is
opened by the doctrine of tianming, but its implementation
is still within an unproblematised social framework. The
form of moral intentionality I am focussing on for the later
period, however, is tied to a set of social changes
involving extensive questioning of received norms by
specific individuals. [Here we can perhaps compare the
mandating authority of the Duke of Zhou with the status of
Moses and the 10 commandments, just as we can link
Confucius with the more speculative movement of the major
prophets].
15. Jacobsen 1976 gives a detailed reading of the process
in Mesopotamian religions whereby reflection on suffering
H9
led to a deepening awareness of the value of the person,
and also move significantly to an increased sense of the
otherness of God.
16. The notion of a human life bound by moral
considerations as a shift from earlier ritualistic
considerations emerges in Fehl's study of li (ritual,
etiquette, correct behaviour), where the shifting
designations of this central concept carry the shifts in
changing patterns of culture; cf Fehl 1971
17. Cf his essay "Religious Evolution" in Bellah 1976.
18. The first volume of Voegelin's philosophy of history
Order and History begins with a set of theoretical
considerations on the development of forms of symbolisation
as the development of cultural orders, though the most
detailed considerations are to be found in volume four,
where he engages in a rethinking of his philosophic
procedure. Cf Voegelin 1956 and 1974, and in commentary
Sandoz 1981.
19. Altekar 1962 provides an account of the shifting
status of women within Hinduism, while Altekar 1934 looks
in part at the position of v/omen within education.
20 On the question of women within Buddhism cf Horner 1930 andl^L
1 972.
21 This was worked out not just in terms of ethical and
religious practice, but also via a metaphysic within which
women were of inferior ontological status. For the Jains,
to be reborn as a woman was a particular form of punishment
for wrongdoing, and offered little chance of rebirth at a
higher level.
22. On the development of Greek educational institutions
in general cf Marrou 1956.
23. Aristotle, for instance, specifically claimed that
woman was a deformed man, a point taken up by Aquinas
independent of the Christian doctrine of original sin.
24. One reading of the Oresteia would in it a powerful
consolidation of patriarchal culture, with a subordination
through death of 'the feminine1 in the figures of
Iphigeneia and Clytaemnestra.
25. On this cf for instance Patai 1974.
26. These issues are dealt with in considerable detail, and
with theoretical insight, in Voegelin 1954.
27. The reading of this issue is vexed. Bauer, for
instance, suggests that the excesses of the Shang kings (to
which the Zhou referred as part of their claim that the
Shang had lost the divine authority to rule) may in fact
have represented "certain matriarchal orgiastic cults whose
origin the Chou did not understand" Bauer 1976: 12, and he
remarks that Zhou patriarchy "differed from the Shang,
where matriarchal elements still survived" p. 11. Eichhorn
suggests that an early totemistic stage of religion
(pre-dating the Shang) implied belief in a primal mother,
Eichhorn 1976:1.
Chang summarizes the issues thus:
Some believe in the existence of an archaic society
in Chinese history, in which descent was traced
through the maternal line and in which women
commanded higher political status than men. This
belief is based on two very different sources. The
first is the nineteenth century evolutionist paradigm
according to which every society goes through a
matriarchal phase...The second source consists of
scattered textual accounts of a society in the remote
past in which mothers were known (or recognized)
while fathers were not. If there was indeed such a
stage in Chinese history, it must have occurred long
before the Three Dynasties. We know of no actual
clans for the Three Dynasties period that were not
patrilineal. Chang 1983: 9n.l
28. Laozi, as we shall see, speaks of "returning to the
mother"; cf for instance Chen, E.M. 1969.
29 Schafer 1968 examines how the creation of animal
enclosures and hunting parks marked a safe preserve for the
encounter with animal powers, which were otherwise seen "as
allied to the power of darkness, akin to the savage tribes
that surrounded the old Middle Kingdom" p 319. In the hunt
the glories of kingship and the needs of ritual were
interlinked:
Kings and barons killed leopards and deer, under
carefully controlled conditions, to demonstrate their
power and glory, p 31 9
The book of Huai nan tzu ascribed the invention of
animal preserves to T'ang, the divine founder of the
Shang dynasty, giving the needs of ritual as his
motive - the animals supplied meat offerings to the
ancestral temples. p 321.
The link between hunting and warfare did not just exist for
the elite: Creel observes that "(e)ven peasants who
regularly tilled their fields might receive military
training" and that this was given during "a great hunt
which was used as training for warfare" Creel 1970: 285.
On matters of individual heroic skill Schafer notes that
"bears tempted the prowess of exceptional athletes" p 320.
29a. Takeuchi examines the different conjunctive uses of
mei and concludes that "(c)omparing these antithetical
li s\
phrases, we are convinced that they all express external
beauty of man or thing" Takeuchi 1965: 66; and reading ren
in this light he remarks that ren "is a modifier admiring
only external beauty" not a designator of "internal
goodness such as conscientiousness" or benevolence ibid p.
66
30. This is the approach of Lin Yli-sheng, who notes that
at the time of these two odes (both of which he dates about
-770)
there occured...a need among the Chinese people for
finding a new word to stand for "manliness" or
"manhood", which referred to a conception of man's
distinctive quality...jen did mean "manly" (when
it was used as an adjective) and "manliness" or
"manhood" (when it was used as a noun) in referring
to qualities conceptually regarded as those
distinctively possessed by man...jen in Shu-yu-t'ien
primarily connoted the daring quality of man without
any moral implication. The daring quality of man
must therefore be regarded as the substantive sense
of the word jen during the time when the poem was
composed." Lin 1974-5: 179
31. The arguments are reviewed in Zhang 1980-81, whose
rpinciple object of attack is the reading of ren proposed
by Guan Feng. For the Spring and Autumn period Guan
identifies 3 types of ren, that of the slave owning class,
the landowning class, and the common people. The position
of the slave-owning class, synthesised by Confucius but
developed before him, consists for Guan of "ceremonial
yielding" (lirang), "loving one's kin" (aiqin), and "doing
things as if attending a ritual sacrifice. Whether Guan's
position is accepted or rejected, it should be noted that
his substantive reading of ren is very different from the
one we are following here as "manliness." That much said,
the notion that we might be dealing with an aristocratic or
slave-owning conception of "manliness" as normative for the
Shijing world remains an open issue at this stage of our
inquiry.
32. At one point, speaking of Shang expeditions against a
specific tribe named Ren, Prusek notes:
The campaigns against the Jen were major expeditions,
one of which lasted as long as seven months...The
chief of the Jen was captured and sacrificed to the
gods. From the last period of the Shang a skull-bone
has been preserved, with the inscription: Tsu I
attacked the count Jen-fang...The question arises
whether the name Jen is not a transcription of a
foreign name elsewhere transcribed as Jung, adopted
as a general term for barbarians. The phonetic
difference between jen...and jung...is not so great
as to exclude the possibility of both being
transcriptions of the same name. It requires no
stretch of the imagination to assume that the Chou
transcribed this name as Jung and later, as thei
power expanded, carried it throughout the eastern
regions. Prusek 1971: 38
Prusek here goes beyond the idea of parallel meanings for
ren and rong to suggest that they are different terms with
the same designation, and reiterates the point elsewhere:
the word Jung is a Chinese word simply meaning
"bellicose." It is of course quite possible that the
word has behind it the name of a certain tribe,
perhaps the jen...who were fought by the Shang
kings...We could imagine a similar sounding tribal
name being written as the character for "bellicose"
and then becoming the general term for the idea of
"barbarian" among the Chou people. Ibid p210
33. There is an obvious tension between this suggestion
and the reading of Prusek. It is not possible to engage in
a full etymology of terms here, and I would simply note
that the self-referential use of ren for the Shang and the
reference to others as ren suggests a continuity of meaning
that would seem to disallow a reading of ren as barbarian.
That is not to say, though, that those other tribes called
ren by the Shang did not come to be reviewed as rong by the
Zhou.
34. Commenting on the strategies of exclusion by which
certain groups separate others from the status of "humans"
Derrida focusses on the prestige attached to the possession
of a certain writing, and quotes Leroi-Gourhan's
observation that
in many human groups, the only word by which the
members designate their ethnic group is the word
'man'. Derrida: 1976: 83-4.
35. The passage is quoted in Chang Kwang-chih \<\20: Z26-7
36. Cf also the assessment of Pulleyblank:
Attempts to show from oracle bore inscriptions
that... prisoners were... employed at forced labour
seem very forced - though there is nothing inherently
improbbly in it. Even if they were, it is difficult
to believe that anything but doctrinaire
preconceptions could lead anyone to think from the
available evidence that this was on such a large
scale as to make China a slave society.
Pulleyblank 1958: 186
37. On the functions and status of the Shang king cf for
instance Chao 1982: 53-73.
38. Thus Creel:
The relationship between the Chou King and Heaven was
conceived to be peculiarly intimate. There seems to
be no evidence that the Shang King was ever called
the "son of Ti," but the Chou King was the "son of
<^3
Heaven." And this was not merely a formal title. A
poem says of the King, literally, "may T'ien son
him", that is, treat him as its son. If T'ien were
in fact the former Kings as a body, this could
explain the relationship perfectly." Creel ;970:
303.
39. For an account of the implications behind the forms
of the different characters cf Creel 1970: 493ff.
The stress that Heaven's Mandate is uncertain and
unpredictable - a point evident in a number of the odes -
was a powerful motive force in securing compliance with
those moral practices that Heaven would find acceptable.
40. Cf the lament we have already noted
"That blue one, Heaven,
Takes all our good men.
Mao 131; Waley, 1960: 311
The lines come in an ode lamenting the lives of those who
had to die with their ruler (in this case the Duke Mu).
Waley comments:
"The extent to which Kings were followed into the
grave by their servitors differed very much at
various times and in various localities. The
practice existed on a grand scale during the dynasty
which preceded the Chou. It was disapproved of by
the Confucians, but revived by the Ch'u when they
conquered all China (middle of the third century BC).
So far as I know it was never revived after the rise
of the Han in 206 BC. Ibid p 312.
We will qualify this observation in the next chapter. The
topic of human sacrifice in China is rarely treated without
some measure of excuse or rationalisation. Pulleyblank,
for instance, offers the extraordinary observation that "In
historical times it was considered highly honourable to
follow one's lord into the grave." Pulleyblank 1958: 186,
and Mencius suggests a similar argument (cf below, chapter
four). The force of ode 131, however, is its demonstration
of the horror and tearfulness surrounding this entire
practice.
41.We will see in chapter four how Mozi departs somewhat
from this conception by viewing Heaven as an entirely
creative power. An important issue in the background here
is that Tian is not seen as a lawgiver, ie as a figure that
establishes the physical universe according to fixed laws
and patterns (Mozi again is a partial exception) and this
marks an important contrast with the basic metaphorical
structure of Western theology and physical science. For
considerations cf Needham, 1951.
42. This is a very complex question that I do not intend
to pursue here. Chang Kwang-chih, 1983, notes that there
were several hundred clans during the Shang and Zhou perod,
and that "the political landscape of ancient China was
US'ty-
dotted with hundreds of thousands of towns inhabited by
members of discrete clans and lineages" p 32. If rain later
came to have the connotation of "the common people", then
maybe we can distinguish powerful clans from those that
gradually become less significant with min taking on the
sense of powerlessness in contrast with ren; though the
suggestion must remain tentative.
43. For a consideration cf Prusek "History and Epics in
China and the West", Jprusej^ 1970: 17-34.
44. Wang 1975 provides a very fruitful reading of a
Chinese heroic tradition where, in redefining the epic
process, he focusses on the centrality of cultural (wen)
heroism rather than martial (wu) heroism.
45. Cf for instance James Liu 1967.
46. Cf for instance the lines from one of the odes:
Very clear-sighted was he and wise.
He assured his own safety. Mao 260; Wally 1960: 142
Waley comments thus:
To assure one's own safety ('guard oneself') was one
of the main avowed objects of Chou morality. The
phrase occurs on numerous bronze inscriptions. Ibid.
47.Focussing on what he sees as the basic Chinese
repudiation of a martial spirit, Wang comments on a
position taken by Zhu Xi:
"In the ancient times," Chu says, "one observed the
start of a military expedition with the rite
equivalent to funeral; when the call to arms came,
all the warriors wept." The reluctance...is
determined by Chinese ethics in general that almost
repudiates martial spirit from heroism. The display
of martial power (wu) is never as worthy as the
exhibition of cultural eloquence (wen). In the
sanctification of King Wu of Chou's military action
against the Shang, Confucianism judges the conquest
incomplete until the weapon is put away and the rite
performed appropriately, op. cit. p 27
48. Cf Takeuchi 1965: 67-8; and Lin Yii-sheng 1974-5;
199-200.
Chapter 3 Notes
1. Cf also how, in praising the virtue (ren) of Guan Zhong
Confucius identifies him in particular as a saviour from
the descent into barbarism:
Zigong said, 'I don't suppose Guan Zhong was a man of
ren (renzhe). Not only did he not die for Prince Jiu,
but he lived to help Duke Huan who had the prince
killed.*
The Master said, "Guan Zhong helped Duke Huan to
become the leader of the feudal lords and to save the
Empire from collapse. To this day, the common people
still enjoy the benefit of his acts. Had it not been
for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair
down and folding our robes to the left (ie as the
barbarians)." An 14.17.
2. There are various crucial background issues involved in
determining what it might have meant for Confucius to say
that he was "for the Zhou." One issue is that Lu, the home
state of Confucius, can perhaps be viewed as the heartland
of Zhou culture after the loss of the Western Zhou capital
in the -8th century. Fung Yu-lan has this comment:
The Tso dvuan. ..tells us concerning an envoy from Wu,
that it was when he visited Lu that "he observed the
music of Chou"...and again that when Han Hsuan Tzu
was visiting Lu, he examined the books of the Great
Historian, and saw the symbols of the I and the Ch'un
Ch'iu of Lu, whereupon he said: "The ceremonials of
Chou are complete in Lu, and now I comprehend the
virtue of the Duke of Chou and how it was that the
Chou became kings"...Culturally speaking, it is
evident that Lu must have been a miniature reflection
of the ancestral Chou. Especially was this the case
when, after the first few centuries of its rule, the
House of Chou so declined in power that a raid of
western barbarians forced King P'ing (770-720) to
move his capital from the west to the east, where he
established the Eastern Chou dynasty. On this
occasion many objects of cultural importance must
have been lost, with the result that Chou culture
from that time on became centred in the state of Lu.
Fung 1952: 55
If Confucius thus inherited the heart of Zhou culture, it
would seem that he also, indirectly, inherited the memory
of Shang culture, since Lu was one of the areas to which
the Shang were transported after the original Zhou victory.
Indeed, Hu Shi as argued that Confucius and the group to
which he belonged (called ru, "weaklings": the term became
the name of the Confucian school) actively preserved the
memory of the Shang, and constituted thus a messianic
movement whose expectations of deliverance were part of a
Shang identity. Acknowledging that Fung Yu-lan rejects Hu's
ideas, Bauer notes how Hu starts from an analysis of the
term ru - a term itself much older , than Confucius - and
finds in it not only the meaning 'weak', but also the
connotation "to wait':
He tried to prove that the Ju "Confucians" still wore
the garments of the Shang, that they observed their
ritual, particularly the ceremony of mourning, and
that they played the leading role in the State of
Sung and the regions east of it, the states of Ch' i
and Lu (the state where Confucius was born), the
domain of the Shang. According to Hu Shih, they did
not simply resign themselves to the decline of the
Shang but hoped for a restoration of their rule and
thus of their own position of dominance.
Bauer 1976:15
With an opposite reading, Creel combines the Shang and Zhou
elements in the history of Lu by viev/ing Lu as a model of
Zhou enculturation:
In Lu, as perhaps nowhere else, we can see how
completely the Chou succeeded in winning the
allegiance of the conquered people (ie the Shang)
Creel 1970:93
3. Confucius viewed his work as ordained by Heaven, yet in
one saying he seems to despair of Heaven's support:
The Master said, "I am thinking of giving up speech."
Zigong said, "If you do not speak, what would there
be for us, your disciples, to transmit?" The Master
said, "What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the
four seasons going round, and there are the hundred
things coming into being. What does Heaven ever
say?" An 17.19.
We will see below that Tian does not figure significantly
in the Analects. and that where it does it counts generally
as an impersonal principle of cosmic order.
4. On the question of time and the slow appropriation of
virtue and order in general cf for instance An 13.10, 8.12,
9.11, 11.26, 7.17. On government note the following:
The Master said, "Even with a true king it is bound
to take a generation for ren to become a reality." An
13.12
The Master said, "How true is the saying that after a
state has been ruled for a hundred years by good men
it is possible to get the better of cruelty and do
away with killing. An 13.11
Though for a contrary reading, which suggests a more shamanic
interpretation of the process of political change, cf An 6.24.
5. Originally, for the Shang period, the functions of
Shaman and scribe or historiographer were interlinked -
Chang Kwang-chih remarks that
the combination of the historiographic and the
Shamanistic roles in individuals would be in accord
4?7
with the view of many historians that the earliest
historiographers were also religious - possibly
shamanistic figures. Chang 1983:91
For the Shang the chief shaman was the king. For the Zhou
I take the functions of shaman and scribe to be distinct,
though as a scribe and an expert on ritual affairs I take
Confucius to be fully cognizant of the place and function
of shamanic practices, just as I take his text in places
to be structured by shamanic ideas (particularly in
association with the effective power of rulership).
6. The strong preservation of shamanic ideas in the Chuci
(Songs of the South) and their influence of Laozi and
Zhuangzi will be considered in the next chapter. Many
religions carry myths identifying a rupture or break in
shamanic or vatic power, Uihen the ladder of direct
inspired communion with the god is withdrawn, at which
point there is a substitution of scribal traditions for
shamanic or prophetic traditions . Chang op.cit. 44-5
records an early myth which identifies how a generalised
shamanic power, which led to an indiscriminate mingling of
the spirits with the people, was reduced and focussed in
kingly power as the one legitimate shamanism. The
scribal curtailment of shamanic power is a later stage,
which I take to be fully underway by the beginning of the
Zhou dynasty.
7. The contrast betv/een sudden, immediate access to
transcendent power (which is spoken of by Voegelin as
metastatic faith: we will consider this in chapter eight in
remarking his reading of St. Paul), and gradual opening to
transcendence and self-transcendence, is a basic polarity
across different religions. We will return to it in
various ways throughout our inquiry.
8. Cf for instance Bauer 1976: 5-6
9. Fingarette speaks, for instance, of
"the magic power which Confucius saw, quite
correctly, as the very essence of human virtue"
Fingarette 1972:1
By "magic" I mean the power of a specific person to
accomplish his will directly and effortlessly through
ritual, gesture and incantation. The user of
magic... simply wills the end in the proper ritual
setting and with the proper ritual gesture and word;
without further effort on his part, the deed is
accomplished. Confucius' words at times strongly
suggest some magical power as central to this way.
Ibid p.3.
10. Cf An 4:15
The Master said, "Can! There is one single thread
binding my way together."
Since the saying occurs in the chapter devoted particularly
to ren, there is a strong prima facie case that it is ren
i+sz
which is indicated here.
11. This is developed, for instance, in Tu 1968.
12. Cf how Hansen develops this theme:
Confucius did not write the Lun-yu and develop a
philosophical system. The book was compiled by
disciples and shows all kinds of evidence of arising
from a dispute. The fragments attributed to
Confucius are notoriously contradictory in tone and
content. The word Lun is used mainly in classical
literature for dialogues between two sides - debates.
The White Horse lun, the Iron and Salt lun, Chuang
Tzu equalizes lun (debates) about things. The Lun-yu
(debate sayings) are best regarded as a collection of
aphorisms partisans of two different lines of
interpretation "remembered" Confucius as saying.
They constitute a kind of debate using argument from
authority...The history of Chinese Confucianism does
not start with a sublime, rounded truth - but with an
emerging tension and division between two lines.
Hansen 1984 a:1
13/ Chan, 1955, also argues that the meaning of ren in the
alects is changed in comparison with its previous use.
However, he takes pre-Confucian ren to denote "a particular
virtue, namely, kindness of a ruler to his people." p. 296.
Such a reading is completely at odds with the way re. is
used in the Odes. (For criticism of Chan here cf Lin
Yu-shang 1974-5:174). The change Chan emphasises is from a
specific virtue of kindness to the more general idea of
virtue-as-such, or perfect virtue. Two points should be
emphasised here. Firstly, the shift towards formulating a
general concept of human excellence is already found within
the Odes, as we have remarked above. And secondly, the
shift between the Odes and the Analects is not from a
specific to a more general concept, but rather a shift
between two general concepts, between two different visions
of human excellence. [Lin hypothesises that this shift
occurred in the context of a generalised debate about the
meaning of ren].
14. Chan, 1955: 296-7 notes that this passage has caused
perplexity for the last 1800 years, and after considering
various interpretations of it suggests that the issue
cannot yet be resolved. This was a questionable conclusion
at the time of writing, and we shall see that the issue has
since then been resolved.
15. Bodd^s article was originally published in 1933.
Part of his argument assumes that ^u is not regularly used
as a conjunction between subjects, a point refuted by Chan,
1955: 297. (The substantial documentation in Malmqvist
1978 shows further how frequently yu does serve as a
conjunction between subjects). However, to note that Bodde
is wrong on this point does not invalidate his more general
4:.
argument, as Chan apparently thinks, for the argument does
not hinge on whether or not yu is conjunctive, but on the
undisputed verbal function of yu as "discourse." Bodde1s
reading is secured by a point oF punctuation that Chan does
not question. [What is difficult is that Bodde has
Confucius speaking (frequently) about ming, which cannot be
sustained].
16. One of the difficulties in assessing Confucius'
attitude to a transcendent reality is that there is little
of direct reference to such in the analects: not only do
tian and ming figure infrequently, they also seem to
designate transcendence as impersonal lot or destiny.
[One reason for taking the saying here as a piece of late
polemic is that the issue over li_ (profit, benefit) only
came to the fore after Mozi, in whose philosophy it served
as a key notion. It is Mencius in particular, as we shall
see, who separates a Confucian ethic from any utilitarian
concern with JLi_, but this is not an issue for Confucius
himself].
17. It is part of Hansen's argument, 1984a, that from the
point of view of the li (traditionalist) school any
emphasis on ren (which Hansen reads as an intuitive
capacity for virtue) would by-pass the authority of li.
The contrast between traditional-cumulative and direct-
intuitive approaches to self-cultivation - the polarity
marking the later major division between Confucian schools
- is thus a polarity within the Analects itself.
18. For a survey of sifferent translations and
interpretations of ren, cf Chan 1975b. Fingarette remarks
Jen has been translated variously as Good, Humanity,
Love, Benevolence, Virtue, Manhood,
Manhood-at-its-Best and so on. For various
commentators jen has seemed to be a virtue, the
all-inclusive virtue, a spiritual conditions, a
complex of attitude and feelings, a mystic entity.
Fingarette 1972: 37-8
19. On the background to the concept junzi Munro remarks
the shifts in meaning from the Shijing through to Confucius
and comments that, while j unzi came to designate a moral
category for Confucius, the hierarchical connotation of
superior social status was not lost:
The Confucian aristocracy held its position by merit
rather than heredity, but a hierarchy was still
present. Therefore, Confucian terms for the
ethically advanced also carry a connotation of social
rank. Munro: 1969: 115
This is a very moderate statement in comparison with
Marxist critiques (noted in part already) which would
simply see Confucius as providing an ethic for a landlord
class; we will return to the connotations of j unzi below.
20. Mencius gives the warning, for instance, to "exercise
due care over the education provided by village schools,
and discipline the people by teaching them duties proper to
sons and younger brothers." Mencius 1A7; Lau 1970:59. And
cf also his reference to different types of educational
institution and practice:
Xiang, xu, xue, and xiao were set up for the purpose
of education. Xiang means "rearing", xiao means
"teaching" and xu means "archery." In the Xia dynasty
it was called xiao, in the Yin x^L and in the Zhou
xiang, while xue was a name common to all the Three
Dynasties. They all serve to make the people
understand human relationships,Men. 3A3 Lau 1970:98
Mencius specifies the elite aspect to education by adding
the rider
"When it is clear that those in authority (shang)
understand human relationships (renlun: the ordered
relationships amongst the ren), the ordinary people
(xiamin: the people below) will be affectionate."
21. Cf for instance how Cheng Te-kun perceives the issue:
Confucius was probably the first scholar to establish
a public school. Before him knowledge was a sign of
nobility and learning a monopoly of the nobel
families. He took the classics from the royalhouse-
hold to teach to the common people, to anyone
regardless of his class and profession. In the
Chan-kuo (Warring States) period, public education
like this became popular, opening the way for more of
the common people to receive education and enter
government service. This soon gave rise to a class
of professional civil servants called shih (scholars)
Cheng 1963: xxx
While Confucius is the first Zhou teacher, of whom we know,
to accept payment for instruction and to accept as students
any who wished to learn, in the absence of detailed
knowledge of educational institutions, their foundation and
aims, it seems likely that the peasant who received
instruction from Confucius would be a rare and occasional
figure. Hsu 1968 looks at the background issue of social
mobility in the time of Confucius, ana insofar as Confucian
instruction was in major part geared to attainment of
social status through public service then the relationship
between education and social mobility is an important one.
Gait 1951 is of value for the later development of
educational institutions.
22. The centrality of "friendship" as an issue in Western
philosophical and religious literature - at least, for the
period we are covering here - and its relative neglect as a
matter of direct concern within Chinese philosophical
discussions is a crucial point of contrast between
traditions. My first comment here would be that, always
within Confucianism, clan and family relationships took
priority (so that any notion of friendship is subordinate
to, or contained within, them) whilst from the Greeks the
transition from clan order to democratic order made the
I
relationships between individuals (thus, beyond family
considerations) a much more central issue. The topic is
much more nuanced than this, though, as we shall see.
23. A statement recorded in the Zuozhan suggests
furthermore that the people be kept in ignorance of the
laws by which they were governed, thus maintaining all
power firmly in the hands of the ruling elite. On the
promulgation of the lawcode of Jiu Confucius is reckoned to
have complained:
China is going to ruin! It has lost its proper
rules. China ought to keep the laws and rules which
T'ang Shu received for the regulation of his people,
and the ministers and great officers ought to keep
them in their several positions. Then the people
would be able to honour the upper classes, and the
higher classes would be able to preserve their
inheritances. There would be nothing wrong with the
noble or the mean. We should have what might be
called the proper rule...But now when those rules are
abandoned, and tripods with the penal laws on them
are cast instead, the people will study the tripods.
How will they then honour their men of rank, and what
will the nobles do? When there is no distinction of
noble and mean, how can a state continue to exist?
Quoted Fung ; 952:31 4
24. Munro remarks:
For the Confucians, the sage-king (sheng-wang) was a
lofty ideal, whose status was rarely reached. The
term was restricted to someone of the stature of the
first Chou kings. Ranks more within the grasp of
most men were the "superior men" (chun-tzu) and the
"knight" or "gentleman" (shih). Munro 1969:115
25. We noted in chapter two that the Yuejing (Classic of
Music) was an early classic that was subsequently lost, its
traces surviving perhaps in a chapter in the Liji. One
reading of early Confucianism (indeed, of Zhou culture
prior to Confucius) might be in terms of a tension between
yue and _li, where yue carried connotations of pleasure (the
character can also be translated as pleasure) and
spontaneity, with li standing for order and decorum. In
Xunzi the balance is finally in favour of li_ over yue, on
which Bauer remarks:
(Hsun-tzu) considered music as that element of
culture that united men beyond all their differences,
whilst its no less important opposite pole, "ritual"
(li), supposedly had the function of separating them
according to their different classes. But some
especially important, perhaps indeed the most
important, provisions of "ritual" referred to the
instructions concerning the various forms of mourning
for the dead. Particularly with respect to the kinds
of garment and the length of time they were to be
worn, these rules made such subtle distinctions that
(f.62
the severely hierarchical social structure found an
exceptionally clear expression here. It would
therefore appear that from the very beginning,
"ritual" evoked associations of "misfortune,"
"mourning" and class-conscious dress in Chinese
thought, and also the "distinction" created by social
categories. Conversely "music" evoked such concepts
as "happiness", "joy", "nakedness", and the union of
men irrespective of class and sex. Hsun-tzu wished
to assure "ritual" the most important place in the
Confucian system. Although his strict views did not
find unanimous acceptance, it seems almost an omen
that of the "Five Classics" most deeply respected in
Confucianism, one, originally the sixth according to
tradition, should have been lost. It was the "classic
of music." Conversely, the "classic of ritual"
became so voluminous that it had to be reedited in
three separate v/orks. Bauer 1976:11
Confucius expresses his appreciation of music at various
points - cf for instance An 3.23, 3.25, 7.14, 8.8, 8.15 -
but a full appreciation of what is at stake would require
consideration of the kind of music that he favoured.
26. Obviously, there is a choice involved as to whether to
be virtuous or not: Confucius is constantly prompting a
choice for and ren., and rejecting the choice of Zai Yu
who stayed in bed during the day, An. 5.10, but he seems to
presume that there can be no conflict between different li:
the junzi knows that any apparent conflict, once examined,
will reveal the appropriate hierarchical ordering of the li_
in question, thus rendering action transparent and
spontaneous. On the basic metaphor CLT work here - of a
way, dao, without a crossroads - cf Fingarette 1972: 18-36.
27. The conflict is between Confucius' own authority as
scribe and teacher (with his claim to correct understanding
of the traditions of the Zhou) and the authority of those
invested with power in society, who might perceive Zhou
traditions differently. We will consider below whether
there is an implicit conflict between Confucius' claims to
authority and the claims of kingship.
28. Though this observation requires qualification in the
light of Fung Yu-lan's comment:
Confucius... spent many years in the company of his
disciples, travelling unceasingly from one feudal
state to another and talking with their rulers
Fung 1952:50
29. An exception to this would seem to be indicated at An
1.6 where Confucius says that "a young man...should love
the multitude at large (ai zhong)."
30. While the reading of ren as love or affection became
central later, it must be stressed that only a forced
interpretation can derive this as a major part of its
q-63
meaning in the Analects. Thus, Chan overstates the case
when he remarks
when a pupil asked him about jen, (Confucius)
replied, "It is to love man" (Xll.22). We have here
the key word to Confucian doctrine, namely "ai" love.
It is on the basis of this meaning, no doubt, that
the standard Chinese dictionary, the Shuo-wen (AD
100), defines jen as "affection" (ch'in. It is
also on this basis that ancient Chinese philosophers,
whether Confucian, Taoist, Moist, or Legalist, and
practically all Han Confucianists have equated jen
with love. Chan. 1955:299
That the doctrine of Confucius came to be developed in this
direction is, I would say, more to do with the force of his
rival Mozi's teaching on universal love, and Mencius1
reformulation of Confucian teaching in response to it, than
with any specifically strong or central resources in the
Analects itself.
Tu 1981 reads ren as love, stressing its tender aspect,
drawing in part on Boodberg 1953, and in part on an
analysis by Fang Ying-hsien (which I have not been able to
consult) where the pre-Confucian reading of ren is taken as
tenderness and altruism (p 47). We have already seen that
such a reading cannot hold for ren in the Shijing, and it
is curious that Tu makes no reference to Lin Yu-sheng's
study. Boodberg's article raises some more interesting
issues.
31. Some quality of yielding or deference does seem to be
implicated in ren, and I take this to be in major part a
consequence of its link with where deference and
knowing ones position are crucial to the code of li.
(Confucius identifies this, for instance, in speaking of
the deferential behaviour appropriate to archery).
Boodberg claims, on etymological grounds, and on the basis
of comparing renwith other terms with initial "r-", that
ren
possessed the same connotations as our word "gentle,"
"gentleness" and "gentility", all derived from the
Latin gens. The notion of gentleness as softness in
a primary sense, rather than as a quality
characteristic of the gentleman, is however, more
deep-seated and is probably inherent in jen, as
evidenced by a host of its etymological relatives."
Boodberg 1953:328.
(Boodberg cites ru ("weakling", Confucian) as one such
relative). My one reservation on this etymology is that it
does not work for ren in the Shijing. with its more
material connotation, though this use could be seen as
deviant from the original sense of the "r-" family.
32. In other respects also the comparison is quite
inappropriate. Fung Yu-lan, for instance, draws a specific
comparison between Confucius and the Sophists, insofar as
both accepted payment for teaching, and both sought to
educate people for a life of government and public office;
<H>4.
cf Fung 1952:52-3.
33. A valuable reading of the history of li, which closely
specifices different phases is that history, can be found
in Fehl, 1971.
34. I consider this below.
35. Cf. Fingarette 1972:9
36. Analects 10 provides a survey of li as these are
exemplified in the life of Confucius.
37. The process of differentiation, as we have already
indicated, is crucial to Voegelin's philosophy of history
and is elaborated particularly in Voegelin 1956 and .1974
38. I think this is a difficult point to evaluate. We
have remarked already how the essence of Zhou ritual
traditions was preserved in Lu, and that Confucius
identified with these. I will consider below the possible
focus of relativism in the Analects, and try to assess its
implications.
39. Thus one saying has it that
The Master said, "The junzi is no vessel" An. 2.12
while another remarks
Zigong asked, "What do you think of me?"
The Master said, "You are a vessel."
"What kind of vessel?"
"A sacrificial vessel." An. 5.4
Lau 1979:64 notes that the denial in An 2.12 is a denial
that the j unzi is a specialist: ritual vessels each had
specific functions, whereas the jumzi is identified with no
function other than the attainment of virtue. Yet this is
only part of the issue, for there was a function that
Confucius prepared his followers for, and pursued himself,
and that was government service and political leadership.
Here it is important to note that, for Confucius and
throughout most of Chinese history, the state or government
was conceived ( in essence and ideal) in a semi-sacred way,
constituting itself a religious order (and this is one
reason why for Confucius a religious order or church
separable from the State was fairly much ruled out, though
Zhu Xi1s neo-Confucian reforms, and the status of
neo-Confucian academies, do move in that direction, ie
towards institutions devoted to learning for
self-cultivation rather than learning for public service).
Commenting on the significance of government service in
Chinese tradition, Creel remarks:
the Chinese have not only written and thought about
government; most of them have considered active
participation in it to be the noblest and most
desirable of occupations. Since as early as Shang
times... civilian administrators have been the great
heroes...In China, the concentration and fervor that
the Romans devoted to war were channeled into
government.
Creel 1 970:251 .
40. Commenting on the section from An. 12.11 (which Lau
translates "Let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a
subject, the father a father, the son a son") Fingarette
remarks that what is at stake is not a status or role but
an activity: "to be a father is an activity" Fingarette,
1981:338. This secures an important feature in Confucius'
philosophy, viz. that if one ceases to act as a prince then
one ceases to be a prince: mere status and power are
irrelevant. Whether one might cease to be a father,
however, is a more problematic issue, as we shall see.
41. Cf for instance An. 9.5:
When under siege in Kuang, the Master said, "With
King Wen dead, is not culture (wen) invested here in
me? If Heaven intends culture to be destroyed,
those who come after me will not be able to have any
part of it. If Heaven does not intend culture
to be destroyed, then what can the men of Kuang do
to me.
Confucius also identified to a considerable extent with the
Zhou - cf for instance An. 7.5.
42. For consideration of the inherited themes of writing
and cunning cf for instance Derrida's essay "Plato's
Pharmacy" Derrida 1981
We have already noted (n. 24) Confucius' sense of the
subversive power of writing - that if the law codes should
be written down then the people would be able to subvert
the traditional political order.
43. One prime example of obedience is fidelity to the ways
of the parents after their death.
44. Cf An 13:18 and Confucius' comment that "Fathers cover
up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers.
Straightness is to be found in such behaviour." The
questions of relativism comes up particularly in this
example to the extent that, when presented with the
situation in another state (where a son gave evidence
against his father for theft, rather than cover up for
him), Confucius simply says "It is not like that in our
state." The issue here is whether Confucius simply accepts
that different states have different customs, or whether
implicitly he is holding up the practices of his own state
as normative.
45. Creel 1951: 20-22 makes some mention of the horrors
that were part of life at the time of Confucius, and
detailed documentation can be found throughout the
Zuozhuan.
46. For consideration of some of the issues here cf for
instance Blumenberg 1 98i" and Girard 1 972,
47. The critique of Aristotle (as exemplar of a
rationalism first presented by Socrates) is a major motif
in The Birth of Tragedy, where the step back to Aeschylus
and Sophocles is a step towards a full integration of
Apollonian and Dionysiac moments within tragedy. Here
Aristotelian catharsis marks a rationalised handling of
profound emotion within the world of theatre as spectacle,
where the separation of the audience from the scene of
representation parallels and implicates the separation of
rationality from the play of force and energy within the
unconscious life of the individual.
48. Both issues are covered by Heidegger:
being-towards-death and the theme of terror and dread in
Being and Time, and the more playful approach to death that
is evident in his later writings - though there remains an
element of nostalgia (completely alien to Zhuangz. . j where
the element of play still sits within the shadow of death
as terror. [On the ways in which for the West the death of
God marks the space within which death becomes god, or a
new absolute, cf M.C. Taylor 1986).
49. For some valuable reflections here cf Fingarette
1979a, and Hall and Ames 1987:253ff.
50. Confucius repudiated the title sage (sheng) for
himself, but it was given to him by some of his followers -
cf for instance An 19.25.
51. The issues involved here are often denied, rather than
encountered. Thus Hsu Cho-yun remarks:
while archaeological excavations from Shang dynasty
sites still reveal the practice of human sacrifice,
there are no examples of human sacrifice from Chou
sites.
from "The Unfolding of Early Confucianism", Eber
1986:25
There are in fact many Zhou sites that evidence human
sacrifice, as is shown for instance in Li Xueqin 1985.
52. For a valuable reading of violence and the
foundations of religion and culture cf Girard 1972.
53. Mencius, for instance, indicates that the junzi does
not wish to know of the killing that goes on in order to
bring food to the table; he wishes simply to enjoy the
food: Men. 1A7; Lau 1970:55.
54. Cf. for instance An. 6.18
55. Cf for instance An. 17:25
The Master said, "in one's household, it is the women
and the small men that are difficult to deal with.
If you let them get too close, they become insolent.
<e*7
If you keep them at a distance, they complain.
Cf also how at An. 16.14 the identity of the woman is
circumscribed as an aspect of male identity - a point we
shall return to with Dong Zhongshu;
56. Though Confucius was soon viewed as a focus of royal
virtue; Creel remarks:
As early as the Mo Tzu we find a Confucian asserting
that if a sage had been on the throne in his
lifetime, Confucius would have been made Emperor (Mo
Tzu 12.11b), and Mencius felt called upon to explain
why it was that Confucius had not occupied the throne
(Mencius 5(i)6.3).
Creel 1 951 : 296
57. Cf Mozi 39; Watson 1964: 125-6.
CHAPTER 4 NOTES
1/ Cf for instance Hansen 1984a: 2
I doubt that in the Western sense of the term, we
could call Confucius a philosopher at all - let alone
the greatest philosopher of China. Confucius was
essentially pre-philosophical in the sense that his
sayings show little evidence that he was engaged in a
critical dialogue with other thinkers or in
constructing critical theory.
2/ For aspects of the social background prior to and
during the time of Mozi cf for instance Blakely 1977 and
1979, Hsu Cho-yun 1968, and Hsiao 1979: 214-224
3/ For further details here cf the section "Moderation in
Funerals", Mozi 25, Watson 1964: 65-77.
4/ Cf for instance the description of an original
Hobbesian state of nature, leading to a desire for
hierarchy and an identification v/ith the wishes of
superiors as a path to social order, in Mozi II, Watson
1964: 34ff.
5/ This is one of the few passages that I know of in
Chinese philosophy that approximates to Western ideas of a
divine creator laying down laws of nature.
6/ Thus Hansen:
(Mozi) assumes, with Confucius, that our affections
are naturally 'filial', but argues... that humans can
best accomplish their filial goals by practicing
universal love. Hansen 1984b: 7
7/ For more on the shi cf Hsu Cho-yun 1968; Munro
1969:9-10; Fung 1952:52.
8/ On the acceptance of hierarchy and authority behind
Mozi's position here Hansen comments:
Mo Tzu's argument...draws on the Confucian
assumptions of the power of models and the
naturalness of following traditions - whatever they
are. Practicing universality will change society
because people respond to models. 1984b: 7
Bauer comments:
Through the system of adaptation (or assimilation) to
what is above, the thinking of the entire people is
to be developed in many individual cells and by
degrees. It is to be focussed on the leader and to
become strong and unified in him. The knowledge and
the will of the ruler are thus greatly strengthened,
and it is in the thinking of them that the people
kl
will find its fulfilment.
Bauer 1976: 29-30
9/ On the notion that Mozi envisaged a rigidly
hierarchical and authoritarian state cf for instance Rubin
1976: 39ff.
10/ On the function of belief in spirits as an aspect of
the maintenance of social order cf Mozi 31, Watson
1964:94ff. What Mozi offers here is a set of pragmatic
religious sanctions for social order; Fung Yu-lan remarks
that his arguments for a theological position are thin
but we must remember that Mo Tzu had no interest in
metaphysics as such, his purpose being merely to
establish religious sanctions with which to induce
men to love one another." Fung 1952: 97
11/ On ren and jian'ai in Mozi cf for instance Hsiao,
1979: 229fF.
12/ Mozi was a military specialist and his community of
followers can be read as a distinctly martial group, which
carries definite implications for the tenor one might wish
to ascribe to jian'ai. Rubin for instance, emphasising the
hierarchical conform.!sm of Mozi's social vision, remarks
Although an opponent of aggressive wars, Mo Tzu
chooses the latter of the opposed principles of wen
and wu, not only because he is a firm and
irreconcilable opponent of culture, but also because
in his scheme all of society is militarized. Rubin
1976:43
13/ Though Mozi's culture-heroes are different from those of
Confucius: Mozi goes back to earlier figures than those
praised in the analects, in order to establish a more
ancient, and thus more privileged, foundation for order and
virtue - cf Bauer:
It is interesting to observe how the rivals of the
Confucians imitated them in presenting the past as a
model. They simply situated their own golden ages in
periods still more remote, thereby opening up the
past to an ever greater depth. Bauer 1976: 30.
14/ I take it as an important point that Mozi nowhere
praises the virtues of war: to this extent I think Rubin
over-emphasises the martial tenor and implications of his
philosophy.
15/ For consideration of how Mozi has fared within the
cultural reassessments of post-revolutionary China, cf
Louie 1986.
16/ For a development of this argument cf Fried "Tribe to
State or State to Tribe in ancient China" and Keightley
"The Late Shang State, When, Where and What"
in Keightley 1983:467-493 and 523-564.
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17/ For a fruitful consideration of this issue cf Chang
Chung-yuan 1975: 19ff.
18/ There is, furthermore, no indication from the
Daodej'jng that Laozi reckoned women capable of becoming
sages - though the text is so brief that there is much
about which it carries no indication. There is a strong
tradition of female shamans in the Chuci, however, and it
is possible that this is presupposed by Laozi.
19/ I am indebted here to the arguments put forward in
Hansen 1984c (on Laozi), together with Hansen's earlier
article "A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu," in Mair 1983: 24-55.
20/ I am thus reading Laozi here as similar in many
respects to that later tradition which is in fact the one
legitimate philosophical continuation of early Daoism, viz.
the iconoclastic tradition of Chan (Zen) Buddhism. I do
not dispute that there are strong substantive aspects to
Laozi's text, just as there are within Chan practice, but
there is also a strong philosophy of language which
establishes the emptiness of any philosophical position -
including Laozi's!
21/ Again, if we note Chan/Zen as a continuation of
Laozi's thinking, then it is the absolute stillness of a
Zen garden that epitomizes Laozi's vision of nature,
perhaps even more than the vast landscapes of traditional
Chinese painting where man is such an insignificant figure:
those landscapes represent nature as a living, growing
form, nearer to Mencius' tree-covered mountain than to
Laozi's uncarved block.
22/ The extent to which the all-devouring mother is a male
fiction - an index of male fear of the female - would need
to be considered in any reading of the underlying structure
of ideas here. Neumann looks at "the mother" from the
perspective of an archetypal symbolism, but his work would
need to be balanced by consideration of, for instance,
Kofman 1985.
23/ This has to be set against aspects of his philosophy
where li is important. However, where for Confucius we
find ren and li to be tv/o main poles or strands of his
thinking, we find with Mencius a single conjoint moral
notion renyi (benevolence and righteousness) as a
foundation for morality, with l_i_ taking a relatively
insignificant place in comparison.
24/ Commenting on the idea of benevolent government,
renzhong, that is so central to Mencius' extended reading
of the significance of ren, Hsiao Kung-Chuan remarks
The benevolent government must have its concrete
forms through which to be practiced. Mencius'
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statements on this would all seem to be more or less
summed up under the headings: to teach and to
nourish. Moreover, his theory of nurturing the people
is especially penetrating; there is nothing
comparable to it in all the pre-Ch'in
philosophies...Throughout the Seven Books of the
Mencius, Mencius focusses his concern on enriching
the people's livelihood, decreasing taxes and
imports, bringing wars to an end, and correcting
boundaries
Hsiao 1979:150
25/ Gaozi said, "Human nature is like whirling
water. Give it an outlet in the east and it will
flow east; give it an outlet in the west and it will
flow west. Human nature does not show any preference
for either good or bad just as water does not show
any preference for either east or west."
"It certainly is the case," said Mencius, "that water
does not show any preference for either east or west,
but does it show the same indifference to high and
low? Human nature is good just as water seeks low
ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no
water that does not flow downwards. Men. 6A2; Lau
1983:160
26/ The artisanal and geometric imagery here could have
been lifted direct from Mozi.
27/ Thus, Mencius speaks of 3 sages - Bo Yi, Yi Yin and
Confucius - and remarks
All three were sages of old. I have not been able to
emulate any of them, but it is my hope and wish to
follow the example of Confucius."
"Were Po Yi and Yi Yin as much an equal of Confucius
as that?"
"No. Ever since man came into this world, there has
never been another Confucius."
Men, 2A2; Lau 1983:79.
And cf also, on Confucius as sage-king, 3B9.
28/ Cf for instance 1A2, 1B1, 4A1.
29/ In relation to this cf 7A5, 4A1.
30/ Cf the question asked of Mencius:
"Is it not excessive to travel with a retinue of
hundreds of followers in scores of chariots and to
live off one feudal lord after another?"
Men 3B4; Lau 1983:109
On the alienation this could imply, Hsiao remarks:
Not only Yen Hui and Yuan Hsien (two of Confucius'
best disciples, noted both for their retiring
behaviour and for their poverty) would not have been
able (to approach close enough) so much as to glimpse
him; even Confucius with his single cart drawn by two
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horses presented an appearance that is by no means in
a class with Mencius.
Hsiao 1979:145
31/ Hansen comments on some of the presuppositions behind
the cultivation of qi, pointing to aspects of this
cultivation,, in Daoist practice prior to Mencuis:
"Early Chinese "medical" theory treated life and death as explain^
j>u the presence or absence of Ch'i" ethers (also
breath"). When you breath you are alive, when you
run out you are dead!
Yang Chu thought the length of life was
pre-determined by Heaven and the determining
mechanism was ch'i. The more you have the longer you
live. The determination, therefore, was not by
purposive heavenly intervention but was natural. The
amount of ch'i determined only the time of your
natural death. If your ch'i was released by violent
physical trauma, you would die before your mandated
time - thus disobeying Heaven. Hansen 1984d: 2.
Mencius' cultivation of qi thus fits first into the context
(already noted in the Shijing) of the ordained requirement
to preserve one's life, and then into the context, of
meditational practices developed by those who chose to
withdraw from society in order to preserve their qi. This
aspect of Mencius' philosophy marks one point of his close
proximity to Daoism.
32/ We have seen in the Shijing the sense in which the
people (min) are generated by heaven and in turn generate
the ren : the people thus have an original proximity to
Heaven. Mencuis acknowledges that the people of other
states will come flocking to a state that is well ruled,
thus showing by their action how Heaven is with the
well-ruled state.
33/ Cf for instance 1B8, and also 4A2:
If a ruler ill-uses his people to an extreme degree,
he will be murdered and his state annexed; if he does
it to a lesser degree, his person will be in danger
and his territory reduced. Such rules will be given
the posthumous names of Yu (ie "benighted") and Li
("tyrannical"), and even dutiful sons and grandsons
will not be able to have them revoked in a hundred
generations. Lau 1983: 118-9.
Mencius also points out that, in compsoing the Spring and
Autumn Annals in a time of regicide and parricide
Confucius' was, strictly speaking, taking over the rulers'
prerogative, but only because the times necessitated it.
-cf 3B9.
34/ Part of the background that is crucial for Zhuangzi is
the development of forms of logical argumentation in the
-3rd century. Graham comments:
The new art of disputation affected in different ways
all the schools of the 3rd century. Chuang-tzu was a
friend of Hui Shih, debated with him and made fun of
his logic. Living at a time when reason first became
self-aware in China, he is the first conscious
anti-rationalist. Disputation is the technique for
judging between alternatives; but according to
Chuang-tzu it is precisely when we distinguish
alternatives, the right and the wrong, the beneficial
and the harmful, self and other, that we cut
ourselves off from the world we objectify, and lose
the capacity of the angler, the carpenter and the
swimmer to heed his total situation with undivided
attention and respond with the immediacy of a shadow
to a shape and an echo to a sound. Graham 1978:21
35/ Cf for instance Hansen's remarks here:
Chuang Tzu's opening contradicts the fundamental
assumption of primitive, contradictory Taoism.
Language is not unnatural, nor all wrong, nor
inimical to the cosmos. On the contrary, all
language is natural, all doctrines are equally the
pipes of Heaven. heaven blows out of all the pipes,
not just one - neither preferring the Confucians',
nor the MohistsI...Since all doctrines are pipes of
heaven, yours has no special status in being caused
by heaven. Instead of saying all doctrines are wrong,
Chuang Tzu grants (in a sense) all are right - that
is, all are in accord with heaven-nature.
Hansen 1984e: 5-6.
36/ Throughout Zhuangzi the shenren can be viewed as a
powerful shaman set within a philosophical text.
37/ Cf Zhuangzi 2, Graham 1986:49.
38/ For the best extended treatment of Zhuangzi as a
naturalistic philosopher cf Wu 1982.
39/ For some reflections here cf Wu 1932: 117-121
40/ I think Zhuangzi does himself favour a kind of
naturalistic simplicity and reclusiveness as a (most)
worthwhile life, but recognises that any attempt to argue
for it as the sole way is as open to contradiction as any
argument privileging Mohism or Confucianism.
41/ For the strongest critique of ren and yi cf Zhuangzi
8, Graham 1986: 200-203; for the way in which Zhuangzi
usurps the voice of Confucius, and makes Confucius himself
reject ren and yi as impediments cf Zhuangzi 6, Graham
1986: 92.
42/ For extended consideration here cf Chasseguet-Smirgel
1985b.
43/ For careful re-readings of Xunzi's pragmatism cf
Hansen 1984f and Cua 1985.
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1/ For further on the daotong cf Ching 1974b.
2/ The process of transmission was referred to as "The
Transmission of the Lamp", and selections from the texts
considered central to it can be found in Chang Chung-yuan
1969. Comment on some of the presuppositions at work in
this idea of transmission - particularly insofar as it
ascribes authority to the Chan master and his teachings as
a form of living scripture - Yanagida remarks:
The attitude which led to this reverence for the oral
record of one's predecessors is one which favors
individual facts or incidents over abstract
generalities. The earliest genre of Ch1 an literature
- a group of works known as the "transmission of the
lamp" histories (ch'uan-teng shih or, more simply
teng-shih) - generally consist of the biographies of
the earlier Patriarchs and successive Masters. This
is fully in accordance with the predisposition toward
personalized, "incidental expressions of truth, the
concrete rather than the abstract."
From "The Recorded Sayings" Text of Chinese Ch'an
Buddhism", in Lai and Lancaster 1983:189.
We have mentioned already the centrality of the
"conversational tradition" in Chinese philosophy; I will
return to this briefly in chapter 7 by way of comparison
with the formalised Platonic dialogue, where the idea of
"conversation" is handled in a completely different way.
3/ On the general structure and outlines of Dong's
philosophy cf Fung 1953: 7-87.
4/ Some of the background religious ideas that are
implicated in Dong's philosophy are very well considered in
Loewe 1979 and 1982. Pirazzoli - t'Sterstevens 1982: 41-60
also usefully covers the same topic.
5/ Commenting on the general background presuppositions at
work here, Bauer remarks:
In the doctrine of the transmission of the heavenly
mandate, there had already existed certain phenomena
which were interpreted as the signs of a beginning, a
flourishing or a declining dynasty. But they had
been confined to certain good or evil acts of the
ruler. People believed that they knew that such acts
would either result in the approval of heaven and
thus the transfer or the retention of the mandate, or
provoke its displeasure and therefore its withdrawal.
But during the Han period a special "language" of the
silent heaven was beginning to be discovered. It no
longer tended to express itself in the language of
the people and its right to revolution, as had been
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the case with Mencius, but in the language of nature.
History books were suddenly filled with reports about
miraculous celestial or terrestrial phenomena which
were assigned a particular significance and usually
meant that the ruler was being either encouraged or
admonished. Of course, reports of this sort
concerning comets, earthquakes, mountain slides, hail
storms and similar events had been provided in
earlier chronicles. Similarly, the vague feeling
that some of them at least had a more profound
significance can be shown to have existed at an early
time. What was new was their systematization, and
especially the opinion that they were not mere
reactions of heaven to the way the ruler governed,
but were frequently devoid of moral overtones. This
was the case when they announced by certain signs the
dawn of a new dynasty destined to rule under a
different element. The ruler (and therefore mankind
as a whole) was no longer wholly the master of his
own fate. Even when his conduct was exemplary, his
time could have run out and an era might end.
Historical development no longer followed the laws of
men as much as it did those of nature." Bauer 1976:
72-3.
Part of the background thinking here, that was assimilated
into a full system during the Han, was already under way in
the Zhou period in the cosmological speculations centred
around the Yin-yang and wuxing (5 elements) schools. For
considerations cf Fung 1952: 159-169, and 379-399.
6/ There are various difficulties in this formulation -
which remain as difficulties in the theorisation of
transcendence within Dong's philosophy - but I do not
intend to pursue them here. The difficulties (around what
is in the West partly a contrast between imminance and
transcendence) remain operative within Zhu Xi's philosophy,
and I will consider them further there.
7/ This vision of man is severely criticised by Wang Chong,
as we shall see below.
8/ Voegelin 1956 considers various aspects of the
microcosm - macrocosm parallels in different cultures. For
some fascinating reflections on the process whereby the
imperial order of the Han came to be established, and thus
for an indirect treatment of some of the tensions present
in Deng's attempt to link Heaven and Earth, Heaven and Man,
cf Voegelin 1974: 272-299. With various modifications at
the level of metaphysical articulation, the concept of the
body itself as a mirror and image of transcendence -
continuous with the ideas, already encountered, of the body
as sacred, and of the need to preserve one's qi - remains a
central image for Zhu Xi, and is indeed one of the
hallmarks of Chinese philosophical and religious
anthropology, for virtually every school and tradition
(there are some excesses of asceticism and
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religiously-inspired suicide, in pursuit of nirvana, within
Chinese Buddhism, but these are exceptional). As we have
acknowledged, though, the sacredness of the body needs to
be read against the harrowing of the body in the mourning
rituals. And it also needs to be read in relation to the
extensive repertoire of torture and physical mutilation as
a form of punishment, that remained standard in the Zhou,
Han, and indeed later dynasties.
9/ Commenting on the way in which, through extensive
modification of the Mencian position, Xunzi's ritualism
came to be accepted as an outworking of (human) nature,
Bauer notes:
In addition to many texts which clearly derived from
the school of Hsun-tzu, although his name was not
mentioned, other texts were introduced which were
intended to demonstrate that the Confucian attitude
had grown like a thing in nature, as had been
maintained by the school of Mencuis. As mentioned
previously, the bridge here was the notion of family
love as rooted in nature. By an almost unnoticeable
shift in the argument, the presumably much less
"natural" love of children for their parents "piety"
(hsiao), was given priority over the (most nearly
"natural") love of parents for their offspring (for
which a special term was not even created).
Bauer 1976: 69-70.
1 0/ It is ■ uncommon for writers engaged in comparative
work to contrast the complementary dualism of Yin and yang
with the conflict dualism of Ahura Mazda and Ahriman, and
to stress that Chinese cosmology works within a basically
harmonious and balanced, rather than conflictual, universe.
There is truth in this as regards Daoist readings of
yin-yang, but for Confucians yin is usually a subordinate
principle, liable to enter into conflict with yang. For
Dong Zhongshu and the Bohutong yin is a primary focus for
the presence of evil in cosmic and human affairs (for Zhu
Xi this function is taken over by qi).
11/ We have already touched on the issue of friendship in
relation to Confucius. The determining background factors
for the different philosophical and theoretical approaches
to friendship in China and the West are difficult to
determine. We will encounter, in relation to Homer and
Aristotle, the presupposition of a conflictual and
competitive basis to social order, meaking a contractual
form of friendship a necessary feature of survival.
Shijing poets and Confucians focussed on a vision of social
harmony but in the conflicts of the Warring States period
we might well expect, in the absence of harmony, friendship
to be prized and theorised within a programme of social
survival. This did not happen; and whi1e Confucians
stressed clan-order (v/here family links, rather than
friendships with those outwith the clan/family, were to the
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fore) the Legalist who destroyed the clans emphasised the
power of the state rather than friendships between
individuals and groups. For the Confucians it is again the
power of the clan that becomes central.
Conflict apart, three other factors bearing on friendship
might be mentioned. 1/ Greek democracy, with its stress
on the individual, emphasised relationships between
individuals, friendship included. 2/ Christianity, with its
stress on the unique significance of persons, symbolised
friendship as an aspect of spiritual experience. 3/
Christianity, with its emphasis on God as person,
emphasised the possibility of friendship between man and
God. These three points marks significant contrasts with
Chinese traditions.
12/ Serres1 reading of the parasite stands as one of the
most powerful readings of post-humanist philosophy.
13/ This despite the fact that the possibility, the very
meaning, of integrity, is rendered null from the start.
14/ To follow this further, we could fruitfully ready Wang
Chong in the light of Nietzsche's will to power.
15/ This notion could be read in line with medieval
Christian notions of evil as privatio boni.
16/ Th literature here is vast; for a very useful
philosophical appraoch to Zen concepts of the person cf
Kasulis 1981.
17/ For a still-valuable consideration of issues here cf
Suzuki.
CHAPTER 6_ NOTES
1/ On issues between Confucianism and Buddhism, and Zhu Xi
and Buddhism, cf for instance Fu 1973 and Fu "Chu Hsi on
Buddhism", Chan 1986b: 377-407. On neo-Confucian and
Daoist interactions cf Berling 1979; of interest also is
Cahill 1980. The crypto-Buddhism of the idealist (Lu-Wang)
strand of neo-Confucianism, and Zhu's disagreement with it,
is particularly well focussed in the Goose Lake Monastery
meeting between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan - on this cf Ching
1974a. For comprehensive discussions of Zhu Xi's work and
context cf Chan 1986b.
2/ There is considerable discussion as to how to interpret
taiji, li, qi, and also tian. within Zhu Xi1s philosophy.
One commentator remarks:
T' ai-chi and JLi have been understood to stand on the
same level because T'ai-chi can be thought of as the
Great Ultimate from which everything is generated and
in which everything exists. But a higher place, a
place superior to li, can be given to T'ai-chi
because it is "the ultimate of li" or "the totality
of li." This is a fairly prevalent way of
understanding Chu Hsi's philosophical system. Yu
Yamanoi "The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi's
Philosophy," Chan 1986b: 79.
The reading of taij i in relation to li_ is particularly
important insofar as Zhu took Cheng Yi's statement that
"principle (li) is one but its manifestations are many" to
constitute the basis of his metaphysics. Huang indicates
how important the arguments on li and taiji were in
providing a platform against Buddhism.
A new philosophical approach of searching after
arguments for the reality of an ultimate was a
departure from the past. In the thinking of
Neo-Confucianists, it would seem, their success or
failure in reviving the Confucian philosophy largely
depended on how convincing their arguments for a
sounder theory were, so as to challenge effectively
the prevailing Buddhist doctrine of the phenomenal
world, including man, as unreal and illusory - a
doctrine which the Neo-Confucianists believed to be
ontologically and ethically-religiously unsound.
Interestingly, the term t'ai-chi, merely mentioned in
the I Ching, was now to receive due attention from
the Sung philosophers as the ultimate source of the
universe. Huang 1974: 278
Taiji was not, however, simply a rational principle
designating an ordered cosmos; it was also a world
principle of absolute perfection, governing both the cosmos
as a whole and the inner structure of an individual life.
As it specified a totality of rational order, so it
specified a totality of moral achievement that v/as
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incumbent on the individual; commenting on the tension that
this tension provoked for moral life (a point to which we
shall return) Metzger remarks:
The pathos of this totalism.also made meaningful the
Neo-Confucian term for ultimate being, t'ai-chi (the
supreme, ultimate point which can be reached). Chu
Hsi's view that this "supreme ultimate" is part of
every individual existent connoted the totalistic
quality of ultimacy ascribed to all moral life. Even
the very idea of ts'un (preserving) the presence of
heaven in one's daily life connoted the totalistic
watchfulness needed to cling to something on the
verge of being lost. The anxious fear of "losing"
this presence is obvious in Chu Hsi. Metzger 1977:
62
3/ While this much is true and important, there is
nonetheless an issue over mastery in the cosmos that does
exist as a topic in Zhu's philosophy. We noted in chapter
one how Zhu could not read tian as a quasi-personal cosmic
lord. This notion is tied also to the idea that
intelligence and awareness are cosmic, not simply human,
properties, which carried the further assumption that the
human mind in conformity with the mind of Heaven might
ultimately control the cosmic process. Metzger comments:
The Neo-Confucian's emphasis on cognition was
invariably combined with the insight that since the
capacity to have awareness and think intelligently
was itself not the product of human intelligence, it
existed as a cosmic given. This chih-chueh (purely
natureal consciousness) had, they further assumed, a
kind of spiritual or even magical quality, for which
they used ancient terms like ling (spiritually free),
ming (bright), shen (buoyantly empathetic spirit),
and hsu (empty of all particular concepts or
feelings). Thus Chu Hsi said, "The spiritually free
aspect of existnece is just the mind." Neo-Confucians
also answered that this "purely natural
consciousness" was indivisible throughout the cosmos.
This idea was a correlate of their belief in the
organic oneness of the cosmos and in the mind's
transnatural power to control the cosmos. Metzger
1977: 67; and cf pp 77-79.
We will consider below how there are two senses to tian in
Zhu: in one, tian is subordinate to taiji, but in the other
(the moral aspect of tian) tian controls taiii. Commenting
on this, Yu remarks:
It seems that the t'ien as spoken of by Chu Hsi has a
double meaning, one as a natural object in the
universe and one as the creator or organiser of the
universe. While t'ien, so far as it can be defined
as one of all creation in the universe, can remain in
the frame of the li-chi philosophy, T'ien as the
creator or organizer of the universe exists beyond
the realm of li-ch'i, jutting out of the frame of the
li-ch'i philosophy. Art. cit. Chan 1906b:88
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4/ Zhu thus sees the universe, constituted by yin and yang
and wuxing, as a constant cycle of change and
transformation. He remarks:
When (taiji) is not moving, it is at rest; when it is
not at rest, it is moving again. Yichuan (Cheng Yi)
said "There is no start for activity and stillness,
and there is no beginning for yin and yang. Only the
one who understands the Dao can understand this."
When activity arrives at its limit, then there is
stillness; when stillness is at its limit, then
activity is underway once more...in fact, prior to
activity there is stillness; and prior to stillness
activity is underway. This is as when the day is
passed, then night ensues. When night has passed,
the day that is tomorrow comes. Zhuzi yulei 94: 10a.
The centrality of change for Zhu Xi marks a powerful
proximity between his philosophy and the process philosophy
of Whitehead and his followers. Because the universe is at
once in movement and at rest, it was for Zhu essential to
develop a philosophy of man that would accomoedate movement
and rest. While we will see that he does give a priority
to li_ over qi, to metaphysical form over changing matter
and consciousness, nonetheless he does not opt for what is
in his eyes a Buddhist preference for tranquillity and
stillness, a preference which to him appeared to reduce the
world to a void.
5/ Cf for instance the statement where, in specifying that
principle exists before physical form (xingershang) and qi
after physical form (xingerxia) he notes:
Fundamentally li and qi cannot be spoken of as prior
or posterior. But if we must trace their origin, we
are obliged to say that li is prior. However, li is
not a separate entity. It exists right in qi.
Qithout qi, li would have nothing to adhere to. As
qi, there are the Agents (or Elements) of Metal,
Wood, Water and Fire. As li_ there are ren, yi, li,
and zhi. Zhuzi daquan 49:1b; Chan 1963: 634.
6/ Lokung, in his essay "Chu Hsi's Theory of Metaphysical
Structure", Chan 1986a: 58-78, examines aspects of the
similarity between qi and materia; Hatton 1982 brings out
the differences between the terras.
7/ Cf Yu, art. cit. Cha 1936a: 85
8/ We saw above, n.3, that something of Dong's difficulty
with Tian is preserved in the way Zhu understands Tian,
particularly the issue of whether Tian is a moral force
that controls the cosmos or whether it is some kind of
subordinate principle within the cosmos, a manifestation of
qi that is "secondary" to tai'ji and li. The reading that
is followed has crucial implications for anthropology, as
we shall see.
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9/ The way in which we understand Zhu's desire for
constancy beyond change is important. Whilst, as we have
seen, Zhu stresses the changing aspect of the universe as a
never-ending process, he is committed also to the notion
that the rnind (xin) must establish itself on pure and
unchanging principles (chang li) if the process of moral
perfection is to be achieved. On the resultant anxiety
emerging from the tension between change and constancy
(intensified insofar as qi is a positive resistance to
constancy), cf Metzger 1977.
10/ That Zhu seems to take li as universals is suggested
for instance in the following texts:
Whenever anything is made, there is in it its own li.
For all things which come to be in the universe there
is a specific li. Yulei 101.26
How do dried up withered things possess xing
(nature?) From the beginning they have had such a
li. Thus it is said that there is nothing in the
universe that lies beyond xing. Walking down the
stps the Master said "The bricks of these steps have
their li which belongs to the bricks." Sitting dov/n
he said "This bamboo chair has within it the li of
bamboo chairs." Yulei 4.6
11/ For a careful reading of the different meanings of qi
within Zhu's philosophy, and a statement on its relative
incommensurability with any Western terms, cf Kim 1984.
12/ It is in the context of ideas about the difference
between the qi of man and the qi of things that the
neo-Confucian concept of sagehood - which was a rich and
enormously powerful notion, carrying, as we have already
indicated, the sense of the individual as cosmic lord - was
elaborated. The notion for Zhu Xi was a strongly
optimistic one, despite a strong measure of anxiety within
it; that anxiety was in part determined by the resistant
aspect of qi, in part by the problem of finding a
theoretical statement of the fundamental ord.er of things
that might allow man a secure place in the cosmos. On this
issue Metzger remarks
Sung Neo-Confucians, therefore, differe from Chou and
Han Confucians not only inmaking more explicit the
idea of the oneness of heaven and man but also in
regarding this oneness as an unsolved problem. Nor
is this surprising when one considers the intervening
impact of Buddhism. According to Chu Hsi, the
Buddhists regarded the realm of concrete experience
(or, more precisely, ch1i [the ether of
materialization]) as cha-tzu (dregs, worthless
leftovers). Chu Hsi charged that this view "broke
off and extinguished moral relationships." Whether
or not he accurately gauged Buddhism's moral
implications, his assessment of its ontological
position is sound enough. Metzger 1977:72-3
[Though I would not here follow Metzger's reading of
'3/ The phrase zhizhi gewu comes, as we have noted, from
the Daxue; for further on the Daxue within the context of
Zhu's philosophy cf Gardner 19C3. Commenting on the
process of learning integral to Zhu's concept of
self-cultivation Yu Ying-shih remarks that it involves
three aspects
First, a moral attitude of 'seriousness' or
'reverence' must be established and maintained at all
times; second, an intellectual activity of ko-wu or
chih-chih must be pursued in a spiritual state of
'seriousness* or 'reverence'; third, as a result,
'principles' (li_) of things become known. In Chu
Hsi's view this operation is an endless, ever ongoing
process in the life of every tryly confirmed
Confucianist. It is through this spiritual journey
that a Confucianist seeks to bring his moral nature
to perfection. Thus, taken as a whol, these three
aspects constitute a total system of moral practice.
But even in such a system of primarily moral
character, we find that the rold assigned to
knowledge by Chu I-Isi is essential even though it is,
paradoxically, also secondary at the same time.
Yu, "Morality and Knowledge in Chu Hsi's
Philosophical System", Chan 1986b:231.
The issue of gewu is taken up at various points in the
Jinsi Lu. In one case Cheng Yi's comment is quoted:
There is principle in everything, and one must
investigate principle to the utmost. There are many
ways to do this. One way is to read books and
elucidate moral principle. Another way is to discuss
people and events of the past and present, and to
distinguish which are right and which wrong. Still
another way is to handle affairs and settle them in
the proper way. All these are ways to investigate the
principle of things extensively.
14/ For a translation of the Renshuo cf Chan 1963:593-596.
k%
CHAPTER 7 NOTES
1 / There are now various works which consider the
development of a concept of mind within the framework of
Greek culture. Basic has been Snell 1953, together with
Adkins 1970; Bremmer 1983 provides a good recent
consideration; Jaynes, 1979, offers a fascinating reading
within the context of cultural psychology; a reading of the
issues with Plato can be found in Voegelin 1957b.
2/ The framework that is opened in Derrida's inquiry is
one whereby Western philosophical traditions are judged to
have been dominated, since Plato, by a sense of the
priority of mind as the basic resource category for
philosophy. The significantly new space now being entered
by philosophy - a space which perhaps marks the death of
philosophy - is one where mind, inferiority and
subjectivity have been fractured and dissolved, robbed of
their status as simple, originating categories, and of
their power as unifying concepts. Partly in the wake of
Freud - where the priority of the unconscious over the
conscious is a priority of conflict over order and division
over unity - and partly in the wake of Saussure - where the
idea of language as a play of differences becomes
transferred to the mind as a play of differences - Derrida
pursues a reading of the human "subject" as permanently
broken and divided against itself, as body rather than
mind. For a different approach to the eclipse of "mind" cf
also Rorty 1980 and Foucault 1970.
3/ Obviously I am wary of such generalisations as applied,
for instance, to the whole of Indian (or Chinese) Buddhism.
Points of specific reading that would be significant here,
for instance, would relate to the status of the world
within such an idealist system such as Yogacara. Zhu Xi's
criticism of Lu Xiangshan, as of Chan, is in part a
criticism of the tendency to view all truth as a given
endowment of the mind, thus removing the need for study of
traditions and events as a way to come to an understanding
of li. Zhu's reading of li as innate material and mental
principle is in a sense a reading of the v/orld as a kind of
scripture (thus in a sense bearing a Derrida favouring of
writing over (inner) speech), but whether Lu Xingshan
correlatively read li as "inner word", and whether he
subscribed to a metaphor of inner "audition," is not
something I have been able to establish.
4/ Other aspects of the understanding of the voice apart,
there is a significant contrast between the inner voice as
an active resource within the person (and the extension of
that notion to cover ideas of God's Spirit as active within
the human spirit, and of the divine Logos as the active
power of creation), and Zhu Xi1s stress on li as passive
and unchanging, radically different in this from the active
force of qi.
5/ Compare this with the comments we noted in Chapter 3,
regarding Confucius' resistance to the idea of a positive,
codified law.
6/ The reading here marks a fairly persistent proximity to
structuralist approaches within Derrida1s writing; this
sits in tension with a Nietzschean approach which would not
necessarily abandon a set of structured oppositions, but
which would rather seek to read those oppositions in the
specificity of their historical determinateness, rather
than view them as aspects of a universal schema.
7/ This notion needs to be read with a measure of caution.
What I would stress about writing here is its directness as
an act of communication. Insofar as Chinese thinkers never
believed in a notion of lav/s of nature (of nature possessed
of an internally written structure given to it by Tian,
comparable to the way in which in the West the world is the
book written by God), then they did not believe in a
certain kind of writing: writing as a static structure. If
they did believe in writing as active communication,
though, then that is continuous with the idea of nature as
a constantly active process of birth, of becoming, that we
have already noted in different ways as an integral feature
of Confucian cosmology. Thus, even though Chen Chan and
Zhu Xi speak of "eternal principles" chang li, it is the
active manifestation of those principles in qi that is
perhaps more central.
8/ It is the separation of worls that I take here to be
crucial, though we have already noted that Zhu's system is
a form of dualism, and thus that there is a separation
active in his thinking (which was also perceived and
criticised by later writers in neo-Confucianism, as for
instance Lo Chinshun - cf Bloom 1987). We have also seen,
however, the difficulty Zhu has in presenting his
distinctions between li and qi, whilst also attempting to
maintain this unity. To the extent that he does maintain
unity, his system can be compared to the advaita vedanta
(non-dualism, neither monism nor dualism) of Samkara.
9/ We have noted how, for Confucians, it is an
inner-worldly goal of perfection that is sought, rather
than transcendence achieved at death, or through death and
rebirth. There are strong figurings of a quest for
transcendece within later Daoism, however; and we will note
below how, in an early text such as the Songs of the South,
there are shamanic visions of transcendent flight that
approximate Plato's account of the soul ascending to its
vision of the Forms.
10/ For a reading of Levinas on repetition and the problem
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of metaphysical violence, and for a reading of his contrast
between Greek return (the homecoming of Odysseus) and
Jewish wandering (of Moses, but also of the diaspora) cf
Derrida's essay "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida 1978:
79 - 153.
11/ Green 1979 carries some valuable comments on the
"return of the repressed" within the staging of theatre,
and by extension within the literary work; on this, and on
the problem of "excess" as a moment of "authenticity" cf
Derrida "The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of
Representation", Derrida 1978: 232:250
12/ Nietzsche begins to develop this notion in The Birth
of Tragedy, particularly in relation to Dionysus as the
figure governing the conflictual energy in Greek life, and
in Greek tragedy.
13/ A reading of the social processes at work in
privileging homosexual desire amongst the Greeks can be
found in Gouldner, 1967. For a survey of the practices, and
reflection on them, cf Dover 1978.
14/ On the religious issues at stake in violence cf Girard
1 972.
15/ Again, the implications of this are difficult to
determine. There can be a tendency in Western thinking,
insofar as it has been informed by the experience of tragic
literature, to reckon the only authentic view of life to be
a tragic one - life is always conflictual, and the only
adequate life is lived in full recognition and acceptance
of the sorrow conflict can bring. We have seen how
Zhangzi, though, seemed to accept conflict and loss with
equanimity and joy; and we have noted the difficulty of
locating horror in relation to the vision of Confucius. My
own position would be that a tragic stance is a necessary
moment preliminary to the kind of ease Zhuangzi focusses.
In Chan/Zen this gets marked in an existential passage
through death as preliminary to the moment of awakening.
16/ Here Hippolytus has the naive intense
single-mindedness of a certain kind of adolescent or saint.
His insistence on living only in the light can - pace
Nietzsche - be read as Euripides' way of criticising a
Greek culture that already gone dangerously too far in
revering the rational over the instinctual, Apollo over
Dionysus. The summation of Euripides' critique here is in
the Bacchae. It can be said of Plato that he philosophises
solely in the bright light of the sun, in the fictive world
of Apollo (the world of the Forms).
17/ On this cf for instance the following judgement:
This dialogue consists of a series of elaborately
vested reports. Like a Chinese box, it gives us a
conversation of Apollodorous with a friend, which
t+v
reports a previous conversation of his own, in which
he recalls a speech of Aristodemus, who reports
(among others) a speech of Socrates, who reports a
speech of Diotima, who reports the secrets of the
mysteries. This distancing, continually present to
us in the indirect discourse constructions of the
Greek, makes us always aware of the fragility of our
knowledge of love, our need to grope for
understanding of this central element of our lives
through hearing and telling stories. Nussbaum, 1986:
1 60
For a further reading here that draws our the complexi ty of
the dialogue's construction cf Rosen, 1968: 1-38 and
passim.
18/ On the most manifest level of the organisation of
homosexual desire in Athenian culture, Dover remarks:
Why the Athenians of the fourth century BC accepted
homosexuality so readily and conformed so happily to
the homosexual ethos is a question which can be
answered instantly at a superficial level: they
accepted it because it was acceptable to their
fathers and uncles and grandfathers 1978: 2.
On the development of a homosexual culture, as we have already
remarked, cf Goldner 1967
19/ Much has been written on the significance of Diotima,
and I do not wish to pursue the topic here. All I would
say, on the gender issue, is that no significance seems to
rest with the fact that Socrates calls on a priestess in
order to establish the highest wisdom on eros: here the
priestess is a cipher in the male philosophical text, and
as such an extension of the persona of Socrates.
20/ For a consideration of how Alcestis might be read from
a Christian perspective, in relation to Christian themes of
self-sacrifice, cf Markus 1955
21/ Dover 1978 makes it clear that, while the homosexual
relationship was prized (particularly from the point of
view of the older man), relationships with women were taken
as a practical norm. That much said, the ascription of
value to female desire was not a feature of Athenian
culture (in the way that it had been for instance amongst
Sappho and her followers on Lesbos).
22/ We will consider some of the issues surrounding philia
in Chapter 9.
23/ The kind of eros that speakers praise is determined
very much by their own status as lover or beloved, and by
the way in which they lived according to a certain aspect
of eros. Dover notes that
Pausanias was a real person whose disposition, we have some
reason to think,...was more exclusively homosexual than was
common in the Greek world 1978:13
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And commenting on the length and fidelity of his love for
Agatnon he remarks:
He therefore had a strong personal reason for
treating erastai who turn their eros into an enduring
relationship as superior to those whose interest in a
given eromenos is more transient, and for treating
the endurance itself as a justification of the
original homosexual relationship. ibid p. 84
We will see this stress on constancy developed in his speech.
24/ While we would note Dover's comment on the strength of
Pausanias1 homosexual disposition, and thus take it as a
factor governing his attitude to women, we would note that
the equation here between woman and inconstancy is at no
point reversed in the dialogue.
25/ Were we to pursue the considerations here, we would
open up a series of questions concerning Plato's
relationship with mystery cults, as also his relationship
with the wisdom of Egypt, within which we would need to
achieve a reading of dietary and ascetic practices as one
component in his understanding of the nature and
maintenance of bodily health. It should be recognised,
though, that any generalised normative conception of
"health" is profoundly problematic, as has recently been
shown for instance by Foucault.
26/ R.B. Brandt, "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide"
in J. Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems (New York, 1975) pp
363-387; quoted Nussbaum 1986: 174.
27/ We will have further to say on self-sufficiency in
Chapter 9; it was a central aspect of Greek ethical and
social thinking from Homeric times at least. While we have
noticed the centrality of self-cultivation in Confucianism,
the notion of self-sufficiency (which is carried right
through the dialogue here, finding its strongest expression
in the speech of Diotima) is completely antithetical to the
notion of self-in-coramunity so central to the idea of
ren. Even if Plato reworks a concept of community, its
presupposition is a radical (self-seeking) individualism.
28/ Again, in comparison, we might note that the problem
of chance becomes profoundly central to life once the
question of individual desire as the prime motivating
factor in life, and towards life's fulfilment, is allowed.
For Confucians and neo-Confucians, individual desire, and
thus chance, can never figure in this way, since the
interlinked dispensation of the world is already given by
Heaven, and as destiny (ming) (though there is a proboem of
chance associated with one's allotment of qi, as we have
seen).
29/ Reintegration and generation, statics and dynamics,
being and becoming, self-sufficiency and dependency, would
be some of the contrasting categories that might be called
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upon to explicate the issues at stake here.
30/ We will return to this point again in Chapter 9, when
we will note how "friendship" is in various ways situated
as part of the natural order of things.
31/ It would be very instructive to compare the ideas of
ascent, the intoxication of beauty, and desire as they
occur here with the network of shamanic practices in the
Chuci (Songs of the South). A good deal of the imagery
there, instead of manifesting a flight from this world to
the world of the gods, manifests a process of seduction
whereby the gods are wooed from their transcendent realm to
the human world. Part of the seductive imagery would be
accounted for by the fact that some shamans were women; and
the following song (which may have been sung by a man or a
woman) gives a very sensual account of spiritual
intoxication that would have threatened the foundations of
Plato's askesis of eros:
We have bathed in orchid water and washed our hair
with perfumes,
And dressed ourselves like flowers in embroidered
clothing.
The god has halted, swaying above us,
Shining with a persistent radiance...
The god had just descended in bright majesty,
When off in a whirl he soared again, far into the
clouds.
He lookes down on Ji-zhou and the lands beyond it;
There is no place in the world that he does not pass
over.
Thinking of that lord makes me sigh
And afflicts my heart with a grievous longing
Yun-zhongjun ("The Lord within the Clouds") Hawkes:
1985; 103-4
Or cf the erotic quest imagery as the shaman sets off in
search of his beloved goddess in the song Xiang jun("The
Goddess of the Xiang") ibid pp 106-7
32/ Here, as we have already suggested, the highly-wrought
artifice of the philosophical dialogue is at signal remove
from the conversational style of the Analects, or of Zhu
Xi's Yulei.
CHAPTER 8 NOTES
1/ Outka 1972:7. Outka provides the best philosophical reading
of agape in the context of New Testament usage; for a full
survey of the range and meanings of agape in the New Testament
cf Spicq and also Warfield 1918 ~~
I do not intend to provide a close reading of Nygren's Agape and
Eros here; despite its extensive influence it remains seriously
flawed, both at the level of phenomenology and, more
importantly, at the level of theoretical analysis. D'Arcy,
1954, provided an early valuable corrective. More extensive and
sophisticated readings can now be found in Chydenius 1970 and
1977, and Singer 1984.
3/ Of course, the visions of transcendence focussed around
Jesus and Socrates are also both set within the contexts of
received normative traditions, and many aspects of those
traditions are carried forward on subsequent theorisations of
their life and word. What I would note here is that Jesus and
Socrates/Plato initiate a radical break with, and re-reading of,
the past as part of their overt teaching and self-presentation,
in contrast with Confucius who stresses his continuity with the
past.
4/ The option of direct, as opposed to mediated access to the
command of Heaven seems nowhere to be granted in Confucius.
Even with Mencius the process of mediation is given with "the
murmurings" of the people. It is of interest here, then, to
note that the concern with community, with the people of GocL that
is given in Hebrew thinking is in a sense not as tightly
focussed as is the Confucian sense of community: traditionally
in Israel the prophet had stood apart from the community in
moments of direct access to the voice of God. Even if, in the
post-ptophetic period, the idea of the prophet outside the
community had been abandoned in favour of the scribe and
lawgiver within the community, the precendent had been
established; and it is that precedent that Jesus draws upon and
revives in presenting himself as the one in receipt of the
Spirit of God.
5/ However those different views are finally read, the fact
that Jesus displays an apparently miraculous healing power
within his work constitutes a significant difference in
comparison with Socrates and Confucius. It opens up a different
aspect of the person, insofar as the ability to heal became one
of the gifts of the Spirit for the early Church. [In China
healing lay with the Daoists, beyond the preserve of scholarly
Confucians]. It opens a stress on the body as a locus of the
experience of "salvation". And it sets up a tension around the
very ideas of health and sickness, the more so when we read
Jesus' work in relation to debates about healthy and unhealthy
eros in the Symposium.
6/ In one sense, for instance, Confucius studies in order to
understand the given ideal foundations of the Zhou community.
And we have seen that for Zhu Xi study constitutes an essential
and absolutely unavoidable way of coming to understand the basic
given principles (tianli) by which the human community and the
natural world are formed.
7/ The chief difference in this comparison might be put in
terms of a contrast between fulness and emptiness: it is a world
empty of any determinate structure, and empty of any determinate
principle of self identity, that the enlightened Chan adept
finally understands. It is a world governed by a network of
formative principles, and a self affirmed as immortal and
substantially one with those principles, that Socrates finally
understands.
8/ This also emerges in The Song of Songs, where the bride (as
the people) is prepared for the love relationship by God's love.
9/ This is particularly manifest in the early stages of John's
gospel.
10/ While this is the case, there were nonetheless significant
tensions in the ways in which Socrates and Plato read the
situation with Athens. For a reading of the crucial issue in
Athenian experience - the sense of empire and the sense of
history - cf Voegelin 1974: 178-192
11/ I suggested earlier, in order to intensify the question,
that it might be considered whether Plato on eros had not
covered all that might be said in a discourse on agape. One
issue the question of Athens brings up is the possibility of
universal love in relation to eros. Certainly the aspect of
eros as quest for one's own perfection does not open onto any
possibility of universal love, but the vision of to kalon and
the return to social life might be read in terms of an
other-directed concern. However, "the other" here would seem to
be bounded both by the perceived uniqueness of Athens, and by
the forms of hierarchy operative in Athenian social life (as
also by the received emphasis on the role of self-sufficiency).
We can consider the issues here further in chapter nine, in
relation to classical ideas of friendship.
12/ For issues on the concept of lav; here cf for instance
Wilson et al. 1954 and Zilsel 1942.
13/ Voegelin gives detailed consideration to the way realised
eschatology - as focussed particularly in the death and
resurrection of Jesus - was a crucial element in Paul's teaching
and in his interpretation of history - cf Voegelin 1974: 134-137
and 239 - 260.
14/ For a fruitful reading of the parables that bring out these
points in more detail cf Crossan; and cf also Wilder 1982.
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15/ Crossan 1985 brings this point out more fully by examining
the narrative traditions within which Jesus' life and sayings
came to be set, and by examining the arguments in favour of the
canonicity of some gospels rather than others.
16/ For valuable readings here cf Patte 1974, Funk 1974,and
Crossan 1974.
17/ Whether Jesus might acknowledge any new lav/ as a system of
codification is difficult to establish. Jesus died a young man,
perhaps more interested in the radical change his vision implied
than in any network of practices that might sustain that vision
over generations; or perhaps he saw more sharply than most that
the letter of law and codification is always a dead and divisive
letter, that in the nature of life it always preserves death,
and that it has to be gone against if life is to prevail.
18/ On the issue of growth cf for instance Wilder 1974.
19/ Cf Kristeva 1982
20/ An interesting reading could be generated here on the
status of the face in Christianity and Confucianism. For
Confucius, the preservation of face v/ith the community, the
appropriate affection to rites and behaviour in a publicly
observable domain, is of the essence: to turn the other cheek,
as Jesus commands it, would (even in the framework of deference
presupposed by Confucius) be powerfully damaging to one's
status with the community. [It would also imply disrespect for
the body the parents had given]. Jesus can perhaps ignore a
dispensation of the face because he focusses on the "inner"
v/orld of conscience before God.
21/ For further considerations here cf Piper 1979
22/ It is at this point that a quite radical separation between
Jewish thinking on the one hand, and Plato and Confucius on the
other might open up: Plato favours narcissism, not self-hatred,
and Confucius loves self in fidelity to the parents. But in the
quotation we noted earlier from the Phaedrus Plato has one part
of the soul powerfully subduing the other, in strikingly violent
imagery, so that a moment of self-hatred is there in pursuit of
an ideal self that is only good. And for Confucius, insofar as
the individual is powerfully subservient to the parents there is
a strong, but not overt, element of self-abasement.
23/ For further on the significance of Paul's claims here, cf
Voegelin 1974: 256-260
24/ I do not wish to follow further here the question of how
Jesus perceived his own death: my assumption is that the thought
of it as redemptive and self-sacrificial was a thought of the
early church rather than of Jesus himself.
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25/ Whilst I disagree with the basics of his thinking, I would
acknowledge that Hans Urs von Balthasar has done most to bring
the aesthetic dimension of New Testament and theological
thinking to the fore. Cf his various works listed in the
bibliography.
26/ It also raises a point of proximity to the contrast between
sudden and gradual enlightenment in Chan Buddhism. The
difference would be, though, that Chan practitioners were
employing a series of strategies to open and enhance the mind's
capacities, and part of the debate surrounds the appropriateness
of doing that in a sudden or a cumulative manner. With Paul the
notion is that it is a transcendent agency that suddenly opens
the mind in a certain way. [Though if we read Paul back into his
tradition we can say that his training as a rabbi, and its
implicit questioning in his reflection on the stage of Jesus,
raised his life to the point of tension and paradox that the
Chan masters sought to focus.
27/ Speaking in Paul's case of "the paradox of a reality that
moves beyond its structure", Voegelin notes the contrasts
between classical Greek philosophy which looked for a structure,
an economy of meaning in history, and Paul who looked for a
meaning of history (as salvation history) which eventually
ruptured and transcended history. Speaking of the specific
difference that exists between these two approaches he notes
that it falls
in the classic case, on the cognition of structure and, ir
the Pauline case, on the exodus from structure. The
difference, then, expresses itself in the literary form.
In classical philosophy, the reflections on history appeal
incidental to the analysis of structure. Aristotle wrote
an Ethics and Politics; he aid not write an Histories.
With Paul, the history of faith dominates the Letter to
the Romans, while the reflections on personal and
political conduct in the short present before the Parousia
are appended in Chapters 12-15. The classic meaning in
history can be opposed by Paul with a meaning of history,
because he knows the end of the story in the
transfiguration that begins with the Resurrection.
Voegelin 1974: 258
28/ For some of the issues involved here cf Voegelin 1956.
29/ To develop the issues fully here would involve a detailed
excursus in the philosophy of history. Voegelin 1974 passim
considers various of the issues, and cf also Cairns 1963.
30/ Some comments are perhaps appropriate here. In Hebrew
experience time and history are privileged over place as the
locus of God's presence; in Blanchot;s phrase, it is time itselJ
"which is truly the Promised Land":
What is demanded of Abraham is not only that he sacrifice:
his son, but God himself. The son is God's future on
earth, for it is time which is truly the Promised Land -
the true, the only dwelling place of the chosen people an:
of God in his people. Yet Abraham, by sacrificing his
only son, must sacrifice time and time sacrificed will
certainly not be given back in the eternal beyond. The
beyond is nothing other than the future, the future of God
in time.
Blanchot 1982: 61.
Here, if the son is the future, is God in time, then for
Confucius the father constitutes the future already achieved in
the past - time for Confucius is a static, recapitulative
process, rather than the dynamic process of the Hebrew
scriptures, and the parallel questions (whether to sacrifice the
son in obedience to God, whether to sacrifice the father in
obedience to the moral will of Tian) open up some of the
differences in the way in which time was considered.
31/ The various themes concerning the vision of nature within
Christian thought are well explored in Glacken 1967.
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CHAPTER 9 NOTES
1/ S.Th. 2a 2ae. We enter here, in the consideration of
friendship, onto a topic which we have already seen to be
of negligible significance in Chinese philosophical
thinking. For Western traditions, in their derivation from
Greek, Rome and Christian sources, friendship is a major
issue of concern and reflection. Not only is it viewed as
a cetnral aspect of relations between persons, it is also
in a theological frame considered central to relations
between man and God.
2/ In the de Caritate Aquinas also opens the question of
friendship with God:
Moreover, charity is a certain friendship of man to
God. But friendship to man is not included by
philosophers among the political virtues. Therefore
the love of God ought not to be numbered among the
theological virtues. 2,8.
Moreover, according to the Philosophers in Book VIII
of the Ethic, friendship consists in a certain
equality. But there is the greatest inequality
between God and us, as between beings who are
infinitely separated. Therefore there can be no
friendship of God for us, or of us for God. So
charity, which designates friendship of this kind,
does not seem to be a virtue. 2.15
In the de Caritate Aquinas proceeds in a similar way to
that followed in S. Th. - the issue of friendship is
problematised first, then resolved, and the quotations here
mark its first questioning.
3/ The issue here in favour of final transcendent
perfection as opposed to world-immanent perfection is, as
we have already noticed, a central contrasting feature
between Aquinas and Zhu Xi, as it is between Christianity
and Confucianism in general. Partly involved here also is
the issue of existential anxiety regarding perfection. This
issue, crucial for Zhu Xi, seems paradoxically to be less
central for Aquinas, though it could perhaps be argued that
a doctrine of original sin, and a belief in active demonic
power, rendered the universe more unstable for Aquinas than
it was for Zhu Xi. Aquinas' universe, however, is an
already redeemed universe, and despite the negative tow of
sin the notions of salvation and eternal flourishing
constituted deeply optimistic moments in his thinking.
4/ Thus in the de Caritate he remarks:
it must be said that caritas is not a virtue of man
considered as man, but of man considered as becoming,
through participation in grace, like to God and the
Son of God, according to which it is written (Jn.
3.1) "Behold what manner of charity the Father hath
bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and
should be the sons of God.' 2 ad 15
5/ On the notion of unity and interconnectedness expressed
in terras of the common good (we will say more on the common
good below) Aquinas remarks:
certain gratuitous virtues, which are infused, are
necessary for man when he is enrolled in the heavenly
state; for the proper generation of these virtues
there is required the love of the common good for the
whole society, which is the divine good considered as
the object of beatitude... to love that good for its
own sake in order that it might remain and be made
wide-spread, and that nothing might act against that
good, this does dispose man well tov/ards that society
of the blessed. This is caritas, which loves God for
His own sake, and loves fellow-men who are capable of
attaining beatitude as it loves itself. De Caritate
2. resp.
6/ For Greek ideas of friendship I have drawn here on
Adkins 1963 and Herman 1987.
7/ Plato's example of friendship for wine occurs in the
Phaedrus.
8/ There is perhaps a possible comparison here between a
teleological perfection of relationships in culture
(culture as a perfection of nature) as this is viewed by
Aristotle, and a similar perfection of nature through
culture in early Chinese reflections. I am thinking here
of that aspect of the contrast between ren and min that we
noted in chapter 2, whereby the rain were associated with
sheng, rawness, birth, origins, nature, and the ren were a
cultured, perfected, and differentiated group that were
either separate from the min (thus enjoying the identities
of clan identity) or else continuous with the min as the
leaders of the clan as a whole.
9/ This Greek concept of self-sufficiency, which we have
already noticed with Plato, is significantly different from
the emphases on community in both Confucian and Judaic
thinking. For Confucius, I take it that some steps toward
praising self-sufficiency constituted an aspect of the
thinking around ren in the Shijing, where the singular
heroic individual was central, and that the discourse on
ren in the Analects is a deliberate move to undercut
self-sufficiency and to elevate communality as a primary
value.
10/ It would be of interest to pursue a reading of
Aristotle on hedone and Confucius on yue ( music, but also
pleasure). There is a common aristocratic assumption to
Aristotle and Confucius that the pleasures of a richly-
civilised life are of particular value, as a means to and
token of cultured interpersonal relations.
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11/ This ties in also with the predominant stress on
active desire that we have already encountered with the
analyses of eros in the Symposium. At the same time the
stress on the active element reduces the possibility of
affectionate friendship as a simple sharing. Indeed,
reflection on friendship today might well choose to dismiss
the active element as an avoidance of friendship, as with
the person who is always "doing things" for his or her
friends. 3y contrast with Aristotle, the Christian
handling of friendship - insofar as its premiss is an
original receptivity to God and others - stresses the
non-active element, though not solely or consistently, as
we shall see.
12/ For the best treatment of the development of the
terminology on love within early Christian thinking, cf
Petre 1948.
13/ Its basis is there in the early Confucian emphasis on
graded love, starting from the family, in contrast with the
Mohist idea of universal love without distinctness. Its
clearest statement is perhaps in the Daxue, and through
this text it became a central theoretic notion for Zhu Xi.
Cf for instance the identification of the way in which
virtue is extended:
When the mind is rectified, the personal life is
cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the
family will be regulated; when the family is
regulated, the state will be in order; and when the
state is in order, there will be peace throughout the
world.
Chan 1963: 86-7
14/ For a consideration of the bakcground here cf Bugge,
1975. He notes for instance:
the evidence suggests that the notion of a sexless
state of existence is the very leaven of monastic
thought, and therefore a principle upon whose
viability as a spiritual ideal the development of the
institution has largely depended p.2.
And speaking of the millenarian aspect to monasticism he
remarks:
The millenium was to return men to the State of
uncontaminated spirituality free of the taint of
matter, a state of virginity...man's practice of
virginity in this life not only participates, but
actively hastens, the cosmic process of return to
asexuality...Medieval monastic literature is shot
through with the idea that the monk in his cloister
leads a life that is essentially an anticipation of
the angelic life of heaven. The notion prevails from
the earliest days of Egyptian monasticism down to the
twelfth century and beyond pp 31-2.
The conflict on monasticism in China was a conflict between
the Confucan duty to preserve the family and the Buddhist
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desire to abandon it. Zhu Xi was a man married with
children, and his stress on family virtue marks perhaps his
point of furthest remove in thinking and concern from the
celibate life-world of Aquinas, with its implicit vision of
a sexless, asexual perfection.
15/ For surveys of developments of ideas of love from the earl;
period of Christianity through to the medieval period cf
Chydenius 1970 and 1977, and Singer 1984.
16/ Within this motif, as we have already indicated, the
denial of sexuality in order to achieve a union of love
with God was a central consideration. Bugge speaks of the
interpretation of the Song of Songs in terms of the soul's
aspect to and union with god as a form of Christian gnosis
within which the overtly erotic imagery of the Song is
transposed:
Generally speaking, those exegetes of the Song whose
views on the role of sexuality in man's original
nature mark them as "Christian gnostics" are in
substantial agreement on its significance: it
represents for them a spiritual, and finally
ontological, union between the soul of the individual
Christian and a unifying Christ... Christian gnosis
believed union with the divine was possible only
through the release of man's genuine spiritual being
from its material bonds; but the most resistant of
these was precisely the desire for sexual
intercourse. How was it possible for Christian
gnosis to embrace the metaphysical language of a
condemned sexuality to describe the union the soul
seeks with God? The answer lies in the rigorous
dualism of all gnostic belief, according to which
only the union of spirit with matter is evil, because
it involves contamination or defilement; the union of
spirit with spirit is entirely praiseworthy. Bugge,
1975: 63
17/ More extensively,Augustine notes:
When a man's resolve is to love God, and to love his
neighbour as himself, not according to man's
standards but according to God's, he is undoubtedly
said to be a man of goodwill because of this love.
This attitued is more commonly called charity
(caritas) in holy Scripture; but it appears in the
same sacred writings under the apellation love
(amor)....The reason why I thought I should mention
this is that quite a number of people imagine that
fondness (dilectio) and charity are something
different from love. They say, in fact, that
fondness should be taken in a good sense, love in a
bad sense. It is however well established that this
was not the usage even of authors of secular
literature. But the philosophers will have to decide
whether they make this distinction, and on what
principle. Certainly their books are sufficient
evidence of the high value that they place on love,
when it is concerned with good things and directed
towards God himself. My task, however, was to make
the point that the Scriptures of our religion, whose
authority we rank above all other writings, do not
distinguish between love and fondness or charity.
For I have shown that love is also used in a good
sense. cf Bettenson tr. pp.556-7.
18/ Chydenius 1970 lists the following distinguishing
features of the physical conception of love:
a/ the idea that love is one, with no distinction between
eros and agape, or between amor, diletio and caritas;
b/ the idea that love is self-centred desire;
c/ the idea that there is an opposition between material
and spiritual worlds, and between carnal and spiritual
love;
d/ the idea that the universe constitutes a single
continuous hierarchy, and that this hierarchy constitutes a
ladder of ascent for the soul;
e/ the idea that, when the soul rises in ascent, it is
guided by a symbolism of the love objects.
For further on the physical conception cf also Simonin
1931 .
We might note here a contrast between a "vertical" imagery
of ascent (present also in Plato, and in large measure
derived from him in Christian thinking) which implies two
or more levels in the universe, and a process of perfection
as departure from the lower to the upper; and a
"horizontal" imagery of extension, which views the (social)
world as a series of ever-widening concentric circles, and
a process of perfection as the broadening of affective and
moral dispositions to encompass those situated as a
distance (we have seen this with Confucians, and with
Cicero).
19/ For a survey of developments in the twelfth-century
world cf Chenu 1968. Although dated in parts now, there
remains much of value in II.0. Taylor's (1911) study of
medieval thought and emotion. And cf also Vossler 1958.
20/ Chydenius 1970 notes, in commenting on Abelard, that
aspects of the ecS^^C conception of love imply a vision
of the lover moving out of himself, and that this is worked
out in terms of
1/ a distinction between eros and philia"
2/ a rejection of eros
3/ an analogy between philia and agape.
In Abelard's case the rejection of eros was pronounced,
insofar as in his early life he was famous as a writer of
love songs and poems, and insofar as his initial
relationship Heloise (prior to his violent castration by
Heliose's family) was dominated by eros.
foo
21/ The factors involved here, in the links between
Cistercian love-literature and the secular love-literature
of the time, are well considered in Leclercq 1979.
22/ The proximity to Aristotle's rooting of philia in
phusis is thus marked, though in consequence of a Christian
vision of nature as a divine creation, and with an implicit
doctrine of analogy, Aelred is able to find traces
(vestigia) of friendship even in inanimate nature. We find
this tendency even more pronounced with Aquinas.
23/ In his commentary on the Song of Songs Bernard carried
the love-mysticism of the earlier monastic tradition to a
new point of intensity, developing the notion of the (male)
soul as the bride of Christ, and speaking of the union of
the soul with Christ as a form of intercourse:
It is when the soul is ravished by the Word1s
unutterable sweetness that she is thus stolen by Him
from herself, as it were, in order that she may enjoy
Him...And truly the mother is happy in her offspring;
but the Bride in the arms of her Spouse is happier
still. Dear indeed are the children, the pledges of
His love; but she prefers His kisses... Sweet
intercourse it is, but brief and rare.
On the Song of Songs p 266.
Aspects of Bernard's thinking are taken up by Aelred here,
where it is the souls of two (male spiritual) lovers
together that ascend to a relationship of union with
Christ.
24/ For readings of Aquinas on love in general cf for
instance Simonin 1931 and Diggs; and for a good account of
the structure of Aquinas' philosophy cf Jordan 1986 and
Aertsen 1988.
25/ On love as a natural tendency manifest in all creation
(and spoken of under a variety of terms such as appetitus,
desiderium, inclinatic). cf for instance S. Th. 1. 60. 1;
1.19.1; 1.78.1; De. Ver 23.1. I will say more on appetitus
below.
26/ Though there are moments when it nearly manifest
itself; cf below.
27/ There is an implicit agreement with Zhu Xi here,
although for Zhu's world the contrasting issue of an
ecstatic kind of love that spelled a loss of self in God
was not a consideration. However, Buddhist ideas on wuxin,
no-self, did constitute an important object of critique for
Zhu, and insofar as the presumed a theory and a practice of
loss of (a certain) self then they were discussed on
grounds similar to those on which Aquinas dismissed
ecstatic conceptions of love: they robbed the individual of
a given identity and nature, and denied that the individual
was rooted in the given order of things. For Aquinas and
Zhu Xi such rooting is crucial. One difference between
rot
tLfiiri would be that, while the point is equally emphasised
by each, it is more fully theorised by Aquinas insofar as
his natural philosophy and metaphysics of nature
constitutes a larger part of his writing than does Zhu's.
28/ A very good reading of the Platonism in Aquinas can be
found in Fabro 1970 and 1974.
29/ We have already noted this motif in Levinas 1979 ,
insofar as it is the focus of critique by Derrida in his
essay "Violence and Metaphysics." We should note that
Levinas is close to the ecstatic coneption of love insofar
as he stresses a relationship with the other which is
premissed on freedom and difference rather than identity,
though he is against any notion of a final absorption in
the other in love.
Zhu Xi's sense of metaphysical movement is similar to that
of Aquinas insofar as Zhu has a process of anamnesis
whereby the individual has to return to his ontological
roots in order to discover and live his true identity; Zhu
differs from Aquinas in that the return is purely
inner-worldly, rather than to an original transcendent
source that is also known as a final destiny, patria.
30/ Appetitus naturalis as a given tendency to act in a
certain way would compare with the distribution of yang qi
in Zhu Xi's thinking. One difference would be that for
Aquinas appetitus naturalis is an aspect of metaphysical
structure, whereas for Zhu yang qi is an aspect of
psychophysical material.
31/ It is here, in terms of a theological and
Christological account of caritas, that the widest point of
departure between Aquinas and Zhu Xi actually emerges.
Aquinas' world-drama, insofar as it passes through the
stages of creation, fall, and redemption, has as its
central presupposition the notion of an actively-engaged
God - and it is God who assists the process of perfection
in caritas. For Zhu, without a theology of a personal God
and of divine grace, the stress is on the individual's work
to perfect himself.
CHAPTER 10 NOTES
1/ I am grateful to T. Engstrom for this quotation, which
is taken from Dewey's essay on Emerson.
2/ The shift from the idea of the book to the idea of the
text constitutes one of the main moves in
post-structuralist literary criticism, though it is
prefigured in the experiments with writing conducted since
Mallarme1. Involved here equally is a style of writing and
a style of reading, together with a shift from an emphasis
on the author and authorities intention to a stress on
writing as possessed of many (often conflicting and
contradictory) meanings and intentions. The psychoanalytic
aspect to the new centrality of the text is that, where the
person is now involved more in terms of unconscious (and
conflicting) motivations and aspirations, regressions and
evasions, so the text is now read (often directely on the
basis of psychoanalytic theory) as a play of contradictions
and repressions, rather than as a unified entity governed
by a single meaning. For some of the issues here cf for
instance Elizabeth Wright, 1984, Ilarari 1979 (particularly
Foucault's essay "What is an Author?" pp 141 - 160), and
M.C. Taylor 1986.
3/ Derrida is the writer who has done most to render any
relation with tradition extremely problematic, particularly
through the complexity of readings offered in Glas. That
Derrida remains too clearly involved with tradition,
however, is an issue for some - cf for instance Rorty 1982.
4/ Or from no foundations at all: one of the issues in
recent critiques of foundationalism is that foundations
are always already provided, that one always lives within a
continuous fabric of textuality and that the attempt to
step beyond it towards some ultimate foundation is an
illusion - though it was a powerfully effective illusion
for various forms of modernist thinking, whether for
instance in Husserl's attempt to find a pure ground of
subjectivity, or in Artaud's attempt to find a pure and
original body beyond the defilements of language. The
power of Derrida's reading on issues here is its ability to
go with the desire for foundations, whilst at the same time
showing the impossibility of any foundationalist project.
For a reading of these themes in modernism, particularly in
relation to a modernist sense of crisis, and for a critique
of some of their presuppositions cf Rose 1984.
5/ This is not just an issue of editorial policy, but
rather, and more fundamentally, an issue of an agreed
philosophical curriculum.
foj,
6/ The charge has frequently been made against Derrida
that his writing is idealist - a charge further vindicated
for some in that his long promised engagement with the
texts of Marxism has not materialised. From our viewpoint
here, it does not matter in one sense how Derrida is
placed, since the question concerning the point and value
of reading the past is as much a question for a materialist
as an idealist reading, insofar as implicit in it is the
further question, why not abandon the past altogether?
7/ The functions of secrecy and concealment are for
Steiner central features of any literary and artistic work
- the theme is worked out, for instance, in Steiner 1977.
8/ For an extended consideration here cf Rorty 1980:
315ff. In identifying what he considers to be one of the
prime mistaken ideas which have governed Western
philosophical inquiry Rorty remarks:
The difficulty stems from a notion shared by
Platonists, Kantians, and positivists: that man has
an essence - namely, to discover essences. The notion
that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our
own Glassy Essence, the universe around us is the
complement of the notion, common to Democritus and
Descartes, that the universe is made up of very
simple, clearly and distinctly knowable things,
knowledge of whose essences provides the
master-vocabulary which permits commensuration of all
discourses. p. 357
Shifting from this perception (though retaining aspects of
the hermeneutic approach of Gadamer) Rorty argues for a
new style of philosophising which he calls "edification":
The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may
consist in the hermeneutic activity of making
connections between our own culture and some exotic
culture or historical period, or between our own
discipline and another discipline which seems to
pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable
vocabulary. But it may instead consist in the
"poetic" activity of thinking up such new aims, new
words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to speak,
the inverse of herrneneutics: the attempt to
reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the
unfamiliar terms of our new inventions. In either
case, the activity is (despite the etymological
relation between the two words) edifying without
being constructive - at least if "constructive" means
the sort of cooperation in the accomplishment of
research programs which takes place in normal
discourse. For edifying discourse is supposed to be
abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the
powers of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new
beings. p. 360
9/ The theme of "poisonous pedagogy" is developed in
Miller 1987 in particular, and also in Miller 1985.
Miller's basic, and disturbingly well-documented, thesis is
that all traditional forms of child-rearing have been
geared to securing conformity and obedience, to meeting the
needs and security of the parents rather than the child.
The same point can be made about university curricula,
particularly in humanities subjects which have often been
dominated by a simple presumption of the value of
tradition, and of the importance of historical forms of
inquiry as access to "the tradition."
10/ To my knowledge Mackie 1904 constitutes the
philosophically most astute survey of, and rejection of,
arguments for theism that has been produced by a
contemporary philosopher.
11/ While I would read the production as a sign of Brook's
own post-modernism, it does also open the point that, in
its concept of play, lila, Hindu thinking has already
approximated an aspect of writing and production that has
become central to Derrida and deconstruction (just as there
is a proximity, on similar grounds, between Derrida and
Zhuagnzi). The difference would be that for Hinduism it is
the gods that play, whereas for Derrida it is man alone.
12/ Thus Needham identifies the presuppositions governing
science and civilisation in China with the following words:
Throughout this series of volumes it has been assumed
all along that there is only one unitary science of
Nature, approached more or less closely, built up
more or less successfully and continuously, by
various groups of mankind from time to time. This
means that one can expect to trace an absolute
continuity between the first beginnings of astronomy
and medicine in Ancient Babylon, through the
advancing natural knowledge of medieval China, India,
Islam, and the classical Western world, to the
break-through of late Renaissance Europe when, as has
been said, the most effective method of discovery was
itself discovered. Needham 1974: xxi.
Needham's approach has been strongly criticised by Nathan
Sivin, as Needham himself acknowledges ibid p. xxii-xxiii &
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